

DISPUTE

AGAINST THE

ENGLISH POPISH CEREMONIES

CONTENDED ON

THE CHURCH OF SCOTLAND;

WHEREIN NOT ONLY OUR OWN ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE SAME ARE ABUNDANTLY CONFIRMED,
BUT LIKEWISE THE ANSWERS AND DEFENCES OF OUR OPPONENTS,
SUCH AS BOGDAN, MONTGOMERIE, BURNES, SPURRY, PATRICK, ANDERSON, &c. HAVE,
TILLY, SPOTSWOOD, LINDSEY, FRANKLIN, &c.,
PARTICULARLY CONFOUTED.

BY GEORGE GILLESPIE,

MINISTER AT EDINBURGH,
1662.

See. 10. 12-13.

Who is the man that says, that they understand this? and who is he who says the mouth of the Lord hath spoken, that he says that it, as what
he said perhaps? — And the Lord with, because they have broken the law which I am laying down, and have not obeyed my
voice, neither walked therein; but have walked after the imagination of their own heart, and after Baalim."

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TO
ALL AND EVERY ONE
IN THE
REFORMED CHURCHES
OF
SCOTLAND, ENGLAND, AND IRELAND,
WHO
LOVE THE LORD JESUS, AND MEAN TO ADHERE UNTO THE REFORMATION OF RELIGION,
GRACE, MERCY, AND PEACE, FROM GOD OUR FATHER,
AND FROM
THE LORD JESUS CHRIST.

As Satan's malice, and man's wickedness, cease not to molest the thrice happy estate of the church of Christ, so hath the eternal council of the only wise God predetermined the coming of offences, persecutions, heresies, schisms and divisions, that professors may be proved before they be as approved and made manifest, 1 Cor. xi. 19. And hence "it must needs be that offences come," Matt. xviii. 7; neither hath the church ever enjoyed both purity and peace any long time together. But whiles the church of God, thus disquieted, as well with dangerous alterations, as with doleful alterations, is presented in the theatre of this world, and crieth out to beholders, "Have ye no regard, all ye that pass by!" Lam. i. 12. A pity it is to see the crooked and sinistrous courses of the greatest part, every man moving his period within the enormous confines of his own exorbitant desires; the atheistical nullitudian, nothing regardeth the assolling of ecclesiastical controversies,—he is of Gallic's humour, Acts xviii. 17, and cares for none of those things; the sensual Epicurean and riotous ruffian (go church matters as they will) eats and drinks, and takes his pleasure; the cynical critic speweth out bitter aspersions, gibeth and jesteth at everything that can be said or done in the cause of religion; the scenical jester playeth fast and loose, and can utter anything in sport, but nothing in earnest; the avaricious worldling hath no tune but *Give, give*, and no anthem pleaseth him but *Have, have*; the aspiring Diotrephes puffeth down every course which cannot puff up; the lofty favourite taketh the pattern of his religion from the court lechnography, and if the court swim, he cares not though the church sink; the seditious Machiavillian accounteth the show of religion profitable, but the substance of it troublesome: he studieth not the oracles of God, but the principles of Satanical guile, which he learneth so well, that he may go to the devil to be blabopped; the turn-coat temporiser wags with every wind, and (like Diogenes turning about the mouth of his valuable hog'shead, after the course of the sun) wheresoever the bright beams of corascent authority do shine and cherish, thither followeth and sitteth he; the gnathonic parasite awaketh to all that his benefactor holdeth; the mercenary pensioner will bow before he break; he

who only studieth to have the praise of some witty invention, cannot strike upon another anvil; the silly idiot (with Absalom's two hundred, 2 Sam. xv. 11), goeth, in the simplicity of his heart, after his perverse leaders; the lapped Nicodemite holds it enough to yield some secret assent to the truth, though neither his profession nor his practice testify so much; he whose mind is possessed with prejudicate opinions against the truth, when convincing light is holden forth to him, looketh askint, and therefore goeth awry; the pragmatistical adlaphorist, with his span-broad faith and ell-broad conscience, doth no small harm—the poor pandect of his plagiary profession in matters of faith reckoneth little for all, and in matters of practice all for little. Shortly, if an expurgatory index were compiled of those, and all other sorts of men, who either through their careless and neutral on-looking, make no help to the troubled and disquieted church of Christ, or through their nocent accusation and overthwart intermeddling, work out her greater harm, alas! how few feeling members were there to be found behind who truly lay to heart her estate and condition? Nevertheless, in the worst times, either of raging persecution or prevailing defection, as God Almighty hath ever hitherto, so both now, and to the end, he will reserve to himself a remnant according to the election of grace, who cleave to his blessed truth and to the purity of his holy worship, and are grieved for the affliction of Joseph, as being themselves also in the body, in confidence whereof I take boldness to stir you up at this time, by putting you in remembrance. If you would be rightly informed of the present estate of the reformed churches, you must not acquiesce in the parting verdict of those who are wealthy and well at ease, and mounted aloft upon the uncogged wheels of prosperous fortune (as they call it). Those whom the love of the world hath not enhanced to the serving of the time can give you the soundest judgment. It is noted of Dionysius Hallicarnassensis* (who was never advanced to magistracy in the Roman republic) that he hath written far more truly of the Romans than Fabius, Salustius, or Cato, who flourished among them with riches and honours.

* Bodin. Meth. Hist., cap. 4, p. 47.

After that it pleased God, by the light of his glorious gospel, to dispel the more than cimmerian darkness of antichristianism, and, by the antidote of reformation, to avoid the poison of Popery; forasmuch as in England and Ireland, every noisome weed which God's hand had never planted was not pulled up, therefore we now see the faces of those churches overgrown with the repullulating twigs and sprigs of popish superstition. Mr Sprint acknowledgeth the Reformation of England to have been defective, and saith, "It is easy to imagine of what difficulty it was to reform all things at the first, where the most part of the privy council, of the nobility, bishops, judges, gentry, and people, were open or close Papists, where few or none of any countenance stood for religion at the first, but the Protector and Cranmer." The church of Scotland was blessed with a more glorious and perfect reformation than any of our neighbour churches. The doctrine, discipline, regiment, and policy established here by ecclesiastical and civil laws, and sworn and subscribed unto by the king's majesty and several presbyteries and parish churches of the land, as it had the applause of foreign divines; so was it in all points agreeable unto the word; neither could the most rigid Aristarchus of these times challenge any irregularity of the same. But now, alas! even this church, which was once so great a praise in the earth, is deeply corrupted, and hath "turned aside quickly out of the way," Exod. xxxii. 8. So that this is the Lord's controversy against Scotland: "I had planted thee a noble vine, wholly a right seed? How then art thou turned into the degenerate plant of a strange vine unto me?" Jer. li. 21.

It is not this day feared, but felt, that the rotten dregs of Popery, which were never purged away from England and Ireland, and having once been spued out with detestation, are licked up again in Scotland, prove to be the unhappy occasions of a woeful recidivation. Neither is there need of Lyncan eyes; for if we be not porehild, it cannot be hid from us. What doleful and disastrous mutation (to be bewailed with tears of blood) hath happened to the church and spouse of Christ in these dominions? Her comely countenance is miscaloured with the fading lustre of the mother of harlots; her shamefaced forehead hath received the mark of the beast; her lovely locks are frizzled with the crisping pine of antichristian fashions; her chaste ears are made to listen to the unholy doctrine of enchanting traditions; her dove-eyes look pleasantly upon the well-attired harlot; her sweet voice is mumbling and muttering some missal and magical liturgies; her fair neck beareth the halter-like tokens of her former captivity, even a burdensome chain of superfluous and superstitious ceremonies; her undefiled garments are stained with the meretricious bravery of Babylonish ornaments, and with the symbolising badges of conformity with Rome; her harmless hands reach brick and mortar to the building of Babel; her beautiful feet with shoes are all besmeared, whilst they return apace in the way of Egypt, and wade the ingruent brooks of Popery. Oh! transformed virgin, whether is thy beauty gone from thee? Oh! forlorn prince's daughter, how art thou not ashamed to look thy Lord in the face? Oh! thou best beloved among women, what hast thou to do with the inveigling apparitions and habilement of Babylon the whore?—But among such things as have been the accursed means of the church's desolation, which peradventure might

* Rep. to the Ann. p. 202.

seem to some of you to have least harm or evil in them, are the ceremonies of kneeling in the act of receiving the Lord's supper, cross in baptism, blushing, holidays, &c., which are pressed under the name of things indifferent; yet if you survey the sundry inconveniences and grievous consequences of the same, you will think far otherwise. The vain shows and shadows of these ceremonies have hid and obscured the substance of religion; the true life of godliness is smothered down and suppressed by the burden of these human inventions; for their sakes, many, who are both faithful servants to Christ and loyal subjects to the king, are evil-spoken of, mocked, reproached, menaced, molested; for their sakes Christian brethren are offended, and the weak are greatly scandalised; for their sakes the most powerful and painful ministers in the land are either thrust out, or threatened to be thrust out from their callings; for their sakes the best qualified and most hopeful expectants are debarred from entering into the ministry; for their sakes the seminaries of learning are so corrupted, that few or no good plants can come forth from thence; for their sakes many are admitted into the sacred ministry, who are either popish and Arminianised, who minister to the flock poison instead of food; or ally ignorant, who can dispense no wholesome food to the hungry; or else vicious in their lives, who draw many with them into the dangerous precipice of soul-perdition; or, lastly, so earthly-minded, that they favour only the things of this earth, not the things of the Spirit of God; who feed themselves, but not the flock, and to whom the Great Shepherd of the sheep will say, "The deceased have ye not strengthened, neither have ye healed that which was sick, neither have ye bound up that which was broken, neither have ye brought again that which was driven away, neither have ye sought that which was lost," Ezek. xxxiv. 4. Simple ones, who have some taste and relish of popish superstition (for many such there be in the land), do suck from the intoxicated drugs of conformity, the softer milk which makes them grow in error. And who can be ignorant what a large spread Popery, Arminianism, and reconciliation with Rome, have taken among the arch-bishops of the ceremonies? What marvel that Papists clap their hands! for they see the day coming which they wish for. Woe to thee, O land, which bears professed Papists and avouched Atheists, but cannot hear them who desire to "abstain from all appearance of evil," 1 Thea. v. 22; for truth and equity are fallen in thee, and "he that departeth from evil maketh himself a pray," Isa. lii. 14, 15.

These are the best wares which the big bulk of conformity, favoured with the prosperous gale of mighty authority, hath imported amongst us; and whilst our opposites so quiverly go about to spread the bad wares of these encumbering inconveniences, is it time for us luckily to sit still and to be silent? "Woe unto us, for the day goeth away, for the shadows of the evening are stretched out," Jer. vi. 4.

Moreover, besides the prevailing inconvenience of the controverted ceremonies, the unlawfulness of them is also plainly evinced in this ensuing dispute by such convincing arguments, as, being duly pondered in the equal balance of an attentive mind, shall, by God's grace, afford satisfaction to so many as purpose to buy the truth, and not to sell it. Wherefore, referring to the dispute the points themselves which are questioned, I am in this place to beseech you all by the mercies of God, that, remembering the words of the Lord, "Them that honour me I will honour, and they that despise me shall be lightly esteemed," 1 Sam. ii. 30; remem-

bering, also, the curse and condemnation of Meroz, which came not to help the Lord against the mighty, Judg. v. 23; of the nobles of Tekoa, who put not their necks to the work of the Lord, Neh. iii. 6; and, shortly, of all such as have no courage for the truth, Jer. ix. 3, but seek their own things, not the things which are Jesus Christ's, Phil. ii. 21; and, finally, taking to heart how the Lord Jesus, when he cometh in the glory of his Father with his holy angels, Mark viii. 38, will be ashamed of every one who hath been ashamed of him and his words in the midst of a sinful and crooked generation; you would, with a holy zeal and invincible courage, against all contrary error, superstition, and abuse whatsoever, set yourselves both to speak and do, and likewise (having a calling) to suffer for the truth of Christ and for the purity of his worship, being in nothing terrified by your adversaries, Phil. i. 28; 1 Pet. iii. 14; which, that ye may the better perform, I commend to your thoughts these wholesome admonitions which follow:—

I. When you see so much diversity both of opinion and practice in things pertaining to religion, the rather ye ought to give all diligence for trying the things which are different, Phil. i. 10. If you judge us before you hear us, then do you contrary to the very law of nature and nations, John vii. 61; Acts v. 16. Neither will it help you at your reckoning to say, We believed our spiritual guides, our prelates and preachers, whom God had set over us. Nay, what if your guides be blind? then they not only fall in the ditch themselves, but you with them, Matth. xv. 14. Our Master would not have the Jews to rest upon the testimony of John Baptist himself, but would have them to search the Scriptures, John v. 33, 34, 39; by which touch-stone the Bercans tried the Apostle's own doctrine, and are commended for so doing, Acts xvii. 11. But as we wish you not to condemn our cause without examining the same by the Word, so neither do we desire you blindly to follow us in adhering unto it; for what if your seeing guides be taken from you? How, then, shall you see to keep out of the ditch? We would neither have you to fight for us nor against us, like the blind sword-players, Andabates, a people who were said to fight with their eyes closed. Consider, therefore, what we say, and the Lord give you understanding in all things, 2 Tim. ii. 7.

II. Since the God of heaven is the greatest king, who is to rule and reign over you by his Word, which he hath published to the world, and, tunc vere, &c., then is God truly said to reign in us when no worldly thing is harboured and haunted in our souls, saith Theoplyust; since also the wisdom of the flesh is enmity against God, Rom. vii. 7, who hath therefore, never shall you rightly deprehend the truth of God, nor submit yourselves to be guided by the same, unless, laying aside all the high-soaring fancies and presumptuous conceits of natural and babe-like simplicity to be edified by the word of righteousness. And far less shall you ever take up the cross and follow Christ (as you are required), except, first of all, you labour and learn to deny yourselves, Matth. xvi. 24, that is, to make no reckoning what come of yourselves, and of all that you have in the world, so that God have glory and yourselves a good conscience, in your doings or sufferings.

III. If you would not be drawn away after the error of the wicked, neither fall from your own steadfastness, the apostle Peter teacheth you, that ye must grow both in grace and knowledge, 2 Pet. iii. 18; for, if either your minds be darkened through want of knowledge, or your affections frozen through want of the love of God, then are you naked, and not guarded against the tentations of the time. Wherefore, as the perverters of the truth and simplicity of religion do daily multiply errors, so must you (shunning those shelves and quicksands of deceiving errors which witty make-bates design for you), labour daily for increase of knowledge; and as they to their errors in opinion do add the overplus of a licentious practice and lewd conversation, so must you (having so much the more ado to flee from their impety), labour still for a greater measure of the lively work of sanctifying grace; in which respects Augustine saith well, that the adversaries of the truth do this good to the true members of the church, that the fall of those makes these to take better hold upon God.*

IV. Be not deceived, to think that they who so eagerly press this course of conformity have any such end as God's glory, or the good of his church and profit of religion. When a violent urge of the ceremonies pretendeth religious respects for his proceedings, it may be well answered in Hillary's words: *Subreptis nomine blandienti, occulta specie religionis*—Thou privily creepst in with an enticing title, thou killest with the pretence of religion; for, 1. It is most evidently true of these ceremonies, which our divines; any of the gestures and rites used in the mass, "They are all frivolous and hypocritical, stealing away true devotion from the heart, and making man to rest in the outward gestures of the body." There is more sound religion among them who refuse, than among them who receive the same, even our enemies themselves being judges; the reason whereof let me give in the words of one of our opposites: *Supervacua hinc occupatio circa traditiones humanas, signis semper ignorantiam et contemptum præceptorum divinarum*—This needless business about human traditions doth ever heget the ignorance and contempt of divine commandments. 2. Where read we that the servants of God have at any time sought to advance religion by such hideous courses of stern violence, as are intended and assayed against us by those who press the ceremonies upon us? The jirking and nibbling of their unformal hoggemugger cometh nearer to acrophancy than to sincerity, and is siber to approaching hostility than fraternal charity; for just so they deal with us as the Ariens did with the catholics of old. *Sinceros, &c.*—"The sincere teachers of the churches they delayed and accused before magistrates, as if they alone did continually perturb the church's peace and tranquillity, and did only labour that the divided churches might never again plously grow together; and by this calumny they persuaded politic and civil men (who did not well enough understand this business), that the godly teachers of the churches should be cast forth into exile, and the Arian wolves should be sent into the sheepfolds of Christ." Now, forasmuch as God hath said, "They shall not hurt nor destroy in all my holy mountain," Isa. ix. 11, and will not leave his flock to be ruled with force and with cruelty,

* De Civ. Dei, lib. 18, cap. 51.

† Lib. contra Const. Aug.

‡ Synops. Papie, cont. 12, quest 7, p. 202.

§ Davenant. in rol. 8, p. 166.

¶ Oslend. Hist. Ecclesie, cent. 4, in Ep. Dedic.

Ezek. xxxiv. 4. *Nec potest (saith Lactantius*) aut veritas cum vi, aut justitia cum crudelitate conjungi*—Neither can either truth be conjoined with violence, or righteousness with cruelty: therefore, if our opposites would make it evident that they are in very deed led by religious aims, let them resile from their violent proceedings, and deal with us in the spirit of meekness, showing us from God's word and good reason the equity of their cause, and iniquity of ours; wherein we require no other thing of them, than that which Lactantius required of the adversaries of his profession, even that they would debate the matter *verbis pontius quam verberibus*—by words rather than by whips: *Distringant aciem ingeniorum suorum: sicut eorum vera est, asseratur: parati sumus audire, si doceant*—Let them draw out the sharpness of their engines; if their reason be true let it be avowed; we are ready to hear, if they teach us. 3. If their aims were truly for the advancement of religion, how comes it to pass, that whilst they make so much ado, and move every stone against us for our modest refusing of obedience to certain ordinances of men, which in our consciences we are persuaded to be unlawful, they manumiss and set free the simony, lying, swearing, profanation of the Sabbath, drunkenness, whoredom, with other gross and scandalous vices of some of their own side, by which God's own commandments are most fearfully violated? This just recrimination we may well use for our own most lawful defence. Neither do we hereby intend any man's shame (God knows), but his reformation rather. We wish from our hearts we had no reason to challenge our opposites of that superstition taxed in the Pharisees, *Quod arguunt, &c.*—that they accused the disciples of little things, and themselves were guilty in great things, saith Nicolaus Geranus.

V. Do not account ceremonies to be matters of so small importance, that we need not stand much upon them; for, as Hooker[†] observeth, a ceremony, through custom, worketh very much with people. Dr Burges allegeth[‡] for his writing about ceremonies, that the matter is important for the consequence of it. Cameroll thinketh so much of ceremonies, that he holdeth our simplicity to notify that we have the true religion, and that the religion of the papists is superstitious because of their ceremonies. To say the truth, a church is in so far true or hypocritical as it mixeth or not mixeth human inventions with God's holy worship; and hence the Magdeburgians profess, that they write of the ceremonies for making a difference betwixt a true and a hypocritical church. *Vere enim ecclesia, &c.*—for a true church, as it retains pure doctrine, so also it keeps simplicity of ceremonies, &c.; but a hypocritical church, as it departs from pure doctrine, so for the most part it changeth and augmenteth the ceremonies instituted of God, and multiplieth its own traditions, &c. And as touching our controverted ceremonies in particular, if you consider what we have written against them, you shall easily perceive that they are matters of no small, but very great consequence. Howbeit these be but the beginnings of evils, and there is a worse gallimaufy gobber-wise prepared. It hath been observed of the warring Turks, that often they used this notable deceit—to send a lying rumour and a vain tumult

of war to one place, but, in the meanwhile, to address their true forces to another place, that so they might surprise those who have been unwarily led by pernicious credulity. So have we manifest (alas! too, too manifest) reasons to make us conceive, that whilst the chief urgers of the courses of conformity are skirmishing with us about the trifling ceremonies (as some men count them), they are but labouring to hold our thoughts so bent and intent upon those smaller quarrels, that we may forget to distinguish betwixt evils immanent and evils imminent, and that we be not too much awake to spy their secret sleight in compassing further aims.

VI. Neither let the pretence of peace and unity cool your fervour, or make you spare to oppose yourselves unto those idle and idolised ceremonies against which we dispute; for whilst our opposites make a vain show and pretence of peace, they do like the Romans, who built the Temple of Concord just in the place where the seditious outrages of the two Gracchi, Tiberius and Caius, had been acted; which temple, in the subsequent times, did not restrain, but, by the contrary, gave further scope unto more bloody seditions; so that they should have built discord a temple in that place rather than concord, as Augustine pleasantly tickleth them. Do our opposites think that the bane of peace is never in yielding to the course of the time, but ever in refusing to yield? Or will they not rather acknowledge, that as a man is said to be made drunk by drinking the water of Lyncestus, a river of Macedonia; no less than if he had filled himself with the strongest wine, so one may be inebriate with a contentious humour in standing stiffly for yielding, as well as in standing steadfastly for refusing? Peace is violated by the opponents of the truth, but established by the possessors of the same; for (as was rightly said by Georgius Scolarius in the Council of Florence) the church's peace "can neither stay among men, the truth being unknown; neither can it but needs return, the truth being known. *Nec veritate ignorata manere inter homines potest, nec illa agnita necessario non redire*. We must therefore be mortified together, not by the subtleties of error, but by the bands of truth and unity of faith. And we go the true way to regain peace whilst we sue for the removal of those popish ceremonies which have both occasioned and nourished the discord; we only refuse that peace (falsely so called) which will not permit us to brook purity, and that because (as Joseph Hall[†] noteth) St James (chap. iii. 17.) describeth the wisdom which is from above to be "first pure, then peaceable;" whence it cometh that there can be no concord betwixt Christ and antichrist, nor any communion betwixt the temple of God and idols, 2 Cor. vi. 15, 16. *Aque ut celum, &c.*—"And though heaven and earth should happen to be mingled together, yet the sincere worship of God and his sacred truth, wherein eternal salvation is laid up for us, should worthily be unto us of more estimation than a hundred worlds," saith Calvin.[‡] John Fox[§] judgeth it better to contend against those who prefer their own traditions to the commandments of God, than to be at peace with them. True it is, *Pax optima verum, quas homines novissime datum est*. Yet I trust we may see the words of that great adrephorist, Georgius Cassan-

der:—*Ea demum vera, &c.*—"That alone (saith he*) is true and solid Christian peace which is conjoined with the glory of God and the obedience of his will, and is conjoined from all depravation of the heavenly doctrine and divine worship."

VII. Beware, also, you be not deceived with the pretences of the church's consent, and of uniformity as well with the ancient church as with the now reformed churches, in the forms and customs of both; for, I. Our opposites cannot show that the sign of the cross was received and used in the church before Tertullian, except they allege either the Montanists or the Valentinian heretics for it. Neither yet can they show, that apparel proper for divine service, and distinguished from the common, is more ancient than the days of Pope Caelstinus; nor, lastly, that kneeling in the act of receiving the communion was ever used before the time of Pope Honorius III. They cannot prove any one of the controverted ceremonies to have been in the church the first two hundred years after Christ, except the feast of Easter (which yet can neither be proved to have been observed in the apostles' own age, nor yet to have been established in the after age by any law, but only to have crept in by a certain private custom), and for some of them they cannot find any clear testimony for a long time thereafter. Now, in the third century,† historiographers observe, that *Paulatinus ceremonia auctor sunt, hominum superstitionum opinionibus: unde in baptismo unctionem olei, crucis signaculum, et osculum addiderunt*—Ceremonies were by little and little augmented by the opinions of superstitious men; whence it was that they added the unction of oil, the sign of the cross, and a kiss in baptism. And in the fourth century; they say, *Subinde magis naves, traditiones humanas cumulate sunt*—Forth with human traditions were more and more augmented. And so from that time forward vain and idle ceremonies were still added to the worship of God, till the same was, under Popery, wholly corrupted with superstitious rites; yea, and Mr Sprint hath told us, § even of the first two hundred years after Christ, that the "devil, in those days, began to sow his tares (as the watchmen began to sleep), both of false doctrine and corrupt ceremonies." And now, though some of the controverted ceremonies reformed churches, yet they are not therefore to be the better liked of. For the reason of the reservation was, because some reverend divines who dealt and laboured in the reformation of those churches, perceiving the occurring lets and oppositions which were caused by most dangerous schisms and seditions, and by the raging of bloody wars, scarcely expected to effectuate so much as the purging of the church from fundamental errors and gross idolatry, which wrought them to be content, that lesser abuses in discipline and church policy should be then tolerated, because they saw not how to overtake them all at that time. In the meanwhile, they were so far from desiring any of the churches to retain these causes of ejecting them (far less to recall them, be-dialike of the same, and wished that those churches wherein they lived, might have some blessed opportunity to be rid of all such rotten relics, given rage, and rotten reminders of Popery. All which, since

they were once purged away from the church of Scotland, and cast forth as things accursed into the jakes of eternal detestation, how vile and abominable may we now call the resuming of them? Or what a placcular pervariation is it to borrow from any other church, which was long reformed, a pattern of policy for this church which was more reformed. But, 2. Though there could be more alleged for the ceremonies than truly there can be, either from the customs of the ancient or reformed churches, yet do our opposites themselves profess, that they will not justify all the ceremonies either of the ancient or reformed churches. And, indeed, who dare take this for a sure rule, that we ought to follow every ancient and universally received custom? For as Casaubon sheweth, though the church's consent ought not to be contemned, yet we are not always to hold it for a law or a right rule. And do not our divines teach, that *nihil faciendum est ad aliorum exemplum, sed iuxta verbum*—Nothing is to be done according to the example of others, but according to the word. *Us autem, &c.*—"As the multitude of them who err (saith Oslander), so long prescription of time purchase no patronage to error."

VIII. Moreover, because the foredeck and hind-deck of all our opposites' prohibitions do resolve and rest finally into the authority of a law, and authority they use as a sharp knife to cut every Gordian knot which they cannot unloose, and as a dreadful peal to sound so loud in all ears that reason cannot be heard; therefore we certify you with Calvin,|| that *si acquiescitis imperio, pessimo laqueo vos induistis*—If you have acquiesced in authority, you have wrapped yourselves in a very evil snare. As touching any ordinance of the church, we say with Whitaker,¶ *Obedientiam ecclesiae est, sed iuberenti ac docenti recta*—We are to obey the church but commanding and teaching right things. Surely, if we have not proved the controverted ceremonies to be such things as are not right to be done, we shall straight obey all the ceremonial laws made thereunto; and as for the civil magistrate's part, is it not holden** that he may not enjoin us "to do that whereof we have not good ground to do it of faith?" and that, "although all thy external condition is in the power of the magistrate, yet internal things, as the keeping of faith, and obedience, and a good conscience, are not in his power." For every one of us "shall give account of himself to God," Rom. xiv. 12, but until you hear more in the dispute of the power which either the church or the magistrate hath to enact laws about things belonging to the worship of God, and of the binding power of the same, let me add here touching human laws in general, that where we have no other reason to warrant unto us the doing of that which a human law prescribeth, beside the bare will and authority of the law-maker, in this case a human law cannot bind us to obedience. Aquinas^{††} holdeth with Isidorus, that a human law (among other conditions of it) must both be necessary for removing of some evil, and likewise profitable for guiding us to some good. Gregorius Sayrus^{‡‡} following them herein, saith, *Debet lex homines a malo retrahere, et iusto dicitur necessaria: debet*

* Lib. 8, cap. 20.

† Enarrat. in Matt. xv.

‡ Keel. Pol., lib. 5, sect. 85.

§ Pref. of the Answ., p. 14.

¶ Popish Prelud., cap. 10.

** Cont. 3, cap. 3, col. 100.

†† Non. Turc., tom. 3, lib. 4, p. 61.

‡ Ang. de Civ. Dei, lib. 3, cap. 20.

§ Ib., cap. 20.

¶ Ovid. Metam., lib. 13.

‡ Apud Bluntum, tom. 4; Concil., part 1, p. 240.

¶ No Peace with Rome, sect. 2.

¶ Lib. Epist., col. 208.

** Sedit. in Rev. II., III.

* In Offic. PH. Viri.

† Oxford. Hist. Eccl., cent. 2, lib. 3, cap. 11.

‡ Marten. cent. 4, cap. 8, col. 440.

§ Leland. Angl., p. 104.

* Camend. Ann., pp. 83, 84, 85, 110.

† Euseb. 14, cap. 11.

‡ Marten. in Rom. x. 22.

¶ Hist. Eccl., cent. 4, lib. 3, cap. 38, p. 362.

¶ Lib. Epist., col. 440.

¶ De Auth. Scrip., lib. 1, p. 120.

** Taylor upon Tit. II., p. 558.

†† Aquin., 1a, 2a, quest. 93, art. 2.

‡‡ Cos. Consc., lib. 3, cap. 3, p. 60.

etiam promovere in bonum, et ideo dicitur utilis—A law ought to draw back men from evil, and therefore is called necessary; it ought also to promote them unto good, and therefore is called profitable. Human laws, in Mr Hooker's judgment,* must teach what is good, and be made for the benefit of men. Demostheest describeth a law to be such a thing *qui convenit omnibus parere*, which it is convenient for every one to obey. Camerof† not only alloweth us to seek a reason of the church's laws (*Non enim, saith he, vera ecclesia libet leges ferre quarum non redat rationem*)—It pleaseth not the true church to make and publish laws, whereof she giveth not a reason; but he§ will likewise have us, in such things as concern the glory and honour of God, not to obey the laws of any magistrate blindly and without a reason. "There was one (saith the Bishop of Winchester), that would not have his will stand for reason; and was there none such among the people of God? Yes; we had, I Sam. ii., one of whom it is said, Thus it must be, for Hophni will not have it so, but thus: his reason is, For he will not. And God grant none such may be found among Christians." From Scripture we learn, that neither hath the magistrate any power, but for our good only, Rom. xiii. 4, nor yet hath the church any power, but for our edification only, Ephes. iv. 12. Law-makers, therefore, may not enjoin *quod libet*, that which liketh them; nay, nor always *quod licet*, that which is in itself lawful; but only *quod expedit*, that which is expedient and good to the use of edifying. And to them we may well say with Tertullian, "Iniquam cæcæriti dominationem si ideo negatis licere quia vultis, non quia debuit non licere"—You exercise an unjust dominion; if, therefore, you deny anything to be free, because you will so, not because it ought not to be free. Besides all this, there is nothing which any way pertaineth to the worship of God left to the determination of human laws, beside the mere circumstances, which neither have any holiness in them, forasmuch as they have no other use and praise in sacred than they have in civil things, nor yet were particularly determinable in Scripture, because they are infinite; but sacred, significant ceremonies, such as cross, kneeling, surplices, holidays, bishopping, &c., which have no use and prelee except in religion only, and which, also, were most easily determinable (yet not determined) within those bounds which the wisdom of God did set to the determination of any human law. Neither have men any power to burden us with those or such like ordinances; "For (saith not our Lord himself to the churches), I will put upon you none other burden: but that which ye have already, hold fast till I come," Rev. ii. 24, 25. Wherefore, *pro hac, &c.*, for this liberty we ought stoutly to fight against false teachers.** Finally, it is to be noted, that though in some things we may and do commendably refuse obedience to the laws of them whom God hath set over us, yet are we ever obliged (and accordingly intend) still to subject ourselves unto them; for to be subject doth signify (as Zanchius sheweth††), to be placed under, to be subordinate, and so to give honour and reverence to him who is above, which may well stand without obedience to every one of

his laws. Yea, and Dr Field* also telle us, that "subjection is generally and absolutely required where obedience is not."

IX. Forasmuch as some ignorant ones are of opinion, that when they practise the ceremonies, neither perceiving any unlawfulness in them (but, by the contrary, being persuaded in their consciences of the lawfulness of the same), nor yet having any evil meaning (but intending God's glory and the peace of the church), therefore they practise them with a good conscience. Be not ye also deceived, but rather advert unto this, that a peaceable conscience, allowing that which a man doth, is not ever a good conscience, but oftentimes an erring, bold, presuming, secure, yea, perhaps, a seared conscience. A good conscience, the testimony whereof giveth a man true peace in his doings, is, and is only, such a one as is rightly informed out of the word of God. Neither doth a good meaning excuse any evil action, or else they who killed the apostles were to be excused, because in so doing they thought they did God good service, John xiv. 2. It is the observation even of Papists, that men may commit many a soul-ruining scandal, though they intend no such thing as the ruin of souls.†

X. If once you yield to these English ceremonies, think not that thereafter you can keep yourselves back from any greater evils, or grosser corruptions which they draw after them; for as it is just with God to give each man over to strong delusions as have not received the love of the truth, nor taken pleasure in the sincerity of his worship, 2 Thess. ii. 10, 11; so there is not a more deceitful and dangerous temptation than in yielding to the beginnings of evil. "He that is unjust in the least, is also unjust in much," saith he who could not lie, Luke xvi. 20. When Uriah the priest had once pleased king Ahas, in making an altar like unto that at Damascus, he was afterwards led on to please him in a greater matter, even in forsaking the altar of the Lord, and in offering all the sacrifices upon the altar of Damascus, 2 Kings xvi. 10—16. All your winning or losing of a good conscience, is in your first buying; for such is the deceitfulness of sin, and the cunning conveyance of that old serpent, that if his head be once entering in, his whole body will easily follow after; and if he make you handsomely to swallow gnats at first, he will make you swallow camels ere all be done. Oh, happy they who dash the little ones of Babylon against the stones! Psal. cxxviii. 9.

XI. Do not reckon it enough to bear within the inclosure of your secret thoughts a certain dislike of the ceremonies and other abuses now set afoot, except both by profession and action you evidence the same, and so show your faith by your fact. We are constrained to say to some among you, with Elijah, "How long halt ye between two opinions?" 1 Kings xviii. 21; and to call unto you, with Moses, "Who is on the Lord's side?" Exod. xxiii. 26. Who? "Be not deceived: God is not mocked," Gal. vi. 7; and, "No man can serve two masters," Mat. vi. 24. However, he that is not against us, pro tanto, is with us, Mark ix. 40; that is, in so far he so obligeth himself unto us as that he cannot speak lightly evil of our cause, and we therein rejoice, and will rejoice, Phil. i. 18; yet, *simpliciter*, he that is not with us is against us, Matt. xii. 30;

* Eccl. Pol., lib. i., sect. 10.

† Natal. Comiti. Mythol., lib. ii., cap. 7.

‡ Frelicke, torn. i., p. 387.

§ Ibid., p. 73.

¶ Sermon on John xvi. 7.

‡ Apolog., cap. 4.

** Conrad. Pælien. Clav. Theol., art. 9, p. 373.

†† Comm. in Eph. v., de subjecto.

* If the Church, lib. ii., cap. 34.

† Aquin., 1a, 2a, quest. 43, art. 1; Scilla in Luke xiii. 1.

that is, he who by profession and practice sheweth not himself to be on our side, is accounted before God to be our enemy.

XII. Think not the wounds which the church hath received by means of these nocent ceremonies to be so deadly and desperate, as if there were no balm in Gilead; neither suffer your minds so far to miscarry as to think that ye wish well to the church, and are heartily sorry that matters frame with her as they do, whilst, in the meantime, you essay no means, you take no pains and travail for her help. When king Ahasuerus had given forth a decree for the utter extirpation of the Jews, Mordecai feared not to tell Esther, that if she should then hold her peace enlargement and deliverance should arise unto the Jews from another place, but she and her father's house should be destroyed; whereupon she, after three days' humiliation and prayer to God, put her very life in hazard by going in to supplicate the king, which was not according to the law, Esth. iv. But now, alas! there are too many professors who detract themselves from undergoing lesser hazards for the church's liberty, yea, from using those very defences which are according to the laws of the kingdom. Yet most certain it is, that without giving diligence in the use of the means, you shall neither convince your adversaries, nor yet exonerate your own consciences, nor, lastly, have such comfort in the day of your suffering as otherwise you should. I know that principally, and, above all, we are to offer up to God prayers and supplications, with strong crying and tears, which are the weapons of our spiritual warfare, Heb. v. 7; but as this ought to be done, so the achieving of other secondary means ought not to be left undone.

If you disregard these things whereof, in the name of God, I have admonished you, and draw back your helping hands from the reproached and afflicted cause of Christ, for which we plead, then do not put evil far from you, for wrath is determined against you. And as for you, my dear brethren and countrymen of Scotland, as it is long since first Christianity was preached and professed in this land,† as also it was blessed with a most glorious

and much-renewed Reformation;* and, further, as the gospel hath been longer continued in purity and peace with us than with any church in Europe: moreover, as the Church of Scotland hath treacherously broken her bonds of oath and subscription tied; and, finally, as Almighty God, though he hath almost consumed other churches by his dreadful judgments, yet hath showed far greater long-suffering kindness towards us, to reclaim us to repentance, though, notwithstanding all this, we go on in a most doleful security, induration, blindness, and backsliding: so now, in the most ordinary course of God's justice, we are certainly to expect, that after so many mercies, so great long-suffering, and such a long day of grace, all displeased, he is to send upon us such judgments as should not be believed though they were told. O Scotland! understand and turn again, or else, as God lives, most terrible judgments are abiding thee.

But if you lay these things to heart,—if you be humbled before God for the provocation of your defection, and turn back from the same,—if with all your hearts and according to all your power, you bestow your best endeavours for making help to the wounded church of Christ, and for vindicating the cause of pure religion, yea, though it were with the loss of all that you have in the world, (*augetur enim religio Dei, quo magis premitur*)—God's true religion is enlarged the more it is pressed down), then shall you not only escape the evils which shall come upon this generation, but likewise be recompensed a hundred fold with the sweet consolations of God's Spirit here, and with the immortal crown of never-fading glory hence. Now, our Lord Jesus Christ himself, and God, even our Father, which hath loved us, and hath given us everlasting consolation and good hope through grace, stablish you and keep you from evil, that ye may be presented before his throne. The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with you all, Amen.

* Speed, Hist. of Brit., book 6, chap. 9, sect. 9.

† Lactant., lib. 6, cap. 20.

PROLOGUE.

How good reason those wise men had for them who did not allow of the English popish ceremonies at the first introducing of these novations into the Church of Scotland, foreseeing the bad effects and dangerous evils which might ensue thereupon, and how greatly the other sort were mistaken who did then yield to the same, apprehending no danger in them, it is this day too too apparent to us whose thoughts concerning the event of this course cannot be holden in suspense betwixt the apprehensions of fear and expectations of hope, because doleful experience hath made us feel that which the wiser sort before did fear. Since, then, this church, which was once a praise in the earth, is now brought to a most deplorable and daily increasing desolation by the means of these ceremonies, which have been both the sparkles to kindle, and the bellows to blow up, the consuming fire of intestine dissensions among us, it concerneth all her children, not only to cry out Ah! and Alas! and to "bemoan with the weeping of Jazer," Isa. xvi. 9, but also to bethink themselves most seriously how to succour their dear, though distressed mother, in such a calamitous case. Our best endeavours which we are to employ for this end, next as we have attained "to walk by the same rule, to mind the same thing," Phil. iii. 19, and to labour as much as is possible that the course of the gospel, the doctrine of godliness, the practice of piety lie not behind, because of our differing one from another about the ceremonies, lest otherwise *τὰ ἔργα* grow to be *πῖρεργα*. 2. In such things whereabout we agree not, to make diligent search and inquiry for the truth. For to have our judgments in our heels, and so blindly to follow every opinion which is broached, and squarely to conform unto every custom which is set afoot, becometh not men who are endowed with reason for discerning of things becometh not men who are Christians, who should have their senses exercised to discern both good and evil, Heb. v. 14, and who have received a commandment "to prove all things," 1 Thess. v. 21, before they hold fast anything; and least of all doth it become us who live in these most dangerous days, wherein error and defection so much abound. 3. When we have attained the acknowledging of the truth, then to give a testimony unto the same, according to our vocation, contending for the truth of God against the errors of men, for the purity of Christ against the corruptions of Antichrist: For to understand the truth, and yet not contend for it, argueth cowardliness, not courage; fainting, not fervour; lukewarmness, not love; weakness, not valour. Wherefore, since we cannot insinuate from the troublers of our Israel that true peace which derogateth not from the truth, we may not, we dare not, leave off to debate with them. Among the laws of Solon, there was one which pronounced him defamed and dishonest who, in a civil uproar among the citizens, sitteth still a looker-on and a neuter (*Plut. in Vita. Solon*); much more deserve they to be so accounted of who shun to meddle with any controversy which disquieteth the church, whereas they should labour to win the adversaries of the truth, and, if they prove obstinate, to defend and propugn the truth against them. In things of this life (as Calvin noteth in *Epist. ad Protect. Angl.*) we may remit so much of the right as the love of peace requireth, but as for the regiment of the church which is spiritual, and wherein everything ought to be ordered according to the word of God, it is not in the power of any mortal man *quidquam hic aliis dare, aut in illorum gratiam deflectere*. These considerations have induced me to bestow some time, and to take some pains in the study of the controversies which are agitated in this church about the ceremonies, and (after due examination and discussion of the writings of such as have played the proctors for them) to compile this ensuing dispute against them, both for exonerating myself, and for provoking of others to contend yet more for the truth, and for Zion's sake not to hold their peace, nor be at rest, until the amiable light of long-wished-for peace break forth out of all these confusions, Isa. lxii. 1; which, O Prince of Peace! hasten, who "wilt ordain peace for us: for thou also hast wrought all our works in us," Isa. xxvi. 12.

ORDER.

BECAUSE polemic and eristic discourses must follow the adversaries at the heels whithersoever they go, finding them out in all the lurking-places of their elaborate subterfuges, and conflicting with them wheresoever they pitch, until not only all their blows be awarded, but themselves also all derouted; therefore, perceiving the informality of the Formalists to be such that sometimes they plead for the controverted ceremonies as necessary, sometimes as expedient, sometimes as lawful, and sometimes as indifferent, I resolve to follow the trace, and to evince, by force of reason, that there is none of all those respects to justify either the urging or the using of them. And albeit the Archbishop of Spalato (*Prof. Libror. de Rep. Eccl.*) cometh forth like an Olympic champion, stoutly brandishing and bravading, and making his account that no antagonist can match him except a prelate; albeit likewise the Bishop of Edinburgh (*Proc. in Perth, Assembly*, part iii. p. 55) would have us to think that we are not well advised to enter into combat with such Achillean strength as they have on their side; yet must our opposites know, that we have more daring minds than to be dashed with the vain flourish of their great words. Wherefore, in all these four ways wherein I am to draw the line of my dispute, I will not shun to encounter and handle strokes with the most valiant champions of that faction, knowing that—*Trophæum ferre me a forti viro, pulchrum est: sin autem et vincar, vinci a tali nullum est probum*—But what? Shall I speak doubtfully of the victory, or fear the foil? Nay, I consider that there is none of them so strong as he was who said, "We can do nothing against the truth, but for the truth," 2 Cor. xxiii. 8. I will therefore boldly adventure to combat with them even where they seem to be strongest, and to discuss their best arguments, allegations, answers, assertions, and distinctions. And my dispute shall consist of four parts, according to those four pretences which are given out for the ceremonies, which, being so different one from another, must be severally examined. The lawfulness of a thing is in that it may be done; the indifference of it in that it may either be done or left undone; the expediency of it in that it is done profitably; and the necessity of it in that it may not be left undone. I will begin with the last respect first, as that which is the weightiest.

A DISPUTE

AGAINST

THE ENGLISH POPISH CEREMONIES.

THE FIRST PART.

AGAINST THE NECESSITY OF THE CEREMONIES.

CHAPTER I.

THAT OUR OPPOSITES DO URGE THE CEREMONIES AS THINGS NECESSARY.

Sect. 1. This I prove, 1. From their practice; 2. From their pleading. In their practice, who seeth not that they would tie the people of God to a necessity of submitting their necks to this heavy yoke of human ceremonies? which are with more vehemency, forwardness, and strictness urged, than the weighty matters of the law of God, and the refusing whereof is far more inhibited, monaced, espied, delated, aggravated, censured, and punished, than idolatry, Popery, blasphemy, swearing, profanation of the Sabbath, murder, adultery, &c. Both preachers and people have been, and are, fined, confined, imprisoned, banished, censured, and punished so severely, that he may well say of them that which our divines say of the Papists, *Hæc sua inventa Decalogi anteponunt, et gravius eos multarent qui ea violarent, quam qui divina præcepta transgredirentur.*¹ Wherefore, seeing they make not only as much, but more ado, about the controverted ceremonies than about the most necessary things in religion, their practice herein makes it too, too apparent what necessity they annex to them.

Sect. 2. And if we will hearken to their pleading it tells no less; for howbeit they plead for their ceremonies, as things indifferent in their own nature, yet, when the

ceremonies are considered as the ordinances of the church, they plead for them as things necessary. M. G. Powel, in the *Consideration of the Arguments directed to the High Court of Parliament in behalf of the Ministers suspended and deprived* (ans. 3 to arg. 16), hath these words, yea, these particulars: "Subscription, ceremonies, &c., being imposed by the church, and commanded by the magistrate, are necessary to be observed under the pain of sin." The Bishop of Edinburgh resolves us concerning the necessity of giving obedience to the laws of the church, enacted ancient the ceremonies, thus: "Where a man hath not a law, his judgment is the rule of his conscience, but where there is a law, the law must be the rule. As, for example, before that apostolical canon that forbade to eat blood or strangled things, every man might have done that which in his conscience he thought most expedient, &c., but after the making and the publication of the canon that enjoined abstinence, the same was to rule their consciences. And, therefore, after that time, albeit a man had thought in his own private judgment that to abstain from these things was not expedient, &c. yet, in that case, he ought not to have eaten, because now the will of the law, and not the judgment of his own mind, was the rule of his conscience." The Archbishop of St Andrews, to the same purpose saith, "In things indifferent we must always esteem that to be best and

¹ P. Mari. in 1 Reg. 8. de Templ. dedic.

¹ Epist. to the Pastors of the Church of Scotland.

most seemly which seemeth so in the eye of public authority; neither is it for private men to control public judgment; as they cannot make public constitutions, so they may not control nor disobey them, being once made; indeed authority ought to look well to this, that it prescribe nothing but rightly, appoint no rights nor orders in the church but such as may set forward godliness and piety; yet, put the case, that some be otherwise established, they must be obeyed by such as are members of that church, as long as they have the force of a constitution, &c. But thou wilt say, My conscience suffers me not to obey, for I am persuaded that such things are not right, nor appointed. I answer thee, In matters of this nature and quality the sentence of thy superiors ought to direct thee, and that is a sufficient ground to thy conscience for obeying.¹ Thus we see that they urge the ceremonies, not only with a necessity of practice upon the outward man, but also with a necessity of opinion upon the conscience, and that merely because of the church's determination and appointment; yea, Dr Mortoune maketh kneeling in the act of receiving the communion to be in some sort necessary in itself; for he maintaineth,² that though it be not essentially necessary as food, yet it is accidentally necessary as physic. Nay, some of them are yet more absurd, who plainly call the ceremonies necessary in themselves,³ beside the constitution of the church. Others of them, who confess the ceremonies to be not only unnecessary,⁴ but also inconvenient, do, notwithstanding, plead for them as things necessary. Dr Burges tells us,⁵ that some of his side think that ceremonies are inconvenient, but withal he discovers to us a strange mystery brought out of the unsearchable deepness of his piercing conception, holding that such things as not only are not at all necessary in themselves,⁶ but are inconvenient too, may yet be urged as necessary.

Sect. 3. The urging of these ceremonies as necessary, if there were no more, is a sufficient reason for our refusing them. "To the precepts of God (saith Balduine) nothing is to be added,⁷ Deut. xii. Now God

hath commanded these things which are necessary. The rites of the church are not necessary, wherefore, if the abrogation or usurpation of any rite be urged as necessary, then is an addition made to the commandment of God, which is forbidden in the word; and, by consequence, it cannot oblige me, neither should anything herein be yielded unto." Who can purge these ceremonies in controversy among us of gross superstition, since they are urged as things necessary? But of this superstition we shall hear afterward in its proper place.

CHAPTER II.

THE REASON TAKEN OUT OF ACTS XV., TO PROVE THE NECESSITY OF THE CEREMONIES, BECAUSE OF THE CHURCH'S APPOINTMENT, CONFUTED.

The Bishop of Edinburgh, to prove that of necessity our consciences must be ruled by the will of the law, and that it is necessary that we give obedience to the same, albeit our consciences gainsay, allegeth that apostolical canon,¹ Acts xv., for an example, just as Bellarmine maintaineth, *Festorum observationem ex se indifferentem esse sed posita lege fieri necessariam.*² Hospinian, answering him, will acknowledge no necessity of the observation of feasts, except divine law could be showed for it.³ So say we, that the ceremonies which are acknowledged by formalists to be indifferent in themselves, cannot be made necessary by the law of the church, neither doth that example of the apostolical canon make anything against us; for, according to Mr Sprint's confession,⁴ it was not the force or authority of the canon, but the reason and ground whereupon the canon was made, which caused the necessity of abstaining, and to abstain was necessary for eschewing of scandal, whether the apostles and elders had enjoined abstinence or not.⁵ The reason, then, why the things proscribed in that canon are called necessary, ver. 28, is not because, being indifferent before the making and publication of the canon, they became necessary by virtue of the canon after it was made, as the Bishop teacheth, but *quia tunc*

¹ Serm. at Perth Assem. insert. by Dr Lindsey.

² Practic. Def. cap. 3, sect. 20.

³ Dr Forb. Iren. lib. 1, cap. 6, sect. 6; cap. 7, sect. 1, 9; cap. 9, sect. 6.

⁴ Cassand. Ang. p. 270, 11.

⁵ Ans. to the Ilupl. pref. p. 43.

⁶ Ib. p. 53.

⁷ De Cns. Cons. lib. 4, cap. 11, cas. 3.

¹ Ubi supra.

² De cult. Sancti. cap. 10.

³ De Orig. Fest. Christiani. cap. 2.

⁴ Repl. to the Ans. p. 258.

⁵ Chiv. Com. in hunc locum.

charitas exigebat, ut illa sua libertate qui ex gentibus conversi erant, propter proximi edificationem inter judcos non uterentur, sed ab ea absterentur, saith Chemnitius.¹ This law, saith Tilen,² was *propter charitatem et vitandi offendiculi necessitatem ad tempus sancita.* So that these things were necessary before the canon was made. *Necessaria fuerunt,* saith Ames,³ *antequam Apostoli quidquam de iis statuerant, non absolute, sed quatenus in iis charitas iubeat morem gerere infirmis, ut caeterum notat.* Quamobrem, saith Tilon,⁴ *cum charitas semper sit colenda, semper vitanda scandala.* "Charity is necessary (saith Boza), even in things which are in themselves indifferent."⁵ What they can allege for the necessity of the ceremonies, from the authority and obligatory power of ecclesiastical laws, shall be answered by and by.

CHAPTER III.

THAT THE CEREMONIES THUS IMPOSED AND URGED AS THINGS NECESSARY, DO BEREAVE US OF OUR CHRISTIAN LIBERTY, FIRST, BECAUSE OUR PRACTICE IS ADSTRACTED.

Sect. 1. Who can blame us for standing to the defence of our Christian liberty, which we ought to defend and contend in *rebus quibusvis*? saith Bucer.⁶ Shall we bear the name of Christians, and yet make no great account of the liberty which hath been bought to us by the dearest drops of the precious blood of the Son of God? *Sumus empti,* saith Pareus:⁷ *non igitur nostri juris ut nos mancipemus hominum servitio: id enim manifesta cum injuria redemptoris Christi fuerit: sumus liberti Christi.* Magistratui autem, saith Tilen,⁸ *et ecclesiae prepositis, non nisi usque ad aras obtemperandum, neque ullum certamen aut periculum pro libertatis per Christum nobis partae defensione defugiendum, siquidem mortem ipsius irritam fieri, Paulus asserit, si spiritualis servitutis iugo, nos implicari patiamur.* Gal. v. 1, "Let us stand fast, therefore, in the liberty wherewith Christ

hath made us free, and not be entangled again with the yoke of bondage." But that the urging of the ceremonies as necessary doth take away our Christian liberty, I will make it evident in four points.

Sect. 2. First, They are imposed with a necessity of practice. Spotswood tells us,¹ that public constitutions must be obeyed, and that private men may not disobey them, and thus is our practice adstricted in the use of things which are not at all necessary, and acknowledged *gratis* by the urgers to be indifferent, adstricted (I say) to one part without liberty to the other, and that by the mere authority of a human constitution; whereas Christian liberty gives us freedom both for the omission and for the observation of a thing indifferent, except some other reason do adstrict and restrain it than a bare human constitution. Chrysostome, speaking of such as are subject to bishops,² saith, *In potestate positum est obedire vel non.* Liberty in things indifferent,³ saith Amanus Polanus, *est per quam Christiani sunt liberi in usu vel abstinentia rerum adiaphorum.* Calvin, speaking of our liberty in things indifferent,⁴ saith, We may *cas nunc usurpare nunc omittere indifferenter,* and places this liberty,⁵ *tam in abstinentia quam in utendo.* It is marked of the rites of the ancient church,⁶ that *libere fuerunt horum rituum observationes in ecclesia.* And what meaneth the Apostle while he saith, "If ye be dead with Christ from the rudiments of the world, why, as though living in the world, are ye subject to ordinances, (touch not, taste not, handle not; which all are to perish with the using,) after the commandments and doctrines of men?" Col. ii. 20—22. Surely he condemneth not only *humana decreta de ritibus*, but also subjection and obedience to such ordinances of men as take from us liberty of practice in the use of things indifferent,⁷ obedience (I say) for conscience of their ordinances merely. What meaneth also that place, 1 Cor. vii. 23, "Be not ye the servants of men?" "It forbids us, (saith Paybody) to be the servants of men; that is, in wicked or superstitious actions, according to their perverse commandments

¹ Do Exam. part. 1. de Bon. Oper. p. 180.

² Synt. part. 2, disp. 27, thes. 30.

³ Bell. Enev. tom. 1, lib. 3, cap. 7.

⁴ Ubi supra, thes. 31.

⁵ Annot. in Act. xv. 29.

⁶ Cens. lit. Angl. cap. 2.

⁷ Comm. in 1 Cor. vii. 23.

⁸ Synt. part. 2, disp. 44, thes. 33.

¹ Ubi supra.

² Hom. 1, in Ep. ad Tit.

³ Synt. Theol. lib. 6, cap. 38.

⁴ Instit. lib. 3, cap. 19, sect. 7.

⁵ Ib. cap. 10.

⁶ Chem. Exam. part. 2. de rit. in adm. Sac. p. 33.

⁷ Zanck. comm. in Col. ii. 20.

or desires."¹ If he mean of actions that are wicked or superstitious in themselves, then it followeth, that to be subject unto those ordinances, "Touch not, taste not, handle not," is not to be the servants of men, because these actions are not wicked and superstitious in themselves. Not touching, not tasting, not handling, are in themselves indifferent. But if he mean of actions which are wicked and superstitious, in respect of circumstances, then is his restrictive gloss senseless; for we can never be the servants of men, but in such wicked and superstitious actions, if there were no more but giving obedience to such ordinances as are imposed with a necessity upon us, and that merely for conscience of the ordinance, it is enough to infect the actions with superstition. *Sunt hominum servi*, saith Bullinger,² *qui aliquid in gratiam hominum faciunt*. This is nearer the truth; for to tie ourselves to the doing of anything for the will or pleasure of men, when our conscience can find no other reason for the doing of it, were indeed to make ourselves the servants of men. Far be it then from us to submit our necks to such a heavy yoke of human precepts, as would overload and undo us. Nay, we will stedfastly resist such unchristian tyranny as goeth about to spoil us of Christian liberty, taking that for certain which we find in Cyprian,³ *periculosum est in divinis rebus ut quis cedat jure suo*.

Sect. 3. Two things are here replied, 1. That there is reason for adstricting of our practice in these things, because we are commanded to obey them that have the rule over us, and to submit ourselves, Heb. xiii. 17,⁴ and to submit ourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake, 1 Pet. ii. 16, and that except public constitutions must needs be obeyed, there can be no order,⁵ but all shall be filled with strife and contention. Ans. 1. As touching obedience to those that are set over us, if they mean not to tyrannise over the Lord's inheritance, 1 Pet. v. 3; and to make the commandments of God of no effect by their traditions, Mark vii. 9, they must give us leave to try their precepts by the sure will of God's word; and when we find that they require of us anything in the worship of God which is

¹ Apol. part. 3, cap. 1, sect. 5.

² Comm. in 1 Cor. vii. 23.

³ De heret. Baptiz.

⁴ B. Lind. Epist. to the Pastors of the Church of Scotland.

⁵ Spots. Sermon at Perth Assembly.

either against or beside his written word, then modestly to refuse obedience, which is the only way for order, and shunning of strife and contention. It will be said again, that except we prove the things commanded by those who are set over us to be unlawful in themselves, we cannot be allowed to refuse obedience to their ordinances. Ans. This unlawfulness of the ceremonies in themselves hath been proved by us already, and shall yet again be proved in this dispute. But put the case, they were lawful in themselves, yet have we good reason for refusing them: "David thought the feeding of his body was cause sufficient to break the law of the shew-bread; Christ thought the satisfying of the disciples' hunger to be cause sufficient to break the ceremony of the Sabbath. He thought, also, that the healing of the lepers' bodies was a just excuse to break the law that forbade the touching of them; much more, then, may we think now in our estimation, that the feeding of other men's souls, the satisfying of our own consciences, together with the consciences of other men, and the healing of men's superstition and spiritual leprosy, are causes sufficient to break the law of the ceremonies and of the cross, which are not God's but men's," saith Parker.¹ 2. As touching submission or subjection, we say with Dr Field,² *that subjection is generally and absolutely required where obedience is not*, and even when our consciences suffer us not to obey, yet still we submit and subject ourselves, and neither do nor shall (I trust) show any the least contempt of authority.

Sect. 4. Secondly, It is replied, that our Christian liberty is not taken away when practice is restrained, because conscience is still left free. "The Christian liberty (saith Paybody³), is not taken away by the necessity of doing a thing indifferent, or not doing, but only by that necessity which takes away the opinion or persuasion of its indifference." So saith Dr Burges,⁴ "That the ceremonies in question are ordained to be used necessarily, though the judgment concerning them, and immediate conscience to God, be left free." Ans. 1. Who doubts of this, that liberty of practice may be restrained in the use of things which are in

¹ Of the Cross, cap. 5, sect. 11.

² Of the Church, lib. 4, cap. 34.

³ Apol. part 3, cap. 1, sect. 4. So Dr Forb. Iren.

⁴ lib. 1, cap. 11, sect. 5, 6.

⁵ Manuduct. p. 42.

themselves indifferent? But, yet, if the bare authority of an ecclesiastical law, without any other reason than the will and pleasure of men, be made to restrain practice, then is Christian liberty taken away. Junius saith,¹ that *externum opus ligatur* from the use of things indifferent, when the conscience is not bound; but in that same place he showeth, that the outward action is bound and restrained only *quo usque circumstantie ob quas necessitas imperata est, se extendunt*. So that it is not the authority of an ecclesiastical law, but the occasion and ground of it, which adstricts the practice when the conscience is left free. 2. When the authority of the church's constitution is obtruded to bind and restrain the practice of Christians in the use of things indifferent, they are bereaved of their liberty, as well as if an opinion of necessity were borne in upon their consciences. Therefore we see when the Apostle, 1 Cor. vii., gives liberty of marriage, he doth not only leave the conscience free in its judgment of the lawfulness of marriage, but also give liberty of practice to marry or not to marry. And Col. ii. 21, when he giveth instances of such human ordinances as take away Christian liberty, he saith not, *you must think that you may not touch, &c.*, but "touch not," &c., telling us, that when the practice is restrained from touching, tasting, handling, by the ordinances of men, then is Christian liberty spoiled, though the conscience be left free. Camero, speaking of the servitude which is opposed to Christian liberty, saith,² that it is either *animi servitus*, or *corporis servitus*. Then if the outward man be brought in bondage, this makes up spiritual thralldom, though there be no more. But, 3. The ceremonies are imposed with an opinion of necessity upon the conscience itself, for proof whereof I proceed to the next point.

CHAPTER IV.

THAT THE CEREMONIES TAKE AWAY OUR CHRISTIAN LIBERTY PROVED BY A SECOND REASON, NAMELY, BECAUSE CONSCIENCE ITSELF IS BOUND AND ADSTRACTED.

Sect. 1. Bishop Lindsey hath told us,³ that the will of the law must be the rule of our

conscience, so that conscience may not judge other ways than the law determines. Bishop Spotswood will have the sentence of superiors to direct the conscience,⁴ and will have us to esteem that to be best and most seemly which seemeth so to them. Bishop Andrews, speaking of ceremonies,⁵ not only will have every person inviolably to observe the rites and customs of his own church, but also will have the ordinances about those rites to be urged under pain of the anathema. I know not what the binding of the conscience is, if this be not it: *Apostolus gemendi partes relinquit, non cogendi auctoritatem tribuit ministris quibus plebs non auscultat*.⁶ And shall they who call themselves the apostles' successors, compel, constrain and enthral, the consciences of the people of God? Charles V., as popish as he was, did promise to the Protestants,⁷ *Nullum vim ipsorum conscientis illatum* iri. And shall a popish prince speak more reasonable than protestant prelates? But to make it yet more and plentifully to appear how miserably our opposites would enthral our consciences, I will here show, 1. What the binding of the conscience is. 2. How the laws of the church may be said to bind. 3. What is the judgment of formalists touching the binding-power of ecclesiastical laws.

Sect. 2. Concerning the first of these we will hear what Dr Field saith:⁸ "To bind the conscience (saith he) is to bind the soul and spirit of man, with the fear of such punishments (to be inflicted by him that so bindeth) as the conscience feareth; that is, as men fear, though none but God and themselves be privy to their doings; now these are only such as God only inflicteth," &c. This description is too imperfect, and deserves to be corrected. To bind the conscience is *illam auctoritatem habere, ut conscientia illi subijcere se scire debeat, ita ut peccatum sit, si contra illam quidquam fiat*, saith Ames.⁹ "The binder (saith Perkins¹⁰) is that thing whatsoever which hath power and authority over conscience to order it. To bind is to urge, cause, and constrain it in every action, either to accuse for sin, or to excuse for well-doing; or to say, this

¹ Ubi supra.

² Sermon of the worshipping of Imaginations.

³ Til. Synt. part. 2, disp. 27, thes. 38.

⁴ Thuan. Hist. lib. 124, p. 922.

⁵ Of the Church, lib. 4, cap. 33.

⁶ De Cens. lib. 1, cap. 2.

⁷ Treat. of Cons. cap. 2, sect. 3.

¹ Thra. Theol. de Libert. Christ. thes. 10.

² Profr. in Mat. xviii. 7, tom. 2. p. 340.

³ Ubi supra.

may be done, or it may not be done." "To bind the conscience (saith Alsted¹) *est illam urgere et alligere, ut vel excuset et accuset, vel indicet quid fieri aut non fieri possit.*" Upon these descriptions, which have more truth and reason in them, I infer that whatsoever urges, or forces conscience to assent to a thing as lawful, or a thing that ought to be done, or dissent from a thing as unlawful, or a thing which ought not to be done, that is a binder of conscience, though it did not bind the spirit of a man with the fear of such punishments as God alone inflicteth. For secluding all respect of punishment, and not considering what will follow, the very obliging of the conscience for the time, *ad assensum*, is a binding of it.²

Sect. 3. Touching the second, it is certain that human laws, as they come from men, and in respect of any force or authority which men can give them, have no power to bind the conscience. *Neque enim cum hominibus, sed cum uno Deo negotium est conscientis nostris*, saith Calvin.³ Over our souls and consciences, *nemini quicquam juris nisi Deo*, saith Tilen.⁴ From Jerome's distinction, that a king *præest nolentibus*, but a bishop *volentibus*, Marcus Antonius de Dominis well concludeth: *Volentibus gregi præesse, excludit omnem jurisdictionem et potestatem imperativam ac coactivam et solam significat directivam, ubi, viz., in libertate subditi est et parere et non parere, ita ut qui præest nihil habeat quo nolentem parere aligat ad parendum.*⁵ This point he proveth in that chapter at length, where he disputeth both against temporal and spiritual coactive jurisdiction in the church. If it be demanded to what purpose serveth then the enacting of ecclesiastical laws, since they have not in them any power to bind the conscience, I answer, The use and end for which ecclesiastical laws do serve is, 1. For the plain discovery of such things as the law of God or nature do require of us, so that law which of itself hath power to bind, cometh from the priests and ministers of the Lord neither *ἀποκατασκευαστικῶς* nor *νομοθετικῶς*, but *declarative*, Mal. ii. 7. 2. For declaring to us what is fittest in such things as are, in their own nature, indifferent, and neither enforced by

the law of God nor nature, and which part should be followed in these things as most convenient. The laws of the church, then, are appointed to let us see the necessity of the first kind of things, and what is expedient in the other kind of things, and therefore they are more properly called directions, instructions, admonitions, than laws. For I speak of ecclesiastical laws *qua tales*, that is, as they are the constitutions of men who are set over us; thus considered, they have only *vin dirigendi et monendi*.¹ It is said of the apostles, that they were constituted *doctrinæ Christi testes, non novæ doctrinæ legistores*.² And the same may be said of all the ministers of the gospel, when discipline is taken in with doctrine. He is no nonconformist who holdeth *ecclesiam in terris agere partes oratoris, seu legati obsecrantis et suadentis*.³ And we may hitherto apply that which Gerson, the chancellor of Paris, saith:⁴ "The wisest and best among the guides of God's church had not so ill a meaning as to have all their constitutions and ordinances taken for laws properly so named, much less strictly binding the conscience, but for threatenings, admonitions, counsels, and directions only, and when there groweth a general neglect, they seem to consent to the abolishing of them again;" for seeing, *lex instituitur, cum promulgatur, vigorem habet, cum moribus utentium approbatur*.

Sect. 4. But as we have seen in what respect the laws of the church do not bind, let us now see how they may be said to bind. That which bindeth is not the authority of the church, nor any force which the church can give to her laws. It must be then somewhat else which maketh them able to bind, when they bind at all, and that is *ratio legis*, "the reason of the law," without which the law itself cannot bind, and which hath the chiefest and most principal power of binding. An ecclesiastical law, saith Junius,⁵ *diaræis sive depositio, non vere lex est, sed diaræis aut canon, ac proinde dirigit quidem ut canon agentem voluntarie: non autem necessitate cogit, ut lex etiam involuntarium quod si forte ante accedit coactio, ea non est de natura canonis sed altunde pervenit*. An ecclesiastical canon,

¹ Theol. Cas. cap. 2.
² Ames. de Cons. lib. 1, cap. 3.
³ Instit. lib. 4, cap. 10, sect. 5.
⁴ Synt. part. 2, disp. 32, thes. 4.
⁵ De Rep. Eccl. lib. 5, cap. 2, n. 12.

¹ Til. Synt. p. 2, disp. 27, thes. 39.
² Chem. examp. 2, de Bon. Oper. p. 179.
³ Marc. Ant. de Dom. de Rep. Ec. lib. 6, cap. 10, num. 67.
⁴ Apud Field, of the Church. lib. 4, cap. 34.
⁵ Animad. in Bel. contr. 3, lib. 4, cap. 16, nota 87.

saith Tilen,¹ *ducit volentem, non trahit nolentem: quod si accedat coactio, ea ecclesiastici canonis natura est prorsus aliena*. Calvin's judgment is,² that an ecclesiastical canon binds, when *manifestam utilitatem præ se fert*, and when either *τὸ πᾶν* or *charitatis ratio* doth require, that we impose a necessity on our liberty. It binds not, then, by its own authority in his mind. And what saith the canon law itself?³ *Sed sciendum est quod ecclesiasticæ prohibitiones proprias habent causas quibus cessantibus, cessant et ipsæ*. Hence Junius saith,⁴ that the law binds not *per se*, but only *propter ordinem charitatem, et cautionem scandal*. Hence Ames,⁵ *quavis ad justas leges humanas, justo modo observandas, obligentur homines in conscientis suis a Deo; ipsæ tamen leges humane, quæ sunt leges hominum, non obligant conscientiam*. Hence Alsted:⁶ "Laws made by men of things indifferent, whether they be civil or ecclesiastical, do bind the conscience, in so far as they agree with God's word, serve for the public good, maintain order, and finally, take not away liberty of conscience." Hence the professors of Leyden say,⁷ that laws bind not *primo et per se, sed secundo, et per accidens*; that is,⁸ *quatenus in illis lex aliqua Dei violatur*. Hence I may compare the constitutions of the church with *responsa juris consultorum* among the Romans, which obliged no man, *nisi ex æquo et bono*, saith Daneus.⁹ Hence it may be said, that the laws of the church do not only bind *scandali et contemptus ratione*, as Hospinian,¹⁰ and in *caso libertas fiat eum scandalum*, as Parcus;¹¹ for it were scandal not to give obedience to the laws of the church, when they prescribe things necessary or expedient for the eschewing of scandal, and it were contempt to refuse obedience to them, when we are not certainly persuaded of the unlawfulness or inexpediency of the things prescribed.

Sect. 5. But out of the case of scandal or contempt, divines teach that conscience is not bound by the canon of the church made

¹ Synt. p. 2, disp. 27, thes. 39.
² Instit. lib. 4, cap. 10, sect. 32.
³ Decr. part. 1, dict. 61, cap. 8.
⁴ Ubi supra, art. 21.
⁵ De Cons. lib. 1, cap. 2.
⁶ Theol. Casuum. cap. 2.
⁷ Synt. per Theol. disp. 35, thes. 19.
⁸ Ames. Bell. Ency. tom. 1, lib. 3, cap. 7.
⁹ De Pol. Christ. lib. 5, cap. 1.
¹⁰ De Orig. Fest. Christ. cap. 2.
¹¹ Comm. in 1 Cor. xiv. 40.

about order and policy. *Extra casum scandalum et destinata rebellibus, propter commune bonum, non peccat qui contra constitutiones istas fecerit*, saith Junius.¹ "It a law (saith Perkins)² concerning some external right or thing indifferent, be at some time or upon some occasion omitted, no offence given, nor contempt showed to ecclesiastical authority, there is no breach made in the conscience." Alsted's rule is,³ *Leges humane non obligant quando omitti possunt sine impedimento finis ob quem feruntur sine scandalo aliorum, et sine contemptu legislatoris*. And Tilen teacheth us,⁴ that when the church hath determined the mutable circumstances, in the worship of God, for public edification, *privatorum conscientis liberum est quandoque ista omittere, modo offendicula vitentur, nihil quæ ex contemptu ecclesiæ ac ministerii publici petulantia sanctorum vel ærologia facere videantur*.

Sect. 6. We deny not, then, that the church's canons about rites, which serve for public order and edification, do bind. We say only, that it is not the authority of the church framing the canon that binds, but the matter of the canon chiefly warranted by God's word.⁵ *Scimus enim quæcumque ad decorem et ordinem pertinent, non habenda esse pro humanis placitis, quin divinitus approbantur*. Therefore we think concerning such canons, "that they are necessary to be observed so far forth only, as the keeping of them maintaineth decent order, and preventeth open offence."⁶

Sect. 7. If any say that I derogate much from the authority of the church when I do nothing which she prescribeth, except I do it lawful and expedient, because I should do this much for the exhortation and admonition of a brother. *Ans. 1.* I give far more reverence to the direction of the church than to the admonition of a brother, because that is ministerial, this fraternal; that comes from authority, this only from charity; that is public, this private; that is given by many, this by one. And, finally, the church hath a calling to direct me in some things where-in a brother hath not. 2. If it be still instanced that, in the point of obedience, I do

¹ Thes. Theol. de Libert. Christ. thes. 11.
² Treat. of Cons. cap. 2, sect. 8.
³ Theol. Cas. cap. 2.
⁴ Synt. part. 2, disp. 27, thes. 9.
⁵ Calv. Resp. ad Libel. de pii viri officio, p. 413.
⁶ T. Bez. Conf. cap. 5, art. 18. Perk. ubi supra, et Meisner. Philos. Sobr. part. 3, sect. 2, quest. 12.

no more for the church than for any brother, because I am bound to do that which is made evident to be lawful and expedient, though a private Christian do but exhort me to it, or whether I be exhorted to it or not. For answer to this I say, that I will obey the directions of the church in many things rather than the directions of a brother; for in two things which are in themselves indifferent, and none of them inexpedient, I will do that which the church requireth, though my brother should exhort me to the contrary. But always I hold me at this sure ground, that I am never bound in conscience to obey the ordinances of the church, except they be evidently lawful and expedient. This is that, *sine quo non obligant*, and also that which doth chiefly bind, though it be not the only thing which bindeth. Now, for making the matter mere plain, we must consider that the constitutions of the church are either lawful or unlawful. If unlawful, they bind not at all; if lawful, they are either concerning things necessary, as Acts xv. 28, and then the necessity of the things doth bind, whether the church ordain them or not; or else concerning things indifferent, as when the church ordaineth, that in great towns there shall be sermon on such a day of the week, and public prayers every day at such an hour. Here it is not the bare authority of the church that bindeth, without respect to the lawfulness or expediency of the thing itself which is ordained (else we were bound to do every thing which the church ordains, were it never so unlawful, for *quod competit alicui qua tali, competit omni tali*: we behold the authority of the church making laws, as well in unlawful ordinances as in lawful), nor yet is it the lawfulness or expediency of the thing itself, without respect to the ordinance of the church (for possibly other times and diets were as lawful, and expedient too, for such exercise, as those ordained by the church); but it is the authority of the church prescribing a thing lawful or expedient. In such a case, then neither doth the authority of the church bind, except the thing be lawful and expedient, nor doth the lawfulness and expediency of the thing bind, except the church ordain it; but both these jointly do bind.

Sect. 8. I come now to examine what is the judgment of formalists touching the binding of the conscience by ecclesiastical laws. Dr Field saith, that the question

should not be proposed, whether human laws do bind the conscience, but "whether binding the outward man to the performance of outward things by force and fear of outward punishment to be inflicted by men, the non-performance of such things, or the non-performance of them with such affections as were fit, be not a sin against God, of which the conscience will accuse us,"¹ &c. Unto this question thus proposed and understood of human laws, and where no more is considered as giving them power to bind, but only the authority of those who make them; some formalists do give (as I will show), and all of them (being well advised) must give an affirmative answer. And, I pray, what did Bellarmine say more,² when, expressing how conscience is subject to human authority, he taught that conscience belongeth *ad humanum forum, quatenus homo ex precepto ita obligatur ad opus externum faciendum, ut si non faciat, judicat ipse in conscientia sua se male facere, et hoc sufficit ad conscientiam obligandam*? But to proceed particularly.

Sect. 9. I begin with Field himself, whose resolution of the question proposed is,³ that we are bound only to give obedience to such human laws as prescribe things profitable, not for that human laws have power to bind the conscience, but because the things they command are of that nature, that not to perform them is contrary to justice or charity. Whereupon he concludeth out of Stapleton, that we are bound to the performance of things prescribed by human laws, in such sort, that the non-performance of them is sin, not *ex sola legislatoris voluntate, sed ex ipsa legum utilitate*. Let all such as be of this man's mind not blame us for denying of obedience to the constitutions about the ceremonies, since we find (for certain) no utility, but, by the contrary, much inconvenience in them. If they say that we must think those laws to be profitable or convenient, which they, who are set over us, think to be so, then they know not what they say. For, exempting conscience from being bound by human laws in one thing, they would have it bound by them in another thing. If conscience must needs judge that to be profitable, which seemeth so to those that are set over us, then, sure, is power given to them for binding the conscience so

¹ Of the Church, lib. 4, cap. 33.

² De Pont. Rom. lib. 4, cap. 20.

³ Ubi supra.

straitly, that it may not judge otherwise than they judge, and force is placed in their bare authority for necessitating and constraining the assenting judgment of conscience.

Sect. 10. Some men perhaps will say that we are bound to obey the laws made about the ceremonies, though not for the sole will of the law-makers, nor yet for any utility of the laws themselves, yet for this reason, that scandal and contempt would follow in case we do otherwise. *Ans.* We know that human laws do bind in the case of scandal or contempt. But that nonconformity is neither scandal nor contempt, Parker hath made it most evident.¹ For, as touching contempt, he sheweth out of fathers, councils, canon law, schoolmen, and modern divines, that *non obedire* is not contempt, but *nolle obedire*, or *superbiendo repugnare*. Yea, out of Formalists themselves, he sheweth the difference betwixt subjection and obedience. Thereafter he pleadeth thus, and we with him: "What signs see men in us of pride and contempt? What be our *cetera opera* that bewray such an humour? Let it be named wherein we go not two miles, when we are commanded to go but one, yea, wherein we go not as many miles as any shoe of the preparation of the gospel will bear us. What payment, what pain, what labour, what taxation made us ever to murmur? Survey our charges where we have laboured, if they be not found to be of the faithfulest subjects that be in the Lord, we deserve no favour. Nay, there is wherein we stretch our consciences to the utmost to conform and to obey in divers matters. Are we refractory in other things, as Balaam's ass said to his master? Have I used to serve thee so at other times?" And as touching scandal, he sheweth first, that by our not conforming, we do not scandalise superiors, but edify them, although it may be we displease them, of which we are sorry, even as Joab displeased David, when he contested against the numbering of the people, yet did he not scandalise David, but edify him. And, secondly, whereas it might be alleged, that nonconformity doth scandalise the people, before whom it soundeth as it were an alarm of disobedience, we reply with him, "Daniel will not omit the ceremony of looking out at the window towards Jerusalem. Mordecai omitteth the ceremony of bowing the knee to Haman; Christ will not

use the ceremony of washing hands, though a tradition of the elders and governors of the church then being. The authority of the magistrate was violated by these, and an incitement to disobedience was in their ceremonial breach, as much as there is now in ours."

Sect. 11. But some of our opposites go about to derive the obligatory power of the church's laws, not so much from the utility of the laws themselves, or from any scandal which should follow upon the not obeying of them, as from the church's own authority which maketh them. Camero speaketh of two sorts of ecclesiastical laws:¹ 1. Such as prescribe things frivolous or unjust, meaning such things as (though they neither detract anything from the glory of God, nor cause any damage to our neighbour, yet) bring some detriment to ourselves. 2. Such as prescribe things belonging to order and shunning of scandal. Touching the former, he teacheth rightly, that conscience is never bound to the obedience of such laws, except only in the case of scandal and contempt, and that if at any time such laws may be neglected and not observed, without scandal given, or contempt shown, no man's conscience is holden with them. But touching the other sort of the church's laws, he saith, that they bind the conscience indirectly, not only *respectu materiae præcepti* (which doth not at all oblige, except in respect of the end whereunto it is referred, namely, the conserving of order, and the not giving of scandal), but also *respectu præcipientis*, because God will not have those who are set over us in the church to be contemned. He foresaw (belike), that whereas it is pretended in behalf of those ecclesiastical laws which enjoin the controverted ceremonies, that the things which they prescribe pertain to order and to the shunning of scandal, and so bind the conscience indirectly in respect of the end, one might answer, I am persuaded upon evident grounds that those prescribed ceremonies pertain not to order, and to the shunning of scandal, but to disorder, and to the giving of scandal; therefore he laboured to bind such an one's conscience with another tie, which is the authority of the law-makers. And this authority he would have one to take as ground enough to believe, that that which the church prescribeth doth belong to order and the shunning of scandal, and in that persuasion to do it. But, 1.

¹ Of the Cross, cap. 5, sect. 14, 15.

¹ Præl. tom. 1, de Potest: Eccl. cont. 2, p. 371.

How doth this doctrine differ from that which himself setteth down as the opinion of Papists,¹ *Posse los qui præsunt ecclesie, cogere fideles ut id credant vel faciant, quod ipsi judicaverint?* 2. It is well observed by our writers,² that the apostles never made things indifferent to be necessary, except only in respect of scandal, and that out of the case of scandal they still left the consciences of men free, which observation they gather from Acts xv. and 1 Cor. x. Camero himself noteth,³ that though the church prescribed abstinence from things sacrificed to idols, yet the Apostle would not have the faithful to abstain for conscience's sake: why then heldeth he, that beside the end of shunning scandal and keeping order, conscience is bound even by the church's own authority? 3. As for the reason whereby he would prove that the church's laws do bind, even *respectu præcipientis*, his form of speaking is very bad. *Deus* (saith he) *non vult contemni præpositos ecclesie, nisi iusta et necessaria de causa*. Where falsely he supposeth, not only that there may occur a just and necessary cause of contemning those whom God hath set over us in the church, but, also, that the not obeying of them inferreth the contemning of them. Now, the not obeying of their laws inferreth not the contemning of themselves (which were not allowable), but only the contemning of their laws. And as Jeremie,⁴ speaketh of Daniel, *Et nunc Daniel regis iussa contemnus*, &c.; so we say of all superiors in general, that we may sometimes have just reasons for contemning their commandments, yet are we not to contemn, but to honour themselves. But, 4. Let us take Camero's meaning to be, that God will not have us to refuse obedience unto those who are set over us in the church: none of our opposites dare say, that God will have us to obey those who are set over us in the church in any other things than such as may be done both lawfully and conveniently for the shunning of scandal; and if so, then the church's precept cannot bind, except as it is grounded upon such or such reasons.

Sect. 12. Bishop Spotswood and Bishop Lindsey, in those words which I have heretofore alleged out of them, are likewise of opinion, that the sole will and authority of the church doth bind the conscience to obe-

dience. Spotswood will have us, without more ado, to esteem that to be best and most seemly, which seemeth so in the eye of public authority. Is not this to bind the conscience by the church's bare will and authority, when I must needs constrain the judgment of my conscience to be conformed to the church's judgment, having no other reason to move me hereunto but the sole will and authority of the church? Further, he will have us to obey even such things as authority prescribeth not rightly (that is, such rites as do not set forward godliness), and that because they have the force of a constitution. He saith that we should be directed by the sentence of superiors, and take it as a sufficient ground to our consciences for obeying. Bellarmine speaketh more reasonably: *Leges humanæ non obligant sub pœna mortis æternæ, nisi quatenus violatione legis humanæ offenditur Deus*. Lindsey thinketh that the will of the law must be the rule of our consciences; he saith not the reason of the law, but the will of the law. And when we talk with the chief of our opposites, they would bind us by sole authority, because they cannot do it by any reason. But we answer out of Pareus,² that the particular laws of the church bind not *per se*, or *propter ipsum speciale mandatum ecclesie*. *Ratio: quia ecclesia res adiaphoras non jubet facere vel omittere propter suum mandatum, sed tantum propter justas mandandi causas, ut sunt conservatio ordinis, vitatio scandali: quæ quamdiu non violantur, conscientias liberas relinquit*.

Sect. 13. Thus we have found what power they give to their canons about the ceremonies for binding of our consciences, and that a necessity not of practice only upon the outward man, but of opinion also upon the conscience is imposed by the sole will of the law-makers. Wherefore, we pray God to open their eyes, that they may see their ceremonial laws to be substantial tyrannies over the consciences of God's people. And for ourselves, we stand to the judgment of sounder divines, and we hold with Luther,³ that *unum Dominum habemus qui animas nostras gubernat*. With Hemmingius,⁴ that we are free *ab omnibus humanis ritibus, quantum quidem ad conscientiam attinet*.

¹ Ibid. p. 363.

² Par. Com. in Rom. xiv. dub. 7.

³ Ubi supra, p. 372.

⁴ In Dan. vi.

¹ De Pont. Rom. lib. 4, cap. 20.

² Ubi supra.

³ Com. in 1 Pet. v. 3.

⁴ Eucharist. class. 3, cap. 14.

With the Professors of Leyden,¹ that this is a part of the liberty of all the faithful, that in things pertaining to God's worship, *ab omni traditionum humanarum iugo liberæ habeant conscientias, cum solius Dei sit, res ad religionem pertinentes præscribere*.

CHAPTER V.

THAT THE CEREMONIES TAKE AWAY CHRISTIAN LIBERTY, PROVED BY A THIRD REASON, VIZ., BECAUSE THEY ARE URGED UPON SUCH AS, IN THEIR CONSCIENCES, DO CONDEMN THEM.

Sect. 1. If Christian liberty be taken away, by adstricting conscience in any, much more by adstricting it in them who are fully persuaded of the unlawfulness of the thing enjoined; yet thus are we dealt with. Bishop Lindsey gives us to understand, that after the making and publication of an ecclesiastical canon, about things of this nature, albeit a man in his own private judgment think another thing more expedient than that which the canon prescribeth, yet in that case his conscience must be ruled by the will of the law, and not by his own judgment. And Bishop Spotswood, to such as object, that their conscience will not suffer them to obey, because they are persuaded that such things are not right, answereth; that the sentence of their superiors ought to direct them, and make their conscience yield to obedience. Their words I have before transcribed. By which it doth manifestly appear, that they would bear dominion over our consciences, not as lords only, by requiring the willing and ready assent of our consciences to those things which are urged upon us by their sole will and authority, but even as tyrants, not caring if they get so much as constrained obedience, and if by their authority they can compel conscience to that which is contrary to the *πληροφροσύνη* and full persuasion which it hath conceived.

Sect. 2. It will be said, that our consciences are in an error, and therefore ought to be corrected by the sentence of superiors, whose authority and will doth bind us to receive and embrace the ceremonies, though our consciences do condemn them. *Ans.*

Giving, and not granting, that our consciences do err in condemning the ceremonies, yet, so long as they cannot be otherwise persuaded, the ceremonies ought not to be urged upon us; for if we be made to do that which our consciences do condemn, we are made to sin, Rom. xiv. 23. It is an audacious contempt, in Calvin's judgment,¹ to do anything *repugnante conscientia*. The learned Casuists teach us, that an erring conscience, though *non obligat*, yet *ligat*; though we be not obliged to do that which it prescribeth, yet are we bound not to do that which it condemneth. *Quicquid fit repugnante et reclamante conscientia, peccatum est, etiamsi repugnantia ista gravem errorem includat*, saith Alsted.² *Conscientia erronea obligat, sic intelligendo, quod faciens contra peccet*, saith Hemmingius.³ This holds ever true of an erring conscience about matters of fact, and especially about things indifferent. If any say, that hereby a necessity of sinning is laid on them whose consciences are in an error, I answer, that so long as a man keeps an erroneous conscience, a necessity of sinning lies on him, and that through his own fault. This necessity ariseth from this supposition, that he retain his erring conscience, and so is not absolute, because he should inform his conscience rightly, so that he may both do that which he ought to do, and do it so from the approbation of his conscience. If it be said again, What should be done to them who have not laid down the error of conscience, but do still retain the same? I answer, *eligatur id quod tutius et melius est*.⁴ If therefore the error of conscience be about weighty and necessary matters, then it is better to urge men to the doing of a necessary duty in the service of God, than to permit them to neglect the same, because their erring conscience disapproveth it; for example, it is better to urge a profane man to come and hear God's word than to suffer him to neglect the hearing of the same, because his conscience alloweth him not to hear. But if the error of conscience be about unnecessary things, or such as are in themselves indifferent, then it is *pars tutior*, the surest and safest part not to urge men to do that which in their consciences they condemn. Wherefore, since the cere-

¹ Comment. in Rom. xiv. 5.

² Theol. Cas. cap. 2.

³ Enehyr. class. 2, cap. 7.

⁴ Bald. de Cons. Cas. lib. 1, cap. 8.

¹ Synt. pur. Theol. disp. 35, thes. 17.

monies are not among the number of such necessary things as may not be omitted without the peril of salvation, the invincible disallowance of our consciences should make our opposites not press them upon us, because by practising them we could not but sin, in that our consciences judge them unlawful. If any of our weak brethren think that he must and should abstain from the eating of flesh upon some certain day, though this thing be in itself indifferent, and not necessary, yet, saith Baldwin,¹ "he who is thus persuaded in his conscience, if he should do the contrary, sinneth."

Sect. 3. Conscience, then, though erring, doth ever bind in such sort, that he who doth against his conscience sinneth against God. Which is also the doctrine of Thomas.² But, without any more ado, it is sufficiently confirmed from Scripture. For, was not their conscience in an error who thought they might not lawfully eat all sorts of meat? Yet the Apostle showeth that their conscience, as erring as it was, did so bind, that they were damned if they should eat such meat as they judged to be unclean, Rom. xiv. 14, 23. The reason wherefore an erring conscience bindeth in this kind is, *quoniam agens*, &c.³ "Because he who doth any thing against his conscience doth it against the will of God, though not materially and truly, yet formally and by way of interpretation, forso much as that which conscience counsellet or prescribeth, it counsellet it under the respect and account of the will of God. He who reproacheth some private man, taking him to be the king, is thought to have hurt not the private man, but the king himself. So he that condemneth his conscience condemneth God himself, because that which conscience counsellet or adviseth is taken to be God's will." If I go with certain men upon such a course as I judge and esteem to be a treasonable conspiracy against the king (though it be not so indeed), would not his Majesty (if he knew so much), and might he not, justly condemn me as a wicked traitor? But how much more will the King of kings condemn me if I practice the ceremonies which I judge in my conscience to be contrary to the will of God, and to rob him of his royal prerogative?

¹ De Cons. Cas. lib. 1, cap. 7.

² 1 an. 2 an. quest. 19, art. 5.

³ Ames. de Cons. lib. 1, cap. 4.

CHAPTER VI.

THAT THE CEREMONIES TAKE AWAY CHRISTIAN LIBERTY PROVED BY A FOURTH REASON, VIZ., BECAUSE THEY ARE PRESSED UPON US BY NAKED WILL AND AUTHORITY, WITHOUT GIVING ANY REASON TO SATISFY OUR CONSCIENCES.

Sect. 1. When the Apostle forbiddeth us to be the servants of men, 1 Cor. vii. 23, is it not his meaning that we should do nothing upon the mere will and pleasure of men, or *propter hominem et non propter Deum*, as Becane the Jesuit expoundeth it,¹ illustrating what he saith by another place, Eph. vi. 6, 7. Christian servants thought it an unworthy thing to serve wicked men,² neither yet took they well with the serving of godly men, for that they were all brethren in Christ. The Apostle answereth them, that they did not the will of man, because it was the will of man, but because it was the will of God, and so they served God rather than man, importing that it were indeed a grievous yoke for any Christian to do the will of man, if he were not sure that it is according to the will of God. Should any synod of the church take more upon them than the synod of the apostles did, who enjoined nothing at their own pleasure, but only what they show to be necessary, because of the law of charity? Acts xv. 28. Or should Christians, who ought not to be children, carried about with every wind, Eph. iv. 14; who should be able to discern both good and evil, Heb. v. 14; in whom the word of God ought to dwell plentifully, Col. iii. 16; who are commanded to beware of men, Matt. x. 17; not to believe every spirit, to prove all things, 1 John iv. 1; and to judge of all that is said to them, 1 Thes. v. 21; should they, I say, be used as stocks and stones, not capable of reason, and therefore to be borne down by naked will and authority? 1 Cor. x. 15. Yet thus it fareth with us. Bishop Lindsey will have the will of the law to rule our consciences,³ which is by interpretation, *Sic volo, sic jubeo, sit pro ratione voluntas*. He gives us not the reason or equity of the law, but only the will of it, to be our rule. Bishop Spotswood⁴ will have us to be so directed by the sentence of our superiors, that we take their sentence as

¹ Manual. lib. 4, cap. 4.

² Zanch. Comm. in Illu. Lucum.

³ Ubi supra. ⁴ Ubi supra.

a sufficient ground to our consciences for obeying. Which is so much as to say, you should not examine the reason and utility of the law, the sentence of it is enough for you: try no more when you hear the sentence of superiors, rest your consciences upon this as a sufficient ground: seek no other, for their sentence must be obeyed. And who among us knoweth not how, in the Assembly of Perth, free reasoning was shut to the door, and all ears were filled with the dreadful pale of authority? There is this much chronicled¹ in two relations of the proceedings of the same, howbeit otherwise very different. They who did sue for a reformation of church discipline in England, complained that they received no other answer but this:² "There is a law, it must be obeyed;" and after the same manner are we used. Yet is this too hard dealing, in the judgment of a Formalist, who saith,³ that the church doth not so deal with them whom Christ hath redeemed: *Ac si non possint capere quid sit religiosum, quid minus, itaque quæ ab ecclesia proficiuntur, admonitiones potius et hortationes dici debent, quam leges*. And after, he says of ecclesiastical authority, *tenetur reddere perscripti rationem*. "I grant (saith Paybody⁴) it is unlawful to do, in God's worship, anything upon the mere pleasure of man." Chemnitius⁵ taketh the Tridentine fathers for not expounding *rationes decreti*. Junius observeth,⁶ that in the council of the apostles, mention was made of the reason of their decree. And a learned historian observeth⁷ of the ancient councils, that there were in them, reasonings, colloquies, discussions, disputes, yea, that whatsoever was done or spoken, was called the acts of the council, and all was given unto all. *Cæterum* (saith Damæus⁸) *quoniam ut ait Tertullianus in Apologetico, iniqua lex est quæ se examinari non patitur; non tam vi cogere homines ad obsequium quam ratione persuadere debent cæ leges, quæ scribuntur à pio nomotheta. Ergo fere sunt duæ cujusvis legis partes, quemadmodum etiam Plato, lib. 4, de legibus scribit, nimirum præfatio*

et lex ipsa, i.e. jussio lege comprehensa. Præfatio causam affert, cur hominum negotiis sic prospiciatur. Ecclesiastical authority should prescribe what it thinks fit, *Magis docendo, quam jubendo; magis monendo, quam minando*, as Augustine speaketh.¹ *Non oportet vi vel necessitate constringere, sed ratione et vitæ exemplis suadere*, saith Gregory Nazianzen,² speaking of ecclesiastical regiment. They, therefore, who give their will for a law, and their authority for a reason, and answer all the arguments of opponents, by bearing them down with the force of a public constitution and the judgment of superiors, to which theirs must be conformed, do rule the Lord's flock "with force and with cruelty," Ezek. xxxiv. 4; "as lords over God's heritage," 1 Pet. v. 3.

Sect. 2. Always, since men give us no leave to try their decrees and constitutions, that we may hold fast no more than is good, God be thanked that we have a warrant to do it (without their leave) from his own word, 1 Thes. v. 25. *Non numeranda suffragia, sed appendenda*, saith Augustine in Psal. xxxix. Our divines hold,³ that all things which are proposed by the ministers of the church, yea, by œcumenical councils,⁴ should be proved and examined; and that, when the guides of the church do institute any ceremonies as necessary for edification, yet *ecclesia liberum habet judicium approbandi aut reprobandi eas*.⁵ Nay, the canon law,⁶ prohibiting to depart or swerve from the rules and discipline of the Roman church, yet excepteth *discretionem justitiæ* and so permitteth to do otherwise than the church prescribeth, if it be done *cum discretionem justitiæ*. The schoolmen also give liberty to a private man, of proving the statutes of the church, and neglecting the same, if he see cause for doing so, *Si causa fit evidens, per se ipsam licite potest homo statuti observantiam præterire*.⁷ If any be not able to examine and try all such things, *debent omnes posse, Dei jussu: Deficiunt ergo sua culpa*, saith Pareus.⁸ *Si recte probandi facultati destitui nos sentimus, ab eodem spiritu qui per prophetas suos*

¹ Ep. 64.

² In Apologet.

³ Chem. Exam. part. 1, de Bon. Oper. p. 180.

⁴ Synt. pur. Theol. disp. 49, thes. 72.

⁵ Magd. cen. 1, lib. 2, cap. 4, co. 443.

⁶ Decr. part. 1, dist. 12, cap. 1.

⁷ Aquin. 2, 2^a. 4, 147, art. 4.

⁸ Coom. in 1 Cor. x. 15.

¹ Perth Assem. p. 8—10, and B. Lindsey, in the Proceedings set down by him, p. 63, 64.

² Park, of the Cross, cap. 5, sect. 10.

³ Camer. Præl. tom. 1, de Pœst. Eccl. contr. 2.

⁴ Apol. part. 3, cap. 1, sect. 25.

⁵ Exam. part. 3, de Cælib. Sacer. p. 38.

⁶ Animad. in Bel. cont. 3, lib. 4, cap. 16.

⁷ Hist. of the Coun. of Treot, lib. 2.

⁸ Polit. Christ, lib. 5, cap. 3.

loquitur portenda est, saith Calvin.¹ We will not then call any man rabbi, nor *jurare in verba magistri*, nor yet be Pythagorean disciples to the church herself, but we will believe her and obey her in so far only as she is the pillar and ground of truth.

CHAPTER VII.

THAT FESTIVAL DAYS TAKE AWAY OUR LIBERTY, WHICH GOD HATH GIVEN US, PROVED; AND FIRST OUT OF THE LAW.

Sect. 1. That which hath been said against all the controverted ceremonies in general, I will now instance of festival days in particular, and prove, both out of the law and gospel, that they take away our liberty which God hath given us, and which no human power can take from us. Out of the law we frame this argument: If the law of God permit us to work all the six days of the week, the law of man cannot inhibit us. But the law of God doth permit us to work all the six days of the week; therefore our opposites deny not the assumption, which is plain from the fourth commandment, "Six days shalt thou labour," &c. But they would have somewhat to say against the proposition, which we will hear. Hooker tells us,² that these things that the law of God leaves arbitrary and at liberty, are subject to the positive ordinances of men. This, I must say, is strange divinity; for if this were true, then might the laws of men prohibit marriage, because it is left arbitrary, 1 Cor. vii. 36. Then might they also have discharged the apostle Paul to take wages, because here-in he was at liberty, 1 Cor. ix. 11—13.

Sect. 2. Tilen lendeth the cause another lift, and answereth,³ that no sober man will say, *per missionem Dei, principibus suum circa res medias jus imminuere, num enim ob permissum hominibus dominium in volucres cæli, in pisces maris, et bestias agrarii, impie fuerint leges principum, quibus aucupii, piscationes, et venationis libertatem, sebditis aliis indulgent, aliis adimunt.* Ans. That case and this are very different. For every particular man hath not dominion and power over all fowls, fishes, and

beasts (else, beside that princes should have no privilege of inhibiting the use of those things, there should be no propriety of heritage and possession among subjects); but power over all things is given to mankind. Pareus observeth,⁴ *hominem collective intelligi* in that place, Gen. i. 26; and Junius observeth,⁵ *nomen Adam de specie esse intelligendum*. But each particular man, and not mankind alone, is permitted to labour six days. Wherefore it is plain, that man's liberty is not abridged in the other case as in this, because mankind hath dominion over these creatures, when some men only do exercise the same, as well as if all men did exercise it.

Sect. 3. Bishop Lindsey's answer is no better,⁶ viz., that this liberty which God hath given unto men for labour is not absolute, but subject unto order. For, 1. What tyranny is there so great, spoiling men wholly of their liberty, but this pretence agreeth to it? For, by order, he understandeth the constitutions of our governors, as is clear from his preceding words, so that this may be alleged for a just excuse of any tyranny of governors (that men must be subject unto order), no less than for taking away from us the liberty of labouring six days. 2. This answer is nothing else but a begging of that which is in question, for the present question is, whether or not the constitutions of our governors may inhibit us to labour all the six days of the week, and yet he saith no more, but that this liberty of labour must be subject to order, i.e., to the constitutions of governors. 3. Albeit we should most humbly subject ourselves to our governors, yet we may not submit our liberty to them, which God hath graciously given us, because we are forbidden to be the servants of men, 1 Cor. vii. 23; or to be entangled with the yoke of bondage, Gal. v. 1.

Sect. 4. Yet we must hear what the Bishop can say against our proposition:⁷ "If under the law (saith he) God did not spoil his people of liberty, when he appointed them to rest two days at Pasche, one at Whitsunday, &c., how can the king's majesty and the church be esteemed to spoil us of our liberty, that command a cessation from labour on three days?" &c. O horrible blasphemy! O double deceitfulness! Blas-

¹ Comm. in 1 Thes. v. 21.

² Præl. in Eundem Locum.

³ Pro. In Præf. Assen. par. 3, p. 13.

⁴ Ubi supra.

⁵ Comm. in 1 Thes. v. 21.

⁶ Eccl. Pol. lib. 5, n. 71.

⁷ Par. æs. ad Seco. cap. 16, p. 64.

phemy, because so much power is ascribed to the king and the church over us, as God had over his people of old. God did justly command his people, under the law, to rest from labour on other days beside the Sabbath, without wronging them; therefore the king and the church may as justly, and with doing as little wrong, command us to rest likewise, because God, by a ceremonial law, did hinder his people from the use of so much liberty, as the moral law did give them; therefore the king and the church may do so also. Deceitfulness, in that he saith, God did not spoil his people of liberty, &c. We know that, by appointing them to rest on these days, God did not take away liberty from his people, simply and absolutely, because they had no more liberty than he did allow to them by his laws, which he gave by the hand of Moses, yet he did take away that liberty which one part of his laws did permit to them, viz., the fourth commandment of the moral law, which permitted them to labour six days. The Bishop knew that this question in hand hath not to do with liberty, in the general notion of it, but with liberty which the moral law doth permit. We say, then, that God took away from his people Israel, some of the liberty which his moral law permitted to them, because he was the Lawgiver and Lord of the law; and that the king and the church cannot do the like with us, because they are no more lords over God's law than the people who are set under them.

Sect. 5. But he hath yet more to say against us: "If the king (saith he) may command a cessation from economical and private works, for works civil and public, such as the defence of the crown, the liberty of the country, &c., what reason have ye why he may not enjoin a day of cessation from all kind of bodily labour, for the honour of God and exercise of religion?" &c. Ans. This kind of reasoning is most vicious, for three respects: 1. It supposeth that he who may command a cessation from one kind of labour, upon one of the six days, may also command a cessation from all kind of labour, but there is a difference; for the law of God hath allowed us to labour six days of every week, which liberty no human power can take from us. But we cannot say that the law of God alloweth us six days of every week to economical and private works (for then we should never be bound to put our hands to a public work), whence it cometh

that the magistrate hath power left him to command a cessation from some labour, but not from all. 2. The Bishop reasoneth from a cessation from ordinary labour for extraordinary labour, to a cessation from ordinary labour for no labour; for they who use their weapons for the defence of the crown, or liberty of the country, do not cease from labour, but only change ordinary labour into extraordinary, and private labour into public, whereas our opposites plead for a cessation from all labour upon their holidays. 3. He skippeth *de genere in genus*, because the king may command a cessation for civil works; therefore he may command a holy rest for the exercise of religion, as if he had so great power in sacred as in civil things.

Sect. 6. The Bishop hath yet a third dart to throw at us: "If the church (saith he) hath power, upon occasional motives, to appoint occasional fasts or festivities, may not she, for constant and eternal blessings, which do infinitely excel all occasional benefits, appoint ordinary times of commemoration or thanksgiving?" Ans. There are two reasons for which the church may and should appoint fasts or festivities upon occasional motives, and neither of them agreeth with ordinary festivities. 1. Extraordinary fasts, either for obtaining some great blessing, or averting some great judgment, are necessary means to be used in such cases; likewise, extraordinary festivities are necessary testifications of our thankfulness for the benefits which we have impetrated by our extraordinary fasts; but ordinary festivities, for constant and eternal blessings, have no necessary use. The celebration of set anniversary days is no necessary mean for conserving the commemoration of the benefits of redemption, because we have occasion, not only every Sabbath day, but every other day, to call to mind these benefits, either in hearing, or reading, or meditating upon God's word. *Dics Christo dicatos tollendos existimo judicoque*, saith Danæus.¹ *quotidie nobis in evangelii prædicatione nascitur, circumciditur, moritur, resurgit Christus.* God hath given his church a general precept for extraordinary fasts, Joel i. 14; ii. 15, as likewise for extraordinary festivities to praise God, and to give him thanks in the public assembly of his people, upon the occasional motive of some great

¹ lb. p. 26, 27.

² Apud Bald. de Cas. Cons. lib. 2, cap. 12, cas. 1.

benefit which, by the means of our fasting and praying, we have obtained, Zech. viii. 19 with vii. 3. If it be said that there is a general command for set festivities, because there is a command for preaching and hearing the word, and for praising God for his benefits; and that there is no precept for particular fasts more than for particular festivities, I answer: Albeit there is a command for preaching and hearing the word, and for praising God for his benefits, yet is there no command (no, not in the most general generality) for annexing these exercises of religion to set anniversary days more than to other days; whereas it is plain, that there is a general command for fasting and humiliation at some times more than at other times. And as for particularities, all the particular causes, occasions, and times of fasting, could not be determined in Scripture, because they are infinite, as Camero saith.¹ But all the particular causes of set festivities, and the number of the same, might have been easily determined in Scripture, since they are not, nor may not be infinite; for the Bishop himself acknowledgeth,² that to appoint a festival day for every week, cannot stand with charity, the inseparable companion of piety. And albeit so many were allowable, yet who seeth not how easily the Scripture might have comprehended them, because they are set, constant, and anniversary times, observed for permanent and continuing causes, and not moveable or mutable, as fasts which are appointed for occurring causes, and therefore may be infinite. I conclude that, since God's word hath given us a general command for occasional fasts, and likewise particularly determined sundry things anent the causes, occasions, nature, and manner of fastings, we may well say with Cartwright,³ that days of fasting are appointed at "such times, and upon such occasions, as the Scripture doth set forth; wherein because the church commandeth nothing, but that which God commandeth, the religious observation of them, falleth unto the obedience of the fourth commandment, as well as of the seventh day itself."

Sect. 7. The Bishop presseth us with a fourth argument,⁴ taken from the calling of people in great towns from their ordinary

¹ Præl. tom. 1; de Pot. Eccl. contr. 2.

² Ubi supra, p. 16.

³ Ag. the Rhem. annot. on Gal. iv. 10.

⁴ Ubi supra, p. 16, 17.

labours to divine service, which argument Tilen also beateth upon.¹ Ans. There is huge difference betwixt the rest which is enjoined upon anniversary festivities, and the rest which is required during the time of the weekly meetings for divine worship. For, 1. Upon festival days, rest from labour is required all the day over, whereas, upon the days of ordinary and weekly meetings, rest is required only during the time of public worship. 2. Cessation from labour, for prayers or preaching on those appointed days of the week, at some occasions may be omitted; but the rest and commemoration appointed by the church, to be precisely observed upon the anniversary festival days, must not be omitted, in the Bishop's judgment.² 3. Men are straitly commanded and compelled to rest from labour upon holidays; but to leave work to come to the ordinary weekly meetings, they are only exhorted. And here I mark how the Bishop contradicteth himself; for in one place where his antagonist maintaineth truly, that the craftsman cannot be lawfully commanded nor compelled to leave his work and to go to public divine service, except on the day that the Lord hath sanctified, he replieth,³ "If he may be lawfully commanded to cease from his labour during the time of divine service, he may be as lawfully compelled to obey the command." Who can give these words any sense, or see anything in them said against his antagonist's position, except he be taken to say, that the craftsman may be both commanded and compelled to leave his work and go to divine service on the week-days appointed for the same? Nay, he laboureth to prove thus much out of the ninth head of the *First Book of Discipline*, which saith, "In great towns we think expedient, that every day there be either sermon or common prayers," &c., where there is nothing of compulsion, or a forcing command, only there is an exhortation. But ere the Bishop have said much, he forgetteth himself, and tells us,⁴ that it were against equity and charity to adstrict the husbandman to leave his plough so oft as the days of weekly preaching do return, but that, on the festival days, reason would, that if he did not leave his plough willingly, by authority he should be forced. Which place confirmeth this difference which we give betwixt rest on

¹ Paran. ad Sco. cap. 16, p. 64.

² Ubi supra, p. 25.

³ Ibid. p. 17.

⁴ Ibid. p. 27.

the holidays, and rest at the times of weekly meeting.

CHAPTER VIII.

THAT FESTIVAL DAYS TAKE AWAY OUR CHRISTIAN LIBERTY, PROVED OUT OF THE GOSPEL.

Sect. 1. My second argument whereby I prove that the imposing of the observation of holidays doth bereave us of our liberty, I take out of two places of the Apostle; the one, Gal. iv. 10, where he finds fault with the Galatians for observing of days, and giveth them two reasons against them; the one, ver. 3, They were a yoke of bondage which neither they nor their fathers were able to bear; another, ver. 8, They were weak and beggarly rudiments, not beseeching the Christian church, which is liberate from the pedagogical instruction of the ceremonial law. The other place is Col. ii. 16, where the Apostle will have the Colossians not to suffer themselves to be judged by any man in respect of an holiday, i. e. to be condemned for not observing a holiday, for *judicare hic significat culpe reum facere*; and the meaning is, suffer not yourselves to be condemned by those false apostles, or by any mortal man in the cause of meat, that is, for meat or drink taken, or for any holiday, or any part of an holiday neglected.² Two other reasons the Apostle giveth in this place against festival days; one, ver. 17, What should we do with the shadow, when we have the body? another, ver. 20, Why should we be subject to human ordinances, since through Christ we are dead to them, and have nothing ado with them? Now, by the same reasons are all holidays to be condemned, as taking away Christian liberty; and so, that which the Apostle saith doth militate as well against them as against any other holidays; for whereas it might be thought, that the Apostle doth not condemn all holidays, because both he permitteth others to observe days, Rom. xiv. 5, and he himself also did observe one of the Jewish feasts, Acts xviii. 21: it is easily answered, that our holidays have no warrant from these places, except our opposites will say, that they esteem their festival days holier

than other days, and that they observe the Jewish festivities, neither of which they do acknowledge, and if they did, yet they must consider, that that which the Apostle either said or did hereanent, is to be expounded and understood of bearing with the weak Jews, whom he permitted to esteem one day above another, and for whose cause he did, in his own practice, thus far apply himself to their infirmity at that time when they could not possibly be as yet fully and thoroughly instructed concerning Christian liberty, and the abrogation of the ceremonial law, because the gospel was as yet not fully propagated; and when the Messiaical rites were like a dead man not yet buried, as Augustine's simile runs. So that all this can make nothing for holidays after the full promulgation of the gospel, and after that the Jewish ceremonies are not only dead, but also buried, and so deadly to be used by us. Hence it is, that the Apostle will not bear with the observation of days in Christian churches, who have known God, as he speaks.

Sect. 2. The defenders of holidays answer to these places which we allege against them, that the Apostle condemneth the observation of Judaical days, not of ecclesiastical days, which the church instituteth for order and policy; which evasion Bishop Lindsey¹ followeth so hard, that he sticketh not to hold, that "all the days whereof the Apostle condemneth the observation were Judaical days prescribed in the ceremonial law," &c. And this he is not contented to maintain himself, but he will needs father it upon his antagonist by such logic, forsooth, as can infer *quidlibet ex quolibet*. The Apostle comporteth with the observation of days in the weak Jews, who understood not the fulness of the Christian liberty, especially since those days, having had the honour to be once appointed by God himself, were to be honourably buried; but the same Apostle reproves the Galatians who had attained to this liberty, and had once left off the observation of days. What ground of consequence can warrant such an illation from these premises as this which the Bishop formeth, namely, that "all the days whereof the Apostle condemned the observation were Judaical days," &c.

Sect. 3. Now, for confutation of this forged exposition of those places of the

¹ Calv. Comm. in illam locum.

² Zanch. Comm. ibid.

³ Proc. in Perth Assembly, part. 3, p. 43.

Apostle, we say, 1. If all the days whereof the Apostle condemned the observation were Judaical days prescribed in the ceremonial law, then do our divines falsely interpret the Apostle's words against popish holidays, and the Papists do truly allege that their holidays are not condemned by the Apostle. The Rhomists affirm, that the Apostle condemneth only Jewish days,¹ but not Christian days, and that we do falsely interpret his words against their holidays.² Cartwright answereth them,³ that if Paul condemned the observing of feasts which God himself instituted, then much more doth he condemn the observation of feasts of man's devising. So Bellarmine allegeth,⁴ *loqui ibi Apostolum de judeorum tantum festis*. Hospinian, answering him, will have the Apostle's words to condemn the Christian feasts more than the Judaical.⁵ Conrads Vorstius rejecteth this position, *Apostolus non nisi judaicum discremen dierum in N. T. sublatum esse docet*, as a popish error.⁶ 2. If the Apostle mean only of Judaical days, either he condemneth the observing of their days *materialiter*, or *formaliter*, i. e. either he condemneth the observation of the same feasts which the Jews observed, or the observing of them with such a meaning, after such a manner, and for such an end as the Jews did. The former our opposites dare not hold, for then they should grant that he condemneth their own Easter and Pentecost, because these two feasts were observed by the Jews. Nor yet can they hold them at the latter, for he condemneth that observation of days which had crept into the church of Galatia, which was not Jewish nor typical, seeing the Galatians, believing that Christ was already come, could not keep them as figures of his coming as the Jews did, but rather as memorials that he was already come, saith Cartwright.⁷ 1. If the Apostle's reasons wherewith he impugneth the observation of days, hold good against our holidays so well as against the Jewish or popish days, then doth he condemn those, no less these. But the Apostle's reasons agree to our holidays. For, 1. According to that reason, Gal. iv.

¹ Annot. on Col. ii. 16.

² Annot. on Gal. iv. 10.

³ Annot. ibid.

⁴ De Cult. Sanct., cap. 10.

⁵ De Orig. Fest. Christ. cap. 2.

⁶ De Templ. et Fest. in Euclyrid. contr. inter Evang. et Pontif.

⁷ Ubi supra.

3, they bring us under a yoke of bondage. Augustine,¹ complaining of some ceremonies wherewith the church in his time was burdened, thought it altogether best that they should be cut off, *Etiamsi fidei non videantur adversari, quia religionem quam Christus liberam esse voluit, servilibus oneribus premunt*. Yea, he thought this yoke of servitude greater bondage, and less tolerable than the servility of the Jews, because they were subject to the burdens of the law of God, and not to the presumptions of men. The yoke of bondage of Christians, in respect of feasts, is heavier than the yoke of the Jews, not only for the multitude of them, but because *Christianorum festa, ab hominibus tantum, judeorum vero a Deo fuerint instituta*, saith Hospinian.² Have not we then reason to exclaim against our holidays, as a yoke of bondage, heavier than that of the Jews, for that our holidays are men's inventions, and so were not theirs? The other reason, Gal. iv. 9, holdeth as good against our holidays. They are rudimental and pedagogical elements, which beseech not the Christian church, for as touching that which Tilen objecteth,³ that many in the church of the New Testament are still babes to be fed with milk, it maketh as much against the Apostle as against us; for by this reason, he may as well throw back the Apostle's ground of condemning holidays among the Galatians, and say, because many of the Galatians were babes, therefore they had the more need of those elements and rudiments. The Apostle, Gal. iv. 3, compareth the church of the Old Testament to an infant, and insinuateth, that in the days of the New Testament the infancy of the church hath taken an end. And whereas it might be objected, that in the church of the New Testament there are many babes, and that the Apostle himself speaketh of the Corinthians and Hebrews as babes: it is answered by Pareus,⁴ *Non de paucis personis, sed de statu totius ecclesie intelligendum est quod hic dicitur*. There were also some in the church of the Old Testament, *adulti fide heroes*; but in respect of the state of the whole church, who is least in the kingdom of God, is greater than John Baptist, Luke vii. 28. *Lex, saith Beza, vocatur elementa, quia illis velut*

¹ Epist. 118, ad Januar.

² De Orig. Fest. Christ. cap. 2.

³ Paren. ad Scot. cap. 16, pp. 66.

⁴ Comm. in illum locum.

*rudimentis, Deus ecclesiam suam crudivit, postea pleno cornu effudit Spiritum Sanctum tempore evangelii.*¹ 3. That reason also taken from the opposition of the shadow and the body, Col. ii. 17, doth militate against our holidays; for the Apostle there speaketh in the present time, *Etia nã*: whereas the Judaical rites were abolished, whereupon Zanchius noteth,² that the Apostle doth not so much speak of things by-past, as of the very nature of all rites, *Definiens ergo ipsos ritus in sese, dixit eos nil aliud esse quam umbram*. If all rites, then our holidays among the rest, serve only to adumbrate and shadow forth something, and by consequence are unprofitable and idle, when the substance itself is clearly set before us. 4. That reason, Col. ii. 20, doth no less irresistibly infringe the ordinances about our holidays than about the Jewish; for if men's ordinances, about things once appointed by God himself, ought not to be obeyed, how much less should the precepts of men be received about such things in religion as never had this honour to be God's ordinances, when their mere authority doth limit or adstrict us in things which God hath made lawful or free to us. Sect. 4. Thus we see how the Apostle's reasons hold good against our holidays; let us see next what respects of difference the Bishop can imagine to evidence wherefore the Judaical days may be thought condemned by the Apostle, and not ours. He deviseth a double respect; and first he tells us,³ that the Jewish observation of days was to a typical use. And whereas it is objected by us, that the converted Jews did not observe them as shadows of things to come, because then they had denied Christ, he answereth thus: "Howbeit the converted Jews did not observe the Jewish days as shadows of things to come, yet they might have observed them as memorials of by-past temporal and typical benefits, and for present temporal blessings, as the benefit of their delivery out of Egypt, and of the fruits of the earth, which use was also typical." Ans. 1. This is his own conjecture only, therefore he dare not say, they did observe them as memorials, &c., but, they might have observed, to which guessing, if I reply, they might also not have observed them as memorials

of those by-past or present benefits, we say as much against him, and as truly, as he hath said against us. 2. His form of reasoning is very uncouth, for, to prove that the observation of days by the converted Jews was to a typical use, he allegeth, that they might have observed, &c. Thus proving a position by a supposition. O brave! 3. There is no sense in his conjecture, for he yields that they did not observe those days as shadows of things to come, and yet he saith, they might have observed them as memorials of by-past typical benefits; now they could not observe those days as memorials of types, except they observed them also as shadowing forth the antitypes. Pentecost, saith Davenant,¹ *et illa legis date celebratio. Spiritus Sancti missionem, et legis in tabulis cordium per eundem Spiritum inscriptionem, adumbravit. Scenopegie festum peregrinationem hominis pii per hoc mundi desertum ad celestem patriam delineabat, &c.* So that the feast of Pentecost, if it had been observed as a memorial of the promulgation of the law, could not but shadow forth the sending of the Holy Spirit into our hearts, to write the law in them. And the feast of tabernacles, if it had been observed as a memorial of the benefits which God bestowed on his people in the wilderness, could not but shadow out God's conducting of his children, through the course of their pilgrimage in this world, to the heavenly Canaan. 4. If feasts which were memorials of temporal benefits, were for this reason mystical, then he must grant against himself, that much more are our feasts mystical, which are memorials of spiritual benefits, and consecrated to be holy signs and symbols, for making us call to mind the mysteries of our redemption. 5. Before this dispute take an end, we shall see out of the best learned among our opposites, that they observe the holidays as mystical,² and more mystical than the Bishop here describeth the Jewish days to have been, and so we shall see the falsehood of that pretence, that they are observed only for order and policy, and not for mystery. 6. If we would know the true reason which made the converted Jews to observe those days, it was not any mystical use, but that which made them think themselves obliged to other Mosaisical rites; even *propter auctoritatem le-*

¹ Annot. in Gal. iv. 3.

² Comm. in illum locum.

³ Ubi supra, p. 40.

¹ Comm. in Col. ii. 17.

² Infra. part 3, in the arg. of Syncretism.

gis, saith Junius;¹ for albeit they could not be ignorant, that these rites were shadows of things to come, and that the body was of Christ, in whom, and in the virtue of whose death they did stablish their faith, yet they did not at first understand how such things as were once appointed by God himself, and given to his people as ordinances to be kept by him throughout their generations, could be altogether abolished, and for this cause, though they did condescend to a change of the use and signification of those ceremonies, as being no more typical of the kingdom of Christ, which they believed to be already come, yet still they held themselves bound to the use of the things themselves as things commanded by God.

Thus much may be collected from Acts xv. 21, where James gives a reason wherefore it was expedient that the Gentiles should observe some of the Jewish rites for a time, as Calvin,² Beza,³ and Junius,⁴ expound the place. His reason is, because the Jews, being so long accustomed with the hearing of the law of Moses, and such as did preach the same, could not be made at first to understand how the ordinances which God gave to his people by the hand of Moses, might be cast off and not regarded, which importeth as much as I say, namely, that the reason wherefore the converted Jews were so apt to be scandalised by such as cared not for the ceremonial law, and held themselves obliged to observe the same, was because they saw not how they could be exempted from the ordinances and statutes of the law of Moses, with which they had been educated and accustomed.

Sect. 5. Rests the second respect of difference given by the Bishop: "Further (saith he), they did observe them with opinion of necessity, as things instituted by God for his worship and their salvation, which sort of observation was legal."⁵ Ans. 1. Be it so; he cannot hereupon infer, that the Apostle doth only condemn the observation of Judaical days, for he saith nothing of observing days with opinion of necessity, but simply and absolutely he condemneth the observing of days, and his reasons reflex on our holidays, as well as the Jewish. 2. Their opinion of necessity he either refers to

the institution which these days once had from God, or else to the use which, at that time, they had for God's worship and their salvation. That they observed them with opinion of necessity, as things which had been instituted by God, it is most likely; but that they observed them with opinion of necessity, as things necessary for God's worship and their salvation, is more than can be made good; it is more probable that they observed them merely and simply for that they had the honour to be instituted by God in his law. For to say that they observed them to the same use and end for which God did institute them, is false, because then they had observed them as types and shadows of the coming of Christ, and so had denied Christ. 3. If the Apostle condemn the observing of days instituted by God, with opinion of necessity, much more doth he condemn the observing of days instituted by men with such an opinion. And such is the observation of days urged upon us. Though the Bishop pretend that the observing of our holidays is not imposed with opinion of necessity, shall we therefore think it is so? Nay, Papists do also pretend that the observation of their ceremonies is not necessary,¹ nor the neglecting of them a mortal sin. I have proved heretofore, out of their opposites' own words, that the ceremonies in question (and, by consequence, holidays among the rest) are urged upon us with opinion of necessity, and as their words, so their works bewray them, for they urge the ceremonies with so exorbitant vehemency, and punish refusers with so excessive severity, as if they were the weightiest matters of the law of God. Yet they would have us believe, that they have but sober and mean thoughts of these matters, as of circumstances determined for order and policy only. Just like a man who casts firebrands and arrows, and yet saith, Am not I in sport? Prov. xvi. 18, 19. They will tell us that they urge not the ceremonies as necessary in themselves, but only as necessary in respect of the church's determination, and because of the necessity of obeying those who are set over us. But, I pray, is not this as much as the Rhenists say,² who place the necessity of their rites and observances, not in the nature of the things themselves, but in the church's precept?

¹ Bell. de Ench. lib. 6, cap. 13.
² Annot. on Matt. vi. 15, sect. 5.

¹ Anin. in Bel. cont. 3, lib. 4, cap. 16, nota 20.
² Comm. in illum locum.
³ Annot. ibi.
⁴ Anin. ad Bel. contr. 3, lib. 4, cap. 16, nota 32.
⁵ Ubi supra.

CHAPTER IX.

SHOWING THE WEAKNESS OF SOME PRETENCES WHICH OUR OPPOSITES USE FOR HOLIDAYS.

Sect. 1. Since it hath been evinced by unanswerable reasons that holidays, as now urged upon us, take away our Christian liberty, I will now pull off them the coat of some fig leaves wherewith they are trimmed up. And first, I hope it will appear to how small purpose Dr Davenant would conciliate his reader's mind¹ to allow of the church's ordinances about holidays (peradventure because he saw all that he had said of that purpose to be too invalid proof), by six cautions, whereby all superstition and abuse which may ensue upon them may be shunned. For whatsoever doth manifestly endanger men's souls, being a thing not necessary in itself, at which they take occasion of superstitious abuse, should rather be removed altogether out of the way, than be set about with a weak and easily-penetrable hedge of some equivocate cautions, which the ruder sort do always, and the learned do too oft, either not understand or not remember. Now, Bishop Lindsey confesseth,² and puts it out of all doubt, that when the set times of these solemnities return, superstitious conceits are most pregnant in the heads of people; therefore it must be the safest course to banish those days out of the church, since there is so great hazard, and no necessity, of retaining them.

What they can allege for holidays, from our duty to remember the inestimable benefits of our redemption, and to praise God for the same, hath been already answered.³ And as touching any expediency which they imagine in holidays, we shall see to that afterwards.⁴

Sect. 2. The Act of Perth Assembly allegeth the practice of the ancient church for warrant of holidays, and Tilen allegeth the judgment of antiquity to the same purpose.⁵ Ans. The festivities of the ancient church cannot warrant ours; for, 1. In the purest times of the church there was no law to tie men to the observation of holidays. *Observandum est*, say the divines of Magdeburg,⁶

¹ Comm. in Col. ii. 16.
² Ubi supra, p. 7.
³ Supra, p. 7, sect. 7.
⁴ Infra, part. 2, cap. 2.
⁵ Paræm. ad Scot. cap. 16, p. 65.
⁶ Cent 2, cap. 6, col. 119.

apostolos et apostolicos viros, neque de paschate, neque de aliis quibuscunque, festivitibus legem aliquam constituisse. So crates reporteth,¹ that men did celebrate the feast of Easter, and other festival days, *sicuti voluerunt, ex consuetudine quadam.* Nicephorus saith,² that men did celebrate festivities, *sicuti cuique visum erat, in regionibus passim ex consuetudine quadam per traditionem acceptu adducti.* In which place, as the reader will plainly perceive, he opposeth tradition to an evangelical or apostolical ordinance. Sozomen tells us,³ that men were left to their own judgment about the keeping of Easter; Jerome saith of the feasts⁴ which the church in his time observed, that they were *pro varietate regionum diversa.* The first who established a law about any festival day,⁵ is thought to have been Pius I, bishop of Rome, yet it is marked that the Asiatican doctors did not care much for this constitution of Pius. I conclude with Cartwright,⁶ that those feasts of the primitive church "came by custom, and not by commandment; by the free choice of men, and not by constraint." So that from these, no commendation ariseth to our feasts, which are not only established by laws, but also imposed with such necessity and constraint, as spoileth us of our liberty. 2. The festival days observed by the ancient church, were not accounted more excellent than other days; for, saith Jerome,⁷ *non quod celebrior sit dies illa qua convenimus, &c.* But our festival days are made *alii diebus celebriores*, yea, are taken to be holier than other days, as I will afterwards prove.⁸

Sect. 3. Moreover, the proctors for holidays among us think to make advantage of the practice of other reformed churches, and the judgment of modern divines. But we are to consider, 1. As they have the example of some churches for them, so we have the example of other churches for us; for the church of Geneva in Savoy, and the church of Strasburg in Germany, did abolish festival days, as Calvin writeth.⁹ Yea, in *hac tota provincia aboliti fuerunt dies festi*, saith he. The church of Zurich in Helvetia did also banish them all away, as Bullinger writeth to Calvin.¹⁰ 2. The prac-

¹ Lib. 5, cap. 22.
² Lib. 7, cap. 19.
³ Hospi. do Orig. Fest. Christ. p. 71.
⁴ Annot. on Matt. xv. 9.
⁵ Ubi supra.
⁶ Calv. Ep. et Resp. edit. Genev. an. 1617, col. 137.
⁷ Lib. 12, cap. 32.
⁸ In Gal. iv.
⁹ Part. 3.
¹⁰ Ibid. 138.

tice of the greatest part of the reformed churches in observing holidays, cannot commend them in the church of Scotland, 1. Because she did spue them out with so great detestation, that she is more bound to abhor them than other churches which did not the like, and I may well apply to them that which Calvin saith¹ of the ceremonies of the Interim, to Valentinus Pacæus, *Ut concedam fetidas illas sordes quibus purgatæ fuerunt vestrae ecclesie, in rebus mediis posse censeri: earum tamen restitutio eritne res media?* 2. The church of Scotland is tied yet with another bond to hate holidays, of which other churches are free; for, by a solemn oath sworn to the God of heaven, she hath abjured all antichristian and popish rites, and dedicating of days particularly. When Tilen would make answer to this argument, he saith,² that men's consciences should not be snared with rash oaths and superstitious vows, and if that such bonds be laid on, they should be broken and shaken off. What! Calls he this a superstitious vow, which abjured all superstition and superstitious rites? Or calls he this a rash oath, which, upon so sage and due deliberation, so serious advisement, so pious intention, so decent preparation, so great humiliation, was religiously, publicly, solemnly sworn throughout this land, and that at the straight command of authority? Who is ignorant of these things, except he be a stranger in our Israel? But say the oath had been rash and temerations, shall it not therefore oblige? His judgment is, it doth not; and so thinks the Bishop of Winchester,³ who teacheth us, that if the oath be made rashly, *penitenda promissio non perficienda presumptio*; he had said better thus, *penitenda presumptio, perficienda promissio*; for was not that a very rash oath which the princes of Israel did swear to the Gibeonites, not asking counsel at the mouth of the Lord? Josh. ix. 14—16, yet it bound both them, Josh. ix. 19, and their posterity, some hundred years after, 2 Sam. xxi. 1. If the matter then be lawful, the oath binds, were it sworn never so rashly.

Sect. 4. As touching the judgment of divines, we say, 1. Many divines disallow of festival days, and with the church, were free of them. For the Belgic churches, in their synod, anno 1578, wished that the six days

might be wrought upon, and that the Lord's day alone might be celebrated. And Luther in his book, *de Bonis Operibus*, wished that there were no feast-days among Christians but the Lord's day. This wish of theirs declareth plainly, that they allowed of no holiday except the Lord's day; yet Bishop Lindsey must make a fashion of saying something for an answer. "This wish (saith he⁴) Lether and the Belgic churches conceived, out of their miscontentment at the number, corruptions, and superstitions of the festival days, beside the Lord's day, as ye do." Ans. 1. Their wish importeth a simple and absolute mistaking of all festival days besides the Lord's day, and not of their number and corruptions only. 2. It is well that he acknowledgeth both them and us to have reason of miscontentment at holidays, from their corruptions and superstitions. The old Waldenses also⁵, whose doctrine was restored and propagated by John Huss, and Jerome of Prague, after Wiclif, and that with the congratulation of the church of Constantinople, held,⁶ that they wore to rest from labour upon no day but upon the Lord's day, whereby it appeareth, that holidays have had adversaries before us. I find that they pervert some places which they allego against us out of Calvin. Tilen allegeth,⁷ Calvin. Inst., lib. 2, cap. 8, sec. 32, acknowledging *alios quoque dies festos præter dominicum*, &c. I marvel how a judicious reader could imagine such a thing to be in that place, for both in that and the subsequent section, he is speaking of the Lord's day against the Anabaptists, and if any man will think that in sec. 32 he is speaking of holy assemblies of Christians in the general, yet he can see nothing there of any festival days, beside the Lord's day, dedicated to holy meetings. There is another place of Calvin abused by Bishop Spotswood⁸ and Bishop Lindsey,⁹ taken out of one of his Epistles to Hallerus, which I find in the volume before quoted, p. 136, 137, that which they grip to in this epistle is, that Calvin, speaking of the abrogation of festival days in Geneva, saith, *hoc tamen testatum esse volo, si mihi delata optio fuisset, quod nunc constitutum est, non fuisse pro*

¹ Ubi supr., p. 84.

² Alsted. in Cronol. Testium Veritatis.

³ *En. Sylv. apud Didact. att. Damasc. p. 707.*

⁴ *Paræn., cap. 16, p. 64.*

⁵ Sermon at Perth Assembly.

⁶ Ubi supra, p. 83.

sententia dicturum. Ans. That which made Calvin say so, was not any liking which he had to festival days, for he calls the abolishing of them *ordo bene compositus*;¹ but as himself sheweth in the following epistle, which beareth this title, *Cal. Ministro Burensi, S.D.*, the reason why he durst scarcely have so determined, if his judgment had been required, was, because he saw neither end nor remedy for the prevailing tumult of contention raised about festival days, and likely to impede the course of reformation; therefore *fovende pacis studio*, he professeth that he durst not make mention of the abrogation of those holidays. Because he would have tolerated holidays, because he durst not at that time, and as the case then stood, have spoken of the abolishing them, can it be hereupon concluded that he allowed of them? No, sure. But it is observable how both these prelates pervert Calvin's words. Bishop Spotswood allegeth his words anent the abolishing of these festival days, thus: *Ego neque suavor neque impulsor fui, atque hoc testatum volo, si mihi delata optio, &c.* Whereas the words in that epistle lie thus: *Ego tametsi neque suavor, neque impulsor fui, sic tamen accidisse non moleste fero. Quod si statum nostre ecclesie æque compertum haberet, non dubitares meo iudicio subscribere. Hoc tamen testatum esse volo, si mihi delata optio, &c.* The Bishop would have made his hearers believe that Calvin was not content with the abolishing of the festival days, whereas his words testify the very contrary. Bishop Lindsey is as gross in perverting the end of that epistle. *Nec tamen est cur homines adeo exasperentur, si libertate nostra ut ecclesie edificatio postulat utimur, &c.*, from which words he concludes, that in Calvin's judgment, the observation and abrogation of those days is in the power and liberty of the church. But the reader will perceive, that Calvin there speaketh only of the church's liberty to abrogate holidays, and nothing of her power to observe them, for he is showing, that howbeit he durst not have given advice to abolish them, if the decision had been referred to him, yet they had no reason for them who were offended at the abolishing of them in Geneva, because that church had done no more than she had power and liberty to do for edification. 3. Other testimo-

nies they produce, which cannot help them much. That which Bishop Lindsey² allegeth out of Zanchius's confession, maketh him but small advantage; for though Zanchius there alloweth of the sanctification of some festival days, yet, writing on the fourth commandment, he acknowledgeth that it is more agreeable to the first institution, and to the writings of the apostles, that one day of the week only be sanctified. What meant the Bishop to say?³ that this place is falsified and mutilated by his antagonist, who quotes it not to prove that Zanchius disalloweth of festival days, but to prove that, in Zanchius's judgment, the sanctification of the Sabbath only, and no other day in the week, agreeth best with divine and apostolical institution? Was there any need to allege more of Zanchius's words than concerned the point which he had to prove? The Bishop allegeth also a testimony out of Perkins on Gal. iv. 10,⁴ which makes him but very little help; for albeit Perkins thought good, in some sort, to excuse the observing of days in his own mother church of England, yet I find in that place, 1. He complaineth that the greatest part respects those holidays more than they should. 2. He alloweth only the observing of days for order's sake, that men may come to the church to hear God's word, which respect will not be enough to the Bishop, if there be not a solemnising and celebrating of the memory of some of God's inestimable benefits, and a dedicating of the day to this end and purpose. 3. He saith, that it is the privilege of God to appoint an extraordinary day of rest, so that he permitteth not power to the church for appointing a set, constant, and anniversary day of rest, for such a day becometh an ordinary day of rest. 4. He preferreth the practice of those churches of the Protestants who do not observe holidays, because, saith he, the church, in the apostles' days, had no holiday besides the Lord's day, and the fourth commandment enjoins the labour of six days.

Sect. 5. The Bishop meeteth with another answer in his antagonist which crosseth his testimonies, namely, that howsoever foreign divines, in their epistles and councils, spake sometimes sparingly against holidays, when their advice was sought of churches newly risen out of Popery and greatly distressed, yet they never advised a church to resume

¹ Ibid. p. 138.

² Ubi supra, p. 91.

³ Ibid. p. 41.

⁴ Ibid. p. 95.

¹ Ib. col. 119.

² *Paræn. cap. 16, p. 68.*

³ Sermon, Jer. iv. 2.

them where they were removed. The Bishop objecteth against this answer,¹ that Calvin, epist. 51, "advise the Menbelgardens not to contend against the prince for not resuming (he should have said, for not receiving, if he had translated Calvin's words faithfully) of all festival days, but only such as served not to edification, and were seen to be superstitious." *Ans.* 1. Albeit he spake sparingly against holidays, when he gave advice to that distressed and lately reformed church, lest the work of reformation should have been letted, yet he did not allow holidays among them. For in another epistle written to them he saith,² *De pulsu campanarum et diebus festis ita sentimus, ferendas potius esse vobis has ineptias, quam stationem in qua estis à domino collocati deferendam, modo ne approbetis; modo etiam liberum vobis sit reprehendere, quæ inde sequuntur superstitiones.* And this he setteth down for one of these superstitions, *quod dies a die discernitur*, where also he condemneth both the observing of days to the honour of man as superstitious, and the observing of them for the honour of God as

Judaical. If holidays, in Calvin's judgment, be fooleries—if he gave advice not to approve them—if he thought them occasions of superstition—if he held it superstition to distinguish one day from another, or to esteem one above another—if he call them Judaical, though kept to the honour of God, judge then what allowance they had from him. 2. If the Bishop stand to Calvin's judgment in that place which he quoteth, he must allow us to refuse some festival days, though enjoined by the prince. *In festis non recipiendis cuperem vos esse constantiores, sic tamen ut non litigietis de quibuslibet.* Then he allowed them to contend against some holidays, though the prince imposed them. 3. The church of Scotland did remove festival days in another manner, and bound herself never to receive them by another bond than ever the Menbelgardens did; so that having other bonds lying upon us than other churches have, we are so much the more straightly obliged neither to receive holidays, nor any other antichristian and popish ceremony.

THE SECOND PART.

AGAINST THE EXPEDIENCY OF THE CEREMONIES.

CHAPTER I.

AGAINST SOME OF OUR OPPOSITES, WHO ACKNOWLEDGE THE INCONVENIENCY OF THE CEREMONIES, AND YET WOULD HAVE US YIELD TO THEM.

Sect. 1. The Archbishop of St Andrews, new Lord Chancellor forsooth, speaking of the five articles concluded at the pretended Assembly of Perth, saith,³ "The conveniency of them for our church is doubted of by many, but not without cause, &c.; novations in a church, even in the smallest things, are dangerous, &c.; had it been in our power to

have dissuaded or declined them, most certainly we would, &c.; but now being brought to a necessity, either of yielding, or disobeying him, whom, for myself, I hold it religion to offend," &c. Dr Burgess confesseth,⁴ that some of his side think and believe, that the ceremonies are inconvenient, and yet to be observed for peace and the gospel's sake; and how many Fernalists let us hear their hearty wishes, that the ceremonies had never been brought into our church, because they have troubled our peace, and occasioned great strife? When they are demanded why do they yield to them, since they acknowledge great inconveniency in them? they answer, lest by their refusal they

¹ *Ans.* to the Repl. præf. p. 43.

should cast their coal to the fire, to entertain and increase discord, and lest, shunning one inconveniency, they should draw on a greater. Mr Sprint saith,¹ "It may be granted, that offence and hinderance to edification do arise from those our ceremonies."² He confesseth also, that the best divines wished them to be abelished, as being many ways inconvenient; notwithstanding, he hath written a whole treatise, of the necessity of conformity in case of deprivation.

Sect. 2. But let us understand how he proveth³ that sometimes it is expedient and necessary to conform unto such burdensome and beggarly ceremonies, as are many ways inconvenient, and occasions of sundry evil effects. His principal reason is,⁴ That the apostles, by direction of the Holy Ghost, and upon reasons of common and perpetual equity, did practise themselves, and caused others to practise, yea, advised and enjoined (as matters good and necessary to be done) ceremonies so inconvenient and evil in many main and material respects, as the ceremonies enjoined and prescribed in the church of England are supposed to be; whence he would have it to follow, that to suffer deprivation for refusing to conform to the ceremonies of the church of England, is contrary to the doctrine and practice of the apostles. *Ans.* These Jewish ceremonies in the use and practice of the apostles, were no way evil and inconvenient, as himself everywhere confesseth; whereas, therefore, he tells us,⁵ that those ceremonies were abused to superstition, were of mystical signification, imposed and observed as parts of God's worship, swerving from the general rules of God's word, not profitable for order, decency, and edification, offensive many ways, and infringing Christian liberty, he runs at random all the while; for these things agree not to the Jewish ceremonies, as they were rightly used by the apostles themselves, and by others at their advice, but only as they were superstitiously used with opinion of necessity by the obstinate Jews, and by the false teachers, who impugned Christian liberty. So that all that can follow upon Mr Sprint's argument is this: That notwithstanding of the evils and inconveniences which follow upon certain ceremonies in the superstitious abuse of them by others, yet if, in our practice, they have a necessary or ex-

pedient use, then (after the example of the apostles) we may well conform unto them. Now, all this cometh not near the point which Mr Sprint undertaketh to prove, namely, that granting the controverted ceremonies to be, in our use and practice of the same, many ways evil and inconvenient, yet to suffer deprivation for refusing to conform to the same is contrary to the doctrine and practice of the apostles. And as touching the comparison instituted betwixt our controverted ceremonies, and these antiquated ceremonies of the Jews, practised and prescribed by the apostles after the ascension of Christ, and before the full promulgation of the gospel, many evils there be in ours, which could not be found in theirs. For, 1. Ours have no necessary use, and might well be spared; theirs had a necessary use for avoiding of scandal, Acts xv. 28. 2. Ours produce manifold inconveniences (whereof we are to speak hereafter) in over use and practice of the same, which is prescribed, theirs in the use and practice of the same, which was enjoined by the apostles, were most expedient for winning of the obstinate Jews, 1 Cor. ix. 20; and for keeping of the weak, 1 Cor. ix. 22; and for teaching the right use of Christian liberty to such as were strong in the faith, both among the believing Jews and converted Gentiles, Rom. iv. &c.; 1 Cor. viii. x. 3. Ours are proved to be, in their nature, unlawful; theirs were (during the foresaid space) in their nature indifferent, Rom. xiv. 6; Gal. vi. 15. 4. Ours are imposed and observed as parts of God's worship (which we will prove afterward);¹ theirs not so, for where read we, that (during the foresaid space) any holiness was placed in them by the apostles? 5. Ours have certain mystical significations; theirs not so: for it is nowhere to be read, that the apostles either practised or prescribed them as significative resemblances of any mystery of the kingdom of God. 6. Ours make us (though unnecessarily) like unto idolaters, in their idolatrous actions; theirs not so. 7. Ours are imposed with a necessity both of practice and opinion, even out of the case of scandal; theirs not so. 8. Ours are pressed by naked will and authority; theirs, by such special grounds of momentaneous reason, as made the practice of the same necessary for a certain time, whether the apos-

¹ *Ibi* supra, p. 83.

² *Calv. Ep. et Resp.* col. 592.

³ *Serm.* at Perth Assembly Inscrt. by B. Lindsey.

¹ *Repl.* to the *Ans.*, p. 270.

² *Cassand. Ang.*, p. 46.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁴ *Ib.* p. 23.

⁵ *Ib.*, p. 9—11.

¹ *Infra*, part 3. chap. 1.
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ties had enjoined it or not. 9. Ours are urged even upon such as, in their consciences, judge them to be unlawful; theirs not so. 10. Ours have no better original than human and antichristian invention; theirs had their original from God's own institution. 11. Ours are the accursed monuments of popish idolatry, to be ejected with detestation; theirs were the memorials of Mosiacal policy, to be buried with honour. 12. Ours are pressed by such pretended reasons, as make them ever and everywhere necessary; theirs, by such reasons as did only conclude a necessity of using them at some times, and in some places. 13. Ours are urged after the full promulgation of the gospel and acknowledgment of Christian liberty; theirs, before the same. 14. Ours are urged with the careless neglect of pressing more necessary duties; theirs not so. These and other differences betwixt the controverted and Jewish ceremonies, do so break the back of Mr Sprint's argument, that there is no healing of it again.

Sect. 3. His second reason whereby he goeth about to prove the necessity of conforming to inconvenient ceremonies, in the case of deprivation, he taketh from this ground: ¹ That when two duties commanded of God, do meet in one practice, so as we cannot do them both, in this case we must perform the greater duty, and neglect the lesser. Now, whereas he saith, when two duties do meet, &c., he means not, that both may be duties at once, for then a man shall be so straitened that he must needs commit a sin, in that he must needs omit one of the duties. But (as he explaineth himself) he calleth them duties, being considered apart: as, to hear a sermon at the church on the Sabbath, and to tend a sick person ready to die at home, at the same time, both are duties, being considered apart, but meeting together in our practice at one time, there is but one duty, because the lesser work binds not for that present. Now, he assumes that the doctrine and practice of suffering deprivation for refusing to conform to inconvenient ceremonies, doth cause men to neglect greater duties to perform the lesser, for proof whereof he enlargeth a needless discourse, tending to prove that preaching is a greater duty and of higher bond than the duty of labouring unto fit ceremonies, or of refusing incon-

¹ Ubi supra, p. 24, 28.

venient ceremonies, which cannot help his cause. That which he had to prove was, that not to suffer deprivation for refusing of inconvenient ceremonies, is a greater duty than the refusing of inconvenient ceremonies. But it will be said, that to suffer deprivation for the refusing of inconvenient ceremonies, doth cause men to neglect the preaching of the word, and that is a greater duty than the refusing of inconvenient ceremonies. *Ans.* 1. Mr Sprint himself layeth down one ground, which proveth the refusing of inconvenient ceremonies to be a greater duty than the preaching of the word; for he holdeth¹ that the substantial of the second table doth overrule the ceremonial of the first table, according to that which God saith, "I will have mercy and not sacrifice," Matt. xii. 7. And elsewhere he teacheth² that to tend a sick person ready to die is a greater duty than the hearing of the word. Now, to practice inconvenient and scandalous ceremonies, is to commit soul-murder, and so to break one of the most substantial duties of the second table. Therefore, according to Mr Sprint's own ground, the refusing of inconvenient and scandalous ceremonies is a greater duty than the preaching of the word, which is but a ceremonial of the first table; and if the neglect of tending a sick person's body be a greater sin than to omit the hearing of many sermons, much more to murder the souls of men, by practising inconvenient and scandalous ceremonies, is a greater sin than to omit the preaching of many sermons, which is all the omission (if there be any) of those who suffer deprivation for refusing to conform unto inconvenient ceremonies. But, 2. We deny that the suffering of deprivation for refusing to conform unto inconvenient ceremonies, causeth men to neglect or omit the duty of preaching. Neither hath Mr Sprint alleged anything for proof hereof, except that this duty of preaching cannot be done with us ordinarily, as things do stand, if ministers do not conform; for, by order, they are to be deprived of their ministry. Now, what of all this? For though, by the oppressing power of proud prelates, many are hindered from continuing in preaching, because of their refusing inconvenient ceremonies, yet they themselves who suffered deprivation for this cause cannot be said to neglect or omit the duty of preaching: most

¹ Ibid. p. 52.

² Ibid. p. 28.

gladly would they preach, but are not permitted. And how can a man be said to omit or neglect that which he would fain do, but it lieth not in his power to get it done? All the strength of Mr Sprint's argument lieth in this: That forasmuch as ministers are hindered from preaching, if they do not conform, therefore, their suffering of deprivation for refusing conformity, doth cause them neglect the duty of preaching. Which argument, that I may destroy it with his own weapons, let us note,¹ that he alloweth a man (though not to suffer deprivation, yet) to suffer any civil penalty or external loss, for refusing of inconvenient ceremonies commanded and enjoined by the magistrate. Now, put the case, that for refusing inconvenient ceremonies, I be so fined, spoiled, and oppressed, that I cannot have sufficient worldly means for myself and them of my household, hence I argue thus (if Mr Sprint's argument hold good): That forasmuch as I am, by strong violence, hindered from providing for myself and them of my household, if I do not conform, therefore, my suffering of those losses for refusing of conformity, doth cause me to neglect the duty of providing for myself and for them of my family, which neglect should make me worse than an infidel.

Sect. 4. Mr Sprint now addeth a third, proving, that to suffer deprivation for refusing to conform to the prescribed ceremonies² (howbeit many ways inconvenient,) is contrary to the royal law of love, which he labours to evidence three ways. *First*, he saith, that to suffer deprivation for refusing to conform, doth, by abstaining from a thing in nature indifferent (such as our ceremonies, saith he, are proved to be), needlessly deprive men of the ordinary means of their salvation, which is the preaching ministry of the word, &c. *Ans.* 1. That the controverted ceremonies are in nature indifferent, neither he, nor any of his side, hath yet proven; they suppose that they are indifferent, but they prove it not. 2. We deny that the suffering of deprivation for refusing to conform to the prescribed ceremonies, doth deprive men of the preaching of the word. Neither saith Mr Sprint aught for proof hereof but that which we have already confuted, viz., that as things do stand, all such as do not conform are to be deprived, whence it followeth only, that the injury and violence of prelates

¹ Ibid. p. 62.

² Ibid. p. 63.

(not the suffering of deprivation for refusing to conform) depriveth men of the preaching of the word. *Secondly*, he saith,¹ that the doctrine and practice of suffering deprivation for inconvenient ceremonies, condemneth both the apostolical churches, and all churches since their times, because there hath been no church which hath not practised inconvenient ceremonies. *Ans.* It is most false which he saith of the apostolical churches; for those Jewish ceremonies practised by them were most convenient, as we have said before. And as for other churches in after ages, so many of them as have practised inconvenient ceremonies, are not herein to be followed by us. Better go right with a few than err with a multitude. *Thirdly*, he saith,² that the suffering of deprivation for refusing to conform, breedeth and produceth sundry scandals. *First*, saith he, it is the occasion of fraternal discord. O egregious impudency! who seeth not that the ceremonies are the incendiary sparkles, from which the fire of contention hath its being and burning; so that conforming (not refusing) is the furnishing of fuel and casting of faggots to the fire. *Secondly*, He allegeth that the suffering of deprivation for refusing to conform, twofold more scandaliseth the Papist than conformity; for he doth far more insult to see a godly minister thrust out, and with him all the truth of God pressed, than to see him wear a surplice, &c. *Thirdly*, he saith, It twofold more scandaliseth the Atheist, libertine, and Epicure, who, by the painful minister's deprivation, will triumph to see a door opened for him without resistance, to live in drunkenness, whoredom, swearing, &c. Now, for answer to his second and third pretences, we say, 1. Mr Sprint implieth indirectly, that when non-conforming ministers are thrust out, Papists, Atheists, libertines, and Epicures, expect but small opposition from those conforming ministers who come in their rooms. Our opposites have a skillful proctor (forsooth) of Mr Sprint. And, indeed, if Papists and Atheists were so afraid of Conformists as of Nonconformists, they would not thus insult. 2. We must distinguish betwixt deprivation and the suffering of deprivation. Papists insult indeed, that their assured friends, the prelates, are so powerful, as to thrust out from the public ministry the greatest enemies of Po-

¹ Page 67.

² P. 68—70.

perty. But as for the ministers' suffering of themselves to be thrust out, and deprived for refusing of conformity, it is so far from giving to Papists any matter of insulting, that it will rather grieve them and gall them to the heart, to understand that sundry powerful, painful, and learned ministers are so averse from Popery, that before they conform to any ceremony of the same, they will suffer for refusal; and that their constancy and courage, in suffering for such a cause, will confirm many professors in the persuasion of the truth of their doctrine, which they taught against conforming unto popish ceremonies. But to go on. *Fourthly*, saith he, It twofold more scandaliseth such an one as doth truly fear the name of God, who could be more contented to enjoy the means of his faith and salvation, with a small inconvenience of some ceremonies which he grieveth at, than to lose his pastor, the gospel, and the ordinary means of his faith and salvation. *Ans.* 1. Mr Sprint supposeth that such an one, as for no respect whatsoever would be contented with the practice of some inconvenient ceremonies, doth not truly fear the name of God. And who is the Puritan now? Is not Mr Sprint, who standeth in such a huge distance from all who are of our mind, and so far preferreth himself and his followers to us, as if we did not truly fear the name of God? Secondly, He supposeth that, when non-conforming ministers are thrust out, the ordinary means of faith and salvation are not dispensed (to the comfort and contentment of such as truly fear the name of God) by those conforming ministers, who are surrogate in their stead: which, how his fellows will take with, let them look to it. 3. Forasmuch as the fear of God is to depart from evil, therefore such an one as doth truly fear the name of God, in so far as he doth fear the name of God, and *quatenus*, he is such an one, will never take well with the practice of inconvenient ceremonies, which is not a parting from, but a cleaving unto evil. 4. They who truly fear the name of God, are indeed scandalised by the prelates' depriving of ministers for refusing to conform; but by the ministers' suffering of deprivation for this cause, they are not scandalised but edified. But, *Fifthly*, saith Mr Sprint, it offendeth the magistrate, by provoking him (persuaded and resolved as he is) to disgrace these otherwise well-deserving ministers, and to striko them with the sword of autho-

riety. *Ans.* Our refusal to conform to inconvenient ceremonies being a necessary duty, if the magistrate be provoked therewith, we are blameless; neither can it any otherwise provoke him to disgrace those well-deserving ministers, than Moses' seeking of liberty for Israel to go and serve God according to his will, provoked Pharaoh the more to oppress them; or than Christ's preaching of the truth, and his abstaining from the superstitious ceremonies of the Pharisees, provoked them to disgrace him, and plot his hurt. Howbeit we are not ignorant that the magistrate is not provoked by our refusing to conform, except as it is misrepresented, misdeemed, and misconstrued to him by the false calumnies of our adversaries, which being so, he is not incited by our deed, but by theirs.

Sect. 5. Now, *Sixthly*, saith Mr Sprint, it unjustly condemneth the harmony of all true churches that ever were primitive and reformed, and all sound teachers of all times and places, whose universal doctrine it hath been, that conformity to inconvenient ceremonies is necessary, in case of deprivation. *Ans.* That the ceremonies practised by the apostles and apostolic churches were not inconvenient, it hath been already showed; that since their times, sundry churches, both ancient and reformed, have practised inconvenient ceremonies, we deny not: yet Mr Sprint himself¹ will not defend all the practices of those churches, whose practice he allegeth against us. But that all sound teachers, of all times and places, have taught the necessity of conformity to inconvenient ceremonies, in case of deprivation, he neither doth, neither can make good; it is but a bare and a bold affirmation to deceive the minds of the simple. Did not the good old Waldenses,² notwithstanding of all the hot persecutions raised against them, constantly refuse to conform unto any of those ceremonies of the church of Rome, which they perceived to have no necessary use in religion, and to occasion superstition rather than to serve for edification? And we verily rejoyce to be ranked with those Waldenses, of whom a popish historiographer speaketh thus:³ *Alnus in libris cathari dicuntur, quibus respondet qui hodie in Anglia puriorum doctrinam*

¹ Page 85, 93, 110.

² Hist. of the Wald., part. 3, lib. 1, cap. 6. Thuan.

³ Hist. lib. 6, p. 169.

⁴ Thuan. ibid. p. 166.

præ se ferunt. Moreover, it cannot be unknown to such as are acquainted with the history of the Reformation, how that not Flaccius Illyricus only, but many others,¹ among whom was Calvin,² and the Magdeburgian doctors,³ and all the churches of Nether Saxony subject to Maurice,⁴ opposed themselves to those inconvenient and hurtful ceremonies of the Interim, urged by the Adiphorists. And howsoever they perceived many great and grievous dangers ensuing upon their refusing to conform to the same, yet they constantly refused, and many ministers suffered deprivation for their refusal.⁵ Besides, do not our divines require, that the church's canons, even in matters of rite, be "profitable to the edification of the church;"⁶ and that the observation of the same must carry before it a manifest utility;⁷ that in rites and ceremonies the church hath no power to destruction, but only to edification?⁸ Do they not put this clause in the very definition of ecclesiastical rites,⁹ that they be profitably ordained; considering, that otherwise they are but intolerable mis-orders and abuses? Do they not teach,¹⁰ that no idle ceremony which serveth not unto edifying is to be suffered in the church; and that godly brethren are not holden to subject themselves unto such things as they perceive neither to be right nor profitable?¹¹ That whatsoever either would scandalise our brother,¹² or not be profitable to him for his edification, Christians for no respect must dare to meddle with it? Do they not stand so much upon expediency, that this tenet is received with them: That the negative precepts of the law, do bind, not only at all times, but likewise to all times (whereupon it followeth, that we may never do that which is inconvenient or scandalous), and that the affirmative precepts though they bind at all times, yet not to all times, but only *quando expedit* (whereupon it followeth, that we are never bound to the practice of any duty commanded in the law of God,

except only when it is expedient to be done; but Mr Sprint excepteth against this rule,¹ that it is not generally true; for evidence whereof he allegeth many things, partly false, partly impertinent, upon which I hold it not needful here to insist. As for such examples, objected by him, as carry some show of making against this rule, which he dare not admit, I will make some answer thereto. He saith, that sometimes even negative precepts have been lawfully violated; for these precepts were negative,—none but priests must eat shew-bread, yet David did lawfully violate it; thou shalt do no work upon the Sabbath, yet the priests brake this, and are blameless; let nothing of God's good creatures be lost, yet Paul and his company did lawfully cast away their goods in the ship, to save their lives, &c. *Ans.* Mr Sprint might easily have understood, that when divines say, the affirmative precepts bind at all times, but not to all times,—the negative precepts both at all times and to all times, they ever mean, *specie actionis manente eadem*; so long as an action forbidden in a negative precept ceaseth not to be evil, as long the negative precept bindeth to all times: whereas even whilst an action commanded in an affirmative precept, ceaseth not to be good, yet the affirmative precept bindeth not to all times. So that the rule is not crossed by the alleged examples; for David's eating of the shew-bread; the priests' labour upon the Sabbath; and Paul's casting of the goods into the sea, were not evil, but good actions (the kind of the action being changed by the circumstances). In the meantime, the fore-said rule still crosseth Mr Sprint's tenet; for he holdeth that even whilst certain ceremonies remain evil in their use, and cease not to be scandalous and inconvenient, yet we are not ever bound to abstain from them, but may in the case of deprivation practice them, which directly contradiceth the rule.

Sect. 6. The position therefore which we maintain against Mr Sprint, and from which we will not depart the breadth of one nail, is this, that we can never lawfully conform (no not in the case of deprivation) unto any ceremony which is scandalous and inconvenient in the use of it. For further confirmation whereof, we say, 1. Every negative precept of the law of God bindeth to all times, in such sort, that the action which it

¹ Alsted. Chron. Rotib. p. 550.

² See his treatise entitled *Vera Ecclesie Reformationis Ratio*.

³ Alsted. ibid.

⁴ Steid. Com., lib. 21, p. 388.

⁵ Steid., ibid., p. 393.

⁶ Polan. Synl., lib. 7, cap. 17.

⁷ Calv. Inst., lib. 4, cap. 10, sect. 32.

⁸ Chem. Exam. par. 2, p. 121.

⁹ Fenner. Theol., lib. 2, cap. 2.

¹⁰ Pareus in 1 Cor. xiv. 26.

¹¹ Calv. Ep. et Resp., col. 478.

¹² Calv. in 1 Cor. x. 23. Taylor on Tit. i. 15, p. 295.

¹ Ubi supra, p. 55.

forbiddeth (so long as it remaineth evil, and the kind of it is not changed) can never lawfully be done. Therefore, forasmuch as to abstain from things scandalous and inconvenient, is one of the negative precepts of the law of God, and the ceremonies whereunto Mr Sprint would have us to conform in the case of deprivation, are, and remain scandalous and inconvenient in our practice and use of them according to his own presupposal; it followeth, that the use and practice of the same is altogether unlawful unto us. 2. That which is lawful in the nature of it is never lawful in the use of it, except only when it is expedient for edification, as teacheth the Apostle, 1 Cor. vi. 12; x. 23. The Corinthians objected that all indifferent things were lawful. The Apostle addeth a limitation,¹ *esse licita quatenus conducunt*, they are lawful to be used in so far as they are expedient. 3. It is the Apostle's commandment, let all things be done unto edifying, 1 Cor. xiv. 26. Therefore whatsoever is not done unto edifying ought not to be done. 4. The Apostle saith, 1 Cor. viii. 13, "If meat make my brother to offend, I will eat no flesh while the world standeth." Now, put the case, the Apostle had been hindered from preaching the gospel for his precise abstaining from those meats wherewith his brother would be offended, would he in that case have eaten? Nay, he saith peremptorily, that whilst the world standeth he would not eat. 5. Say not our writers,² that we must flee and abstain from every thing which is not expedient for the edification of our brother? And doth not the Bishop of Winchester teach,³ that in our going out, and coming in, and in all our actions, we must look to the rule of expediency? And saith not Bishop Spotswood,⁴ "It is not to be denied, but they are ceremonies, which for the inconvenience they bring, ought to be resisted?" 6. Dare Mr Sprint deny that which Ames saith he heard once defended in Cambridge,⁵ viz., that *quicquid non expedit, quatenus non expedit, non licet*: Whatsoever is not expedient, in so far as it is not expedient, it is not lawful. Doth not Pareus likewise show out of Augustine,⁶ that such things as are not expedient

but scandalous, and do not edify but hurt our brother, *Fiunt ex accidenti illicita et peccata, proinde vitanda*? 7. To conform unto inconvenient and scandalous ceremonies, in the case of deprivation, is at the best, to do evil that good may come of it; which was the pretence of those councillors of Pope Pius V. who advised him to suffer stewards at Rome, for preventing a greater evil of abusing chaste women and honest matrons. So the pseudo-Nicodemites allege for their abstaining from flesh upon the days forbidden by the church, that this they do for shunning a greater evil, which is the scandal of Papists. Our divines answer them,¹ that evil ought not to be done that good may come of it. But, saith Mr Sprint,² this rule of the Apostle (Rom. iii. 8) must be limited,³ and in some cases holdeth not; for a man may, for doing of good, do that which is evil in use, circumstance, and by accident, so it be not simply and in nature evil. *Ans.* 1. He begs the thing in question, for that rule is alleged against him to prove that nothing which is evil in the use of it may be done for any good whatsoever. 2. The difference betwixt that which is simply evil, and that which is evil in use and by accident, is in that the one may never be done, the other is unlawful only *pro tempore*; but in this they agree, that both are unlawful; for that which is evil by accident,⁴ whilst it is such, is unlawful to be done, no less than that which is in nature evil. 3. Divines hold absolutely,⁵ that *Inter duo vel plura mala culpæ* (such as things scandalous and inconvenient) *nullum est eligendum*; that though in evils of punishment we may choose a lesser to shun a greater, yet in evils of fault, election hath no place, neither may we do a lesser fault to shun a greater,⁶ *nec ullum admittendum malum, ut eveniat aliquod bonum, sive per se sive per accidens*. But let us hear what Mr Sprint can say to the contrary. He allegeth, the priests' breaking of the Sabbath, David's eating of the shew-bread, and the apostles' practising of very hurtful ceremonies; all which things being unlawful were done lawfully, to further greater duties.

We have answered already, that the

¹ Pareus in 1 Cor. vi. 12.

² Calv. in 1 Cor. x. 23, & Pareus ibid.

³ Serm. on Job xvi. 7.

⁴ Serm. at Perth Assembly.

⁵ Fresh Sute, cap. 2, p. 12.

⁶ In 1 Cor. x. 23.

¹ Thuan. Hist. lib. 39, p. 367.

² Pareus in 1 Cor. viii. 13.

³ Page 44, 45.

⁴ Pareus in 1 Cor. x. 23.

⁵ Alsted. Theol. Cas. cap. 12, 199.

⁶ Pareus in Rom. iii. 8.

priests' killing of the sacrifices on the Sabbath, and David's eating of the shew-bread, were not unlawful, because the circumstances changed the kind of the actions. Also, that the Jewish ceremonies used by the apostles were in their practice no way hurtful, but very profitable. Mr Sprint allegeth another example out of 2 Chron. xxx. 18—21: To perform God's worship not as it was written, was a sin, saith he, yet to further God's substantial worships, which was a good thing, was not regarded of God. *Ans.* One cannot guess from his words how he thought here to frame an argument, which might conclude the lawfulness of doing some evil, that some good may come of it. Howsoever, that we may have some light in this matter, let us distinguish betwixt these two things: 1. The people's legal uncleanness, when they came to eat the passover. 2. Their adventuring to eat it, notwithstanding their uncleanness. That they were at that time unclean, it was a sin. But whilst they prepared their hearts truly to seek God, and repented of their uncleanness; that in this case they adventured to eat the passover, was no sin, because it is the will of God, that such as prepare their hearts unfeignedly to seek him, lament their wants, and repent for that they are not so prepared and sanctified for his worship as they ought (there being no other thing to hold them back beside some defect of sanctity in themselves), notwithstanding of any defect which is in them, draw near to him in the use of his holy ordinances. As touching the former, no man will say, that they chose to be unclean, that they might further God's worship. But as for the latter, repenting of their uncleanness, they chose to keep the passover, this did they to further God's worship, and this was no sin, especially if we observe with Tremellius, that it is said, ver. 20, the Lord healed the people, that is, by the virtue of his Spirit purified and cleansed them, so that, that which was lame was not turned out of the way, but rather made straight and healed.

Sect. 7. And now we leave Mr Sprint, who hath not only conformed to the controverted ceremonies, even upon presupposal of their inconvenience, but hath also made it very questionable,¹ whether in the case of deprivation he ought to conform to sundry other popish ceremonies, such as shaven

crown, holy water, cream, spittle, salt, and I know not how many more which he comprehendeth under &c.; all his pretences of greater inconveniences following upon not conforming than do upon conforming, we have hitherto examined. Yet what saith Bishop Spotswood¹ to the cause? He also allegeth there is a great inconvenience in the refusing of the ceremonies, namely, the offending of the king. But for answer unto this, look what the largest extent of the prince's power and privilege in matters belonging unto God's worship, which either God's word or the judgment of sound divines doth allow to him, none shall be found more willingly obsequious to his commandments than we. But as touching these ceremonies in question, we are upon evident grounds persuaded in our consciences, that they are both unlawful, and inexpedient for our church; and though they were lawful in themselves, yet we may answer as the opposers of the Interim replied to those who urged yielding to the ceremonies of the same,² surplice, holidays, tapers, &c., because of the emperor's commandment: That the question is not about things indifferent, but about a main article of faith, namely, Christian liberty, which admitteth not any yoke to be imposed upon the conscience, no not in things indifferent. Our gracious prince who now, by the blessing of God, happily reigns over us, will not (we assure ourselves) be offended at us, for having regard to our consciences, God's own deputies placed in our souls, so far, that for all the world we dare not hazard their peace and quiet, by doing anything with their repugnance and aversion. Wherefore, we are more than confident that his Majesty will graciously accept from us such a reasonable apology, as they of Strasburg used to Charles V.³ *Quantum omnino fieri potest, parati sumus tibi gratificari, non solum civilibus verum etiam in rebus sacris. Veruntamen oramus invicem, ut cogites, quoniam sui facti rationem oportet unumquemque Deo reddere, merito nos de salute nostra sollicitos esse, et providere nequid contra conscientiam a nobis fiat.* And as the Estates of Germany to Ferdinand,⁴ when they besought him only not to grieve nor burden their consciences:

¹ Ubi supra.

² Bald. de Cas. Cons. lib. 4, cap. 11, cas. 3.

³ Heid. Com. lib. 21, p. 381.

⁴ Ibid. lib. 25, p. 485.

Te quidem summum, et à Deo nobis datum magistrum agnoscimus, et libentissime quidem, ac nihil est omnium rerum, quod non possis aut debeas à nobis expectare, sed in hac unare propitium te nobis esse flagitamus. If these hoped that popish princes would accept such answers from them, shall not we? O, shall we not be persuaded that the Defender of the Faith will not refuse to take them from us! especially seeing his Majesty shall ever find, that he hath none more loyal and true subjects, who will more gladly employ and bestow their lives, lands, houses, holds, goods, gear, rents, revenues, places, privileges, means, moities, and all in his Highness' service, and maintenance of his royal crown; and moreover, have so deeply conceived a strong and full persuasion of his Majesty's princely virtues, and much renowned propensity to piety and equity, that they will urge their consciences by all good and lawful means, to assent unto every thing which he enjoins as right and convenient, and when the just aversion of conscience upon evident reasons is invincible, will notwithstanding be more willing to all other duties of subjection, and more averse from the least show of contempt.

CHAPTER II.

AGAINST THOSE OF OUR OPPOSITES WHO PLEAD FOR THE CEREMONIES AS THINGS EXPEDIENT.

Sect. 1. As for those who allege some convenience in the ceremonies, they say more than can abide the proof of reason, which the induction of some particulars shall demonstrate. Dr Mortoune¹ allegeth for the surplice, that the difference of outward garments cannot but be held convenient for the distinguishing of ministers from laics in the discharge of their function. *Ans.* This convenience is as well seen to without the surplice. If a man having a black gown upon him be seen exercising the function of a minister, it is very strange if any man think it not sufficiently distinguished from laics. The Act of Perth, anent confirmation and bishoping of children, would make it appear, that this ceremony is most profitable to cause young children in their tender years

¹ Partic. Def. cap. 1, sect. 1.

drink in the knowledge of God and his religion. *Ans.* 1. If this rite be so profitable for the instruction of children, then why do prelates appropriate it to themselves, who use to be employed in higher affairs, that permit them not to have leisure for exact catechising of children? Or, 2. Though they might attend the discharging of this duty; why should it be made their peculiar? Is not the parish minister able to catechise them? Or, 3. If it must depend upon prelates, and wait upon their leisure; what hath imposition of hands ado with catechising? 4. How comes it, that children who are not bishopped are as well catechised as they who are bishopped.

Sect. 2. Tilen¹ setteth out the expediency of holidays, for imprinting in the minds of people the sense and knowledge of the benefits of redemption. *Ans.* 1. There is no mean so good for this purpose as catechising and preaching, out of season and in season. 2. What could he say unto them who have attained his end without his mean? I find people better instructed, and made more sensible of those benefits, where the feasts are not kept than where they are. 3. Think they their people sufficiently instructed in the grounds of religion, when they hear of the nativity, passion, &c.—what course will they take for instructing them in other principles of faith? Why do they not keep one way, and institute an holiday for every particular head of catechise?

But Bishop Lindsey thinks yet to let us see a greater expediency for observing holidays. "Certainly (saith he)² nothing is so powerful to abolish profaneness, and to root out superstition out of men's hearts, as the exercise of divine worship, in preaching, praying and thanksgiving, chiefly then when the superstitious conceits of merit and necessity are most pregnant in the heads of people,—as doubtless they are when the set times of solemnities return,—for then it is meet to lance the aposteme when it is ripe." *Ans.* This is a very bad cure; and is not only to heal the wound of the people slightly, but to make it the more inveterate and festered. I might object, that little or nothing is preached or spoken by him and his companions at the revolution of those festivities against the superstitious keeping of them; but though they should speak as much as can

¹ Paræm., cap. 16, p. 65.

² Proc. in Perth Assembly, part 3, p. 7.

be against this superstition, their lancing being in word only, and not in deed, the recidivation will prove worse than the disease. The best lancing of the aposteme were not to observe them at all, or to preach against them, which are tried to work this effect more powerfully than the Bishop's cure hath done; for all know that there is none so free of this superstition as those who observe not the holidays.

Sect. 3. The same prelate pleadeth¹ for the expediency of giving the communion to the sick in private houses, because he thinks they should not want this mean of comfort, as if the wanting of the sacramental signs, not procured by a man's own negligence or contempt, could stop or stay the comforts of the Holy Spirit. Nay, it is not so. We have seen some who received not the communion in time of their sickness, end more gloriously and comfortably than ever we heard of any who received the sacrament for their viaticum when they were a-dying. Paybody² thinks kneeling, in the act of receiving the communion, to be expedient for the reverend using and handling of that holy sacrament, and that much reverence ariseth to the sacrament from it. *Ans.* I verily believe that more reverence ariseth to the sacrament from kneeling than is due to it; but I am sure there is no less true reverence of that holy sacrament among such as kneel not in the receiving of it, than among such as do kneel. I hope it is not unknown how humbly and reverently many sincere Christians, with fear and trembling, do address themselves to that most holy sacrament, who yet for all the world would not kneel in receiving it. Thus we see that these expediences, pretended for the ceremonies, are attained unto as well and better without them than by them. But I will go forward to show some particular inconveniences found in them.

CHAPTER III.

THAT THE CEREMONIES ARE INEXPEDIENT, BECAUSE THEY ARE PREPARATIVES FOR GREATER EVILS.

First, then, the ceremonies are inexpedient, because our most holy faith, for which

we should earnestly contend, received no small harm and prejudice, and is like to receive still more and more, by their means. Our case is not much different from the estate of the churches in Germany, when Charles V. caused the book called *Interim* to be published:¹ expediency then was pretended of settling the peace of Germany by this as the best way; but it produced a very great inconveniency, and instead of effectuating peace, it brought forth a hotter contention, as well between the Protestants themselves, as between them and Papists. Expediency is now no less pretended for the ceremonies, yet no more truly. But before the bad effects of the *Interim* were seen, the wiser sort of Protestants² wrote against it, and warned men, *ut ab eo tanquam a presentissima peste sibi caverent.* Notwithstanding that the emperor did straitly inhibit all impugning of it. And Sleidane tells us,³ the reason which made them so mistake it was, because they thought such as were upon that course, were opening a way to the popish religion, *per adiphora seu res medias*, and because⁴ they wished to retain the saving doctrine *puram et salvam a technis illorum, qui nunc dum ceremonias restaurare videri volunt, colluvien totam doctrine pontificie rursus introducunt.* The like reason have we to mistake conformity with antichrist in these ceremonies which are obtruded upon our church; for may we not justly fear that hereby we shall be drawn on to conform with him also in dogmatical and fundamental points of faith. Nay, what talk I of fear? We have already seen this bad consequence in a great part, for it is well enough known how many heterodox doctrines are maintained by Formalists, who are most zealous for the ceremonies anent universal grace, free-will, perseverance, justification, images, antichrist, the church of Rome, penance, Christ's passion and descending into hell, necessity of the sacraments, apocrypha books, Christ's presence in the eucharist, assurance of salvation, &c. Their errors about those heads we will demonstrate, if need be, to such as doubt of their mind. In the meantime it hath been preached from pulpits among ourselves, that Christ died for all alike; that the faithful may fall away from grace,

¹ Sleid. Com. lib. 20, p. 365, 371. Alsted in Chron. Religiosis, an. 1548.

² Sleid. Com. lib. 21, p. 377.

³ Ibid. p. 368.

⁴ Ibid. p. 393.

that justification is a successive action; that none can be assured of salvation in this life; that images in churches are not to be condemned; that Christ descended locally unto the place of the damned; that the Pope is not antichrist; that Rome is not Babylon the whore; that the government and discipline of the church must alter like the French fashion, at the will of superiors; that we should not run so far away from Papists, but come as near to them as we can; that abstinence and alms are satisfactions or compensations for sin. These, and sundry such like tenets, have not been spoken in a corner.

Sect. 2. How far conformity to the ceremonies of the church of Rome hath drawn Conformists, of greatest note, to conform to her faith also, I may give instance in the Archbishop of Spalato.¹ He holds, that many rites of the Roman church are ancient and approvable, that others, though neither ancient nor universal, yet, because of custom, should be tolerated; and that few only are either to be abolished, or, by some prudent and easy way, purged and refined. Now, will we know how far this unity in ceremonies drew him to unity in substance, then let us hear what is his verdict of Protestants as well as of Papists, who suffer for their religion:² *Certe potius martyres mundi, quam Dei sunt, qui ex utraque parte sub titulo conscientie sanguinem frustra fundunt: quasi vero fides et religio Romana, et fides ac religio protestantium sunt due fides et due religiones*, &c. He tells us,³ moreover, that if the Protestants will not have peace with those whom they call Papists, and communicate with them, then are they schismatics, and are not in the true church. And in the declaration of the motives whereupon he undertook his departure out of the territory of Venice, he expresseth his judgment of such books as are framed against the doctrine of the church of Rome, that he held them above measure detestable. Neither doth he stand alone in this pitch; for among the sect of Formalists, is swarming a sect of Reconcilers, who preach and profess unity with the church of Rome in matters of faith. For example, they say, that that which the

learned Papists hold concerning justification, is orthodox, and therefore they will not contend against them, except it be for their contending with us, who do agree with them.¹

Sect. 3. These Reconcilers are too far on in the way to Popery already; but if they will be fully reconciled with Papists, they must transport themselves altogether into their tents, because Papists will not come forth to meet them midway. The *Interim* of Germany tended to reconciliation, yet the Papists wrote against it.² Cassander sought this reconciliation, but Bellarmine confuted his opinion.³ The Archbishop of Spalato was upon the same course of reconciliation, but his books were condemned as heretical, in the decree given at Rome, anno. 1616, by the congregation of cardinals deputed by Pope Paul V., for the making and renewing of the index of prohibited books. The Rhemists tell us,⁴ that they will avoid not only our opinions, but our very words which we use. Our adversaries profess that they reject some expositions of certain places of Scripture, against which they have no other reason but because they are our expositions. Are their minds so aliened from us? And must we be altogether drawn overstay to them? Are they so unwilling to be reconciled to the prejudice of their errors? And shall we be so willing to be reconciled with them to the prejudice of the truth? O strange and monstrous invention! that would reconcile Christ with antichrist,—agree the temple of God and idols,—mix light and darkness together. He had good reason for him who objected to the Archbishop of Spalato,⁵ that *qui ubique est, nusquam est*; for instead of reconciling Protestants and Papists, they make themselves a third party, and raise more controversy. *O bellua multorum capitum!*

Sect. 4. Thus we perceive what prejudice hath arisen, and yet ariseth to the true and saving doctrine, by the means of symbolising with the church of Rome in these ceremonies. But because some Formalists approve not of this course of reconciliation, they (I know) would purge the ceremonies of the blame of it: I will therefore show, that Reconcilers are set forward in their

¹ Field, of the Church, append. to the third book, cap. 11, p. 298. B. Andr. Serm. on Jer. xxiii. 6, p. 79—82.

² Sleid. Com. lib. 21, p. 377.

³ De Laiciis, cap. 19.

⁴ Annot. 1 Tim. vi. 20.

⁵ Rep. Eccl. lib. 7, cap. 12, num. 134.

course of reconciliation, by means of the Roman rites remaining in reformed churches.

G. Cassander, in his book *de Officio pii Viri*, relates unto us how he was entered into this course, and conceived this purpose of reconciliation; and tells, that from his youthhood, he was most observant of ecclesiastical ceremonies, yet so, that he abhorred all superstition. And when he had read the writers of that age, who promised some reformation and repurgation of superstitious worships and absurd opinions, he saith, *Mire illorum institutum placuit: qui tamen ita superstitiones et abusiones, quæ nonnullis ceremoniis ecclesiasticis admixtæ erant, exosas haberem ut ipsum ecclesiasticam politiam, quæ his ceremoniis fere constant, non sublatam et eversam, sed repurgatam et emendatam esse vellem*. We see the first thing which induced him to a reconciliation, was his liking which he had to popish ceremonies, and their remaining in protestant churches; and as this course hath been attempted, so is it also advanced by the ceremonies; for thereby people are induced to say, as they said once, when popish ceremonies did re-enter in Germany: "We perceive now, that the Pope is not so black as Luther made him." And as for the Reconcilers themselves, may they not conceive strong hopes to compass their end? May they not confidently embark in this business? May they not with great expectation of prosperous success achieve their project? When once they have footing upon our union with Rome in ceremonies and church policy, they cannot but hereupon conceive no small animosity to work out their intended purpose.

Do I talk of a chimera, and imagine now that which is not? Nay, I will really exemplify that which I say, in that Proteus and Versipelles, the Archbishop of Spalato; for, in the narration of the passages which were betwixt his Majesty and him, collected by the Bishop of Durham, we find,¹ that he thought the procuring of concord betwixt the church of England and the church of Rome to be easy. And his reasons were,² because he was verily persuaded, that the Pope would approve the English liturgy and the public use of it, as he professed in his colloquy with the Bishops of London and Durham, and the Dean of Winchester. And further,³

he told he was of opinion, that the churches of Rome and of England, excluding Puritans, were radically one church. This made him say,⁴ "I do find here why to commend this church, as a church abhorring from Puritanism, reformed with moderation, and worthy to be received into the communion of the Catholic church." In the following words, he tells, that he could carry something out of the church of England which should comfort all them who hate puritan strictness, and desire the peace of the church (meaning them who desired the same reconciliation with himself). What is more clear, than that the English ceremonies were that which made him prosecute, and gave him hope to effectuate a reconciliation betwixt the church of England and that of Rome.

Sect. 5. But put the case, that as yet we had seen no greater evils following upon the ceremonies, yet must they be acknowledged to be inconvenient, because they are dangerous preparatives for many worse things than we are aware of, and may draw after them sundry evil consequences which are not feared. We have heard before from Spotswood, that novations in a church, even in the smallest things, are dangerous. Who can then blame us to shun a danger, and, fearing the worst, to resist evil beginnings,—to give no place to the devil,—to crush the viper while it is in the shell,—to abstain from all appearance of evil, 1 Thes. v. 22,—and to take the little ones of Babylon whilst they are young, and dash their heads against the stones?

It matters not that many will judge us too precise for doing so. What? Do they think this preciseness any other than that which the law of God requireth, even observing of the commandment of God, without adding to it, or diminishing from it, Deut. xii. 32; and keeping the straight path, without declining to the right hand or the left? Deut. xxviii. 14; or, do they think us more precise than Mordecai, who would do no reverence to Haman, because he was an Amalekite, Esth. iii. 2, and so not to be countenanced nor honoured by an Israelite? Deut. xxv. 19. Are we more precise than Daniel, who would not close his window when he was praying, no, not for the king's edict, knowing, that because he had used to do so aforetime, his doing otherwise had been both a denying of his former profession, and

¹ Park., of the Cross, part 2, p. 80.

² P. 32.

³ Ibid. p. 34.

⁴ Ibid. p. 41.

⁵ Ibid. p. 42.

¹ Reg. Eccles. lib. 7, cap. 12, num. 107.

² Ibid. num. 120.

³ Ibid. num. 132. See to the same purpose D. Potter, in his book called, "Want of Charity justly charged," p. 76.

an ensnaring of himself by yielding in small things, to yield in greater, and after an inch to take an ell? Dan. vi. 10. Are we more precise than the Apostle Paul who gave no place to the adversaries of Christian liberty, no, not for an hour? Gal. ii. 5. Are we more precise than David, who would not do so much as take up the names of idols into his lips, least from speaking of them he should be led to a liking of them? Psal. xvi. 4; or, may not the sad and doleful examples of so many and so great abuses and corruptions which have crept into the church from so small and scarcely observable originals, make us loath at our hearts to admit a change in the policy and discipline of a well constituted church, and rightly ordered before the change, and especially in such things as are not at all necessary?

O! from how small beginnings did the mystery of iniquity advance its progression? How little notes have access to mountains! Wherefore¹ *simplicitatem Christi nos oportet colere, à qua ubi primum extulit pedem vanitas, vanitatem sequitur superstitio, superstitionem error, errorem presumptio presumptionem impietas, idololatrica*. We have cause to fear, that if with Israel we come to the sacrifices of idols, and eat of idololithes, and bow down or use any of superstitious and idolatrous rites, thereafter we be made to join ourselves to these idols, and so the fierce anger of the Lord be kindled against us, as it was against them, Num. xxv. 2, 3.

CHAPTER IV.

THAT THE CEREMONIES ARE INEXPEDIENT,
BECAUSE THEY HINDER EDIFICATION.

Sect. 1. That the ceremonies are a great hinderance to edification, appeareth, first, In that they obscure the substance of religion, and weaken the life of godliness by outward glory and splendour, which draws away the minds of people so far after it, that they forget the substance of the service which they are about. The heathenish priests laboured,² *per varietatem ceremoniarum, rem in precio retinere*. The use for which Papists appoint their ceremonies,³ is,

ut externam quandam majestatem sensibus obijciat; and so are the ceremonies urged upon us,¹ though to conciliate reverence and due regard to divine worship, and to stir up devotion. In the meanwhile it is not considered,² that *mentes humane mirificæ capiuntur et facinantur, ceremoniarum splendore et pompa*. Videmus siquidem, saith Bucer,³ *vulgus delectari actionibus scenicis, et multis uti signis*. Chennitius marks of the cumulating of ceremonies in the ancient church,⁴ that it drew to this, *ut tandem in theatricum ferne apparatus ceremoniarum illæ abierint*. Musculus reprehends bishops for departing from the apostolical and most ancient simplicity,⁵ and for adding ceremonies unto ceremonies in a worldly splendour and respectability, whereas the worship of God ought to be pure and simple.

The policy, then, which is most simple and single, and least lusted with the pomp and bravery of ceremonies, cannot but be most expedient for edification. The king's daughter is most like herself when she is all glorious within, not without, Psal. xlv. 13, and the kingdom of God appeareth best what it is, when it cometh not with observation, Luke xvii. 20, 21. But "superstition (saith Camero),⁶ the mother of ceremonies, is lavish and prodigal; spiritual whoredom, as it is, it hath this common with the bodily; both of them must have their paintings, their trinkets, their inveiglements."

Sect. 2. Secondly, The ceremonies are impediments to the inward and spiritual worship, because they are fleshly and external. In the second commandment are forbidden *omnes ritus, qui à spirituali Dei cultu discrepant*.⁷ "The kingdom of God is within you," saith Christ, Luke xvii. 21. Now, if the Apostle, 1 Tim. iv. 8, say, that bodily exercise, such as fasting, watching, &c., which are requisite as helps and furtherances to the humiliation of the soul, do but profit a little, then may we say of our unnecessary and unprofitable ceremonies, that they are exceedingly nocent and harmful to true and spiritual worship. The

¹ Hooker, Eccl. Pol. lib. 4, num. 1.

² Hospin. Epist. Dedic. Præfix. Libris de Orig. Monach.

³ Censur. Liturg. Angl. cap. 9.

⁴ Exan. part 2, de Rit. in Administ. Sacr. p. 32.

⁵ Com. in John iv. 24.

⁶ Popish Prejud. cap. 10.

⁷ Calv. Com. in Exod. xx. 5.

Apostle is not speaking of plays and pastimes, as Bellarmine would have us to think. Who can believe that Timothy was so much addicted to play, that the Apostle had need to admonish him, that such exercise profiteth little? He is speaking, then, of such bodily exercises as in those primitive times were used religiously, as fasting, watching, lying on the ground, and such like; and he would have Timothy rather to exercise himself to the life and power of godliness, and to substantial worship, than to any of these outward things. Neither doth the Apostle condemn only the superstitious use of these exercises, as Calvin well observeth,¹ *aliique in totum damnaret*: whereas he doth only extenuate and derogate from them, saying, that they profit little. Therefore (saith he), *ut maxime integer sit animus, et rectus finis, tamen in externis actionibus nihil reperit Paulus quod magnificiat*. Valde necessaria admonitio, nam semper propendet mundus in illam partem, uti Deum externis obsequiis velit colere. But what will some say? Do we allow of no external rites and ceremonies in divine worship?

Saravia tells us,² that *dum vitia vitant stulti, in contraria ruunt*, and that he is no less in the fault, *qui nullas in externo Dei cultu ceremonias admittit, quæ tantum decori serviunt, hominesque sui admoveant officii, quam qui quasvis citra, delectum recipiunt, &c.* Wherefore, because a transition from idolatry and superstition is more easy to Atheism and the profanation of holy things, than to the golden mediocrity, he saith, he could have wished that Beza had not generally condemned all ceremonies without making any difference.

Ans. Neither Beza, nor any other, who dislike the English ceremonies, condemneth such rites and circumstances in the external worship of God as serve only for decency, but these sacred and significant ceremonies which admonish men of their duty are not of this sort. What shall we say then of such a conjunction as this, *quæ tantum decori serviunt, hominesque sui admoveant officii*? Why would not Saravia write a chronology; I say not *magnarum* (as others), but *mirandarum conjunctionum*, and record that at such a time he found out the conjunction and compatibility of two things which were ever thought incompatible in former ages,

namely, rites serving only for decency, and holy significant ceremonies admonishing men of their duty in God's worship? Had there been no moralist (trow we) then to note, that decency and things serving only for decency, have place in civility and all moral actions, in which notwithstanding there is no significant nor admonitory sacred signs of men's duty in God's worship? And thus should these two things be severed, which he hath conjoined and confounded.

To conclude, we condemn the English controverted ceremonies which are regarded as holy and significant, as most inexpedient, because they derogate from the true inward and spiritual worship; for man's nature, saith Camero,³ "is delighted in that which is fleshly and outward, neglecting that which is spiritual and inward." And this is the reason why least spiritual, lively, and holy disposition hath followed upon the addition of unnecessary ceremonies; and why there was never so much zeal, life, and power of religion inwardly, in the church of Christ, as then, when she was freest of ceremonies. This much a Formalist of great note is forced to acknowledge. Let us consider, saith he, "the primitive church, flourishing more in times of the apostles than ever it did afterwards. Who will not admire her great simplicity in all points, and especially in ceremonies? for excepting the celebration of baptism by washing of water, and of the holy supper, according to the Lord's institution, in taking the bread and wine, and distributing them after thanksgiving; excepting also the imposition of hands upon those who extraordinarily received the Holy Ghost, whether it were in a general calling or a particular, to a charge in the church, and availing for a miraculous effect of healing the sick; I say, these excepted, there will not be found any other ceremony in those primitive times, so admirable was their simplicity."

Sect. 3. Thirdly, the ceremonies are a great hinderance to edification, because they make much time and pains to be spent about them, which might be, and (if they were removed) should be spent more profitably for godly edifying. That which is said of the ceremonies which crept into the ancient church, agreeth well to them.⁴ *Ista ceremoniarum accumulatio, tum ipsos doctores,*

¹ Popish Prejud. cap. 10.

² Camero, ibid.

³ Hospin., ubi supra.

⁴ Com. in illum locum.

⁵ De Diversa. Grad. Ministr. Evang. contr. Bez. cap. 24, sect. 25.

¹ Jun. Animad. in Bell. de Cult. Sanct. lib. 3, cap. 5.

² Natal. Comit. Mythol. lib. 1, cap. 15.

³ Bell. de Effect. Sacram. cap. 31.

tum etiam ipsos auditores, a studio docendi atque discendi verbum Dei abstraxit, atque impediuit necessarias et utiles divini eloquii institutiones.

Pulpits sound oftentimes with declamations for the ceremonies, when there is need of pressing the power of godliness upon the consciences of people, and when there are many more necessary things to be urged. The press also sends forth idle discourses and defences of the ceremonies which might be employed more profitably.

And, moreover, faithful men whose labours might be very profitable to the church in the holy ministry, have neither a door of entrance nor a door of utterance licentiated to them, and that because they will not consent nor yield themselves to be the unhappy instruments of imposing this yoke of ceremonial bondage upon the necks of God's people. Others who have entered, and have been both faithful and painful labourers in the Lord's vineyard, are thrust from their charges for no other quarrel, but that of non-conformity. O unhappy ceremonies! woe unto you, you mischievous lets and prejudices to the edification of the church.

CHAPTER V.

THAT THE CEREMONIES ARE INEXPEDIENT, BECAUSE THEY ARE OCCASIONS OF INJURY AND CRUELTY.

Sect. 1. The ceremonies serve to be instruments of cruelty against the sincere servants of Christ; they are used as Absalom's sacrifice, to be cloaks of wicked malice; they occasion the fining, confining, depriving, imprisoning, and banishing of very worthy and good men.

Such instruments of cruelty brought into the habitation, not of the sons of Jacob, Gen. xlix. 5, but of the God of Jacob, are to be accursed by all who love the peace of Jerusalem, or bear the bowels of Christian compassion within them, because they are not of Christ the meek Lamb of God, who did not cry, nor lift up, nor cause his voice to be heard in the street, who did not break the bruised reed, nor quench the smoking flax, Isa. xlii. 2, 3; but they are of antichrist, to

whom it is given to make war with the saints.¹

Surely those bowels of mercies, kindness, and forbearance, which the Apostle requir-eth, as they should be in every Christian, Col. iii. 12, 13, so chiefly in *is qui præsunt*, as Melancthon noteth,² in them towards all, but chiefly towards these who are both good Christians and good subjects; towards these in all things, but chiefly in matters of ceremony and indifferency. In such matters always, but chiefly when there is no contempt nor refractory disposition, but only a modest and Christian desire to conserve the peace of a pure conscience, by forbearing to do that which it is persuaded is not right. Let magistrates remember well,

"Purcare subjectis et debellare superbos."

Sect. 2. If there were no more but such a doleful and woeful effect as the cruel dealing with the faithful ministers of Jesus Christ, occasioned by the ceremonies, this is too much for evincing the inconveniency of them.

Dr Burges, in a sermon preached before king James, related a speech of the emperor Augustus, who commanded that all the glasses should be broken, that no man might incur such a fright as one Pollio was put into, for breaking one of his master's glasses. Whereby (as he expounds himself)³ he meant to intimate unto that wise king, that it were better to take away the ceremonies than to throw out the ministers for them. Yet it is the verdict of some,⁴ that the blame lieth not upon the ceremonies, but upon ministers themselves, who leave their places and draw all this evil upon themselves. This is even as Nabal blamed David for breaking away from his master, when he was chased away against his will, 1 Sam. xxv. 10; and as Julian,⁵ when he had impoverished the Christians, laughed them to scorn, as if they had impoverished themselves to get that blessing which Christ had promised to the poor.

The canon law speaketh for the Lord's bishops, which are persecuted from city to city: *Nec ipsi in hoc peccant, quoniam non sponte sed coacte hoc agunt: sed illi*

¹ Rev. xvii. 7.

² Com. in illum locum.

³ Pref. of the Ans. p. 17.

⁴ Surav. N. Fratrl et Amico, art. 17.

⁵ Socrat. lib. 3, cap. 12.

⁶ Decr. part 2, caus. 7, quest. 1, cap. 36.

qui eos persequuntur; nec ipsis episcopis hoc imputari potest, sed illis qui eos hoc agere cogunt. How is it that they are not ashamed, who say, that ministers have their own places and callings, when they would fain abide in them, and with heavy hearts are thrust from them.

Sect. 3. Neither is this all the injury which is occasioned by the ceremonies; they make godly and zealous Christians to be mocked and nick-named Puritans, except they can swallow the camel of conformity. Our consciences bear us witness, how without all reason we are branded with the name of those ancient heretics, from whose opinions and manners, O, how far are we! And as for ourselves, notwithstanding all this, we shrink not to be reproached for the cause of Christ. We know the old Waldenses before us,² were also named by their adversaries, Cathares or Puritans; and that, without cause, hath this name been given both to them and us. But we are most sorry that such as are walking humbly with their God, seeking eagerly after the means of grace and salvation, and making good conscience of all their ways, should be made odious, and that piety, humility, repentance, zeal, conscience, &c., should be mocked, and all by occasion of the ceremonies.

CHAPTER VI.

THAT THE CEREMONIES ARE INEXPEDIENT, BECAUSE THEY HARDEN AND CONFIRM THE PAPISTS.

The Papists make advantage of the ceremonies, and thereby confirm themselves in Popery. First, in that they use them as the bellows to blow up the fire of contention among us, remembering the old rule, *divide et impera*. They set us by the ears among ourselves, that they may be in peace, and that intestine discord may make us forget the common adversary.³ Calvin wrote to the Earl of Somerset, *Fieri non posse quin Papistæ superbius insolerent, nisi nature compositum esset dissidium de ceremoniis*. Dr White saith,⁴ that our strife about ceremonies is kindled and nourished by

Papists. If we were liberate from the ceremonies, then might we do more against the Papists, and they should not insult as they do.

Sect. 2. But they have yet more advantage from our Formalists; for they like very well the course of conformity, as the way of returning to Popery, and some of them tell us in broad terms, that they hope we are coming fast home to them. They perceive us receiving and retaining their Roman rites and popish policy, which makes them resolve to stay where they are, promising, that themselves are in the surest hold, and looking for our returning back to them. This was ere now both foreseen and foretold by the wiser sort.

Zanchius told,¹ that he seemed to himself to hear the monks and Jesuits saying among themselves, *Ipsa quoque Regina Angliæ doctissima et prulentissima, paulatim incipit ad Sanctæ Romanæ ecclesiæ redire religionem; resumptis jam sanctissimis et sacratissimis clericorum vestibus; sperandum est fore ut reliqua etiam omnia, &c.* Papists count all to be *Calvino-Papistæ*, i. e., half Papists, who are not Puritans, and daily invite them to an association with them against the Puritans, as Parker² sheweth out of a treatise entitled, *Concertatio Ecclesiæ Catholice in Angliâ contra Calvinos Papistas et Puritanos*. And we may perceive out of Francisus à Sancta Clara,³ that they despair of any agreement with Puritans, yet hoping that Formalists will agree with them. In these hopes they are still more and more confirmed whilst they observe this conformity in ceremonies to be yet prevailing and proceeding, and not like to take a stand. Whereupon they (poor souls) delight to stay still in Babylon, finding us so fast turning back thither, as if we repented we come out from thence.

Sect. 3. Some would here defend the ceremonies, as being most expedient to gain the Papists, who otherwise should be the more aliened from us. O what a fiction! As if, forsooth, hardening of them in Popery were to win them, and fostering of them in the same were to wean them from it. Woeful proof hath taught us, that they are but more and more hardened, and resolutely confirmed in Popery by these Roman remainders among

¹ Epist. ad Regin. Ellis. lib. 1, Epistol. p. 112.

² Of the Cross, cap. 9, sect. 1.

³ Expos. Conf. Aug. art. 37, et problem. 2 do prædest.

¹ The Pastor and the Prelate, p. 26.

² Hist. of the Waldenses, lib. 1, cap. 3.

³ Calv. Epist. et Resp. col. 132.

⁴ Way to the Church, ans. to sect. 33.

us, neither will they, whilst they expect that we are turning back to them, do so much as meet us midway; but they flee from us,¹ *quam longissime*; their over-passing and over-reaching Pharisaical zeal, makes them hold fast the least point of their religion, and adhere to the whole entire fabric of the Roman both doctrine and discipline.

Of the gaining of the adversaries, Augustine speaketh better,² for if you demand, *Unde vincantur pagani, unde illuminentur, unde ad salutem vocentur?* He maketh this answer, *Deserite omnes solennitates ipsorum, deserite nugas eorum: et si non consentiant veritati nostra, saltem pudeat paucitatis sue. Nulla est concedenda gratia adversariis* (say the divines of Germany³), *in mutatione ceremoniarum, nisi prius nobiscum consentiant in fundamento hoc est, in vera doctrina et usu sacramentorum.* They that yield to the adversaries in matters of rite, *eos hoc ipso in impietate sua confirmant*; and the adversaries *cessione ista non parum adjuvantur*, saith Balduin Bellarmine,⁴ rejecteth Cassander's reconciliation,⁵ for this reason among others, because, according to the judgment of the fathers, we should not change nor innovate the smallest matters for gratifying of heretics.

The best way, then, which we can use for winning of the Papists, is to shine as lights in the world, Phil. ii. 15, 16, holding forth the word of life by a pure and plain profession, to be blameless and harmless, the sons of God, without rebuke, in the midst of a crooked and perverse nation, that so the name of God and his doctrine be not blasphemed, 1 Tim. vi. 1. If thus we hold fast the profession of the truth, and walk in all honest conversation according to the truth, so many as are ordained to eternal life shall be converted, and made to glorify God in the day of visitation, 1 Pet. ii. 12.

Sect. 4. If it be said, that the Apostle observed some Jewish ceremonies for winning of the Jews, as we read, Acts xviii. 21; xx. 16; xxi. 26; and that it appeareth, we may by the same reason yield to some popish ceremonies for winning of the Papists. *Ans.* 1. There is not a like reason of the weak

Jews, who then could not have been fully instructed concerning Christian liberty, and obstinate Papists who might have been, and yet may be instructed, but will not. Nor, 2. Is the same to be done in the bright shining meridian light of the gospel, which was done before the full promulgation of the same? Nor, 3. Is so much honour to be given,¹ and so great respect to be had to popish and antichristian rites, as to the ceremonies which were ordained by God himself. These were to be suffered awhile, that they might be honourably buried; to those we are to say with detestation, "Get you hence." Nor, 4. Can the same things be done at Antioch which are done at Jerusalem. At Antioch Peter sinned by using Jewish rites, because there the greatest part were Gentiles, who had both heard his preaching and seen his practice against the ceremonies of the Jews. But at Jerusalem Paul had to do with the weak Jews, who had heard little or no preaching against those ceremonies, and had seen as little practice contrary unto them. Now Scotland must not be likened to Jerusalem, no not to Antioch; for Scotland hath been filled both with preaching and practice contrary to the ceremonies of the Papists, yea, hath moreover spewed them out openly and solemnly, with a religious and strict oath never to lick them up again.

CHAPTER VII.

THAT THE CEREMONIES ARE INEXPEDIENT, BECAUSE THEY DISTURB THE PEACE OF THE CHURCH.

Sect. 1. The great evils which have befallen to many famous churches, through the means of intestine dissensions, should teach us not to admit the occasions of the like inconveniences among ourselves; for as by concord *minima crescunt*, so by discord *maxima dilabuntur*.

Now, the ceremonies are the bane of our church's peace, and the unhappy instruments of lamentable discord among brethren who should dwell together in unity. I know that the refusers of the ceremonies are blamed, as if they were the troublers of the peace of the church, and the tumultuating contentious spirits who make so much ado about matters

of rite and ceremony. But I know also that none have been more ordinarily and commonly blamed for troubling the peace of the church than they who least deserved to be blamed for it. So was Elijah himself¹ thought to be he that troubled Israel, when he contended against the corruptions of the church in his time, 1 Kings xviii. 17. I will therefore observe four marks whereby it may be known when contentions are in a church, which side is reprehensible, and also who are to be blamed as the troublers of our Israel.

Sect. 2. In contentions raised in the church, we are to consider the motive, the measure, the matter, the manner. And, 1st. Touching the motive: They who contend in a church reprehensibly, are moved and induced to the course which they follow, by some worldly respect, Acts xix. 25; 1 Tim. vi. 5. Now, as for those in our church who contend for the ceremonies, many of them are led by such *argumenta inartificialia*, as wealth, preferment, &c., and if conscience be at all looked to by them, yet they only throw and extort an assent and allowance from it, when worldly respects have made them to propend and incline to an anterior liking of the ceremonies. We do not judge them when we say so, but by their fruits we know them. As Pope Innocent VII.,² while he was yet a cardinal, used to reprehend the negligence and timidity of the former popes, who had not removed the schism and trouble of the church of Rome, yet when himself was advanced to the popedom, he followed the footsteps of his predecessors, governing all things tumultuously, and making the schism worse; so among our opposites, not a few have been overcome with ease, pleasure, riches, favour, pre-eminence, &c., to like well of the ceremonies which never had their first love, when they had both spoken and disputed against them. What drew them overstays to contend for them, except (I say not the seeking of, lest I be thought uncharitable, but) their being sought by some worldly benefit? And how could such an one excuse himself but by Paris's apology, *Ingentibus ardent, judicium domus sollicitudinem.* And what marvel that Balak's promotion, Num. xxii. 17; and Saul's fields and vineyards, 1 Sam. xxii. prevail with such as love this present world, 2 Tim. iv. 10.

The popish oil and chrism were defended by Islebius and Sidonius, *ut ipsi nimi-*

*rum discederent unctiores.*¹ How like to them have we known many Formalists! The best respect which Bishop Lindsey nameth for kneeling at the communion is,² the eschewing the prince's offence; but, as for us, let it be told, who hath ever of a Conformist become a Non-Conformist, for any worldly benefit which he might expect by his non-conformity? What worldly respect have we to move us to refuse the ceremonies? What wealth? What preferment? What ease? What pleasure? What favour? Do we not expose ourselves to the hazard of all these things? Only our consciences suffer us not to consent to such things as we see to be unlawful and hurtful for the church.

Sect. 3. 2d. Let it be considered which side exceeds in contending they are in the fault, 1 Tim. vi. 4. Now, our opposites do far overmatch us, and overstride us in contention; for, 1. They harbour an inveterate dislike of every course and custom which we like well of, and they carp at many deeds, words, writings, opinions, fashions, &c. in us, which they let pass in others of their own mind. Whereas we (God knows) are glad to allow in them anything which we allow in others, and are so far from *nitimur in vetitum, semper cupimusque negare*, that most heartily we condescend to apply ourselves, by all possible means, to observe them, please them, and entertain peace with them, who impose and urge upon us an unconscionable observation of certain ceremonies, and to do as much for them as any ground of conscience or reason can warrant. So far as we have attained, we walk by the same rule with them, Phil. iii. 16, and so exceed not in the measure. 2. It may be seen that they exceed in contending with us, if we be compared with the Papists; against them they contend more remissly, against us more intently. Saravia professeth,³ that he thinketh worse of us than of Papists. He hath reason who complaineth of Formalists' desire not to stir and contend against the Papists, and their fierceness against their own brethren.⁴ "This (saith he) is ill provided for, and can have no excuse, that some, not to contend with Papists, should contend with their brethren, and displease the sons of their own mother, to please the enemies of their father,

¹ Maldon. Com. in Matt. viii. 3.

² De Verb. Dom., serm. 6.

³ Conrad. Schlüsselburg. apud Park. of the Cross, part 2, p. 97.

⁴ De Cus. Consc., lib. 4, cap. 11. cas. 3.

⁵ De Laiciis, cap. 19.

¹ Calv. Epist. et Resp. col. 451, 452.

¹ Platin. In vita Innoc. VII.

¹ Steld. com. lib. 21, p. 376.

² Epist. to the Pastors of the Kirk of Scotland.

³ Sarav. N. Fruiti et Amico, art. 17.

⁴ Park., of the Cross, cap. 6, sect. 21.

and beat not the dog before the lion, but the lion for favour of the dog, and make the natural child to weep, while the son of the bondwoman doth triumph." 3. That they exceed, appeareth from the effects of their contending; hurt and damage is a main effect of contention. Calvin, Perkins, and Pareus, observe upon Gal. v. 15, that contentions breed hurtful and pernicious effects, which tend to consumption and destruction. Now, wherein do we injure or harm our opposites in their persons, callings, places, &c.? Yet in all these, and many other things, do they wrong us, by defamation, deprivation, spoliation, incarceration, &c.? How much better were it to remove the Babylonian baggage of antichristian ceremonies, which are the mischievous means, both of the strife and of all the evil which ariseth out of it! Put away the ceremonies, cast out this Jonas, and, behold, the storm will cease. A wise pilot will, in an urgent storm, cast out even some precious wares, that the rest may be safe. "And shall we then (saith Parker¹) cast out the pilots of the ship themselves, and all to spare the wares of Boine, which are no lawful traffic?"

Sect. 4. 3d. Let the matter be looked to for which each side contendeth. "Brethren (saith the Archbishop of St Andrews),² to contend is not a fault, if so it be for a weighty matter, but to be contentious in a light business, this is faulty." Now, I wish it may please him to understand, that when we contend about the removal of the ceremonies, we contend for a very weighty matter; for we prove the removal of them to be necessary, in respect of their inconveniency and unlawfulness. They who urge the ceremonies, contend for things which are not necessary; and we who refuse them, contend for things which are most necessary, even for the doctrine and discipline warranted by God's word, against all corruptions of idolatry and superstition. That the ceremonies can neither be purged of superstition nor idolatry I have proved in the third part of this dispute.

Sect. 5. 4th. If the manner of contending be observed, our opposites will be found reprovable, not we. We contend by the grounds of truth and reason; but they use to answer all objections, and resolve all questions, by the sentence of superiors and the will of the

law; we contend from God's word and good reason, they from man's will and no reason. This was clearly seen at the first conclusion of the five Articles at Perth Assembly.

Bishop Lindsey himself, relating the proceedings of the same, tells us,¹ that Mr John Carmichell and Mr William Scot alleged, that if any would press to abolish the order which had been long kept in this church, and draw in things not received yet, they should be holden to prove either that the things urged were necessary and expedient for our church, or the order hitherto kept not meet to be retained. This was denied, upon this ground, that it was the prince (who by himself had power to reform such things as were amiss in the outward policy of the church) that required to have the change made. Well, since they must needs take the opponent's part, they desired this question to be reasoned, "Whether kneeling or sitting at the communion were the fitter gesture?" This also was refused, and the question was propounded thus: "His Majesty desires our gesture of sitting at the communion to be changed into kneeling, why ought not the same to be done?" At length, when Mr John Carmichell brought an argument from the custom and practice of the church of Scotland, it was answered,² That albeit the argument held good against the motions of private men, yet his Majesty requiring the practice to be changed, matters behoved to admit a new consideration, and that because it was the prince's privilege, &c.

I must say, the Bishop was not well advised to insert this passage, which (if there were no more) lets the world see that free reasoning was denied; for his Majesty's authority did both exeeem the affirmers from the pains of probation (contrary to the laws of disputation), and state the question, and also answer arguments.

And, moreover, when the Articles were put in voting, the Archbishop, in calling on the names, did inculcate these and the like words: "Have the king in your mind—remember on the king—look to the king." This Bishop Lindsey passeth over in deep silence, though it be challenged by his antagonist. Plinius proveth,³ that *animalia insecta* do sometimes sleep, because sometimes when light is holden near them, yet they stir

¹ Ibid. sect. 22.

² Sermon at Perth Assembly.

³ Part I, p. 63.

⁴ Ibid. p. 64.

⁵ Nature II. lib. 10. cap. ult.

not. And may not we conclude that the Bishop was sleeping, when, though both in this and divers other places, such convincing light was holden out before them, yet hath he said nothing, nor stirred himself at all for the matter? Yet, farther, we find that Bishop Spotswood, in his sermon at that pretended Assembly, answereth all such as cannot yield to the ceremonies with the peace of their consciences, that without any more ado, they may not control public judgment, but must always esteem that to be best and most seemly which seemeth so in the eye of public authority,—that even such rites and orders as are not rightly established must be obeyed so long as they have the force of a constitution,—that the sentence of superiors ought to direct us, and be a sufficient ground to our conscience for obeying. This is the best of their reasoning, and before all fail. The Bishop of Winchester reasoneth from bare custom.¹ Have we not cause to renew the complaint which John Lascus made in behalf of the Protestants in Germany,² *nulla cognitione causæ per colloquium aut amicam suffragiorum collationem habita, sed præjudicio tantum ipsorum sententiam damnari.*

CHAPTER VIII.

THAT THE INEXPEDIENCY OF THE CEREMONIES, IN RESPECT OF THE SCANDAL OF THE WEAK, MAY BE PLAINLY PERCEIVED. TWELVE PROPOSITIONS TOUCHING SCANDAL ARE PREMISED.

Sect. 1. There remaineth yet another inconveniency found in the ceremonies, which is scandal. They hinder our spiritual edification and growth in faith and plerophory, and make us stumble instead of going forward. The best members of the body should be cut off when they offend, much more the superfluous humours, such as the popish ceremonies must be reckoned to be, Matt. v. 29, 30. And what if some wide consciences think the ceremonies no stumbling-blocks? Nay, what if some pretend that they edify? *Ferulæ asinis gratissimæ sunt in pabulo, cæteris vero jumentis præsentaneo veneno.*³ It is enough to evince the

inconveniency of the ceremonies, that some are scandalised, yea, many tender consciences are made to stumble by their means. We learn from our Master, that the scandal of one is to be cared for, much more the scandal of many, especially if those many be of the number of the little ones which believe in him, Matt. xviii. 6. But for our clearer proceeding in this argument I will permit these propositions, of which we are to make use.

Sect. 2. 1st. *Σκάνδαλον ὃν πρόσκομμα.* Scandal or offence is not the grieving or displeasing of my brother; for peradventure when I grieve him or displease him, I do edify him. Now edification and scandal are not compatible; but scandal is a word or deed proceeding from me, which is, or may be, the occasion of another man's halting, or falling, or swerving from the straight way of righteousness. *Scandalum* (saith Jerome¹) *nos offendiculum, vel ruinam et impactionem pedis possumus dicere: quando ergo legimus, quicumque de minimis istis scandalizaverit quempiam: hoc intelligimus: quicumque dicto factove occasionem ruine cuiquam dederit. Scandalum* (saith Almandus Polanus²) *est dictum vel factum, quo alius deterior redditur.*

2d. This occasion of halting, stumbling, or swerving, which we call scandal, is sometimes only given on the part of the offender, sometimes only taken on the part of the offended, sometimes both given on the one part, and taken on the other. The first sort is *scandal given and not taken*; the second is *scandal taken and not given*; the third is *scandal both taken and given*.

3d. All these three kinds of scandal are sinful. The first is the sin of the offender; for it is a fault to give my brother occasion of stumbling, though he stumble not. The second is the sin of the offended, who should not take offence where he hath no cause. The third is a sin on both sides; for as it is a fault to lay an occasion of falling before another, so it is a fault in him to fall, though he have occasion.

Sect. 3. 4th. A scandal given, or active, is not only such a word or deed whereby we intend the fall of our brother, but also such a word or deed,³ *quod de sui ratione habet, quod sit inductivum ad peccandum, puta*

¹ Com. in Matt. lib. 2, cap. 15.

² Synt. Theol. lib. 6, cap. 3, col. 19.

³ Aquin. 2, 2 an. quest. 43, art. 1, Marc. Ant. de Dom. de Rep. Eccl. lib. 5, cap. 10, num. 44.

¹ Sermon on I Cor. xi. 16.

² Thuan. Hist. lib. 16, p. 506.

³ Plin. Natur. Hist. lib. 4. cap. 1.

cum aliquis publice facit peccatum, vel quod habet similitudinem peccati, John xvi. 2. Put the case: A man staying away from the Christian assemblies and public worship of God, intending to employ his studies all this time for the good of the church by writing, such a man doth not only not intend the fall of others, but, by the contrary, he intendeth edification; yet doth he scandalise them, because *ratio et conditio operis* is scandalous and inductive to sin.

5th. An active scandal is given (and so is faulty) many ways. If it be in a thing lawful, then it makes our brother condemn our lawful deed, yea, animates him by our example to that which in his conscience he condemneth, both which are sin. If it be in a thing unlawful, then is the scandal given and peccant, if, 1. Either our brother be made to fall into the outward act of sin; or, 2. If he be made to stumble in his conscience, and to call in question the way of truth; or, 3. If it do so much as to make him halt, or weaken his plerophory or full assurance; or, 4. If it hinder his growth and going forward, and make him, though neither to fall, nor to stumble, nor to halt, yet to have a smaller progress; or, 5. If none of these evils be produced in our brother, yet when, either through our intention and the condition of the deed together, or through the condition of the deed alone, occasion is given him of sinning any one of these ways. *Opus nostrum* (saith a great proctor for popish ceremonies) *quoties sive natura sua, sive superaddito accidente alicujus circumstantie, est inductivum proximi ad peccatum, sive causativum magni mali, sive turbativum boni spiritualis; sive impeditivum fidei, &c., quamvis etiam effectus non sequeretur, malum est et peccatum.*

Sect. 4. 6th. A passive scandal, which is taken and not given, is not only faulty when it proceedeth of malice, but also when it proceedeth of ignorance and infirmity; and *scandalum pusillorum* may be *scandalum acceptum*, on the part of the offended faulty, as well as *scandalum Pharisæorum*. When weak ones are offended at me for the use of a lawful thing, before I know of their weakness, and their taking of offence, the scandal is only passive; and so we see that weak ones may take offence where none is given, as well as the mali-

cious. Now, their taking of offence, though it proceed of weakness, yet is sinful; for their weakness and ignorance is a fault, and doth not excuse them.

7th. A scandal may be at first only passive, and yet afterward become active. For example, Gideon's ephod and the brazen serpent were monuments of God's mercies, and were neither evil nor appearances of evil; so that when people were first scandalised by them the scandal was merely passive, but the keeping and retaining of them, after that scandal rose out of them, made the scandal to become active also, because the reserving of them after that time was not without appearance of evil.

Sect. 5. 8th. The occasion of a scandal which is only passive should be removed, if it be not some necessary thing, and we are not only to shun that which giveth scandal, but also that whereupon followeth a scandal taken, whatsoever it be, if it be not necessary. This is so evident, that Papists themselves subscribe to it; for both Cardinal Cajetan¹ and Dominicus Bannes say, that we should abstain even *a spiritualibus non necessariis* when scandal riseth out of them.

9th. Neither can the indifferency or lawfulness of the thing done, nor the ordinance of authority commanding the use of it, make the scandal following upon it to be only passive, which otherwise, i. e., in case the thing were neither lawful nor ordained by authority, should be active. Not the former; for our divines teach,² that *scandalum datum* riseth sometimes, *ex facto in se adiaphoro*, when it is done *intempestive, contra charitatis regulam*. Not the latter; for no human authority can take away the condition of scandal from that which otherwise would be scandal, because *nullus homo potest vel charitati, vel conscientie nostris imperare, vel periculum scandalum dati prestare*, saith a learned Casuist.³

10th. A scandal is passive and taken by the scandalised without the fault of the doer, only in this case,⁴ *cum factum unius est alteri occasio peccandi præter intentionem facientis, et conditionem facti*, so that to the making of the doer blameless, is not only required that he intend not his brother's fall, but also that the deed be neither evil

¹ Com. In 2 m. 2 an. quest. 43, art. 7.
² Henning, Enchir. Theol. class. 3, cap. 17, Magdeburg. cent. 1, lib. 2, cap. 4, col. 418, 449.
³ Ames. lib. 5, de Consc. cap. 11. quest. 6.
⁴ Ames. ibid. quest. 3.

in itself, nor yet done inordinately, and with appearance of evil.

Sect. 6. 11th. The scandal not to be cared for is only in necessary things, such as the hearing of the word, prayer, &c., from which we may not abstain, though all the world should be offended at us. In these, I say, and these only, *scandalum quod oritur ex rebus per se bonis et necessariis, non licet evitare, &c., at rerum legitimarum sed non necessariarum dispar est ratio, &c.*, saith a great Formalist.¹

12th. We ought, for the scandal of the malicious, to abstain from all things from which we ought to abstain for the scandal of the weak; for we ought not to abstain from necessary things for the scandal of the weak, no more than for the scandal of the malicious, and from things that are not necessary, we ought to abstain for the scandal of the malicious as well as for the scandal of the weak. So that weakness and malice in the offended *non variant speciem scandalum*, but only *gradum ejusdem speciei*. Both his fault who is offended through malice, is greater than his fault who is offended through weakness, and likewise his fault who offends the weak in the faith, is greater than his fault who offends those who are malicious against the faith, because as we ought to do good to all men, so chiefly to those of the household of faith. Nevertheless, the kind of scandal remains the same, whether we have to do with the malicious or the weak.

They are, therefore, greatly mistaken, who conclude from Paul's not circumcising of Titus, Gal. ii. 4, 5, that he cared not for the scandal of the malicious. The argument were good if those false brethren had been scandalised by his not circumcising of Titus; but they were only displeased hereby, not scandalised. The Apostle saw that they were to be scandalised by his circumcising of Titus; therefore, of very purpose, he circumcised him not, because he foresaw *statim fore ut illi traherent in calumniam*, saith Calvin.² *Ne eo circumciso gloriarentur evangelicam libertatem quam Paulus prædicabat sublatam*, saith Bullinger.³ If they had compelled him to circumcise Titus, *falsis fratribus parata erat calumniandi ansa adversus Paulum*, saith Pareus,⁴ who also inferreth well from this place, that we are taught to beware of two extremes, to wit,

¹ Camero, Præl. In Matt. xviii. 7, de scand.
² Com. In illum locum.
³ Com. ibid.
⁴ Com. ibid.

the scandal of the weak on the one part, and the perversity of false brethren on the other part: *Si enim, saith he, usu rerum medicarum vitemus, vel illos offendi, hoc est, in fide labefactari vel istos in falsis opinionibus obfirmari omittendum potius sunt, quia tunc per accidens fiunt illicite*. Whereupon I throw back the argument, and prove from this place, that Paul cared to shun the scandal of the malicious, which should have followed upon his circumcising of Titus, as well as he cared to shun the offence of the weak, which should have followed upon his not circumcising of Timothy; and that Paul cared for the scandal of the malicious is further confirmed by his not taking wages at Corinth. They who would have been offended at his taking wages there were malicious, and did but seek occasion against him, 2 Cor. xi. 12, yet his taking wages there not being necessary (as appeareth from 2 Cor. xi. 9), he abstained.

Christ's not caring for the scandal of the Pharisees is also objected, to prove that if the thing be lawful or indifferent, we are not to care for the offence of the malicious. But Parker answereth well: "The scandal there not cared for is, when the Pharisees are offended at his abstaining from their washings and his preaching of true doctrine,—both of which were necessary duties for him to do. And when he defendeth his healing on Sabbath, Luko xiii. 15, and his disciples' plucking ears, Matt. xii. 7, upon this reason they are duties of necessity and charity, he plainly insinuateth, there is no defence for deeds unnecessary when the malicious are scandalised. When the thing was indifferent, doth he not forego his liberty for to please them, as when he paid tribute, lest he should offend them, although he knew they were malicious?" Matt. xvii. 27.

Thus have I evinced a main point, namely, that when scandal is known to follow upon anything, if it be not necessary, there is no respect whatsoever which can justify it.

CHAPTER IX.

ALL THE DEFENCES OF THE CEREMONIES, USED TO JUSTIFY THEM AGAINST THE SCANDAL IMPUTED TO THEM, ARE CONFUTED.

Sect. 1. From that which hath been said it followeth inevitably, that since scandal

¹ Of the Cross, part 2. p. 57.

riseth out of the controverted ceremonies, and since they are not things necessary, they are to be condemned and removed as most inconvenient. But that the inconveniency of them, in respect of the scandal which they cause, may be particularly and plainly evinced, I come to discuss all the defences which our opposites use against our argument of scandal. These Formalists, who acknowledge the inconveniency of the ceremonies in respect of scandal, and yet conform themselves to the same, are brought in by Hooker¹ making their apology on this wise: "Touching the offence of the weak, we must adventure it; if they perish, they perish, &c. Our pastoral charge is God's absolute commandment, rather than that shall be taken from us," &c. The opinion of such, beside that it will be hateful and accursed to every one who considereth it, I have said enough against it heretofore.²

Sect. 2. Wherefore I will here meddle only with such as go about to purge the ceremonies from the inconveniency of scandal. And first, they commonly answer us, that the scandal which followeth upon the ceremonies is passive and taken only, not active and given, which answer I find both impertinent and false. It is impertinent, because, put the case: the scandal were only passive and taken, yet the occasion of it should be removed out of the way when it is not a thing necessary, according to my 8th, 11th, and 12th propositions; and if any of our opposites will deny this, let them blush for shame. A Jesuit shall correct them,³ and teach them from Matt. xvii. 27, that Christ shunned a scandal which would have been merely passive, and therefore that this is not to be taken for a sure and perpetual rule, *scandalum datum, not acceptum esse vitandum*. One of our own writers upon this same place noteth,⁴ that this scandal which Christ eschewed, had been a scandal taken only, because the exactors of the tribute-money ought not to have been ignorant of Christ's immunity and dignity; yet because they were ignorant of the same, lest he should seem to give a scandal, *cedere potius sua libertate voluit*. *Ideo non tantum dicit: ne scandalizentur: sed ne scandalizemus eos, hoc est, ne scandalum materiam eis demus.*

¹ Eccl. Pol. p. 246.

² Supra, cap. 1.

³ Maldonat. Com. in illum locum.

⁴ Pareus, Com. ibid.

Sect. 3. Their answer is also false: 1. There is no scandal taken but (if it be known to be taken, and the thing at which it is taken be not necessary) it is also given. The scandal of the weak, in the apostles' times, who were offended with the liberty of eating all sorts of meats, was passive and taken, as Zanchius observeth,¹ yet was that scandal given and peccant upon their part, who used their liberty of eating all sorts of meats, and so cared not for the offence of the weak. Think they then that our taking of offence can excuse their giving of offence? Nay, since the things whereby they offend us are no necessary things, they are greatly to be blamed.

That the ceremonies are not necessary in themselves our opposites acknowledge, and that they are not necessary in respect of the church's determination, I have proved in the first part of my dispute. Wherefore, having no necessity in them, they ought to be abolished, when scandal is known to arise out of them.

2. Giving and not granting that the scandal of them who were first offended at the ceremonies was only passive, yet the using of them after scandal is known to rise out of them, must be an active scandal, because the keeping of a thing which is not necessary, after scandal riseth out of it, is an active scandal, though the scandal which at first rose out of it had been only passive, as I show in my seventh proposition.

3. The truth is, that both first and last the scandal of the ceremonies is active and given; for an active scandal is *dictum vel factum vere malum, aut mali speciem habens, quo auctor aliis peccandi occasionem præbet*, say our divines.² An active scandal is ever a sin in him who offendeth, *quia vel ipsum opus quod facit est peccatum, vel etiam si habeat speciem peccati, &c.*, say the schoolmen.³ A scandal given and faulty, *id opus aut ex se malum, aut apparentur*, say Formalists themselves.⁴

Sect. 4. Now to say the least that can be said, the ceremonies have a very great appearance of evil, and so the scandal which followeth them shall be proved to be active. The divines of Magdeburg⁵ infer from 1

¹ Com. in Eph. iv. 13.

² Polan. Synt. Theol. lib. 6, cap. 3, col. 19.

³ Aquila. 2, 2 an. quest. 43, art. 2.

⁴ Marc. Ant. de Dom. de Rep. Eccl. lib. 1, cap. 11, num. 18.

⁵ Cent. 1, lib. 2, cap. 4, col. 450.

Thess. v. 22, *speciem mali etiam scandala conficere*. Junius teacheth,¹ that scandal is given, *sive exemplo malo, sive speciem habente mali*. M. Ant. de Dominis maketh² the scandal sin, *Ubi quis opere suo aliquo, vel de se malo vel indifferenti, aut bono, sed cum specie apparentis mali, proximum inducit ad peccandum, etiamsi intentio ipsius ad hoc non feratur*.

But to discover the appearance of evil which is in the ceremonies, let us consider with Zanchius,³ that the appearance of evil from which the Apostle exhorteth to abstain may be expounded two ways. First, It may be referred to the preceding words, and so meant of prophecy and trying the doctrine of prophets or preachers, for we should beware in this matter of all which hath any appearance of evil, that is, from all things, *quæ ab hæreticis in suam sententiam, malamque consequentiam trahi possunt*. For example, saith Zanchius, Nestorius said, that we are saved by the blood, not of the Son of God, but of the Son of man. Now if any, suppressing that negative, should say, we are saved by the blood of the Son of man, though this might receive a right explication, yet it hath an appearance of evil, because from it Nestorius might confirm his heresy. Appearance of evil thus expounded will be found in the ceremonies in question. If a phrase or form of speaking from which heretics may draw had consequences, and confirm their errors, though not truly, yet in show, be an appearance of evil, then much more are visible ceremonies and received customs, from which heretics get occasion to confirm their heretical errors, and damnable superstitions, very plain and undeniable appearances of much evil.

Now Papists confirm many of their superstitions by the English ceremonies. Parker⁴ giveth too many clear instances, namely, that by the English cross Martial justifieth the popish cross, and Saunders the popish images. That the English service-book is drawn by Parsons and Bristowe, to a countenancing of their mass-book; that Rainold draweth private baptism to a proof of the necessity which they put in that sacrament; that the Rhemists draw the absolution of the sick, prescribed in the communion-book, to an approbation of their absolution, auri-

cular confession, and sacrament of penance. To these instances I add, that the Rhemists¹ confirm the feast of their assumption of Mary for the other feasts which the church of England observeth. And so doth J. Hart.²

Sect. 5. It will be said, that Papists have no ground nor reason to confirm any of their superstitions by the English ceremonies. But I answer: 1. If it were so, yet forasmuch as Papists draw them to a confirmation of their superstitions, we should abstain from them as appearances of evil. Eating (at a privato banquet) of that which was sacrificed to idols, did confirm an idolator and infidel in his religion, as Pareus³ noteth; yet from this the idolator had no reason to confirm himself in his idolatry; but because the idolator, seeing it, might draw it to a confirmation, the Apostle will have it for that respect forborne. When the Arians abused trin-immersion in baptism, to signify three natures of the three persons, Pope Gregory,⁴ and the fourth council of Toledo ordained,⁵ that in Spain, thrice washing should no longer be used in baptism, but once only. The Arians had no just reason to draw such a signification from the ceremony of trin-immersion, yet was it abolished when those heretics did so abuse it. If any say, that we are saved by the blood of the Son of man, the phrase is orthodox, because of the communication, or rather communion of properties, and the Nestorians cannot with good reason by it confirm their heresy, yet are we to abstain from this form of speech, in Zanchius's judgment, when it is drawn to the confirmation of that error.

I conclude with that which Parker⁶ allegeth out of the *Harmony of Confessions: Cum adiaphora rapiuntur ad confessionem, libera esse desinunt*. Mark rapiuntur. 2. The ceremonies do indeed greatly countenance those superstitions of Papists, because *communio rituum est quasi symbolum communionis in religione*;⁷ so that Papists get occasion from the ceremonies, of confirming, not only those popish rites which we have not yet received, but also the whole popish religion, especially since they see Conformists so siding with them against Non-Conformists, and making both their opinions

¹ Annot. on Gal. iv. 10.

² Confer. with Rain. cap. 8, div. 2, p. 408, 410.

³ Cam. in 1 Cor. x. 28.

⁴ Lib. 1, epist. 41.

⁵ Can. 5.

⁶ Ubi supra.

⁷ Bald. de Cas. Cons. lib. 2, cap. 14, cas. 7.

¹ Com. in Dan. i. 8.

² De Rep. Eccl. lib. 5, cap. 10, num. 44.

³ Com. in 1 Thes. v. 22.

⁴ Of the Cross, cap. 3, sect. 6.

and practices to be better than we reckon them to be.

Saravia,¹ perceiving how much the popish sacrament of confirmation is countenanced and confirmed by our bishoping, thinks it best to put the fairest face he can upon the Papists' judgment of that bastard sacrament. He would have us believe, that the Papists do not extol the dignity of the sacrament of confirmation above baptism. But he should have considered that which Cartwright² marketh out of the first tomo of the councils, that in the epistle which is ascribed to Eusebius and Melciades, bishops of Rome, it is plainly affirmed, that the sacrament of confirmation "is more to be revered than the sacrament of baptism."

Sec. 6. Zanchius hath another exposition of the appearance of evil, which doth also agree to the ceremonies. The appearance of evil which maketh scandal, and from which the Apostle would have us to abstain, may be taken generally of all sorts of sin, and all evil things whatsoever; for so we should abstain from all that which hath any appearance of evil; *nullam præbentes occasionem proximo nostro aliquid mali de nobis suspicandi*. He instanceth for example, the eating of idolothites in Paul's time, 1 Cor. x. Now if the eating of idolothite meats was an appearance of evil, and so scandalous, because it gave the weak occasion to suspect some evil of such as did eat them, much more idolothite rites which have not only been dedicated and consecrated to the honour of idols, but also publicly and commonly used and employed in idolatrous worship; surely whosoever is with such idolothites, gives great occasion to his brother to suspect some evil of him, because of such evil-favoured appearances. And thus we see how great appearance of evil is more than manifest in the ceremonies, which maketh the scandal active, if there were no more; but afterwards we shall see the ceremonies to be evil and unlawful in themselves, and so to be in the worst kind of active scandal.

Sec. 7. Two things are objected here by our adversaries, to make it appear that the scandal of conformity is not active nor faulty upon their part. 1. They say they are blameless, because they render a reason of that which they do, so that we may know the lawfulness of it. To this sufficient answer hath been made already by one whose

answers I may well produce to provoke Conformists therewith, because no reply hath ever been made to them. "This (saith he¹), if it be true, then see we an end of all the duty of bearing with the weak; of forbearing our own liberty, power, and authority in things indifferent, for their supportance; yea, an end of all the care to prevent their offence, by giving them occasion *aut condemnandi factum nostrum, aut illud imitandi contra conscientiam*,² which we have so often,³ so seriously, with so many reasons, obtestations, yea, wees and threatenings, commanded to us throughout the word. What needed Paul to write so much against the scandal of meats, and against the scandal of idolothious meats? This one precept might have sufficed, let the strong give a reason for his eating, &c. Though he hath given many reasons to them of Corinth for the lawfulness of taking wages; though he hath given divers reasons for the lawfulness of all sorts of meats to them of Rome, yet neither will take wages himself, nor suffer others to eat all sorts of meats, when others are offended. And what is that which he writeth Rom. x.? Take and receive the weak for their supportance, and not for controversy and disputation," &c.

It will be said that they are to be thought obstinate, who, after a reason given, are still scandalised. But the answer is in readiness: *Fieri potest ut quidam nondum sint capaces rationis redditæ, qui dicere quamvis ratio sit illis reddita, habendi sunt adhuc pro pusillis*.⁴ They are rather to be thought obstinate in scandalising, who, perceiving the scandal to remain, notwithstanding of their reason given, yet for all that take not away the occasion of the scandal. But say some,⁵ whoever ought to be esteemed weak, or not capable of reason, ministers must not be so thought of. Whereunto I answer with Diocletianus:⁶ *Infirmatatem in doctiores cadere posse, neminem negaturum puto, et superiorum temporum historia de dimicatione inter doctores ecclesiæ, ob ceremonias, id ipsum probat. Parati etiam sunt coram Deo testari se non posse acquies-*

¹ Park., of the Cross, part 2, p. 57; 1 Thes. v. 14; Rom. xiv. 16; 1 Cor. ix. 12; 1 Thes. ii. 7; Acta xx. 34; Matt. xviii. 6.

² Cornel. Jansen. Conc. Evang. cap. 71.

³ Aug. de Morib. Manich. lib. 2, cap. 14; Rom. xiv. 10.

⁴ Ames. lib. 5, de Consc. cap. 11, quest. 6.

⁵ Dr Forbese Iren. lib. 2, cap. 20, num. 27.

⁶ Alt. Damasc. cap. 9, p. 556.

cere in Formalistarum foliis feebicis. The reason which they give us commonly is will and authority; or if at any time they give another reason, it is such an one as cannot clear nor resolve our consciences. But let their reasons be so good as any can be, shall we be thought obstinate for being offended, notwithstanding of their reason? Dare they say that those who contended so much of old about the celebration of Easter, and about the feast of the Sabbath, were not weak, but obstinate and malicious, after a reason was given? Why consider they not, that "men may, for their science,¹ be profitable ministers, and yet fail of that measure of prudence whereby to judge of a particular use of indifferent things?"

Sec. 8. 2d. They say they give no scandal by the ceremonies, because they have no such intent as to draw any into sin by them. Ans. A scandalous and inordinate quality or condition of an action, any way inductive to sin, maketh an active scandal, though the doer have no intention to draw into sin. This I made good in my fourth proposition; and it is further confirmed by that great scandal whereby Peter compelled the Gentiles to Judaize, Gal. ii. 14. "He constrained them (saith Perkins²) by the authority of his example, whereby he caused them to think that the observation of the ceremonial law was necessary." It was then the quality of his action which made the scandal active, because that which he did was inductive to sin, but we are not to think that Peter had an intention to draw the Gentiles to sin. Cardinal Baronius³ laboureth to make Peter blameless, and his fact free of all fault; *quia præter ipsius spem id acciderat*, and it fell forth only *ex accidenti et inopinato, ac præter intentionem ipsius*. M. Ant. de Dominis⁴ confuteth him well: *Est scandalum et cum peccato, quando quis licet non intendat peccatum alterius, facit autem opus aut ex se malum aut apparenter, ex quo scit, aut seire debet, consequuturum alterius peccatum, aut quodcumque malum: nam etiam dicitur illud voluntarium interpretative*.

Sec. 9. I will yet descend more particularly to confute our opposites' several answers and defences, which they have used against our argument of scandal. And I

begin with our Lord Chancellor: "As for the godly amongst us (saith he¹), we are sorry they should be grieved; but it is their own fault, for if the things be in themselves lawful, what is it that should offend them?"

Ans. 1. He does not well express scandal (whereof he is there speaking) by grief; for I may be grieved, yet not scandalised, and scandalised, yet not grieved, according to my first proposition touching scandal.

2. To what purpose tells he it is their own fault? Thinks he that there are any offended without their own fault? To be offended is ever a fault,² as I show in my third and sixth propositions; so that if a scandal be not removed where it is men's own fault that they are offended, then no scandal shall ever be removed, because all who are scandalised commit a fault in being scandalised. *Nihil potest esse homini causa sufficiens peccati, quod est spiritualis ruina, nisi propria voluntas; et ideo dicta vel facta alterius hominis possunt esse solum causa imperfecta aliquantulum inducens ad ruinam*, saith Aquinas,³ giving a reason why, in the definition of scandals, he saith not that it giveth cause, but that it giveth occasion of ruin.

3. Why thinks he that if the things be in themselves lawful, they are purged of scandal? What if they edify not? 1 Cor. xx. 23. What if they be not expedient? Are they not therefore scandalous, because in themselves lawful? This shift is destroyed by my ninth proposition. And, I pray, were not all meats lawful for the Gentiles in the apostles' times? Yet this could not excuse their eating all sorts of meats, when the Jews were thereby offended.

4. Whereas he demandeth, if the things be in themselves lawful, what is it that should offend them? I demand again, though adultery, murder, &c., be in themselves unlawful, what is it that should offend us? Should we offend or be scandalised for anything? Nay, then, we should sin; for to be offended is a sin.

5. He had said to better purpose, What is it that may offend them, or doth offend them, that it may be voided? Whereunto I answer, that there is a twofold scandal which may be and hath been given by things

¹ Serm. at Perth Assembly.

² "Non enim solum scandalizare, sed etiam scandalizari peccatum est, quia infirmitas est," saith Maldonat. upon Matt. xviii. 7.

³ 2. 2 an., quest. 43, art. 1.

¹ Parker, of the Cross, part 2, p. 75.

² Com. upon this place.

³ Tom. 1, an. 56, num. 39.

⁴ De Rep. Eccl., lib. 1, cap. 11, num. 18.

lawful in themselves (as I touched in my fifth proposition), viz., the giving of occasion to the weak to condemn our lawful deeds, and the animating of them to follow our example against their own consciences—both ways we may make them to sin. The Apostle, 1 Cor. x. 29, where he is speaking of a certain kind of idolothites which are in themselves lawful, and only evil in the case of scandal, sheweth, that if the weak, in a private banquet, see the strong eating such meats as have been offered to idols, notwithstanding of warning given, then is the weak one scandalised; because, would the Apostle say, *Vel ipse etiam clet tuo exemplo, vacillante conscientia, vel tacite frictum tuum damnabit.*¹ Behold what scandal may arise even out of things which are in themselves lawful, which also ariseth out of the ceremonies (let them be as lawful as can be). 1. We are provoked to disallow of lawful things, and to condemn the doers as superstitious and popishly affected. 2. We are animated by the example of Formalists to practise conformity, which in our consciences we condemn, and by consequence do sin, because he that doubteth is damned, and whatsoever is not of faith is sin.

Sect. 10. Let us see next how the Bishop of Edinburgh can help the cause. He will have us not to respect scandal, because it is removed by the law. "For (saith he²) by obedience to a lawful ordinance, no man gives scandal; and if any take offence, both the cause and occasion thereof is the perverseness only of the person offended." Tertullian saith well, *Res bona neminem offendit nisi malam mentem.*

Ans. 1. I show in my ninth proposition, that the ordinance of superiors cannot make that to be no scandal which otherwise should be scandal. If this be not taken well from us, let one of our opposites speak for us,³ who acknowledgeth that human power cannot make us do that which we cannot do without giving of scandal; and that, in this case, the pretext of obedience to superiors shall not excuse us at the hands of the Supreme Judge.

2. I would learn of him what makes a lawful ordinance about matters of fact or things to be done? Not the will of superiors, else there shall be no unlawful ordinances (for every ordinance hath the will of

the ordainer); not the lawfulness of the thing in itself which is ordained neither, for then every ordinance which prescribeth a thing lawful in itself, were it never so inexpedient in respect of supervenient circumstances, should be lawful. To a lawful ordinance then is required, not only that the thing ordained be lawful in itself, but also that it be not inexpedient; so that a thing may be lawful in itself, yet not lawfully ordained, because the ordinance commandeth the doing of it, whereas there are many things lawful which ought not to be done, because they are not expedient, 1 Cor. vi. 12.

3. Since it cannot be a lawful ordinance which ordaineth a thing inexpedient, it cannot be a lawful obedience which is yielded to such an ordinance.

4. If by a lawful ordinance he mean (as it seems he doth) an ordinance prescribing that which is lawful in itself, then his answer is false. What if an ordinance of superiors had ordained the Corinthians to eat freely of all meats which were in themselves clean? Durst the Bishop say that this ordinance of superiors had been of greater weight and superior reason than the law of charity, which is God's law? Had no man given scandal by obedience to this ordinance? And would not the Apostle for all that have forbidden, as he did, the using of this liberty with the offence of others?

5. When any man is offended at a thing lawful, prescribed by an ordinance, the cause thereof is indeed in himself (yet it is not always his perverseness, but oftimes weakness); but the occasion of it is the thing at which he offendeth, which occasion should ever be removed when it is not a thing necessary, as I showed already.

6. As for that sentence of Tertullian, it must admit the exception of a reverend divine. He signifieth, saith Pareus,¹ scandal not to be properly committed, save in things evil in themselves, or else indifferent: *quoniam interdum circa bonas intemperate factas, etiam committi possit.*

Sect. 11. In the third place, we will look what weapons of war Dr Forbess² produceth in his *Ironicum*,³ falsely so called. And first, he will not hear us touching scandal, except we first acknowledge the ceremonies not to be evil in themselves: otherwise he thinks we debate in vain about scandal, since

¹ Pareus, Com. In illum locum.

² Epist. to the Past. of the Church of Scotland.

³ Dr Forbess, Iren., lib. 2, cap. 20, num. 19.

¹ Com. In 1 Cor. viii. 9.

² Lib. 2, cap. 20, num. 5, 6.

we have a more convenient way to exterminate the ceremonies, by proving them to be evil in themselves, and also because, when we are pressed with the weight of arguments, we will still run back to this point, that nothing which in itself is unlawful can be done without scandal.

Ans. 1. The argument of scandal is not vainly or idly debated; for though we prove the ceremonies to be evil in themselves, yet fitly we argument also from the scandal of them, because this maketh yet more. 1. *Ad rem*; for the scandal of a thing is more than the unlawfulness of it: every unlawful thing is not scandalous, but that only which is done to the knowledge of another. 2. *Ad hominem*; for that we may either content or convince our opposites, we argument *ex ipsorum concessis*, to this purpose,—that since they yield the ceremonies to be in themselves indifferent, therefore they must acknowledge that they are to be forborne, because scandal followeth upon them, and they should abstain from things indifferent, in the case of scandal.

2. Whereas he thinks we will still turn back to the unlawfulness of the ceremonies in themselves, albeit we may justly make use of this answer, when they go about to purge the ceremonies from scandal by the lawfulness of them in themselves, (because the argument of scandal doth not presuppose our concession of the lawfulness of the ceremonies, but theirs,) yet he deceives himself in thinking that we cannot handle this argument without it; for were they never so lawful in themselves, we evince the scandal of them from the appearance of evil which is in them;¹ so that, without respecting the unlawfulness of the ceremonies in themselves, we can and do make good our argument of scandal, so far as concerneth the ceremonies considered by themselves.

But when our opposites object, that many are scandalised by us who refuse the ceremonies, we here compare the scandal of non-conformity, if there be any such (for though some be displeased at it, I see not how they are scandalised by it), with the scandal of conformity, and show them that the scandal of non-conformity is not to be cared for, because it is necessary, and that by reason of the unlawfulness of the ceremonies. I will make all this plain by a simile.

A pastor dealing with a fornicator, layeth

before him both his sin and the scandal of it too. Now, as touching the scandal, the fornicator careth not for it, because he is in the opinion that fornication is indifferent. Whereupon the pastor thus proceedeth: If it were indifferent, as you say, yet because scandal riseth out of it, you should abstain. And so, amongst many arguments against fornication, the pastor useth this argument taken from the scandal of it, both for aggravating the sin in itself, and for convincing the sinner; and this argument of scandal the pastor can make good against the fornicator out of his own intemperate and unrequired concession of the indifferency of fornication (because things indifferent, and in the case of scandal, and when they are done with the appearance of evil, should be forborne), without ever mentioning the unlawfulness of it. But if in a froward tergiversation, the fornicator begin to reply, that he also is scandalised and provoked to go on in his fornication obstinately, by the pastor rebuking him for so light a matter, and that the pastor's reproof to him hath appearance of evil, as much as his fornication hath to the pastor; albeit here it may be answered, that the pastor's reproof is not done inordinate, neither hath any appearance of evil, except in the fornicator's perverse interpretation, yet for stopping the fornicator's mouth, as well more forcibly as more quickly, the pastor rejoineth, that if any scandal follow upon his reproof, it is not to be regarded, because the thing is necessary, and that because fornication being a great sin, he may not but reprove it.

So, albeit our argument of scandal holdeth out against the ceremonies considered by themselves, without making mention of the unlawfulness of them in themselves: albeit also when the scandal of non-conformity (if there be any such) is compared with the scandal of conformity, we say truly that this hath appearance of evil in its own condition, and that hath none, except in the false interpretation of those who glory in gain-saying.

Yet for further convincing of our opposites, and darting through their most subtle subterfuges with a mortal stroke, we send them away with this final answer,—You should abstain from the ceremonies when scandal riseth out of them, because you confess them to be in themselves indifferent. But we do avouch and prove them to be unlawful; wherefore it is necessary for us to

¹ Supra, sect. 4—6.

abstain, though all the world should be offended.

Sect. 12. The Doctor¹ proceedeth to throw back the argument of scandal upon our own heads, and to charge us with scandalising both the church and commonwealth by our refusing the ceremonies. But what? should a doctor be a dictator? or a proctor a prater? Why, then, doth he ventilate words for reason? That some are displeased at our non-conformity, we understand to our great grief; but that thereby any are scandalised, we understand not; and if we did, yet that which is necessary, such as non-conformity is, can be taken away by no scandal.

But the Doctor² goeth forward, denying that there is in the ceremonies so much as any appearance of evil, to make them scandalous. Where I observe, that he dare not adventure to describe how a thing is said to have appearance of evil, and consequently a scandalous condition. The man is cautious, and perceiveth, peradventure, that the appearance of evil can be made to appear no other thing than that which doth more than appear in the ceremonies. And this I have heretofore evinced out of Zanchius.

The Doctor³ holdeth him upon kneeling in receiving the sacramental elements, and denieth that it is scandalous, or any way inductive to spiritual ruin. But (if he will) he may consider that the ruder sort, who cannot distinguish betwixt worshipping the bread, and worshipping before the bread, nor discern how to make Christ the passive object of that worship and the bread the active, and how to worship Christ in the bread, and make the worship relative from the bread to Christ, are, by his example, induced to bread-worship, when they perceive bowing down before the consecrated bread in the very same form and fashion wherein Papists are seen to worship it, but cannot conceive the nice distinctions which he and his companions use to purge their kneeling in that act from idolatry. As for others who have more knowledge, they are also induced to ruin, being animated by his example to do that which their consciences do condemn.

There occurreth next an objection, taken from Paul's not taking wages at Corinth (though he might lawfully), for shunning the offence both of the malicious and the weak;

in the solution whereof the Doctor¹ spendeth some words. The substance of his answer is this, that Paul taught it was lawful to take wages, and that they should not be offended at it; and if we do as he did, we must teach that the ceremonies are lawful in themselves, yet not using our power for the time, lest the weak be offended, or lest the malicious glory: but for all that, not denying our right and liberty, nor suffering a yoke of bondage to be imposed upon us by contumacious men. And, besides, that the Apostle was commanded by no ecclesiastical decree to take wages from the Corinthians, as we are commanded by the decree of Perth to receive the five Articles; so that Paul might, without contempt of ecclesiastical authority, abstain from taking of wages, but we cannot, without contempt of the church, reject the Articles.

Ans. 1. This importeth, that if the question were not *de jure*, and if we disliked the ceremonies, and were offended at them, for some other reason than their unlawfulness, for this offence they would abstain. It may be his reverend fathers return him small thanks for this device. For let some men be brought forth, acknowledging the ceremonies to be in themselves indifferent, yet offended at them for their inexpediency, whether they be weak or malicious, the Doctor thinks he should abstain for their cause.

2. How knows he that they who were offended at Paul's taking of wages at Corinth, thought not his taking of wages there unlawful, even as we think the ceremonies unlawful?

3. Why judgeth he that we are not scandalised through weakness, but through malice and contumacy? So he giveth it forth both in this place and elsewhere.² Who art thou that judgest another man's servant?

But, 4. If we were malicious in offending at the ceremonies as things unlawful, and in urging of non-conformity as necessary, should they therefore condemn our being scandalised? Those that would have Titus circumcised, were they not malicious? Did they not urge circumcision as necessary? Held they it not unlawful not to circumcise Titus?

Yet did the Apostle abstain because they were to be scandalised, that is, made worse and more wicked calumniators by the circumcising of Titus, as I have showed;³ so

¹ Num. 17.

² *Iren.*, lib. 1, cap. 10, sect. 2.

³ *Supra*, cap. 8, sect. 6.

¹ *Ibid.*, num. 7.

² Num. 10—14.

³ Num. 15, 16.

that albeit we are not to take care for the displeasing of men that maliciously and contumaciously urge (as necessary) abstaining from that which is lawful to be done; yet must we care for scandalising them and making them worse: rather, ere that he, we ought to abstain from the use of our liberty.

5. If an ecclesiastical decree had commanded Paul at that time to take wages at Corinth, the Doctor thinks he had contemned ecclesiastical authority in not taking wages, though some should be offended at his taking wages. What! could an ecclesiastical decree command Paul to take wages in the case of scandal? or could he have obeyed such a decree in the case of scandal? We have seen before that no human authority can make that no scandal which otherwise were scandal; so that Paul had not contemned ecclesiastical authority by not obeying their command in this case of scandal which had followed by his obeying; for he had not been bound to obey, nay, he had been bound not to obey in such a case; yea, farther, albeit scandal had not been to follow by his taking wages, yet he had no more contemned the church by not obeying a command to take wages than he had done by living unmarried, if the church had commanded him to marry. The bare authority of the church could neither restrain his liberty nor ours in things indifferent, when there is no more to bind but the authority of an ordinance.

6. Why holds he us contemners of the church for not receiving the five Articles of Perth? We cannot be called contemners for not obeying, but for not subjecting ourselves, wherewith we cannot be charged. Could he not distinguish betwixt subjection and obedience? Art thou a Doctor in Israel, and knowest not these things? Nay, art thou a Conformist, and knowest not what thy fellow Conformists do hold?

Sect. 13. One point more resteth, at which the Doctor² holdeth him in this argument, namely, that for the offence of the weak necessary things are not to be omitted, such as is obedience to superiors, but their minds are to be better informed.

Ans. 1. Obedience to superiors cannot purge that from scandal which otherwise were scandal, as we have seen before.³

2. That information and giving of a reason cannot excuse the doing of that out of which scandal riseth, we have also proved already.¹

3. That the ordinance of superiors cannot make the ceremonies necessary, I have proved in the first part of this dispute. This is given for one of the chief marks of the man of sin;² "That which is indifferent, he by his laws and prohibitions maketh to be sin;" and shall they who profess to take part with Christ against antichrist, do no less than this? It will be replied, that the ceremonies are not thought necessary in themselves, nor non-conformity unlawful in itself, but only in respect of the church's ordinance. Just so the Papists profess,³ that the omission of their rites and observances is not a sin in itself, but only in respect of contemning the church's customs and commandments. How comes it, then, that they are not ashamed to pretend such a necessity for the stumbling-blocks of those offending ceremonies among us, as Papists pretend for the like among them?

Sect. 14. But the English Formalists have here somewhat to say, which we will hear. Mr Hooker tells us,⁴ that ceremonies are scandalous, either in their very nature, or else through the agreement of men to use them unto evil; and that ceremonies of this kind are either devised at first unto evil, or else having had a profitable use, they are afterwards interpreted and wrested to the contrary. As for the English ceremonies, he saith, that they are neither scandalous in their own nature, nor because they were devised unto evil, nor yet because they of the church of England abuse them unto evil.

Ans. 1. Though all this were true, yet forasmuch as they have been abused by the Papists unto idolatry and superstition, and are monuments of Popery, the trophies of Antichrist, and the relics of Rome's whorish bravery,—they must be granted, at least for this respect, to be more than manifest appearances of evil, and so scandalous.

But, secondly, It is false which he saith; for kneeling in receiving the communion is, in its own nature, evil and idolatrous, be-

¹ *Ibid.*, sect. 7.

² *Money Myster.* of Iniq. in the conclus.

³ *Aquin.* 3, quest. 66, art. 8; *Rhem.* Annot. on *Matt.* xvi. sect. 5; *Bell.* de Pontif. Rom. lib. 4, cap. 18; and *De Sacrific. Missae*, lib. 6, cap. 13.

⁴ *Eccles. Pol.*, lib. 4, 11, 12.

¹ *Field.* of the Church, lib. 4, cap. 34; and *Bills.* *supra* Parker, of the Cross, part 2, p. 33.

² *Ibid.*, lib. 2, cap. 20, num. 14.

³ *Supra*, cap. 8, sect. 5; cap. 9, sect. 10.

cause religious adoration before a mere creature, which purposely we set before us in the act of adoring, to have state in the worship, especially if it be an actual image in that act representing Christ to us (such as the bread in the act of receiving) draweth us within the compass of co-adoration or relative worship, as shall be copiously proved afterwards.

Other of the ceremonies that are not evil in their own nature, yet were devised to evil; for example, the surplice. The replier¹ to Dr Mortoune's particular defence, observeth, that this superstition about apparel in divine worship, began first among the French bishops, unto whom Cælestinus writeth thus:—*Discernendi*, &c. "We are to be distinguished from the common people and others by doctrine, not by garment,—by conversation, not by habit,—by the purity of mind, not by attire; for if we study to innovation, we tread under foot the order which hath been delivered unto us by our fathers, to make place to idle superstitions; wherefore we ought not to lead the minds of the faithful into such things, for they are rather to be instructed than played wital; neither are we to blind and beguile their eyes, but to infuse instructions into their minds." In which words Cælestinus reprehends this apparel, as a novelty which tended to superstition, and made way to the mocking and deceiving of the faithful.

Lastly, Whereas he saith the ceremonies are not abused by them in England, I instance the contrary in holidays. Perkins saith,² that the feast of Christ's nativity, so commonly called, is not spent in praising the name of God, but in rifting, dicing, carding, masking, mumming, and in all licentious liberty, for the most part, as though it were some heathen feast of Ceres or Bacchus. And elsewhere³ he complaineth of the great abuse of holidays among them.

Sect. 15. As touching the rule which is alleged against the ceremonies out of Paul's doctrine, namely, that in those things from which we may lawfully abstain, we should frame the usage of our liberty with regard to the weakness of our brethren. Hooker answereth to it, 1. That the weak brethren among them were not as the Jews, who were known to be generally weak, whereas, saith he, the imbecility of ours is not common to

so many, but only here and there some such an one is found. 2. He tells us that these scandalous meats, from which the Gentiles were exhorted to abstain for fear of offending the Jews, cannot represent the ceremonies; for their using of meats was a matter of private action in common life, where every man was free to order that which himself did; but the ceremonies are public constitutions for ordering the church, and we are not to look that the church is to change her public laws and ordinances, made according to that which is judged ordinarily and commonly fittest for the whole, although it chance that, for some particular men, the same be found inconvenient, especially when there may be other remedies also against the sores of particular inconveniences. Let them be better instructed.

Ans. 1. This is bad divinity that would make us not regard the scandalising of a few particular men: Christ's woe striketh not only upon them who offend many, but even upon them who offend so much as one of his little ones, Matt. xviii. 6.

2. That which he saith of the few in England, and not many, who are scandalised by the ceremonies, hath been answered by a countryman of his own.¹ And as for us, we find most certainly that not a few, but many, even the greatest part of Scotland, one way or other, are scandalised by the ceremonies. Some are led by them to drink in superstition, and to fall into sundry gross abuses in religion; others are made to use them doubtfully, and so damnably. And how many who refuse them are animated to use them against their consciences, and so to be damned? Who is not made to stumble? And what way do they not impede the edification of the church?

3. What if there had been a public constitution, commanding the Gentiles to eat all meats freely, and that this hath been judged ordinarily and commonly fittest for the whole, even to signify the liberty of the church of the New Testament? Should not the Gentiles, notwithstanding of this constitution, have abstained because of the scandal of the Jews? How comes it then, that that which the Apostle writeth against the scandal of meats, and the reasons which he giveth, are found to hold ever good, whether there be a constitution or not?

4. As for his remedy against the scandal

¹ Cap. 1, sect. 3.

² Expos. of the Creed, Art. of Christ's Birth.

³ Com. on Gal. iv. 10.

¹ Parker, of the Cross, cap. 6, sect. 10.

of particular men, which is to instruct them better, it hath been answered before.¹

Sect. 16. Now, if I reckon Paybody to be no body, perhaps some body will not take it well. I will therefore examine how he handleth this argument. Four things are answered by him² to those places, Rom. xiv. 15; 1 Cor. viii. 10; Matt. xviii. 6, which are alleged against the use of things indifferent, when we cannot use them without scandal.

First, he saith, that all those Scriptures which are quoted as condemning the scandalising of others in things indifferent, speak only of scandalising them who are weak.

Ans. 1. Be it so, thought he, that they are all malicious, and none weak, who are offended by the ceremonies. He himself describeth the weak whom we are forbidden to scandalise, to be such as are weak in knowledge and certainty of the truth. Now there are many who are in this respect weak, scandalised by the ceremonies. But I say, moreover, that his description is imperfect; for there are some who know the truth, and that certainly, who are, notwithstanding, to be accounted weak, in regard of the defect of that prudence which should guide, and that stability which should accompany all their actions, in the particular usago of such things as they know certainly, in their general kind, to be agreeable to truth and righteousness. Such Christians are impeded by the ceremonies from going on in their Christian course so fast as otherwise they would, if not also made to waver or stumble. And thus are they properly scandalised according to my fifth proposition. *Si quis nostra culpa vel impingit, vel abducitur a recto cursu, vel tardatur, cum dicimur offendere*, saith Calvin.³ *Porro scandalum est dictum vel factum quo impeditur evangelii cursus, cujus ampliacionem et propagationem, totius vite nostre scopum esse oportet*, saith Martyr.⁴

2. It is a fault to give offence even to the strong, or else Peter was not to be blamed for giving offence to Christ, Matt. xvi. 23. Yea, it is a fault to offend the very malicious by things that are not necessary, as I have proved in my twelfth proposition.

Sect. 17. Secondly, saith he, all those

Scriptures condemn only the scandal of the weak which is made at that time when we know they will be scandalised.

Ans. 1. If he speak of certain and infallible knowledge, none but God knoweth whether a man shall be scandalised or not, by that which we are to do. He must mean, therefore, of such knowledge as we can have of the event of our actions, and so his answer bringeth great damage to his own cause. Formalists know that their weak brethren have been of a long time scandalised by the ceremonies, and they hear them professing that they are yet scandalised, and how then can they but know that scandal will still follow upon that which they do?

2. Albeit they know not that their brethren will be scandalised by the ceremonies, yea, albeit their brethren should not be scandalised thereby, yet because the ceremonies are appearances of evil, inductive to sin, and occasions of ruin, scandal is given by them, whether it be taken by their brethren or not, according to my fourth and fifth propositions.

Sect. 18. Thirdly, saith Paybody, all those Scriptures condemn only that offence of another in things indifferent, which is made by him who is at liberty and not bound: they speak not of using or refusing those things, as men are tied by the commandment of authority. Where he labour-eth to prove that obedience to the magistrate in a thing indifferent is a better duty than the pleasing of a private person in such a thing.

Ans. 1. I have proved heretofore, that the commandment of authority cannot make the use of a thing indifferent to be no scandal, which otherwise were scandal.

2. I have also proved in the first part of this dispute, that an ecclesiastical constitution cannot bind us, nor take away our liberty in the using or not using of a thing indifferent in itself, except some other reason be showed us than the bare authority of the church. As touching the civil magistrate's place and power to judge and determine in things pertaining to the worship of God, we shall see it afterwards, and so shall we know how far his decisions and ordinances in this kind of things have force to bind us to obedience.

3. He should have proved that obedience to the magistrate in a thing indifferent, is a better duty than abstaining from that which scandaliseth many Christians. He should

¹ Sect. 7.

² Apol., part 3, cap. 5.

³ Com. in Matt. xviii. 6.

⁴ Com. 1 Cor. viii.

not have opposed pleasing and scandalising (for perhaps a man is most scandalised when he is most pleased), but edifying and scandalising, according to my first proposition. Now, will anybody except Paybody say, that obedience to the magistrate in a thing indifferent, out of which scandal riseth, is a better duty than forbearing for the edification of many Christian souls, and for shunning to scandalise them. This we must take to be his meaning, or else he saith nothing to the purpose.

Sect. 19. His fourth answer is, that all those scriptures condemning scandal, must needs especially condemn that which is greatest. Peter and his companions coming to Antioch, were in danger of a double scandal; either of the Jews by eating with the Gentiles, which was the less, or of the Gentiles in refusing their company, as if they had not been brethren, which was far the greater. Now Paul blamed Peter very much, that for the avoiding the lesser scandal, he and his companions fell into the greater.

Ans. 1. He is greatly mistaken whilst he thinks that a man can be so straitened betwixt two scandals, that he cannot choose but give the one of them. For, *nulla datur talis perplexitas, ut necessarium sit pro homini sive hoc sive illud faciat, scandalum alicui dare.*¹

2. That sentence of choosing the least of two evils, must be understood of evils of punishment, not of evils of sin, as I showed before;² so that he is in a foul error whilst he would have us to choose the least of two scandals.

3. As for the example which he allegeth, he deceiveth himself to think that Peter had given scandal to the Jews by his eating with the Gentiles. *Cum Gentibus cibum capiens, recte utebatur libertate Christiana*, say the Magdeburgians;³ but when certain Jews came from James, he withdrew himself, fearing the Jews, and *quod ante de libertate Christiana edificarat, rursus destruebat*: by eating, then, with the Gentiles, he gave no scandal, but by the contrary he did edify. And farther, I say, that his eating with the Gentiles was a thing necessary, and that for shunning of two great scandals; the one of the Gentiles, by compelling them to Judaize; the other

of the Jews, by confirming them in Judaism, both which followed upon his withdrawing from the Gentiles; so that by his eating with the Gentiles no scandal could be given, and if any had been taken, it was not to be cared for. Wherefore there was but one scandal which Peter and his companions were in danger of, which also they did give, and for which Paul reprehended them, namely, their withdrawing of themselves from the Gentiles, and keeping company only with the Jews, whereby both the Jews and the Gentiles were scandalised, because both were made to think (at least occasion was given to both for thinking) the observation of the ceremonial law necessary. That which deceiveth Paybody, is the confounding of *scandalising* and *displeasing*. Peter, by eating with the Gentiles, perhaps had displeased the Jews, but he had thereby edified them, though the scandal which he gave them was by Judaizing; *Judaizabat olim Petrus per dissimulationem*, saith Gerson;⁴ by this Judaizing through such dissimulation and double-dealing, as was his eating with the Gentiles first, and then withdrawing of himself, when certain Jews came; for keeping company with them only, he scandalised the Jews and confirmed them in Judaism, as Pareus noteth.⁵ How then can it be said, that he that scandalised them by his eating with the Gentiles? for hereupon it should follow that there was a necessity of doing evil laid upon Peter, so that he believed to offend the Jews either by his eating with the Gentiles, or by his not eating with the Gentiles; for he could not both eat with them and not eat with them. This is therefore plain, that if he scandalised the Jews by his not eating with the Gentiles, as I have showed, then had he not scandalised them, but edified them by his eating with the Gentiles.

I perceive he would say, that the scandal of non-conformity is a greater scandal than the scandal of conformity; and so he would make us gain little by our argument of scandal. He is bold to object,⁶ "Where one is offended with our practice of kneeling, twenty, I may say ten thousand, are offended with your refusal." O adventurous arithmetic! O huge hyperbole! O desultory declamation! O roving rethoric! O prodigal paradox!

¹ Ames., lib. 5, de Consc., cap. 11.

² Supra, cap. 1.

³ Cent. 1, lib. 2, cap. 10, col. 560.

⁴ De Auserib. Papæ, consider. 12.

⁵ Com. in illum locum.

⁶ Ubi Supra, p. 441.

Yet, I reply, 1. Though sundry (yet not ten thousand for one) are displeased by our refusal, who can show us that any are thereby scandalised; that is, made worse and induced to ruin? This man is bold to say well to it; but we have solidly proved that scandal riseth out of kneeling and the rest of the ceremonies: let it be measured to us with the same measure wherewith we mete.

2. Put the case, that ten thousand were scandalised by our refusal, will it thereupon follow that our refusal is a greater scandal than their practising? Nay, then, let it be said that the cross of Christ is a greater scandal than a private man's fornication, because both Jews and Greeks were offended at that, 1 Cor. i. 23; whereas, perhaps, a small congregation only is offended at this.

3. Our refusal is necessary, because of the unlawfulness of the ceremonies which we refuse, so that we may not receive them, but must refuse them, notwithstanding of any scandal which can follow upon our refusal. If he had ought to say against this answer, why is he silent? He might have found it at home. "Our forbearance of conformity (saith Parker¹) is a necessary duty, there is therein no fault of any scandal in us."

4. Our opposites should do well to assail our argument of scandal before they propound any other argument against us; for so long as they make it not evident that the scandal of the ceremonies, which we object, is an active or faulty scandal, so long they cannot object the scandal of non-conformity to us; because if the scandal (which is to be avoided) be in their practising of the ceremonies, it cannot be in our refusing of them.

5. We know many are grieved and displeased with our non-conformity, yet that every one who is grieved is not by and by scandalised, the Bishop of Winchester teacheth as well as we. "Many times (saith he²) men are grieved with that which is for their good, and earnestly set on that which is not expedient for them." But, in good earnest, what do they mean who say they are scandalised, or made worse by our non-conformity? for neither do we make them condemn our lawful deed as unlawful, nor yet do we animate them by our example to do that which, in their consciences, they judge unlawful. They themselves acknowledge that sitting is as lawful as kneeling; that tho

not-observing of the five holidays is as lawful as the observing of them; that the not-bishoping of children is as lawful as the bishoping of them. Do they not acknowledge the indifferency of the things themselves? Do they not permit many of their people either to kneel or to sit at the communion? Have not many of themselves taken the communion sitting in some places? Have not our Conformists in Scotland hitherto commonly omitted bishoping of children, and the ministration of the sacraments in private places? As for ourselves we make our meaning plain when we object the scandal of conformity; for many ignorant and superstitious persons are, by the ceremonies, confirmed (*expertus loquor*) in their error and superstition; so that now they even settle themselves upon the old dregs of popish superstition and formality, from which they were not well purged. Others are made to practise the ceremonies with a doubting and disallowing conscience, and to say with Naaman, "In this the Lord be merciful unto us if we err:" with my own ears have I heard some say so. And even those who have not practised the ceremonies, for that they cannot see the lawfulness of them, yet are animated by the example of practising Conformists to do these things which, in their consciences, they condemn as unlawful (which were to sin damnably), and if they do them not, then is there no small doubting and disquietness, trouble and trepidation, harboured in their consciences. And thus, one way or other, some weakening or deterioration cometh to us by the means of the ceremonies; and if any of our opposites dare think that none of us can be so weak as to stumble or take any harm in this kind, because of the ceremonies, we take God himself to witness, who shall make manifest the counsels of the heart, that we speak the truth, and lie not.

Finally, Let that be considered which divines observe to be the perpetual condition of the church,³ namely, that as in any other family there are found some great, some small, some strong, some weak, some wholesome, some sickly, so still is there found such an inequality in the house of God, which is the church,—and that because some are sooner, some are later called, some endued with more gifts of God, and some with fewer.⁴

¹ Of the Cross, part 2, p. 79.

² Serm. on John xvi. 7.

³ Pareus, Com. in Rom. xv. 1.

⁴ Serm. on John xvi. 7.

THE THIRD PART,

AGAINST THE LAWFULNESS OF THE CEREMONIES.

CHAPTER I.

THAT THE CEREMONIES ARE UNLAWFUL, BECAUSE SUPERSTITIOUS, WHICH IS PARTICULARLY INSTANCED IN HOLIDAYS, AND MINISTERING THE SACRAMENTS IN PRIVATE PLACES.

Sect. 1. The strongest tower of refuge to which our opposites make their main recourse, is the pretended lawfulness of the ceremonies, which now we are to batter down and demolish, and so make it appear how weak they are even where they think themselves strongest.

My first argument against the lawfulness of the ceremonies I draw from the superstition of them. I cannot marvel enough how Dr Mortoune and Dr Burges could think to rub the superstition upon Non-conformists, whom they set forth as fancying their abstinence from the ceremonies to be a singular piece of service done to God, placing religion in the not using of them, and teaching men to abstain from them for conscience' sake. Dr Ames¹ hath given a sufficient answer, namely, that abstaining from sin is one act of common obedience, belonging as well to things forbidden in the first; and that we do not abstain from those ceremonies but as from other unlawful corruptions, even out of the compass of worship. We abstain from the ceremonies even as from lying, cursing, stealing, &c. Shall we be holden superstitious for abstaining from things unlawful? The superstition therefore is not on our side, but on theirs:—

Sect. 2. For, 1st, Superstition is the opposite vice to religion, in the excess, as our divines describe it; for it exhibits more in the worship of God than he requires in his worship. Perro saith,²

Zanchius in cultum ipsum excessu ut, peccatur; si quid illi quem Christus instituit, jam addas, aut ab aliis additum sequar is; ut si sacramentis à Christo institutis, alia addas sacramenta; si sacrificiis, alia sacrificia; si ceremoniis cujusvis sacramenti, alios addas ritus, qui merito omnes superstitionis nomine appellantur. We see he accounteth superstition to be in the addition of ceremonies not instituted by Christ, as well as in the addition of more substantial matters. Superstitio (as some derive the word) is that which is done *supra statutum*; and thus are the controverted ceremonies superstitious, as being used in God's worship upon no other ground than the appointment of men.

Sect. 3. 2d. Superstition is that which exhibits divine worship, *vel cui non debet, vel eo non modo quo debet*, say the school-men.¹ Now our ceremonies, though they exhibit worship to God, yet this is done inordinately, and they make the worship to be otherwise performed than it should be; for example, though God be worshipped by the administration of the sacraments in private places, yet not so as he should be worshipped. The Professors of Leyden² condemn private baptism as inordinate, because *baptismus publici ministerii, non private exhortationis est appendix*. It is marked in the fourth century,³ both out of councils and fathers, that it was not then permitted to communicate in private places; but this custom was thought inordinate and unbecoming. If it be said, that the communion was given to the sick privately in the ancient church, I answer: Sometimes this was permitted, but for such special reasons as do not concern us; for, as we may see plainly by the fourteenth canon of the first Council of Nice (as those canons are collected by

¹ Fresh Suite ag. Cerem., cap. 9, p. 96, 100.

² Lib. 1, de Vit. Ext. Cult. Oppos., col. 501, 502.

¹ Aquin. 2. 2, quest. 92, art. 1.

² Syn. Pur. Theol., disp. 44, thes. 53.

³ Magdeh., cent. 4, cap. 6, col. 427.

Ruffinus), the sixty-ninth canon of the Council of Eleberis, and the sixth canon of the Council of Ancyra, the communion was only permitted to be given in private houses to the *pœnitentes*, who were *abstenti* and debarred from the sacrament, some for three years, some for five, some for seven, some for ten, some for thirteen, some longer, and who should happily be overtaken with some dangerous and deadly sickness before the set time of abstention was expired. As for the judgment of our own divines, *Calviniani*, saith Balduino,¹ *morem illum quo eucharastia ad ægrotos tanquam vaticum defertur improbat, eamque non nisi in cœtibus publicis usurpandam censet.* For this he allegeth Beza, Aretius, and Musculus. It was a better ordinance than that of Perth, which said, *non oportet in domibus oblationes ab episcopis sive presbyteris fieri.*² But to return.

Sect. 4. 3d. The ceremonies are proved to be superstitious, by this reason, if there were no more, they have no necessary nor profitable use in the church (as hath been proved), which kind of things cannot be used without superstition. It was according to this rule that the Waldenses³ and Albigenses taught that the exorcisms, breathings, crossings, salt, spittle, unction, chrism, &c. used by the church of Rome in baptism, being neither necessary nor requisite in the administration of the same, did occasion error and superstition, rather than edification to salvation.

4th. They are yet more superstitious, for that they are not only used in God's worship unnecessary and unprofitably, but likewise they hinder other necessary duties. They who, though they serve the true God, "yet with needless offices, and defraud him of duties necessary," are superstitious in Hooker's judgment.⁴ I wish he had said as well to him as from him. What offices more unnecessary than those Roman rituals? yet what more necessary duties than to worship God in a spiritual and lively manner,—to press the power of godliness upon the consciences of professors,—to maintain and keep faithful and well qualified ministers in the church,—to bear the bowels of mercy and meekness,—not to offend the weak, nor to confirm Papists in Popery,—to have all

things in God's worship disposed according to the word, and not according to the will of man,—not to exercise lordship over the consciences of those whom Christ hath made free,—to abolish the monuments of by-past and badges of present idolatry; yet are those and other necessary duties shut quite out of doors by our needless ceremonial service.

Sect. 5. 5th. The ceremonies are not free of superstition, inasmuch as they give to God an external service, and grace-defacing worship, which he careth not for, and make fleshly observations to step into the room of God's most spiritual worship. Augustine¹ allegeth that which is said,—"The kingdom of God is within you," Luke xvii. against superstitious persons, who *exterioribus principalem curam impendunt.* The Christian worship ought to be "in spirit, without the carnal ceremonies and rites," saith one of our divines;² yea, the kingdom of God cometh not *cum apparatu aut pompa mundana, ita ut observari possit tempus vel locus*, saith a Papist.³ Carnal worship, therefore, and ceremonial observations, are (to say the least) superfluous in religion, and by consequence superstitious.

Sect. 6. 6th. Worship is placed in the ceremonies, therefore they are most superstitious. To make good what I say, holiness and necessity are placed in the ceremonies, *ergo*, worship. And, 1st, Holiness is placed in them. Hooker⁴ thinks festival days clothed with outward robes of holiness; nay, he saith plainly,⁵—"No doubt, as God's extraordinary presence hath hallowed and sanctified certain places, so they are his extraordinary works that have truly and worthily advanced certain times, for which cause they ought to be, with all men that honour God, more holy than other days." He calleth also the cross an holy sign.⁶ Dr Burges⁷ defendeth that the ceremonies are and may be called worship of God, not only *ratione modi*, as belonging to the reverend usage of God's prescribed worship, but also *ratione medii*, though not *medii per se*, of and by itself, yet *per aliud*, by virtue of somewhat else. Now, do not Papists place worship in their cross and crucifix? yet do

¹ Apud Aquin. 2. 2, quest. 93, art. 2.

² J. Ruinold's Confer. with J. Hart, cap. 8, divis. 4, p. 489.

³ Stella, Com. in Luke xvii. 20.

⁴ Eccl. Pol., lib. 5, 70.

⁵ Ibid., sect. 69.

⁶ Ibid., sect. 65.

⁷ Of the Lawfulness of Kneeling, cap. 3.

¹ De Cas. Consc., lib. 2, cap. 12, cas. 13.

² Concil. Laodic., can. 53.

³ Hist. of the Waldenses, part 3, lib. 1, cap. 6.

⁴ Eccles. Pol., lib. 5, sect. 3.

they place no holiness in it *per se*, but only *per aliud*, in respect of Christ crucified thereby represented, and they tell us,¹ that *creaturæ insensibili non debetur honor vel reverentia, nisi ratione rationalis naturæ*; and that they give no religious respect unto the tree whereon Christ was crucified, the nails, garments, spear, manger, &c., but only *quantum ad rationem contactus membrorum Christi*. Saith Dr Burgos any less of the ceremonies? Nay, he placeth every way as much holiness and worship in them in the forequoted place. And elsewhere he teacheth,² that after a sort the ceremonies are worship in themselves, even such a worship as was that of the free-will offerings under the law, and such a worship as was the building and use of altars here and there³ (before God had chosen out the standing place for his altar), though to the same end for which the Lord's instituted altar served. Thus we see that they offer the ceremonies as worship to God: yet put the case they did not, the school saith,⁴ that a thing belongeth to the worship of God, *vel quo ad offerendum, vel quo ad assumendum*. Whereupon it followeth, that superstition is not only to be laid to their charge who offer to God for worship that which he hath not commanded, but theirs also who assume in God's worship the help of anything as sacred or holy which himself hath not ordained. 2. They place as great a necessity in the ceremonies as Papists place in theirs, whereby it shall also appear how superstitiously they place worship in them; for *quæcunque observatio quasi necessaria commendatur, continuo censetur ad cultum Dei pertinere*, saith Calvin.⁵ The Rhemists think,⁶ that meats of themselves, or of their own nature, do not defile, "but so far as by accident they make a man to sin; as the disobedience of God's commandment, or of our superiors, who forbid some meats for certain times and causes, is a sin." And they add, "that neither flesh nor fish of itself doth defile, but the breach of the church's precept defileth." Aquinas⁷ defendeth that trin-immersion is not *de necessitate baptismi*, only he thinks it a sin to

¹ Aquin. 3, 4, 25, art. 4.

² Ubi Supra, cap. 15, p. 42.

³ Ibid., p. 41.

⁴ Aquin. 2, 2, quest. 95, art. 2.

⁵ De Vera Eccl. Riform., p. 367.

⁶ Annot. on Matt. xv., sect. 5.

⁷ 3, quest. 66, art. 6.

baptise otherwise, because this rite is instituted and used by the church. Do not Formalists place the same necessity in the ceremonies, while, as they say, they urge them not as necessary in themselves, but only as necessary in respect of the determination of the church, and the ordinance of those who are set over us? Nay, Papists place not so great necessity in many ordinances of their church as Formalists place in the ceremonies. If the cause be doubtful, Aquinas¹ sends a man to seek a dispensation from the superior. But *si causa sit evidens, per seipsum licite potest homo statuti observantiam præterire*. What Formalist dare yield us such liberty, as by ourselves, and without seeking a dispensation from superiors, to neglect the observation of their statutes, when we see evident cause for so doing? They think that we have no power at our own hand to judge that we have an evident cause of not obeying those who are set over us; yet this much is allowed by this Papist, who also elsewhere acknowledgeth² that there is nothing necessary in baptism but the form, the minister, and the washing of water, and that all the other ceremonies which the church of Rome useth in baptism are only for solemnity. Bellarmine saith,³ that the neglecting and not observing the ceremonies of the church, with them is not a mortal sin, except it proceed *ex contemptu*. And that he who, entering into a church, doth not asperse himself with holy water, sinneth not,⁴ if so be he do it *circa contemptum*. Now, to be free of contempt will not satisfy our Formalists, except we obey and do that very same thing which we are commanded to do. Cornelius Jansenius,⁵ commenting upon these words, "In vain do they worship me, teaching for doctrines the commandments of men," saith, that the commandments of men there forbidden and condemned, are those which command nothing divine, but things merely human; and therefore he pleadeth for the constitutions of the church about feasts, choice of meats, festivities, &c., and for obedience to the same upon no other ground than this, because *pius quisque facile videt quam habeant ex scripturis originem et quomodo eis consonant, eo quod faciant ad*

¹ 2, 2, quest. 147, art. 4.

² 3, quest. 66, art. 10.

³ De Sac. Missæ, lib. 6, cap. 13.

⁴ De Pont. Rom., lib. 4, cap. 18.

⁵ Conc. Evan., cap. 60.

carnis castigationem et temperantiam, aut ad fidelium unionem et edificationem. I know it to be false which this Papist affirmeth; yet in that he thus pleadeth for those constitutions of the church from Scripture and reason, forsaking the ground of human authority, he is a great deal more modest and less superstitious than those our opposites, who avouch the ceremonies as necessary, and will have us bound to the practice of them upon no other ground than the bare will and authority of superiors, who have enjoined them, as hath been shown in the first part of this dispute. Yea, some of them place a certain and constant necessity in the ceremonies themselves, even beside and without the church's constitution (which is more than Papists have said of their ceremonies). Dr Forbess¹ calleth the Articles of Perth, *pauca necessaria*, &c., a few things necessary for God's glory, and the promoting of piety in our church, for order, peace, unity, and charity; and particularly he teacheth, that a minister may not lawfully omit to administer the sacraments in private places, and without the presence of the congregation, to such as through sickness cannot come to the public assembly; which he calleth, *eis necessaria ministrare*. To say the truth, the ministration of the sacraments in private places importeth a necessity in the matter itself, for which cause the divines of Geneva resolved² that in *Ecclésiis publice institutis*, baptism might not be administered in private places, but only publicly in the congregation of the faithful, *partim ne sacramenta, &c.*, "partly (say they) lest the sacraments, being separate from the preaching of the word, should be again transformed in certain magical ceremonies, as in Popery it was; partly that the gross superstition of the absolute necessity of external baptism may be rooted out of the minds of men." Sure, the defenders of private baptism place too great necessity in that sacrament. Hooker plainly insinuates³ the absolute necessity of outward baptism, at least in wish or desire, which is the distinction of the schoolmen, and followed by the modern Papists to cloak their superstition. But whatsoever show it hath, it was rightly impugned in the Council of Trent⁴ by Marianus, who alleged against it that the angel

said to Cornelius his prayers were acceptable to God, before ever he knew of the sacrament of baptism; so that, having no knowledge of it, he could not be said to have received it, no not in vow or wish; and that many holy martyrs were converted in the heat of persecution, by seeing the constancy of others, and presently taken and put to death, of whom one cannot say, but by divination, that they knew the sacraments, and made a vow.

Sect. 7. 7th. I will now apply this argument, taken from superstition, particularly to holidays. *Superstitiosum esse docemus*, saith Boza,¹ *arbitrari unum aliquem diem altero sanctiorem*. Now I will show that Formalists observe holidays, as mystical and holier than other days, howbeit Bishop Lindsey thinks good to dissemble and deny it.² "Times (saith he) are appointed by our church for morning and evening prayers in great towns; hours for preaching on Tuesday, Thursday, &c.; hours for weekly exercises of prophecy, which are holy in respect of the use whereunto they are appointed; and such are the five days which we esteem not to be holy, for any mystic signification which they have, either by divine or ecclesiastical institution, or for any worship which is appropriated unto them, that may not be performed at another time, but for the sacred use whereunto they are appointed to be employed as circumstances only, and not as mysteries." Ans. This is but falsely pretended, for as Didoclavius observeth,³ *aliud est deputare, aliud dedicare, aliud sanctificare*. Designation or deputation is when a man appoints a thing for such an use, still reserving power and right to put it to another use if he please; so the church appointeth times and hours for preaching upon the week-days, yet reserving power to employ those times otherwise, when she shall think fit. Dedication is when a man so devotes a thing to some pious or civil use, that he dedicates himself to all right and title which thereafter he might claim unto it, as when a man dedicates a sum of money for the building of an exchange, a judgment-hall, &c., or a parcel of ground for a church, a churchyard, a glebe, a school, an hospital, he can claim no longer right to the dedicated thing. Sanctification is the setting apart of

¹ Iren., lib. 1, cap. 5, sect. 6; cap. 7, sect. 7.

² Apud Zanc. Epist., lib. 1, p. 111.

³ Eccl. Pol., lib. 5, sect. 60.

⁴ Hist. of the Counc. of Trent., lib. 2.

¹ Confess., cap. 5, art. 41.

² Proc. in Perth Assembly, part 3, p. 18.

³ All. Damasç., cap. 10, p. 878.

a thing for a holy and religious use, in such sort that hereafter it may be put to no other use, Prov. xx. 25. Now whereas times set apart for ordinary and weekly preaching, are only designed by the church for this end and purpose, so that they are not holy, but only for the present they are applied to an holy use; neither is the worship appointed as convenient or beseeching for those times, but the times are appointed as convenient for the worship. Festival days are holy both by dedication and consecration of them; and thus much the Bishop himself forbeareth not to say,¹ only he laboureth to plaster over his superstition with the untempered mortar of this quidditative distinction, that some things are holy by consecration of them to holy and mystical uses,² as water in baptism, &c., but other things are made holy by consecration of them to holy political uses. This way, saith he, the church hath power to make a thing holy, as to build and consecrate places to be temples, houses to be hospitals; to give rent, lands, money and goods, to the ministry and to the poor; to appoint vessels, and vestures, and instruments for the public worship, as table, table-cloths, &c. *Ans.* 1. The Bishop, I see, taketh upon him to coin new distinctions at his own pleasure; yet they will not, I trust, pass current among the judicious. To make things holy by consecration of them to holy uses for policy, is an uncouth speculation, and, I dare say, the Bishop himself comprehendeth it not. God's designation of a thing to any use, which serves for his own glory, is called the sanctification of that thing, or the making of it holy, and so the word is taken, Isa. xiii. 3; Jer. i. 5, as G. Sanctius noteth in his commentaries upon these places; and Calvin, commenting upon the same places, expoundeth them so likewise; but the church's appointing or designing of a thing to an holy use, cannot be called the making of it holy. It must be consecrated at the command of God, and by virtue of the word and prayer: thus are bread and wine consecrated in the holy supper. *Res sacre*, saith Fennerus,³ *sunt quæ Dei verbo in prædictum usum sanctificatæ et dedicatæ sunt.* Polanus, speaking of the sacramental elements, saith,⁴ *Sanctificatio rei terrenæ est actio ministri, qua destinat*

rem terrenam ad sanctum usum, ex mandato Dei, &c. The Professors of Leyden¹ call only such things, persons, times and places holy, as are consecrated and dedicated to God and his worship, and that *divina præscriptione*. If our ordinary meat and drink cannot be sanctified to us, so that we may lawfully, and with a good conscience, use these common things, but by the word of God and prayer, how then shall anything be made holy for God's worship but by the same means? 1 Tim. iv. 5. And, I pray, which is the word, and which be the prayers, that make holy those things which the Bishop avoucheth for things consecrated and made holy by the church, namely, the ground whereupon the church is built, the stones and timber of an hospital; the rents, lands, money, or goods given to the ministry and the poor; the vessels, vestures, tables, napkins, basons, &c., appointed for the public worship.

Sect. 8. 2d. Times, places and things, which the church designeth for the worship of God, if they be made holy by consecration of them to holy political uses, then either they may be made holy by the holy uses to which they are to be applied, or else by the church's dedicating of them to those uses. They cannot be called holy by virtue of their application to holy uses; for then (as Ames argueth²) the air is sacred, because it is applied to the minister's speech whilst he is preaching, then is the light sacred which is applied to his eye in reading, then are his spectacles sacred which are used by him reading his text, &c. But neither yet are they holy, by virtue of the church's dedicating of them to those uses for which she appointed them; for the church hath no such power as by her dedication to make them holy. P. Martyr³ condemneth the dedication or consecration (for those words he useth promiscuously) whereby the Papists hallow churches, and he declareth against it the judgment of our divines to be this, *Licere, imo jure pietatis requiri, ut in prima cujusque rei usurpatione gratias Deo agamus, ejusque bonitatem celebremus, &c. Collati boni religionis ac sanctum usum poscimus.* This he opposeth to the popish dedication of temples and bells, as appeareth by these words: *Quanto santius rectusque decernimus.* He implieth, therefore, that these things are

¹ Syn. Pur. Theol. Disp. 21, thes. 7.

² Fresh Suite, cap. 5, p. 59.

³ Comm. in 1 Reg. viii. de Tempt. Dedic.

¹ Ubi Supra, p. 29.

² Ibid., p. 23.

³ Theol., lib. 6, cap. 3.

⁴ Syn., lib. 6, cap. 51, p. 433.

only consecrated as every other thing is consecrated to us. Of this kind of consecration he hath given examples. *In libro Nehemiæ dedicatio mœnium civitatis commemoratur, quæ nil aliud fuit nisi quod muris urbis instauratis, populus una cum Levitis et sacerdotibus, nec non principibus, eo se contulit, ibique gratias Deo egerunt de mœnibus reedificatis, et justam civitatis usuram postularunt, qua item ratione prius quam sumamus cibum, nos etiam illum consecramus.* As the walls of Jerusalem then, and as our ordinary meat are consecrated, so are churches consecrated, and no otherwise can they be said to be dedicated, except one would use the word *dedication*, in that sense wherein it is taken, Deut. xx. 5; where Calvin turns the word *dedicavit*; Arias Montanus, *initiauit*; Tremelius, *cepit uti*. Of this sort of dedication, Gaspar Sanctius writeth thus: *Alia dedicatio est, non solum inter prophanos, sed etiam inter Hæbreos usitata, quæ nihil habet sacrum sed tantum est auspiciatio aut initium operis, ad quod destinatur locus aut res cujus tunc primum libatur usus.* Sic Nero Claudius dedicasse dicitur domum suam cum primum illam habitare cepit. Ita Suetonius in Nerone. Sic Pompeius dedicavit theatrum suum, cum primum illud publicis ludis et communibus usibus aperuit; de quo Cicero, lib. 2, epist. 1. Any other sort of dedicating churches we hold to be superstitious. Peter Waldus, of whom the Waldenses were named, is reported to have taught that the dedication of temples was but an invention of the devil.¹ And though churches be dedicated by preaching and praying, and by no superstition of sprinkling them with holy water, or using such magical rites, yet even these dedications, saith the Magdeburgians,² *ex Judaismo natæ videntur sine nullo Dei præcepto.* There is, indeed, no warrant for such dedication of churches as is thought to make them holy. Bellarmine would warrant it by Moses' consecrating of the tabernacle, the altar, and the vessels of the same; but Hospinian answereth him:³ *Mosis factum expressum habuit Dei mandatum: de consecrandis autem templis Christianorum, nulum uspiam in verbo Dei præceptum extat, ipso quoque Bellarmino teste.* Where-

upon he concludeth that this ceremony of consecrating or dedicating the churches of Christians, is not to be used after the example of Moses, who, in building and dedicating of the tabernacle, did follow nothing without God's express commandment. What I have said against the dedication of churches, holds good also against the dedication of altars; the table whereupon the elements of the body and blood of Christ are set, is not to be called holy; neither can they be commended who devised altars in the church, to be the seat of the Lord's body and blood, as if any table, though not so consecrated, could not as well serve the turn. And what though altars were used in the ancient church? Yet this custom *à Judaica, in ecclesiâ Christi permanavit ac postea superstitioni materiam præbuit*, say the Magdeburgians.⁴ Altars savour of nothing but Judaism, and the borrowing of altars from the Jews, hath made Christians both to follow their priesthood and their sacrifices. *Hæc enim tria, scilicet sacerdos, altare, et sacrificium, sunt correlativa, ut ubi unum est, cætera duo adesse necesse sit*, saith Cornelius à Lapide.⁵

Sect. 9. 3d. If some times, places and things, be made holy by the church's dedication or consecration of them to holy uses, then it followeth that other times, places and things, which are not so dedicated and consecrated by the church, howbeit they be applied to the same holy uses, yet are more profane, and less apt to divine worship, than these which are dedicated by the church. I need not insist to strengthen the inference of this conclusion from the principles of our opposites; for the most learned among them will not refuse to subscribe to it. Hooker teacheth us,⁶ that the service of God, in places not sanctified as churches are, hath not in itself (mark in itself) such perfection of grace and comeliness, as when the dignity of the place which it wisheth for, doth concur; and that the very majesty and holiness of the place where God is worshipped, bettereth even our holiest and best actions. How much more soundly do we hold with J. Rainolds,⁷ that unto us Christians, "no land is strange, no ground unholy,—every coast is Jewry, every town Jerusalem, and every house Sion,—and every faithful company, yea, every faithful body, a temple to serve God in." The con-

¹ Cent. 4, cap. 6, col. 409.

² Com. in Mat. i. 11.

³ Eccles. Pol., lib. 5, sect. 16.

⁴ Coofer. with J. Hart, cap. 8, divis. 4, p. 491.

¹ Hist. of the Waldenses, lib. 1, cap. 1.

² Cent. 4, cap. 6, col. 480.

³ De Orig. Temp., lib. 4, cap. 2.

trary opinion Hospinian rejecteth as favouring Judaism,¹ *alligat enim religionem ad certa loca*. Whereas the presence of Christ among two or three gathered together in his name, maketh any place a church, even as the presence of a king with his attendants maketh any place a court. As of places, so of times, our opposites think most superstitiously. For of holidays Hooker saith thus,² "No doubt as God's extraordinary presence hath hallowed and sanctified certain places, so they are his extraordinary works that have truly and worthily advanced certain times, for which cause they ought to be with all men that honour God more holy than other days." What is this but popish superstition? For just so the Rhemists think that the times and places of Christ's nativity,³ passion, burial, resurrection, and ascension, were made holy; and just so Bellarmine holdeth,⁴ that Christ did consecrate the days of his nativity, passion, and resurrection, *eo quod nascens consecravit præsepe, moriens crucem, resurgens sepulchrum*. Hooker hath been of opinion, that the holidays were so advanced above other days, by God's great and extraordinary works done upon them, that they should have been holier than other days, even albeit the church had not appointed them to be kept holy. Yet Bishop Lindsey would have us believe that they think them holy, only because of the church's consecration of them to holy political uses. But that now, at last, I may make it appear to all that have common sense, how falsely (though frequently) it is given forth by the Bishop, that holidays are kept by them only for order and policy, and that they are not so superstitious as to appropriate the worship to those days, or to observe them for mystery and as holier than other days:—

Sect. 10. First, I require the Bishop to shew us a difference betwixt the keeping of holidays by Formalists, and their keeping of the Lord's day; for upon holidays they enjoin a cessation from work, and a dedicating of the day to divine worship, even as upon the Lord's day. The Bishop allegeth five respects of difference,⁵ but they are not true. First, he saith, that the Lord's day is commanded to be observed of necessity, for con-

science of the divine ordinance as a day sanctified and blessed by God himself. *Ans.* 1. So have we heard from Hooker, that holidays are sanctified by God's extraordinary works; but because the Bishop dare not say so much, therefore I say, 2. This difference cannot show us that they observe holidays only for order and policy, and that they place no worship in the observing of them, as in the observing of the Lord's day (which is the point that we require), for worship is placed in the observing of human as well as of divine ordinances, otherwise worship hath never been placed in the keeping of Pharisaical and popish traditions. This way is worship placed in the keeping of holidays, when for conscience of an human ordinance, they are both kept as holy and thought necessary to be so kept. 3. The Bishop contradicteth himself; for elsewhere he defendeth,⁶ that the church hath power to change the Lord's day. Secondly, He giveth us this difference, that the Lord's day is observed as the Sabbath of Jehovah, and as a day whereon God himself did rest after the creation. *Ans.* 1. This is false of the Lord's day; for after the creation, God rested upon the seventh day, not upon the first. 2. Dr Downe saith,⁷ that festival days also are to be consecrated as Sabbaths to the Lord. Thirdly, The Bishop tells us, that the Lord's day is observed in memory of the Lord's resurrection. *Ans.* He shall never make this good; for, we observe the Lord's day in memory of the whole work of redemption. 2. If it were so, this could make no difference; for just so Christmas is observed in memory of the Lord's nativity, Good Friday in memory of his passion, &c. His fourth and fifth respects of differences are certain mysteries in the Lord's day. But we shall see by and by how his fellow Formalists who are more ingenuous than himself, shew us mysteries in the festival days also. Lastly, Albeit the Bishop hath told us that there is no worship appropriated unto the festival days, which may not be performed at any other time, yet this cannot with him make a difference betwixt them and the Lord's day; for in his epistle, which I have quoted, he declareth his judgment to be the same of the Lord's day, and teacheth us, that the worship performed on it is not so appropriated to that time, but lawfully the same may be per-

¹ Ep. to the Pastors of the Church of Scotland.
² On Præc. 5.

¹ Ubi Supra.

² Eccl. Pol., lib. 5, sect. 69.

³ Annot. on 1 Tim. iv. 5.

⁴ De Culi. Sanct., cap. 10.

⁵ Ubi Supra, p. 21.

formed at any other convenient time, as the church shall think fit. Now, as the worship performed on the Lord's day is appropriated (in his judgment) to that time, so long as the church altereth it not, and no longer, just as much thinks he of the appropriating to festival days the worship performed on the same.

Sect. 11. 2d. If the holidays be observed by Formalists only for order and policy, then they must say the church hath power to change them. But this power they take from the church, by saying that they are dedicated and consecrated to those holy uses to which they are applied. *Simul Deo dicatum non est ad usus humanos ulterius transferendum*, saith one of the popes.¹ And, by the dedication of churches, the founders surrender that right which otherwise they might have in them, saith one of the Formalists themselves.² If, then, the church hath dedicated holidays to the worship of God, then hath she denuded herself of all power to change them, or put them to another use: which were otherwise if holidays were appointed to be kept only for order and policy. Yea, farther, times and places which are applied to the worship of God, as circumstances only for outward order and policy, may be by a private Christian applied to civil use, for in so doing he breaketh not the ordinance of the church. For example, material churches are appointed to be the receptacles of Christian assemblies, and that only for such common commodity and decency which hath place as well in civil as in holy meetings, and not for any holiness conceived to be in them more than in other houses. Now, if I be standing in a churchyard when it raineth, may I not go into the church that I may be defended from the injury of the weather? If I must meet with certain men for putting order to some of my worldly affairs, and it fall out that we cannot conveniently meet in any part but in the church, may we not there keep our trust? A material church, then, may serve for a civil use the same way that it serveth to an holy use. And so, for times appointed for ordinary preaching upon week-days in great towns, may not I apply those times to a civil use when I cannot conveniently apply them to the use for which the church appointeth

them? I trust our prelates shall say, I may, because they use to be otherwise employed than in divine worship during the times of weekly preaching. Now if holidays were commanded to be kept only for order and policy, they might be applied to another use as well as those ordinary times of weekly meetings in great towns, whereas we are required of necessity to keep them holy.

Sect. 12. 3d. If the holidays be kept only for order and policy, why do they esteem some of them above others? Doth not Bishop Andrews call the feast of Easter the highest and greatest of our religion?³ and doth not Bishop Lindsey himself, with Chrysostom, call the festival of Christ's nativity, *metropolim omnium festorum*?⁴ By this reason doth Bellarmine prove⁵ that the feasts of Christians are celebrated non solum ratione ordinis et politice, sed etiam mysterii, because otherwise they should be all equal in celebrity, whereas Leo calls Easter *festum festorum*, and Nazianzen, *celebratatem celebritatum*.

Sect. 13. 4. If the holidays be kept only for order and policy, then the sanctification of them should be placed in *ipso actuali externi cultus exercitio*.⁶ But Hooker hath told us before, that they are made holy and worthily advanced above other days by God's extraordinary works wrought upon them. Whereupon it followeth, that as *Deus septimum sanctificavit vacatione sancta, et ordinatione ad usum sanctum*,⁷ so hath he made festival days no less holy in themselves, and that as the Sabbath was holy from the beginning, because of God's resting upon it, and his ordaining of it for an holy use, howbeit it had never been applied by men to the exercises of God's worship, even so festival days are holy, being advanced truly and worthily by the extraordinary works of God, and for this cause commended to all men that honour God to be holier with them than other days, albeit it should happen that by us they were never applied to an holy use. If Bishop Lindsey thinketh that all this toucheth not him, he may be pleased to remember that he himself hath confessed,⁸ that the very presence of the

¹ Serm. on Matt. vi. 16.

² Ubi Supra, p. 25.

³ De Culi. Sanct., cap. 10.

⁴ Zanc. in 4 Præc., p. 682.

⁵ Pareus Com. in Gen. ii. 3.

⁶ Ubi Supra, p. 20.

¹ Bonifac. VIII., de Reg. Juris, reg. 51.
² Hook. Eccl. Pol., lib. 5, sect. 12.

festivity puts a man in mind of the mystery, howbeit he have not occasion to be present in the holy assembly. What order or policy is here, when a man being quiet in his parlour or cabinet, is made to remember of such a mystery on such a day? What hath external order and policy to do with the internal thoughts of a man's heart, to put in order the same?

Sect. 14. 5th. By their fruits shall we know them. Look whether they give so much liberty to others, and take so much to themselves upon their holidays, for staying from the public worship and attending worldly business, as they do at the diets of weekly and ordinary preaching; yet they would make the simple believe that their holidays are only appointed to be kept as those ordinary times set apart for divine service on the week-days; nay, moreover, let it be observed whether or not they keep the festival days more carefully, and urge the keeping of them more earnestly than the Lord's own day. These prelates that will not abase themselves to preach upon ordinary Sabbaths, think the high holidays worthy of their sermons. They have been also often seen to travel upon the Lord's day, whereas they hold it irreligion to travel upon an holiday. And whereas they can digest the common profanation of the Lord's day, and not challenge it, they cannot away with the not observing of their festivities.

Sect. 15. 6th. By their words shall we judge them. Saith not Bishop Lindsey that the five anniversary days are consecrate to the commemoration of our Saviour, his benefits being separate from all other ordinary works, and so made sacred and holidays? Will he say this much of ordinary times appointed for weekly preaching? I trow not. Dr Downname¹ holdeth that we are commanded, in the fourth commandment, to keep the feasts of Christ's nativity, passion, resurrection, ascension, and Pentecost, and that these feasts are to be consecrated as sabbaths to the Lord. Bishop Andrews, a man of the greatest note amongst our opposites, affordeth us here plenty of testimonies of the proof of the point in hand, namely, that the anniversary festival days are kept for mystery, and as holier than other days. Sermon on Psal. lxxxv. 10, 11, he saith of Christmas, That mercy and truth, righteousness and peace, "of all the days of

the year meet most kindly on this day."

Sermon on Psal. ii. 7, he saith of the same day, That of all other "*hodies*, we should not let slip the *hodie* of this day, whereon the law is most kindly preached, so it will be most kindly practised of all others." Sermon on Heb. xii. 2, he saith of Good Friday, "Let us now turn to him, and beseech him by the sight of this day." Sermon on 1 Cor. v. 7, 8, he saith of the keeping of the Christian passover upon Easter, That then "it is best for us to do it, it is most kindly to do it, most like to please Christ, and to prosper with us. And, indeed, if at any time we will do it, *quando pascha nisi in pascha*, &c., so that without any more ado, the season pleadeth for this effectually," &c. Sermon on Col. iii. 1, he saith, That "there is no day in the year so fit for a Christian to rise with Christ, and seek the things above, as Easter day." Sermon on Job. ii. 19, he saith, That "the act of receiving Christ's body is at no time so proper, so in season, as this very day." Sermon on 1 Cor. xi. 16, he tells us out of Leo, "This is a peculiar that Easter day hath, that on it all the whole church obtaineth remission of their sins." Sermon on Acts ii. 1—3, he saith of the feast of Pentecost, That "of all days we shall not go away from the Holy Ghost empty on this day; it is *dies donorum*: his giving day." Sermon on Eph. iv. 30, he saith, "This is the Holy Ghost's day, and not for that originally so it was, but for that it is to be intended, ever he will do his own chief work upon his own chief feast, and *opus dici*, the day's work upon the day itself." Sermon on Psal. lxxviii. 18, he saith, That "love will be best and soonest wrought by the sacrament of love upon Pentecost, the feast of love." Sermon on Acts x. 34, 35, he saith, That the receiving of the Holy Ghost in a more ample measure is *opus dici*, "the proper work of this day." Sermon on James i. 16, 17, he calls the gift of the Holy Ghost the gift of the day of Pentecost, and tells us that the Holy Ghost, the most perfect gift of all, this day was, and any day may be, but chiefly this day, will be given to any that will desire." Sermon on Luke iv. 18, he saith of the same feast, That "because of the benefit that fell on this time, the time itself it fell on, is, and cannot be but acceptable, even *eo nomine*, that at such a time such a benefit happened to us." Much more of this stuff I might produce out of this prelate's holiday ser-

¹ Ubi Supra. p. 29.

² On Præc. 4.

mons,¹ which I supersede as more tedious than necessary; neither yet will I stay here to confute the errors of those and such like sentences of his; for my purpose is only to prove against Bishop Lindsey, that the festival days, whereabout we dispute, are not observed as circumstances of worship, for order and policy, but that, as the chief parts of God's worship are placed in the celebration and keeping of the same, so are they kept and celebrated most superstitiously, as having certain sacred and mystical significations, and as holier in themselves than other days, because they were sanctified above other days by the extraordinary works and great benefits of God which happened upon them; so that the worship performed on them is even appropriated to them; all which is more than evident from those testimonies which I have in this place collected.

And, finally, the author of *The Nullity of Perth Assembly*² proveth this point forcibly: Doth not Hooker say "That the days of public memorials should be clothed with the outward robes of holiness? They allege for the warrant of anniversary festivities, the ancients, who call them sacred and mystical days. If they were instituted only for order and policy, that the people might assemble to religious exercises, wherefore is there but one day appointed betwixt the passion and the resurrection; forty days betwixt the resurrection and ascension; ten betwixt the ascension and Pentecost? Wherefore follow we the course of the moon, as the Jews did, in our moveable feasts? &c. Wherefore is there not a certain day of the month kept for Easter as well as for the nativity?" &c. That which is here alleged out of Hooker and the ancients, Bishop Lindsey passeth quite over it, and neither inserts nor answers it. As touching those demands which tie him as so many Gordian knots, because he cannot unloose them, he goeth about to break them, telling us,³ that they order these things so for unity with the catholic church. This is even as some natural philosophers, who take upon them to give a reason and cause for all things in nature, when they can find no other, they flee to *sympathia physica*. When it is asked,

wherefore the loadstone doth attract iron rather than other metal? they answer, that the cause thereof is *sympathia physica inter magnetem et ferrum*. With such kind of etymology doth the Bishop here serve us; yet peradventure he might have given us another cause. If so, my retractation is, that if he be excused one way, he must be accused another way; and if he be blameless of ignorance, he is blameworthy for dissimulation. The true causes why those things are so ordered, we may find in Bishop Andrew's sermons, which I have made use of in handling this argument. For example,¹ the reason why there is but one day betwixt the passion and the resurrection, is, because that Jonas was but one day in the whale's belly, and Christ but one day in the bosom of the earth; for in their going thither he sets out Good Friday; in their being there, Easter eve; in their coming thence, Easter day. As for the fifty days betwixt Easter and Pentecost, he saith,² "Fifty is the number of the jubilee; which number agreeth well with this feast, the feast of Pentecost;—what the one in years, the other in days;—so that this is the jubilee as it were of the year, or the yearly memory of the year of jubilee: that, the pentecost of years; this, the jubilee of days." In the end of the same sermon, he tells us the reason why there are ten days appointed betwixt the ascension and Pentecost. "The feast of jubilee (saith he) began ever after the high priest had offered his sacrifice, and had been in the *sancta sanctorum*, as this jubilee of Christ also took place from his entering into the holy places, made without hands, after his propitiatory sacrifice, offered up for the quick and the dead, and for all yet unborn, at Easter. And it was the tenth day; and this now is the tenth day since." He hath told us also why there is not a certain day of the month appointed for Easter,³ as there is for the nativity, namely, because the fast of Lent must end with that high feast, according to the prophecy of Zechariah. Wherefore I conclude, *aliquid mysterii alunt*, and so *aliquid monstri* too.

¹ Sermon on Matt. xii. 39, 40.

² Sermon on Luke iv. 18, 19.

³ Sermon on Matt. vi. 16.

¹ See Sermon on Gal. iv. 4; Sermon on Luke ii. 10, 11; Sermon on Lam. i. 12; Sermon on John xx. 19; Sermon on Job xix. 23; Sermon on John xx. 17; Sermon on Heb. xlii. 20, 21; Sermon on Matt. vi. 16; Sermon on Acts ii. 16; Sermon on John v. 6, &c.

² P. 67.

³ Ubi Supra, p. 23.

CHAPTER II.

THAT THE CEREMONIES ARE UNLAWFUL BECAUSE THEY ARE MONUMENTS OF BY-PAST IDOLATRY, WHICH NOT BEING NECESSARY TO BE RETAINED, SHOULD BE UTTERLY ABOLISHED, BECAUSE OF THEIR IDOLATROUS ABUSES: ALL WHICH IS PARTICULARLY MADE GOOD OF KNEELING.

Sect. 1. I have here proved the ceremonies to be superstitious; now I will prove them to be idolatrous. These are different arguments; for every idolatry is superstition, but every superstition is not idolatry, as is rightly by some distinguished.¹ As for the idolatry of the controverted ceremonies, I will prove that they are thrice idolatrous: 1. *Reductivè*, because they are monuments of by-past idolatry; 2. *Participativè*, because they are badges of present idolatry; 3. *Formaliter*, because they are idols themselves.

First, then, they are idolatrous, because having been notoriously abused to idolatry heretofore, they are the detestable and accursed monuments, which give no small honour to the memory of that by-past idolatry which should lie buried in hell. Dr Burges² reckons for idolatrous all ceremonies devised and used in and to the honouring of an idol, whether properly or by interpretation such. "Of which sort (saith he) were all the ceremonies of the pagans, and not a few of the Papists." If an opposite, writing against us, be forced to acknowledge this much, one may easily conjecture what enforcing reason we have to double out our point. The argument in hand I frame thus:—

All things and rites which have been notoriously abused to idolatry, if they be not such as either God or nature hath made to be of a necessary use, should be utterly abolished and purged away from divine worship, in such sort that they may not be accounted nor used by us as sacred things or rites pertaining to the same.

But the cross, surplice, kneeling in the act of receiving the communion, &c., are things and rites, &c., and are not such as either God or nature, &c.

Therefore they should be utterly abolished, &c.

¹ Synop. Pur. Theol., disp. 19, thes. 30.
² Maudock, sect. 2, p. 38.

Sect. 2. As for the proposition I shall first explain it and then prove it. I say, "all things and rites," for they are alike forbidden, as I shall show. I say, "which have been notoriously abused to idolatry," because if the abuse be not known, we are blameless for retaining the things and rites which have been abused. I say, "if they be not such as either God or nature hath made to be of a necessary use," because if they be of a necessary use, either through God's institution, as the sacraments, or through nature's law, as the opening of our mouths to speak (for when I am to preach or pray publicly, nature makes it necessary that I open my mouth to speak audibly and articulately), then the abuse cannot take away the use. I say, "they may not be used by us as sacred things, rites pertaining to divine worship," because without the compass of worship they may be used to a natural or civil purpose. If I could get no other meat to eat than the consecrated host, which Papists idolatrise in the circumgestion of it, I might lawfully eat it; and if I could get no other clothes to put on than the holy garments wherein a priest hath said mass, I might lawfully wear them. Things abused to idolatry are only then unlawful when they are used no otherwise than religiously, and as things sacred.

Sect. 3. The proposition thus explained is confirmed by these five proofs: 1. God's own precept,—"Ye shall defile also the covering of thy graven images of silver, and the ornaments of thy molten images of gold: thou shalt cast them away as a menstruous cloth, thou shalt say unto it, Get thee hence," Isa. xxx. 22. The covering of the idol here spoken of, Gaspar Sanctus¹ rightly understandeth to be that, *quo aut induebantur simulacra Gentilico ritu, aut bracteas quibus ligneæ imagines integuntur, aut quo homines idolis sacrificaturi amiciebantur*; so that the least appurtenances of idols are to be avoided. When the apostle Jude² would have us to hate garments spotted with the flesh, his meaning is, *detestandam esse vel superficiem ipsam mali sive peccati, quam tunicae appellatione subinnuere videtur*, as our own. Rolloke hath observed,³ If the very covering of an idol be forbidden, what shall be thought of other things which are not only spotted, but irrecoverably polluted

¹ Com. in illum locum.
² Jude 23.
³ Com. in Thess. v. 22.

with idols? Many such precepts were given to Israel, as "Ye shall destroy their altars, break their images, and cut down their groves," Exod. xxxiv. 13. "The graven images of their gods shall ye burn with fire: thou shalt not desire the silver nor gold that is on them, nor take it unto thee, lest thou be snared therein; for it is an abomination to the Lord thy God," Deut. vii. 25, 26. Read to the same purpose, Num. xxxiii. 52; Deut. vii. 5; xii. 2, 3.

Secondly, God hath not only by his precepts commanded us to abolish all the relics of idolatry, but by his promises also manifested unto us how acceptable service this should be to him. There is a command "That the Israelites should destroy the Canaanites," Num. xxxiii. 52, *evellantque res omnes idolatricas ipsorum cui mandato, saith Junius, subjicitur sua promissio*, namely, that the Lord would give them the promised land, and they should dispossess the inhabitants thereof, ver. 53; yea, there is a promise of remission and reconciliation to this work: "By this shall the iniquity of Jacob be purged, and this is all the fruit to take away his sin; when he maketh all the stones of the altar as chalk-stones that are beaten asunder, the groves and images shall not stand up." Isa. xxvii. 9.

Sect. 4. Thirdly, The churches of Pergamos and Thyatira are reproved for suffering the use of idolothites, Rev. ii. 14—20, where the eating of things sacrificed to idols is condemned as idolatry and spiritual adultery, as Perkins² noteth. Paybody, therefore, is greatly mistaken when he thinks that meats sacrificed to idols, being the good creatures of God, were allowed by the Lord, out of the case of scandal, notwithstanding of idolatrous pollution; for the eating of things sacrificed to idols is reproved as idolatry, Rev. ii.; and the eating of such things is condemned as a fellowship with devils, 1 Cor. x. 20. New idolatry and fellowship with devils, I suppose, are unlawful, though no scandal should follow upon them. And whereas he thinks meats sacrificed to idols to be lawful enough out of the case of scandal, for this reason, because they are the good creatures of God, he should have considered better the Apostle's mind concerning such idolothites; which Zanchius³ setteth down thus: *Verum est, per se hæc nihil*

sunt, sed respectu eorum quibus immolantur aliquid sunt; quia per hæc illis quibus immolantur, nos consociamus. Qui isti? Demones. For our better understanding of this matter, we must distinguish two sorts of idolothites, both which we find, 1 Cor. x. Of the one, the Apostle speaks from the 14th verse of that chapter to the 23d; of the other, from the 23d verse to the end. This is Beza's distinction in his Annotations on that chapter. Of the first sort, he delivers the Apostle's mind thus: That as Christians have their holy banquets, which are badges of their communion both with Christ and among themselves; and as the Israelites, by their sacrifices, did seal their copulation in the same religion, so also idolaters, *cum suis idolis aut potius demonibus, solemnibus illis epulis copulantur*. So that this sort of idolothites were eaten in temples, and public solemn banquets, which were dedicated to the honour of idols, 1 Cor. viii. 10. Cartwright sheweth¹ that the Apostle is comparing the table of the Lord with the table of idolaters; whereupon it followeth, that as we use the Lord's table religiously, so that table of idolaters of which the Apostle speaketh, had state in the idolatrous worship like that feast, Num. xxv. 3; *quod in honorem falsorum Deorum celebrabatur*, saith Calvin.² This first sort of idolothites Pareus³ calls the sacrifices of idols; and from such, he saith, the Apostle dissuadeth by this argument, *Participare epulis idolorum, est idololatia*. Of the second sort of idolothites, the Apostle begins to speak in ver. 23. The Corinthians moved a question, Whether they might lawfully eat things sacrificed to idols? *In privatis conviviis*, saith Pareus.⁴ The Apostle resolves them that *domi in privato convicti*, they might eat them, except it were in the case of scandal; thus Beza.⁵ The first sort of idolothites are meant of Rev. ii., as Beza there noteth; and of this sort must we understand Augustine⁶ to mean whilst he saith, that it were better *mori fame, quam idolothites vesci*. These sorts are simply and in themselves unlawful. And if meats sacrificed to idols be so unlawful, then much more such things and rites as have not only been sacrificed and destined

¹ Annot. on 1 Cor. x. 21.
² Com. in illum locum.
³ Anal. in 1 Cor. x.
⁴ Ibid.
⁵ Annot. ibid.
⁶ De Bono Conjugali, cap. 16.

¹ Anal. in illum locum.
² Expos. upon Rev. ii. 14.
³ In Præc. 2, p. 534.

to the honour of idols (for this is but one kind of idolatrous abuse), but also of a long time publicly and solemnly employed in the worshipping of idols, and deeply defiled with idolatry, much more, I say, are they unlawful to be applied to God's most pure and holy worship, and therein used by us publicly and solemnly, so that the world may see us conforming and joining ourselves unto idolaters.

Sect. 5. Fourthly, I certify my proposition by approved examples; and, first, we find that Jacob, Gen. xxxv. 4, did not only abolish out of his house the idols, but their ear-rings also, because they were *superstitionis insignia*, as Calvin; *res ad idololatriam pertinentes*, as Junius; *monilia idolis consecrata*, as Pareus calleth them; all writing upon that place. We have also the example of Elijah, 1 Kings xviii. 30: he would by no means offer upon Baal's altar, but would needs repair the Lord's altar, though this should hold the people the longer in expectation. This he did, in P. Martyr's judgment, because he thought it a great indignity to offer sacrifice to the Lord upon the altar of Baal; whereupon Martyr reprehendeth those who, in administering the true supper of the Lord, *uti velint Papisticis vestibus et instrumentis*. Further, we have the example of Jehu, who is commended for the destroying of Baal out of Israel, with his image, his house, and his very vestments, 2 Kings x. 22—28. And what example more considerable than that of Hezekiah, who not only abolished such monuments of idolatry as at their first institution were but men's invention, but brake down also the brazen serpent (though originally set up at God's own command), when once he saw it abused to idolatry? 2 Kings xviii. 4. This deed of Hezekiah Pope Steven² doth greatly praise, and professeth that it is set before us for our imitation, that when our predecessors have wrought some things which might have been without fault in their time, and afterward they are converted into error and superstition, they may be quickly destroyed by us who come after them. Farellus saith,³ that princes and magistrates should learn by this example of Hezekiah what they should do with those significant rites of men's devising which have turned to superstition. Yea,

¹ Com. in illum locum.

² Apud Wolphium, com. in 2 Reg. xviii. 4.

³ Calv. Epist. et Resp., p. 79.

the Bishop of Winchester acknowledgeth,¹ that whatsoever is taken up at the injunction of men, when it is drawn to superstition, cometh under the compass of the brazen serpent, and is to be abolished; and he excepteth nothing from this example but only things of God's own prescribing. Moreover, we have the example of good Josiah, 2 Kings xxiii., for he did not only destroy the houses, and the high places of Baal, but his vessels also, and his grove, and his altars; yea, the horses and chariots which had been given to the sun. The example also of penitent Manasseh, who not only overthrew the strange gods, but their altars too, 2 Chron. xxxiii. 15. And of Moses, the man of God, who was not content to execute vengeance on the idolatrous Israelites, except he should also utterly destroy the monument of their idolatry, Exod. xxxii. 17—20. Lastly, we have the example of Daniel, who would not defile himself with a portion of the king's meat, Dan. i. 8; because, saith Junius,² it was converted in *usum idololatriæ*; for at the banquets of the Babylonians and other Gentiles, *erant præmissa sive præmissa, quæ diis præmittebantur*, they used to consecrate their meat and drink to idols, and to invoke the names of their idols upon the same, so that their meat and drink fell under the prohibition of idololithes. This is the reason which is given by the most part of the interpreters for Daniel's fearing to pollute himself with the king's meat and wine; and it hath also the approbation of a Papist.³

Sect. 6. Fifthly, Our proposition is backed with a twofold reason, for things which have been notoriously abused to idolatry should be abolished: 1. *Quia monent. Quia movent.* First, then, they are monitory, and preserve the memory of idols; *monumentum* in good things is both *monimentum* and *munimentum*; but *monumentum* in evil things (such as idolatry) is only *monimentum*, which *monet mentem*, to remember upon such things as ought not to be once named among saints, but should lie buried in the eternal darkness of silent oblivion. These relics therefore of idolatry, *quidus quasi monumentis posteritas admoneatur* (as Wolphius rightly saith⁴), are to be quite defaced and destroyed, because they serve to honour the memory of

¹ Serm. on Phil. ii. 10.

² Com. in illum locum.

³ ti. Sanctus, com. ibid.

⁴ Com. in 2 Reg. xxiii. 6.

cursed idols. God would not have so much as the name of an idol to be remembered among his people, but commanded to destroy their names as well as themselves, Exod. xxiii. 13; Deut. xii. 3; Josh. xxiii. 7; whereby we are admonished, as Calvin saith,¹ how detestable idolatry is before God, *cujus memoriam vult penitus deleri, ne posthac ullum ejus vestigium appareat*: yea, he requireth,² *eorum omnium memoriam deleri, quæ semel dicata sunt idolis*. If Mordecai would not give his countenance, Esth. iii. 2, nor do any reverence to a living monument of that nation whose name God had ordained to be blotted out from under heaven, much less should we give connivance, and far less countenance, but least of all reverence, Deut. xxv. 19, to the dead and dumb monuments of those idols which God hath devoted to utter destruction, with all their naughty appurtenances, so that he will not have their names to be once mentioned or remembered again. But, secondly, *movent* too; such idolithous remainders move us to turn back to idolatry. For *usu compertum habemus, superstitiones etiam postquam explesæ essent, si qua relicta fuissent earum monumenta, cum memoriam sui ipsarum apud homines, tum id tandem ut revocantur obtinuisse*, saith Wolphius,³ who hereupon thinks it behoveful to destroy *funditus* such vestiges of superstition, for this cause, if there were no more: *ut et aspirantibus ad revocandam idololatriam spes frangatur, et res novas molientibus ansa pariter ac materia præripitur*. God would have Israel to overthrow all idolatrous monuments, lest thereby they should be snared, Deut. vii. 25; xii. 30. And if the law command to cover a pit, lest an ox or an ass should fall therein, Exod. xxi. 23, shall we suffer a pit to be open wherein the precious souls of men and women, which all the world cannot ransom, are likely to fall? Did God command to make a battlement for the roof of a house, and that for the safety of men's bodies, Deut. xxii. 8, and shall we not only not put up a battlement, or object some bar for the safety of men's souls, but also leave the way slippery and full of snares? Read we not that the Lord, who knew what was in man, and saw how propense he was to idolatry, did not only remove out of his people's way all such things as might any

¹ Com. in Isa. xxvii. 9.

² Calv. Com. in Exod. xxiii. 24.

³ Ubi Supra.

way allure or induce them to idolatry (even to the cutting off the names of the idols out of the land, Zech. xiii. 2), but also hedge up their way with thorns that they might not find their paths, nor overtake their idol gods, when they should seek after them? IIos. ii. 6, 7. And shall we by the very contrary course not only not hedge up the way of idolatry with thorns, which may stop and stay such as have an inclination aiming forward, but also lay before them the inciting and enticing occasions which add to their own propension, such delectation as spurreth forward with a swift facility?

Sect. 7. Thus, having both explained and confirmed the proposition of our present argument, I will make my next for the confutation of the answers which our opposites devise to elude it. And, First, They tell us, that it is needless to abolish utterly things and rites which the Papists have abused to idolatry and superstition, and that it is enough to purge them from the abuse, and to restore them again to their right use. Hence Saravia¹ will not have *pium crucis usum* to be abolished *cum abusu*, but holds it enough that the abuse and superstition be taken away. Dr Forbess's answer is,² that not only things instituted by God are not to be taken away for the abuse of them, but farther, *neque res medicæ ab hominibus prudenter introductæ, propter sequentem abusum semper tollendæ sunt. Abusi sunt Papistæ templis, et oratoriis, et cathedralis, et sacris vasis, et campanis, et benedictione matrimoniali; nec tamen res istas censuerunt prudentes reformatores abjiciendas*. Ans. 1. Calvin,³ answering that which Cassander allegeth out of an Italian writer, *abusum non tolli bonum usum*, he admits it only to be true in things which are instituted by God himself, not so in things ordained by men, for the very use of such things or rites as have no necessary use in God's worship, and which men have devised only at their own pleasure, is taken away by idolatrous abuse. *Pars tutior* here, is to put them wholly away, and there is by a great deal more danger in retaining than in removing them. 2. The proofs which I have produced for the proposition about which now we debate, do not only infer that things and rites which have been notoriously abused to idolatry should be abolished, in case they be

¹ N. Fratris et Amici, art. 17.

² Iren. lib. I. cap. 7, 9, 6.

³ Resp. ad Vercipcl., p. 41—44.

not restored to a right use, but simply and absolutely that in any wise they are to be abolished. God commanded to say to the covering, and the ornaments of idols, "Get you hence," Isa. xxx. 22. It is not enough they be purged from the abuse, but *simplificiter* they themselves must pack them and be gone. How did Jacob with the ear-rings of the idols; Elijah with Baal's altar; Jehu with his vestments; Josiah with his houses; Manasseh with his altars; Meses with the golden calf; Joshua with the temples of Canaan; Hezekiah with the brazen serpent? Did they retain the things themselves, and only purge them from the abuse? Belike, if these our opposites had been their counsellors, they had advised them to be contented with such a moderation; yet we see they were better counselled when they destroyed utterly the things themselves, whereby we know that they were of the same mind with us, and thought that things abused to idolatry, if they have no necessary use, are far better away than a-place. Did Daniel refuse Bel's meat because it was not restored to the right use? Nay, if that had been all, it might have been quickly helped, and the meat sanctified by the word of God and prayer. Finally, Were the churches of Pergamos and Thyatira reprov'd because they did not restore things sacrificed to idols to their right use? Or, were they not rather reprov'd for having anything at all to do with the things themselves?

Sect. 8. As for that which Dr Forbesse objecteth to us, we answer, that temples, places of prayer, chairs, vessels, and bells, are of a necessary use, by the light and guidance of nature itself; and matrimonial benediction is necessary by God's institution, Gen. i. 28; so that all those examples do except themselves from the argument in hand. But the Doctor¹ intendeth to bring those things within the category of things indifferent; and to this purpose he allegeth, that it is indifferent to use this or that place for a temple, or a place of prayer; also to use these vessels, and bells, or others. And of matrimonial benediction to be performed by a pastor, he saith there is nothing commanded in Scripture. Ans. Though it be indifferent to choose this place, &c., also to use these vessels or other vessels, &c.; yet the Doctor, I trust, will not deny that temples, houses of prayer, vessels and bells, are

¹ Ubi Supra.

of a necessary use (which exempteth them from the touch of our present argument); whereas, beside that it is not necessary to kneel in the communion in this place more than in that place, neither to keep the feast of Christ's nativity, passion, &c. upon these days more than upon other days, &c., the things themselves are not necessary in their kind; and it is not necessary to keep any festival day, nor to kneel at all in the act of receiving the communen. There is also another respect which hindereth temples, vessels, &c. from coming within the compass of this our argument, but neither doth it agree to the controverted ceremonies. Temples, houses of prayer, vessels for the ministration of the sacraments, and bells, are not used by us in divine worship as things sacred, or as holier than other houses, vessels, and bells; but we use them only for natural necessity,—partly for that common decency which hath no less place in the actions of civil than of sacred assemblies; yea, in some cases they may be applied to civil uses, as hath been said;¹ whereas the controverted ceremonies are respected and used as sacred rites, and as holier than any circumstance which is alike common to civil and sacred actions, neither are they used at all out of the case of worship. We see now a double respect wherefore our argument inferreth not the necessity of abolishing and destroying such temples, vessels, and bells, as have been abused to idolatry, viz. because it can neither be said that they are not things necessary, nor yet that they are things sacred.

Sect. 9. Nevertheless (to add this by the way), howbeit for these reasons the retaining and using of temples which have been polluted with idols be not in itself unlawful, yet the retaining of every such temple is not ever necessary, but sometimes it is expedient, for farther extirpation of superstition, to demolish and destroy some such temples as have been horribly abused to idolatry, Calvin also² and Zanchius³ do plainly insinuate. Whereby I mean to defend (though not as in itself necessary, yet as expedient *pro tunc*,) that which the reformers of the church of Scotland did in casting down some of those churches which had been consecrate to popish idols, and of a long time polluted with idolatrous worship. As

¹ Supra, cap. 1, sect. 11.

² Com. in Deut. xii. 2.

³ In 4 Præc., cot. 709.

on the one part the reformers (not without great probability) feared, that so long as these churches were not made even with the ground, the memory of that superstition, whereunto they had been employed and accustomed, should have been in them preserved, and, with some sort of respect, recognised; so, on the other part, they saw it expedient to demolish them, for strengthening the hands of such as adhered to the reformation, for putting Papists out of all hope of the re-entry of Popery, and for hedging up the way with thorns, that the idolatrously-minded might not find their paths. And since the pulling down of those churches wanted neither this happy intent nor happy event, I must say that the bitter invectives given forth against it, by some who carry a favourable eye to the pompous bravery of the Romish where, and have deformed too much of that which was by them reformed, are to be detested by all such as wish the eternal exile of idolatrous monuments out of the Lord's land; yet let these Momus-like spirits understand that their censorious verdicts do also reflect upon those ancient Christians of whom we read,¹ that with their own hands they destroyed the temples of idols; and upon Chrysostom, who stirred up some monks, and sent them into Phœnicia, together with workmen, and sustained them on the expences and charges of certain godly women, that they might destroy the temples of idols, as the Magdeburgians² have marked out of Theodoret; likewise upon them of the religion in France, of whom Thuanus recordeth, that *templa confractis ac disjectis statuis et altaribus, expilaverant*; lastly, upon foreign divines,³ who teach, that not only *idola*, but *idolia* also, and *omnia idololatrica instrumenta* should be abolished. Moreover, what was it else but reason's light which made Cambyeses to fear that the superstition of Egypt could not be well rooted out if the temples wherein it was seated were not taken away; so that *offensus superstitionibus Egyptiorum, Apis ceterorumque Deorum cedes dirui jubet: ad Ammonis quoque nobilissimum templum expugnandum, exercitum mittit*, saith Justinus.⁴ And is not the danger of retaining idolatrous churches thus

pointed at by P. Martyr: *Curavit, &c.* "Jehu (saith Le) took care to have the temples of Baal overthrown, lest they should return any more to their wonted use. Wherefore, it appears, that many do not rightly, who, having embraced the gospel of the Son of God, yet, notwithstanding, keep still the instruments of Popery. And they have far better looked to piety who have taken care to have popish images, statues and ornaments, utterly cut off; for, as we read in the ecclesiastical histories, Constantine the Great, after he had given his name to Christ, by an edict provided and took order that the temples of the idols might be closed and shut up; but, because they did still remain, Julian the Apostate did easily open and unlock them, and thereafter did prostitute the idols of old superstition to be worshipped in them,—which Theodosius, the best and commended prince, animadverting, commanded to pull them down, lest they should again any more be restored." But because I suppose no sober spirit will deny that sometimes, and in some cases, it may be expedient to rase and pull down some temples polluted with idols, where other temples may be had to serve sufficiently the assemblies of Christian congregations (which is all I plead for); therefore I leave this purpose and return to Dr Forbesse.

Sect. 10. As touching matrimonial benediction, it is also exempted out of the compass of our present argument, because through divine institution it hath a necessary use, as we have said. And though the Doctor, to make it appear that a pastor's performing of the same is a thing indifferent, allegeth, that in Scripture there is nothing commanded thereabout; yet plain it is from Scripture itself, that matrimonial benediction ought to be given by a pastor; for God hath commanded his ministers to bless his people, Num. vi., which by just analogy belongeth to the ministers of the gospel; neither is there any ground for making herein a difference betwixt them and the minister of the law, but we must conceive the commandment to tie both alike to the blessing of God's people. Unto which ministerial duty of blessing, because no such limits can be set as may exclude matrimonial blessing, therefore they are bound to the performance of it also. And if

¹ Magdeb., cent. 4, cap. 15, col. 1538, 1539.

² Cent. 5, cap. 15, col. 1511.

³ Danæus Polit. Christ., lib. 3, p. 229; Polan. Synt. Theol., lib. 10, cap. 65.

⁴ Epist. Hist., lib. 1.

¹ Com. in 2 Reg. x. 27.

farther we consider, that the duty of blessing was performed by the minister of the Lord, Heb. vi. 7, even before the law of Moses, we are yet more confirmed to think, that the blessing of the people was not commanded in the law as a thing peculiar and proper to the Levitical priesthood, but as a moral and perpetual duty belonging to the Lord's ministers for ever. Wherefore, notwithstanding of any abuse of matrimonial benediction among Papists, yet, forasmuch as it hath a necessary use in the church, and may not (as the controverted ceremonies may) be well spared, it is manifest that it cometh not under the respect and account of those things whereof our argument speaketh.

Sect. 11. Lastly, Whereas the Doctor would bear his reader in hand, that in the judgment of wise reformators, even such things as have been brought in use by men only, without God's institution, are not to be ever taken away, for the abuse which followeth upon them; let reformators speak for themselves: *Nos quoque priscos ritus, quibus indifferenter uti licet, quia verbo Dei consentanei sunt, non rejicimus; modo ne superstitio et pravus abusus eos abolere cogat.*¹ This was the judgment of the wisest reformators,—that rights which were both ancient and lawful, and agreeable to God's word, were notwithstanding of necessity to be abolished, because of their superstition and wicked abuse.

Sect. 12. Secondly, Our opposites answer us, that beside the purging of things and rites abused by idolaters from the idolatrous pollution, and the restoring of them to a right use, preaching and teaching against the superstition and abuse which hath followed upon them, is another means to avoid that harm which we fear to ensue upon the retaining of them. Ans. 1. This is upon as good ground pretended for the keeping of images in churches: *At inquit statim, docemus has imagines non esse adorandas. Quasi vero, saith Zanchius,² non i tem olim fecerit diligentius Deus, per Mosen et prophetas, quam nos faciamus. Cur igitur etiam volebat tolli imagines omnes? quia non satis est verbo docere non esse faciendum malum; sed tollenda etiam sunt malorum offendicula, irritamenta, cause, occasiones.* It is not enough, with the scribes and Pharisees, to teach out of Moses' chair what

the people should do, but all occasions, yea, appearances of evil, are to be taken out of their sight. *Efficacious enim et plus movent, quæ in oculis quam quæ in aures incidunt. Potuerat et Hezekias populum monere, ne serpentem adorarent, sed multo confingere et penitus e conspectu auferre; et rectius fecit, saith one well to this purpose.¹ 2. Experience hath taught to how little purpose such admonitions do serve. Calvin,² writing to the Lord Protector of England of some popish ceremonies which did still remain in that church after the reformation of the same, desireth that they may be abolished, because of their former abuse, in time of Popery. *Quid enim, saith he, illæ ceremoniæ aliud fuerunt, quam totidem lenocinia quæ miseræ animas ad malum perducerent?* &c. But because he saw that some might answer that which our Formalists answer now to us, and say, it were enough to warn and teach men that they abuse not these ceremonies, and that the abolishing of these ceremonies themselves were not necessary; therefore immediately he subjoineth these words: *Jam si de cautione agitur, monebuntur homines scilicet, ne ad illas nunc impingant, &c. Quis tamen non videt obdurari ipsos nihilominus, nihil ut infelici illa cautione obtineri possit.* Whereupon he concludes, that if such ceremonies were suffered to remain, this should be a means to nourish a greater hardness and obfirmation in evil, and a veil drawn, so that the sincere doctrine which is propounded should not be admitted as it ought to be. In another epistle to Cranmer,³ archbishop of Canterbury, he complaineth that external superstitions were so corrected in the church of England, *ut residui mancant innumeri surculi, qui assidue pullulent.* And what good, then, was done by their admonitions, whereby they did, in some sort, sned the reviving twigs of old superstition, since forasmuch as they were not wholly eradicate, they did still shoot forth again? If a man should dig a pit by the way-side, for some commodity of his own, and then admonish the travellers to take heed to themselves, if they go that way in the darkness of the night, who would hold him excusable? How then shall they be excused who dig a most dangerous pit, which is like to ruin many souls, and yet will have*

us to think that they are blameless, for that they warn men to beware of it?

Sect. 13. Thirdly, we are told that if these answers which our opposites give get no place, then shall we use nothing at all which hath been used by idolaters, and by consequence, neither baptism nor the Lord's supper. But let Zanchius answer for us,¹ that these things are by themselves necessary, so that it is enough they be purged from the abuse. And elsewhere² he resolveth, that things which are by themselves both good and necessary, may not for any abuse be put away. *Si vero res sint adiaphoræ sua natura et per legem Dei, eoque tales quæ citra jacturam salutis omitti possunt, etiam si ad bonos usus initio fuerunt institutæ; si tamen postea videamus illas in abusus perniciosos esse conversas; pietas in Deum, et charitas erga proximum, postulant ut tollantur, &c.* He adds, for proof of that which he saith, the example of Hezekiah in breaking down that brazen serpent; which example doth indeed most pregnantly enforce the abolishing of all things or rites notoriously abused to idolatry when they are not of any necessary use, but it warranteth not the abolishing of anything which has a necessary use, because the brazen serpent is not contained in the number of those things, *quibus cavere non possumus*, saith Wolpius,³ answering to the same objection which presently I have in hand. Now, that the ceremonies have not in themselves, nor by the law of God, any necessary use, and that without hazard of salvation they may be omitted, is acknowledged by Formalists themselves; wherefore I need not stay to prove it.

Sect. 14. Besides these answers which are common in our adversaries' mouths, some of them have other particular subterfuges, which now I am to search. "We must consider (saith Bishop Lindsey⁴) the ceremony itself (dedicated to, and polluted with idolatry,) whether it be of human or divine institution. If it be of human institution it may be removed, &c.; but if the ceremony be of divine institution, such as kneeling is,—for the same is commended by God unto us in his word,—then we ought to consider whether the abuse of that ceremony hath proceeded from the nature of the action

wherein it was used; for if it be so, it ought to be abolished, &c.; but if the abuse proceed not from the nature of the action, but from the opinion of the agent, then, the opinion being removed, the religious ceremony may be used without any profanation of idolatry. For example, the abuse of kneeling in elevation, &c., proceedeth not only from the opinion of the agent, but from the nature of the action, which is idolatrous and superstitious, &c., and, therefore, both the action and gesture ought to be abolished. But the sacrament of the supper, being an action instituted by God, and kneeling being of its own nature an holy and religious ceremony, it can never receive contagion of idolatry from it, but only from the opinion of the agent: then remove the opinion, both the action itself may be rightly used, and kneeling therein," &c. Ans. 1. Since he granteth that a ceremony dedicated to and polluted with idolatry, may (he answereth not the argument which there he propounded, except he say must) be abolished, if it be of human institution, he must grant from this ground, if there were no more, that the cross, surplice, kneeling at the communion, &c., having been so notoriously abused to idolatry, must be abolished, because they have no institution except from men only. But, 2. Why saith he that kneeling is a ceremony of divine institution? which he pronounceth not of kneeling, as it is actuated by some individual case, or clothed with certain particular circumstances, (for he maketh this kneeling whereof he speaketh to be found in two most different actions, the one idolatrous, the other holy,) but kneeling in the general, *per se*, and *præcise ab omnibus circumstantiis*. Let him now tell where kneeling thus considered is commended unto us in God's word. He would possibly allege that place, Psal. xcv. 6, "O come, let us worship and bow down: let us kneel before the Lord our Maker," which is cited in the Canon of Perth about kneeling; but I answer, whether one expounded that place with Calvin,¹ in this sense, *ut scilicet ante arcam fœderis populus se prosternat, quia sermo de legali cultu habetur*: whereupon it should follow that it commendeth only kneeling to the Jews in that particular case, or whether it be taken more generally, to commend kneeling (though not as necessary, yet as laudable and becoming

¹ Calv. Res. ad Versipel., p. 413.

² De Imagin., col. 402.

¹ Tho. Naogeorgus in 1 John v. 21.

² Calv. Epist. et Resp., p. 86.

³ Ibid., col. 136.

¹ Com. in Col. ii. 17.

² De Imagin., col. 403.

³ Com. in 2 Kings xviii. 4.

⁴ Proc. in Perth Assembly, part 2, p. 120.

¹ Com. in Illud locum.

ing) in the solemn acts of God's immediate worship, such as that praise and thanksgiving whereof the beginning of the psalm speaketh,—whether, I say, it be taken in this or that sense, yet it condemneth not kneeling, except in a certain kind of worship only. And as for kneeling in the general nature of it, it is not of divine institution, but in itself indifferent, even as sitting, standing, &c., all which gestures are then only made good or evil when in *actu exercitio*, they are actuated and individualised by particular circumstances. 3. If so be the ceremony be abused to idolatry, it skills not how; for, as I have showed before, the reasons and proofs which I have produced for the proposition of our present argument, hold good against the retaining of anything which hath been known to be abused to idolatry; and only such things as have a necessary use are to be excepted. 4. The nature of an action, wherein a ceremony is used, cannot be the cause of the abuse of that ceremony; neither can the abuse of a ceremony proceed from the nature of the action wherein it is used, as one effect from the cause; for *nihil potest esse homini causa sufficiens peccati*, except only *propria voluntas*.¹ 5. The abuse of kneeling in the idolatrous action of elevation, proceedeth not from the nature of the action, but from the opinion of the agent, or rather from his will; for (*principium actionum humanarum*, is not opinion, but will, choosing that which opinion conceiteth to be chosen, or *voluntas praevalens luce intellectus*.) it is the will of the agent only which both maketh the action of elevation to be idolatrous, and likewise kneeling in this action to receive the contagion of idolatry. For the elevation of the bread *materialiter* is not idolatrous (more than the lifting up of the bread among us by elders or deacons, when in taking it off the table, or setting it on, they lift it above the heads of the communicants), but *formaliter* only, as it is elevated with a will and intention to place it in state of worship. So likewise kneeling to the bread *materialiter* is not idolatry (else a man were an idolater who should be against his will thrust down and holden by violence kneeling on his knees when the bread is elevated), but *formaliter*, as it proceedeth from a will and intention in men to give to the bread elevated a state in that worship,

¹ Aquin. 2, 2 an., quest. 43, art. 1.

and out of that respect to kneel before it. 6. What can he gain by this device, that the abuse of kneeling in the Lord's supper proceeded not from the nature of the action, but from the will of the agent? Can he hereupon infer, that kneeling in that action is to be retained notwithstanding of any contagion of idolatry which it hath received? Nay, then, let him say that Hezekiah did not rightly in breaking down the brazen serpent, which was set up at God's command, and the abuse whereof proceeded not from the thing itself, which had a most lawful, profitable, and holy use, but only from the perverse opinion and will of them who abused it to idolatry.

Sect. 15. But the comparing of kneeling to the brazen serpent is very unsavoury to the Bishop; and wherefore? "The brazen serpent (saith he), in the time it was abolished, had no use: that ceased with the virtue of the cure that the Israelites received by looking upon it; the act of kneeling continueth always in a necessary use, for the better expressing of our thankfulness to God." Ans. 1. Both kneeling, and all the rest of the popish ceremonies, may well be compared to the brazen serpent. And divines do commonly allege this example, as most pregnant to prove that things or rites polluted with idols, and abused to idolatry, may not be retained, if they have no necessary use; and I have cited before the Bishop of Winchester, acknowledging that this argument holdeth good against all things which are taken up, not at God's prescription, but at men's injunction. J. Rainold¹ argumenteth from Hezekiah's breaking down of the brazen serpent, to the plucking down of the sign of the cross. 2. Why saith he that the brazen serpent, in the time it was abolished, had no use? The use of it ceased not with the cure, but it was still kept for a most pious and profitable use, even to be a monument of that mercy which the Israelites received in the wilderness, and it served for the better expressing of their thankfulness to God, which the Bishop here calleth a necessary use. 3. When he saith that kneeling continueth always in a necessary use, we must understand him to speak of kneeling in the act of receiving the communion; else he runs at random; for it is not kneeling in the general, but kneeling in this particular case, which is compared to

¹ Confer. with J. Hart, cap. 8, divis. 4, p. 509.

the brazen serpent. Now, to say that this gesture in this action is necessary for our better expressing of our thankfulness to God, importeth that the church of Scotland, and many famous churches in Europe, for so many years have omitted that which was necessary for the better expressing of their thankfulness to God, and that they have not well enough expressed it. And, moreover, if kneeling be necessary in the Lord's supper for our better expressing of our thankfulness to God, then it is also necessary at our own common tables. Though we be bound to be more thankful at the Lord's table, and that because we receive a benefit of infinite more worth, yet we are bound to be *tam grati*, as well thankful at our own tables, albeit not *tanta gratitudine*. If, then, the same kind of thankfulness be required of us at our own tables (for *intentio et remissio graduum secundum magis et minus, non variant speciem rei*), that which is necessary for expressing of our thankfulness at the Lord's table must be necessary also for the expressing of it at our own. When I see the Bishop sitting at his table, I shall tell him that he omitteth the gesture which is necessary for the expressing of his thankfulness to God. 4. Did not the apostles' receiving this sacrament from Christ himself well enough express their thankfulness to God? yet they kneeled not, but sat, as is evident, and shall be afterwards proved against them who contradict everything which crosseth them. 5. God will never take a ceremony of men's devising for a better expressing of our thankfulness than a gesture which is commended to us by the example of his own Son, and his apostles, together with the celebration of this sacrament in all points according to his institution. 6. How shall we know where we have the Bishop and his fellows? It seems they know not where they have themselves; for sometimes they tell us that it is indifferent to take the communion sitting, or standing, or passing, or kneeling, yet here the Bishop tells us that kneeling is necessary. 7. I see the Bishop perceiveth that no answer can take kneeling at the communion out of the compass of the brazen serpent, except to say it hath a necessary use; this is the dead lift, which yet helpeth not, as I have showed. All things, then, which are not necessary (whereof kneeling is one), being notoriously abused to idolatry, fall under the brazen serpent.

Sect. 16. Paybody also will here talk with us, therefore we will talk with him too. He saith,¹ that God did not absolutely condemn things abused to idolatry, and tells us of three conditions on which it was lawful to spare idolatrous appurtenances: 1. If there were a needful use of them in God's worship. 2. In case they were so altered and disposed, as that they tended not to the honour of the idol, and his damnable worship. 3. If they were without certain danger of ensnaring people into idolatry. Ans. 1. Either he requires all these conditions in every idolothite and idolatrous appurtenance which may be retained, or else he thinks that any one of them sufficeth. If he require all these, the last two are superfluous; for that which hath a needful use in God's worship, can neither tend to the honour of the idol, nor yet can have in it any danger of ensnaring people into idolatry. If he think any one of those conditions enough, then let us go through them: The first I admit, but it will not help his cause; for while the world standeth they shall never prove that kneeling in the act of receiving the communion, and the other controverted ceremonies, have either a needful, or a profitable, or a lawful use in God's worship. As for his second condition, it is all one with that which I have already confuted,² namely, that things abused to idolatry may be kept, if they be purged from their abuse, and restored to the right use. But he allegeth for it a passage of Parker, of the Cross, cap. 1, sect. 7, p. 10, where he sheweth out of Augustine, that an idolothite may not be kept for private use, except, 1. *Omnis honor idoli, cum apertissima destructione subvertatur*. 2. That not only his honour be not despoiled, but also all show thereof. How doth this place (now would I know) make anything for Paybody? Do they keep kneeling for private use? Do they destroy most openly all honour of the idol to which kneeling was dedicated? Hath their kneeling not so much as any show of the breadden god's honour? Who will say so? And if any will say it, who will believe it? Who knoweth not that kneeling is kept for a public, and not for a private use, and that the breadden idol receiveth very great show of honour from it? He was scarce of warrants when he had no better than Parker could afford him. His third condition rests,

¹ Apol., part 3, cap. 4, sect. 15—17.
² Supra, sect. 9.

and touching it I ask, what if those idolatrous appurtenances be not without apparent danger of ensnaring people into idolatry? Are we not commanded to abstain from all appearance of evil? Will he correct the Apostle, and teach us, that we need not care for apparent, but for certain dangers? What more apparent danger of ensnaring people into idolatry than unnecessary ceremonies, which have been dedicated to and polluted with idols, and which, being retained, do both admonish us to remember upon old idolatry, and move us to return to the same, as I have before made evident?

Sect. 17. Now, as for the assumption of our present argument, it cannot be but evident to any who will not harden their minds against the light of the truth, that the ceremonies in question have been most notoriously abused to idolatry and superstition, and withal, that they have no necessary use to make us retain them. I say, they have been notoriously abused to idolatry. 1. Because they have been dedicated and consecrated to the service of idols. 2. Because they have been deeply polluted, and commonly employed in idolatrous worship. For both these reasons doth Zanchius condemn the surplice,¹ and such like popish ceremonies left in England, because the whore of Rome hath abused, and doth yet abuse them, *ad alliciendo homines ad scortandum. Sunt enim pompæ iste omnes, et ceremoniæ Papistice, nihil aliud quam fuci meretriciæ, ad hoc excoctati, ut homines ad spirituales scortationem alliciantur.* O golden sentence, and worthy to be engraven with a pen of iron, and the point of a diamond! for most needful it is to consider, that those ceremonies are the very meretricious bravery and veigling trinkets wherewith the Romish whore doth fard and paint herself, whilst she propineth to the world the cup of her fornications. This makes Zanchius² to call those ceremonies the relics and symbols of popish idolatry and superstition. When Queen Mary set up Popery in England, and restored all of it which King Henry had overthrown, she considered that Popery could not stand well-favouredly without the ceremonies; whereupon she ordained,³ *ut dies omnes festicelebrentur, superioris ætatis ceremoniæ restituantur, pueri adul-*

tiores ante baptisati, ab episcopis confirmantur. So that not in remote regions, but in his Majesty's dominions,—not in a time past memory, but about fourscore years ago,—not by people's practice only, but by the laws and edicts of the supreme magistrate, the ceremonies have been abused to the re-inducing and upholding of Popery and idolatry. Both far and near, then, both long since and lately, it is more than notorious how grossly and grievously the ceremonies have been polluted with idolatry and superstition.

I cannot choose but marvel much how Paybody was not ashamed to deny that kneeling hath been abused by the Papists.⁴ Blush, O paper, which art blotted with such a notable lie! What will not desperate impudency dare to aver? But Bishop Lindsey seemeth also to hold that kneeling hath been abused by the Papists⁵ only in the elevation and circumgession of the host, but not in the participation; and that Honorius did not command kneeling in the participation, but only in the elevation and circumgession. *Ans. 1. Saltem mendacem oportet essemorem.* Saith not the Bishop himself elsewhere of the Papists,⁶ “In the sacrament they kneel to the sign,” whereby he would prove a disconformity between their kneeling and ours; for we kneel, saith he, “by the sacrament to the thing signified.” Now if the Papists in the sacrament kneel to the sign, then they have idolatrously abused kneeling, even in the participation; for the Bishop dare not say that, in the elevation or circumgession, there is either sacrament or sign. 2. Why do our divines controvert with the Papists, *de adoratione eucharistiæ*, if Papists adore it not in the participation? for the host, carried about in a box, is not the sacrament of the encharist. 3. In the participation, Papists think that the bread is already transubstantiated into the body of Christ, by virtue of the words of consecration. Now, if in the participation they kneel to that which they falsely conceive to be the body of Christ (but is indeed corruptible bread), with an intention to give it *latría* or divine worship, then in the participation they abuse it to idolatry. But that is true; therefore, &c. 4. Durand sheweth,⁷ that

¹ Apol., part 3, cap. 4.

² Proc. in Pertb Assembly, part 2, p. 118, 119.

³ Ibid., p. 22.

⁴ Ration., lib. 5, Tit. de Prima et lib. 6, Tit. de Die Sancta Pasce.

¹ Supra, sect. 6.

² Epist. ad Reg. Elizab. Epistolar., lib. 1, p. 112.

³ Ibid., p. 111.

⁴ Sleid. Com., lib. 25, p. 481.

though in the holidays of Easter and Pentecost, and the festivities of the blessed Virgin, and in the Lord's day, they kneel not in the church, but only stand (because of the joy of the festivity), and at the most do but bow or incline their heads at prayer, yet in *præsentia corporis et sanguinis Christi*, in presence of the bread and wine, which they think to be the body and blood of Christ, they cease not to kneel. And how will the Bishop make their participation free of this idolatrous kneeling? The Rhenists show us,¹ that when they are eating and drinking the body and blood of our Lord, they adore the sacrament, and, humbling themselves, they say to it, *Domine non sum dignus, Deus propitius esto mihi peccatori.* 5. As for that which Honorius III. decreed, Dr White calleth it the adoration of the sacrament,² which, if it be so, then we must say, that he decreed adoration in the participation itself, because *extra usum sacramenti*, the bread cannot be called a sacrament. Honorius commanded that the priest should frequently teach his people to bow down devoutly when the host is elevated in the celebration of the mass, and that they should do the same when it is carried to the sick. All this was ordained in reference to the participation. *Ad usum illa instituta sunt*, saith Chemnitius,³ speaking of this decree, *quando scilicet panis consecratur, et quando ad infirmos deferitur, ut exhibeatur et sumatur.* So that that which was specially respected in the decree, was adoring in the participation.

Lastly, Here we have to do with Dr Burges, who will have us to think, that adoration in receiving the sacrament⁴ hath not been idolatrously intended to the sacrament in the church of Rome, neither by decree nor custom. Not by decree, because albeit Honorius appointed adoration to be used in the elevation and circumgession, yet not in the act of receiving. And albeit the Roman ritual do appoint, that clergymen coming to receive the sacrament do it kneeling, yet this was done in veneration of the altar,⁵ or of that which standeth thereupon, and not for adoration of the host put into their mouths. Not by custom; for he will not

have it said that kneeling in the time of receiving was ever in the church of Rome any rite of or for adoration of the sacrament, because albeit the people kneel in the act of receiving, yet I “deny (saith he) that they ever intended adoration of the species, at that moment of time when they took it in their mouths, but then turned themselves to God,” &c. *Ans. 1.* As for the decree of Honorius, I have already answered with Chemnitius, that it had reference specially to the receiving. 2. When clergymen are appointed in the Roman ritual to receive the sacrament at the altar kneeling, this was not for veneration of the altar, to which they did reverence at all times when they approached to it, but this was required particularly in their receiving of the sacrament, for adoration of it. Neither is there mention made of the altar as conferring anything to their kneeling in receiving the sacrament; for the sacrament was not used the more reverently because it stood upon the altar, but by the contrary, for the sacrament's sake reverence was done to the altar, which was esteemed the seat of the body of Christ. It appeareth, therefore, that the altar is mentioned, not as concerning the kneeling of the clergymen in their communicating, but simply as concerning their communicating, because none but they were wont to communicate at the altar, according to that received canon, *Solis autem ministris altaris licet ingredi ad altare et ibidem communicare.*⁶ The one of the Doctor's own conjectures is, that they kneeled for reverence of that which stood upon the altar; but I would know what that was which, standing upon the altar, made them to kneel in the participation, if it was not the host itself? Now, whereas he denies, as touching custom, that people did ever intend the adoration of the species, I answer: 1. How knows he what people in the Roman church did intend in their minds? 2. What warrant hath he for this, that they did not in the participation adore the host, which was then put into their mouth? 3. Though this which he saith were true, he gaineth nothing by it; for put the case, they did not intend the adoration of the species, dare he say, that they intended not the adoration of that which was under the species? I trow not. Now, that which

¹ Annot. on Matt. viii., sect. 3; and on 1 Cor. xi., sect. 18.

² Way to the Church, Answer to sect. 51.

³ Exam. Conc. Trit. de Euchar., can. 6, p. 86.

⁴ Of the Lawfulness of Kneeling, cap. 21, p. 65.

⁵ Ibid., p. 69.

⁶ Concil. Laodicæ., can. 19. See also Conc. Tolet. 4, can. 17.

was under the species, though in their conceit it was Christ's body, yet it was indeed bread; so that, in the very participation, they were worshipping the bread. But, 4. What needeth any more? He maketh himself a liar, and saith plainly,¹ that after transubstantiation was embraced, and when all the substance of the visible creaturo was held to be gone, they did intend the adoration of the invisible things, as if there had been now no substance of any creature left therein, whereby he destroyeth all which he hath said of their not intending the adoration of the species.

Sect. 20. Last of all, for the other part of my assumption, that the ceremonies have no necessary use in God's worship, I need no other proof than the common by-word of Formalists, which saith they are things indifferent. Yet the Bishop of Edinburgh² and Paybody³ have turned their tongues bravely, and chosen rather to say anything against us than nothing. They spare not to answer, that kneeling hath a necessary use. They are most certainly speaking of kneeling in the act of receiving the communion; for they and their opposites, in those places, are disputing of no other kneeling but this only. Now we may easily perceive they are in an evil taking, when they are driven to such an unadvised and desperate answer. For, 1. If kneeling in the act of receiving the Lord's supper be necessary, why have themselves too written so much for the indifference of it? O desultorious levity that knows not where to hold itself! 2. If it be necessary, what makes it to be so? What law? What example? What reason? 3. If it be necessary, not only many reformed churches, and many ancient too, but Christ himself and his apostles have, in this sacrament, omitted something that was necessary. 4. If it be necessary, why do many of their own disciples take the communion sitting, in places where sitting is used? What need I to say more? In the first part of this dispute I have proved that the ceremonies are not necessary, in respect of the church's ordinance; howbeit if it were answered in this place, that they are in this respect necessary, it helpeth not, since the argument proceedeth against all things notoriously abused to idolatry, which neither God nor nature hath made necessary. And for any

¹ Ubi Supra, p. 61.

² Ubi Supra, p. 118.

³ Ubi Supra.

necessity of the ceremonies in themselves, either our opposites must repudiate what hath unadvisedly fallen from their pens hereanent, or else forsake their beaten ground of indifference, and say plainly, that the ceremonies are urged by them, to be observed with an opinion of necessity, as worship of God, and as things in themselves necessary. Look to yourselves, O Formalists, for you stand here upon such slippery places, that you cannot hold both your feet!

CHAPTER III.

THAT THE CEREMONIES ARE UNLAWFUL, BECAUSE THEY SORT US WITH IDOLATERS, BEING THE BADGES OF PRESENT IDOLATRY AMONG THE PAPISTS.

Sect. 1. It followeth according to the order which I have proposed, to show next, that the ceremonies are idolatrous, *participative*. By communicating with idolaters in their rites and ceremonies, we ourselves become guilty of idolatry; even as Abaz, 2 Kings xvi. 10, was an idolater, *eo ipso*, that he took the pattern of an altar from idolaters. Forasmuch, then, as kneeling before the consecrated bread, the sign of the cross, surplice, festival days, bishopping, bowing down to the altar, administration of the sacraments in private places, &c., are the wares of Rome, the baggage of Babylon, the trinkets of the whore, the badges of Popery, the ensigns of Christ's enemies, and the very trophies of antichrist, — we cannot conform, communicate and symbolise with the idolatrous Papists in the use of the same, without making ourselves idolaters by participation. Shall the chaste spouse of Christ take upon her the ornaments of the whore? Shall the Israel of God symbolise with her who is spiritually called Sodom and Egypt? Shall the Lord's redeemed people wear the ensigns of their captivity? Shall the saints be seen with the mark of the beast? Shall the Christian church be like the antichristian, the holy like the profane, religion like superstition, the temple of God like the synagogue of Satan? Our opposites are so far from being moved with these things, that both in pulpits and private places they used to plead for the ceremonies by this very argument, that we should not run so far away from Papists, but come as

near them as we can. But for proof of that which we say, namely, that it is not lawful to symbolise with idolaters (and by consequence with Papists), or to be like them in their rites or ceremonies, we have more to allege than they can answer.

Sect. 2. For, 1st, We have Scripture for us. "After the doings of the land of Egypt, wherein ye dwelt, shall ye not do: and after the doings of the land of Canaan, whither I bring ye, shall ye not do, neither shall ye walk in their ordinances," Lev. xviii. 3. "Take heed to thyself that thou be not snared by following them, &c., saying, How did these nations serve their gods? even so will I do likewise. Thou shalt not do so unto the Lord thy God," Dent. xii. 30. "Thou shalt not do after their works," Exod. xxiii. 24. Yea, they were straitly forbidden to round the corners of their heads, or to make any cuttings in the flesh for the dead, or to print any mark upon them, or to make baldness upon their heads, or between their eyes, forasmuch as God hath chosen them to be a holy and a peculiar people, and it behoved them not to be framed nor fashioned like the nations, Lev. xix. 27, 28, and xxi. 5; and Dent. xiv. 1. And what else was meant by those laws which forbade them to suffer their cattle to gender with a diverse kind, to sow their field with diverse seed, to wear a garment of diverse sorts, as of woollen and linen, to plough with an ox and an ass together? Levit. xix. 19; Dent. xxii. 6—11. This was the hold that people in simplicity and purity, *ne hinc inde accersat ritus alienos*, saith Calvin, upon these places. Besides, find we not that they were sharply reprov'd when they made themselves like other nations? "Ye have made you priests after the manner of the nations of other lands," 2 Chron. xiii. 9. "They followed vanity, and became vain, and went after the heathen that were round about them, concerning whom the Lord had charged them, that they should not do like them," 2 Kings xvii. 15. The gospel commendeth the same to us which the law did to them: "Be not ye unequally yoked with unbelievers; for what fellowship hath righteousness with unrighteousness? and what communion hath light with darkness? and what concord hath Christ with Belial? and what agreement hath the temple of God with idols," &c. "Wherefore, come out from among them, and be ye separate, saith the Lord, and

touch not the unclean thing," 2 Cor. vi. 14—17. "If any man worship the beast, and his image, and receive his mark in his forehead, or in his hand, the same shall drink of the wine of the wrath of God," Rev. xiv. 9. And the apostle Jude, ver. 12, will have us to hate the very garment spotted with the flesh, importing, that as under the law men were made unclean not only by leprosy, but by the garments, vessels and houses of leprous men; so do we contract the contagion of idolatry, by communicating with the unclean things of idolaters.

Sect. 3. Before we go further, we will see what our opposites have said to those Scriptures which we allege. Hooker saith, that the reason why God forbade his people Israel the use of such rites and customs as were among the Egyptians and the Canaanites, was not because it behoved his people to be framed of set purpose to an utter dissimilitude with those nations, but his meaning was to bar Israel from similitude with those nations in such things as were repugnant to his ordinances and laws. *Ans.* 1. Let it be so: he hath said enough against himself. For we have the same reason to make us abstain from all the rites and customs of idolaters, that we may be barred from similitude with them in such things as are flatly repugnant to God's word, because dissimilitude in ceremonies is a bar to stop similitude in substance; and, on the contrary, similitude in ceremonies openeth a way to similitude in greater substance. 2. His answer is but a begging of that which is in question, forasmuch as we allege those laws and prohibitions to prove that all the rites and customs of those nations were repugnant to the ordinances and laws of God, and that Israel was simply forbidden to use them. 3. Yet this was not a framing of Israel of set purpose to an utter dissimilitude with those nations, for Israel used food and raiment, sowing and reaping, sitting, standing, lying, walking, talking, trading, laws, government, &c., notwithstanding that the Egyptians and Canaanites used so. They were only forbidden to be like those nations in such unnecessary rites and customs as had neither institution from God nor nature, but were the inventions and devices of men only. In things and rites of this kind alone it is that we plead for dissimilitude with the ido-

¹ Eccl. Pol. lib. 4, sect. 6.

lators Papists; for the ceremonies in controversy are not only proved to be under the compass of such, but are, besides, made by the Papists badges and marks of their religion, as we shall see afterwards.

Sect. 4. To that place, 2 Cor. vi., Paybody answereth,¹ that nothing else is there meant, than that we must beware and separate ourselves from the communion of their sins and idolatries. *Ans. 1.* When the Apostle there forbiddeth the Corinthians to be unequally yoked with unbelievers, or to have any communion or fellowship with idolaters, and requireth them so to come out from among them, that they touch none of their unclean things, why may we not understand his meaning to be, that not only they should not partake with pagans in their idolatries, but that they should not marry with them, nor frequent their feasts, nor go to the theatre to behold their plays, nor go to law before their judges, nor use any of their rites? For with such idolaters we ought not to have any fellowship, as Zanchius resolves,² but only in so far as necessity compelleth, and charity requireth. *2.* All the rites and customs of idolaters, which have neither institution from God nor nature, are to be reckoned among those sins wherein we may not partake with them, for they are the unprofitable works of darkness, all which Calvin judgeth to be in that place generally forbidden,³ before the Apostle descend particularly to forbid partaking with them in their idolatry. As for the prohibition of diverse mixtures, Paybody saith,⁴ the Jews were taught thereby to make no mixture of true and false worship. *Ans. 1.* According to his tenets, it followeth upon this answer, that no mixture is to be made betwixt holy and idolatrous ceremonies, for he calleth kneeling a bodily worship, and a worship gesture, more than once or twice. And we have seen before, how Dr Burges calleth the ceremonies worship of God. *2.* If mixture of true and false worship be not lawful, then forasmuch as the ceremonies of God's ordinance, namely, the sacraments of the New Testament are true worship; and the ceremonies of Popery, namely, cross, kneeling, holidays, &c., are false worship; therefore, there ought to be no mixture of them to-

¹ Apol., part 3, cap. 4, sect. 5.

² In Præc. 2, p. 543.

³ Com. in illum locum.

⁴ Ubi Supra.

gether. *3.* If the Jews were taught to make no mixture of true and false worship, then by the self-same instruction, if there had been no more, they were taught also to shun all such occasions as might any ways produce such a mixture, and by consequence all symbolising with idolaters in their rites and ceremonies.

Sect. 5. As touching those laws which forbade the Israelites to make round the corners of their heads, or to mar the corners of their beards, or to make any cuttings in their flesh, or to make any baldness between their eyes, Hooker answereth,¹ that the cutting round of the corners of the head, and the tearing off the tufts of the beard, howbeit they were in themselves indifferent, yet they are not indifferent being used as signs of immoderate and hopeless lamentation for the dead; in which sense it is, that the law forbiddeth them. To the same purpose saith Paybody,² that the Lord did not forbid his people to mar and abuse their heads and beards for the dead, because the heathen did so, but because the practice doth not agree to the faith and hope of a Christian, if the heathen had never used it. *Ans. 1.* How much surer and sounder is Calvin's judgment,³ non aliud fuisse Dei consilium, quam ut interposito obstaculo populum suum a prophanis Gentibus dirimeret? For albeit the cutting the hair be a thing in itself indifferent, yet because the Gentiles did use it superstitiously, therefore, saith Calvin, albeit it was per se medium, Deus tamen noluit populo suo liberum esse, ut tanquam pueri discerent ex parvis rudimentis, se non aliter Deo fore gratos, nisi exteris et præputiatis essent prorsus dissimiles, ac longissime abessent ab eorum exemplis, præsertim vero ritus omnes fugerent, quibus testata fuerit religio. So that from this law it doth most manifestly appear, that we may not be like idolaters, no not in things which are in themselves indifferent, when we know they do use them superstitiously. *2.* What warrant is there for this gloss, that the law forbiddeth the cutting round of the corners of the head, and the matting of the corners of the beard, to be used as signs of immoderate and hopeless lamentation for the dead, and that in no other sense they are forbidden? Albeit the cutting of the flesh may be expounded to

¹ Eccl. Pol., lib. 4, sect. 6.

² Ubi Supra.

³ Com. in Lev. xix. 27, 28.

proceed from immoderate grief, and to be a sign of hopeless lamentation; yet this cannot be said of rounding the hair, marring the beard, and making of baldness, which might have been used in moderate and hopeful lamentation, as well as our putting on of mourning apparel for the dead. The law saith nothing of the immoderate use of these things, but simply forbiddeth to round the head, or mar the beard for the dead; and that because this was one of the rites which the idolatrous and superstitious Gentiles did use, concerning whom the Lord commanded his people, that they should not do like them, because he had chosen them to be a holy and peculiar people, above all people upon the earth. So that the thing which was forbidden, if the Gentiles had not used it, should have been otherwise lawful enough to God's people, as we have seen out of Calvin's commentary.

Sect. 6. Secondly, We have reason for that which we say; for by partaking with idolaters in their rites and ceremonies, we are made to partake with them in their religion too. For, *ceremonie omnes sunt quedam protestationes fidei*, saith Aquinas.¹ Therefore *communio rituum est quasi symbolum communionis in religione*, saith Balduino.² They who did eat of the Jewish sacrifices were partakers of the altar, 1 Cor. x. 18, that is, saith Pareus,³ socios Judaice religionis et cultus se profitebantur. For the Jews by their sacrifices *mutuam in una eademque religione copulationem sanciant*, saith Beza.⁴ Whereupon Dr Fulk noteth,⁵ that the Apostle in that place doth compare our sacraments with the altars, hosts, sacrifices or immolations of the Jews and Gentiles, "in that point which is common to all ceremonies, to declare them that use them to be partakers of that religion whereof they be ceremonies." If then Isidore thought it unlawful for Christians to take pleasure in the fables of heathen poets,⁶ because *non solum thura offerendo demonibus immolatur, sed etiam eorum dicta libentius capiendo*; much more have we reason to think that, by taking part in the ceremonies of idolaters, we do but offer to devils, and join ourselves to the service of idols.

¹ Aquin., 2, 2æ, quest. 103, art. 4.

² De Cas. Cens., lib. 2, cap. 14, cas. 7.

³ Com. in illum locum.

⁴ Annot. ibid.

⁵ Ag. the Rhem., Annot. on 1 Cor. x., sect. 8.

⁶ Apud Gratian. Decr., p. 1, dist. 37, cap. 15.

Sect. 7. Thirdly, As by Scripture and reason, so by antiquity, we strengthen our argument. Of old, Christians did so shun to be like the pagans, that in the days of Tertullian it was thought they might not wear garlands, because thereby they had been made conform to the pagans. Hence Tertullian justifieth the soldier who refused to wear a garland as the pagans did.¹ Dr Mortoune himself allegeth another case out of Tertullian,² which maketh to this purpose, namely, that Christian proselytes did distinguish themselves from Roman pagans, by casting away their gowns and wearing of cloaks. But these things we are not to urge, because we plead not for dissimilitude with the Papists in civil fashions, but in sacred and religious ceremonies. For this point then at which we hold us, we allege that which is marked in the third century out of Origen,³ namely, that it was held unlawful for Christians to observe the feasts and solemnities, either of the Jews or of the Gentiles. Now we find a whole council determining thus,⁴ *Non oportet a Judæis vel hæreticis, feriatice quæ mittuntur accipere, nec cum eis dies agere feriatos*. The council of Nice also condemned those who kept Easter upon the fourteenth day of the month. That which made them pronounce so (as is clear from Constantine's epistle to the churches⁵) was, because they held it unbecoming for Christians to have anything common with the Jews in their rites and observances. Augustine condemneth fasting upon the Sabbath day as scandalous, because the Manichees used so, and fasting upon that day had been a conformity with them;⁶ and wherefore did Gregory advise Leander to abolish the ceremony of trin-immersion? His words are plain:⁷ *Quia nunc huc usque ab hæreticis infans in baptismo tertio mergebatur, sciendum apud vos esse non censeo*. Why doth Epiphanius,⁸ in the end of his books contra hæreses, rehearse all the ceremonies of the church, as marks whereby the church is discerned from all other sects? If the church did symbolise in ceremonies with other sects, he could not have done so. And, moreover, find we not in the canons of

¹ De Corona Militis.

² Partic. Def., cap. 1, sect. 1.

³ Magd., cent. 3, cap. 6, col. 147.

⁴ Concil. Laodiceen., can. 37.

⁵ Apud Theod., lib. 1, cap. 10.

⁶ Epist. 86, ad Casulan.

⁷ Lib. 1, epist. 41.

⁸ Apud Bell. de Effect. Sacr., lib. 2, cap. 31.

the ancient councils,¹ that Christians were forbidden to deck their houses with green boughs and bay leaves, to observe the calends of January, to keep the first day of every month, &c., because the pagans used to do so? Last of all, read we not in the fourth century of the ecclesiastical history,² that the frame of Christians in that age was such, that *nec cum hæreticis commune quicquam habere voluerunt*?

Sect. 8. One would think that nothing could be answered to any of these things, by such as pretend no less than that they have devoted themselves to bend all their wishes and labours for procuring the imitation of venerable antiquity. Yet Hooker can coin a conjecture to frustrate all which we allege.³ "In things (saith he) of their own nature indifferent, if either councils or particular men have at any time with sound judgment misliked conformity between the church of God and infidels, the cause thereof hath not been affliction of dissimilitude, but some special accident which the church, not being always subject unto, hath not still cause to do the like. For example (saith he), in the dangerous days of trial, wherein there was no way for the truth of Jesus Christ to triumph over infidelity but through the constancy of his saints, whom yet a natural desire to save themselves from the flame might, peradventure, cause to join with the pagans in external customs, too far using the same as a cloak to conceal themselves in, and a mist to darken the eyes of infidels withal; for remedy hereof, it might be, those laws were provided." *Ans. 1.* This answer is altogether doubtful and conjectural, made up of *if*, and *peradventure*, and *it might be*. Neither is anything found which can make such a conjecture probable. *2.* The true reason why Christians were forbidden to use the rites and customs of pagans, was neither a bare affliction of dissimilitude, nor yet any special accident which the church is not always subject unto, but because it was held unlawful to symbolise with idolaters in the use of such rites as they placed any religion in. For in the fathers and councils which we have cited to this purpose, there is no other reason mentioned why it behoved Christians to abstain from those forbidden

customs, but only because the pagans and infidels used so. *3.* And what if Hooker's divination shall have place? Doth it not agree to us, so as it should make us mislike the Papists? Yes, sure, and more properly. For put the case, that those ancient Christians had not avoided conformity with pagans in those rites and customs which we read to have been forbidden them, yet for all that, there had been remaining betwixt them and the pagans a great deal more difference than will remain betwixt us and the Papists, if we avoid not conformity with them in the controverted ceremonies; for the pagans had not the word, sacraments, &c., which the Papists do retain, so that we may far more easily use the ceremonies as a mist to darken the eyes of the Papists, than they could have used those forbidden rites as a mist to darken the eyes of pagans. Much more, then, Protestants should not be permitted to conform themselves unto Papists in rites and ceremonies, lest, in the dangerous days of trial (which some reformed churches in Europe do presently feel, and which seem to be faster approaching to ourselves than the most part are aware of), they join themselves to Papists in these external things, too far using the same as a cloak to conceal themselves in, &c. *4.* We find that the reason why the fourth council of Toledo forbade the ceremony of thrice dipping in water to be used in baptism, was,¹ lest Christians should seem to assent to heretics who divide the Trinity. And the reason why the same council forbade the clergymen to conform themselves unto the custom of heretics,² in the shaving off the hair of their head, is mentioned to have been the removing of conformity with the custom of heretics from the churches of Spain, as being a great dishonour unto the same. And we have heard before, that Augustine condemneth conformity with the Manichees, in fasting upon the Lord's day, as scandalous. And whereas afterwards the council of Caesar-Augusta forbade fasting upon the Lord's day, a grave writer layeth out the reason of this prohibition thus:³ "It would appear that this council had a desire to abolish the rites and customs of the Manichean heretics, who were accustomed to fast upon the Lord's day." Lastly, we have seen from Constantine's epistle to the churches, that dissimili-

¹ Conc. African., can. 27; Conc. Tolet. 4, can. 5, et 10; Conc. Brac. 2, can. 73.

² Magd., cent. 4, cap. 6, col. 458.

³ Eccl. Pol., lib. 4, sect. 7.

¹ Can. 5.

² Can. 40.

³ Sims. Hist. of the Church, lib. 4, cent. 6.

tude with the Jews was one (though not the only one) reason why it was not thought becoming to keep Easter upon the fourteenth day of the month. Who then can think that any special accident, as Hooker imagineth, was the reason why the rites and customs of pagans were forbidden to Christians? Were not the customs of the pagans to be held unbecoming for Christians, as well as the customs of the Jews? Nay, if conformity with heretics (whom Hooker acknowledgeth to be a part of the visible church¹), in their customs and ceremonies, was condemned as a scandal, a dishonour to the church, and an assenting unto their heresies, might he not have much more thought that conformity with the customs of pagans was forbidden as a greater scandal and dishonour to the church, and as an assenting to the paganism and idolatry of those that were without?

Sect. 9. But to proceed. In the fourth place, the canon law itself speaketh for the argument which we have in hand: *Non licet iniquas observationes agere calendarum, et otios vacare Gentilibus, neque lauro, aut viriditate arborum, cinjere domos: omnis enim hæc observatio paganismi est.*² And again: *Anathema sit qui ritum paganorum et calendarum observat.*³ And after: *Dies Ægyptiaci et Januarii calendarum non sunt observandæ.*⁴

Fifthly, Our assertion will find place in the school too, which holdeth that Jews are forbidden to wear a garment of diverse sorts,⁵ as of linen and woollen together, and that their women were forbidden to wear men's clothes, or their men women's clothes, because the Gentiles used so in the worshipping of their gods. In like manner, that the priests were forbidden to round their heads,⁶ or mar their beards, or make incision in their flesh, because the idolatrous priests did so.⁷ And that the prohibition which forbade the commixion of beasts of diverse kinds among the Jews hath a figurative sense,⁸ in that we are forbidden to make people of one kind of religion, to have any conjunction with those of another kind.

¹ Eccl. Pol., lib. 3, sect. 1.

² Decr., part 2, causa 26, quest. 7, cap. 13.

³ Ibid., cap. 14.

⁴ Ibid., cap. 17.

⁵ Aquin. 1, 2æ, quest. 102, art. 6, resp. ad 6m.

⁶ Ibid., resp. ad 11m.

⁷ Baruch. 6, 3 Reg. xviii.

⁸ Ibid., resp. ad 8m.

Sixthly, Papists themselves teach,¹ that it is generally forbidden to communicate with infidels and heretics, but especially in any act of religion. Yea, they think,² that Christian men are bound to abhor the very phrases and words of heretics, which they use. Yea, they condemn the very heathenish names of the days of the week imposed after the names of the planets,³ Sunday, Monday, &c. They hold it altogether a great and damnable sin to deal with heretics in matter of religion,⁴ or any way to communicate with them in spiritual things. Bellarmine is plain,⁵ who will have catholics to be discerned from heretics, and other sects of all sorts, even by ceremonies, because as heretics have hated the ceremonies of the church, so the church hath ever abstained from the observances of heretics.

Sect. 10. Seventhly, Our own writers do sufficiently confirm us in this argument. The bringing of heathenish or Jewish rites into the church is altogether condemned by them,⁶ yea, though the customs and rites of the heathen⁷ be received into the church for gaining them, and drawing them to the true religion, yet is it condemned as proceeding *ex kaxoxia sen prava Ethnicorum imitatione*. J. Rainold⁸ rejecteth the popish ceremonies, partly because they are Jewish, and partly because they are heathenish. The same argument Beza⁹ useth against them. In the second command, as Zanchius¹⁰ expoundeth it, we are forbidden to borrow anything, *ex ritibus idololatrarum Gentium*. *Fidelibus* (saith Calvin¹¹) *fas non est ullo symbolo ostendere, sibi cum superstitionis esse consensum*. To conclude, then, since not only idolatry is forbidden, but also, as Pareus noteth,¹² every sort of communicating with the occasion, appearances, or instruments of the same; and since, as our divines have declared,¹³ the Papists are in many respects gross idolaters, let us choose to have the commendation which was given to the ancient Britons for being

¹ Rhem. Annot. on 2 Cor. vi. 14.

² Rhem. on 1 Tim. vi., sect. 4.

³ Rhem. on Apoc. i. 10.

⁴ Rhem. on 2 John x.

⁵ De Effect. Sax., lib. 2, cap. 31.

⁶ Magd. Cent. 4, cap. 6, col. 406.

⁷ Hosp. de Orig. Templ., lib. 2, cap. 7, p. 115.

⁸ Confer. with J. Hart, divis. 4, cap. 8.

⁹ Antith. Pap. et Christ., art. 9.

¹⁰ In 2 Præc., col. 363.

¹¹ Com. in Psal. xvi. 4.

¹² Com. in 1 Cor. x. 14.

¹³ Synops. Purior. Theol., diap. 19.

enemies to the Roman customs,¹ rather than, as Pope Pius V. was forced to say of Rome,² that it did more *Gentilizare, quam Christianizare*; so they who would gladly wish they could give a better commendation to our church, be forced to say, that it doth not only more *Anglizare, quam Scotizare*, but also more *Romanizare, quam Evangelizare*.

Sect. 11. But our argument is made by a great deal more strong, if yet further we consider, that by the controverted ceremonies, we are not only made like the idolatrous Papists, in such rites of man's devising as they place some religion in, but we are made likewise to take upon us those signs and symbols which Papists account to be special badges of Popery, and which also, in the account of many of our own reverend divines, are to be so thought of. In the oath ordained by Pius IV., to be taken of bishops at their creation (as Onuphrius writeth³), they are appointed to swear, *Apostolicas et ecclesiasticas traditiones, reliquasque ejusdem ecclesie observationes et constitutiones firmissime admitto et amplector*; and after, *Receptos quoque ac approbatos ecclesie Catholice ritus, in supra dictorum sacramentorum solemnii administratione, recipio, et admitto*. We see bishops are not created by this ordinance, except they not only believe with the church of Rome, but also receive her ceremonies, by which, as by the badges of her faith and religion, cognizance may be had that they are indeed her children. And farther, Papists give it forth plainly,⁴ that as the church hath ever abstained from the observances of heretics, so now also catholics (they mean Romanists) are very well distinguished from heretics (they mean those of the reformed religion) by the sign of the cross, abstinence from flesh on Friday, &c. And how do our divines understand the mark of the beast, spoken of Rev. xiii. 16, 17? Junius⁵ comprehendeth confirmation under this mark. Cartwright⁶ also referreth the sign of the cross to the mark of the beast. Pareus⁷ approveth the Bishop of Salisbury's exposition, and placeth the com-

mon mark of the beast the observation of antichrist's festival days, and the rest of his ceremonies, which are not commanded by God. It seems this much has been plain to Joseph Hall, so that he could not deny it; for whereas the Brownists allege, that not only after their separation, but before they separated also, they were, and are verily persuaded that the ceremonies are but the badges and liveries of that man of sin whereof the Pope is the head and the prelates the shoulders,—he, in this *Apology*¹ against them, saith nothing to this point.

Sect. 12. As for any other of our opposites, who have made such answers as they could to the argument in hand, I hope the strength and force of the same hath been demonstrated to be such that their poor shifts are too weak for gain-standing it. Some of them (as I touched before) are not ashamed to profess that we should come as near to the Papists as we can, and therefore should conform ourselves to them in their ceremonies (only purging away the superstition), because if we do otherwise, we exasperate the Papists, and alienate them the more from our religion and reformation. Ans. 1. Bastwick,² propounding the same objection, *Si quis objiciat nos ipsos pertinaci ceremoniarum papalium contemptu, Papistis offendiculum posuisse, quo minus se nostris ecclesiis associant*, he answereth out of the Apostle, Rom. xv. 2, that we are to please every one his neighbour only in good things to edification, and that we may not wink at absurd or wicked things, nor at anything in God's worship which is not found in Scripture. 2. I have showed³ that Papists are but more and more hardened in evil by this our conformity with them in ceremonies. 3. I have showed also,⁴ the superstition of the ceremonies, even as they are retained by us, and that it is as impossible to purge the ceremonies from superstition, as to purge superstition from itself.

There are others, who go about to sew a cloak of fig leaves, to hide their conformity with Papists, and to find out some difference betwixt the English ceremonies and those of the Papists; so say some, that by the sign of the cross they are not ranked with Papists, because they use not the ma-

¹ Sect. 48.

² Elench. Relig. Papist. in Præfat.

³ Part 2, cap. 6.

⁴ Supra, cap. 1.

terial cross, which is the popish one, but the aerial only. But it is known well enough that Papists do idolatrise the very aerial cross; for Bellarmine holds,¹ *venerabile esse signum crucis, quod effingitur in fronte, aere, &c.* And though they did not make an idol of it, yet forasmuch as Papists put it to a religious use, and make it one of the marks of Roman Catholics (as we have seen before), we may not be conformed to them in the use of the same. The fathers of such a difference between the popish cross and the English have not succeeded in this their way, yet their posterity approve their sayings, and follow their footsteps. Bishop Lindsey² by name will trade in the same way, and will have us to think that kneeling in the act of receiving the communion, and keeping of holidays, do not sort us with Papists; for that, as touching the former, there is a disproportion in the object, because they kneel to the sign, we to the thing signified. And as for the latter, the difference is in the employing of the time, and in the exercise and worship for which the cessation is commanded. What is his verdict, then, wherewith he sends us away? Verily, that people should be taught that the disproportion between the Papists and us is not so much in any external use of ceremonies, as in the substance of the service and object whereunto they are applied. But, good man, he seeks a knot in the bulrush; for, 1. There is no such difference betwixt our ceremonies and those of the Papists, in respect of the object and worship whereunto the same is applied, as he pretendeth; for, as touching the exercise and worship whereunto holidays are applied, Papists tell us,³ that they keep Pasche and Pentecost yearly for memory of Christ's resurrection, and the sending down of the Holy Ghost; and, I pray, to what other employment do Formalists profess that they apply these feasts, but to the commemoration of the same benefits? And as touching kneeling in the sacrament, it shall be proved in the next chapter, that they do kneel to the sign, even as the Papists do. In the meanwhile, it may be questioned whether the Bishop meant some such matter, even here where professedly he maketh a difference betwixt the Papists' kneeling and ours. His words, wherein I apprehend this much, are these:

"The Papists in prayer kneel to an idol, and in the sacrament they kneel to the sign: we kneel in our prayer to God, and by the sacrament to the thing signified." The analogy of the antithesis required him to say, that we kneel "in the sacrament" to the thing signified; but changing his phrase, he saith, that we kneel "by the sacrament" to the thing signified. Now, if we kneel "by the sacrament to Christ," then we adore the sacrament as *objectum materiale*, and Christ as *objectum formale*. Just so the Papists adore their images; because *per imaginem*, they adore *prototypum*. 2. What if we should yield to the Bishop that kneeling and holidays are with us applied to another service, and used with another meaning than they are with the Papists? Doth that excuse our conformity with Papists in the external use of these ceremonies? If so, J. Hart¹ did rightly argument out of Pope Innocentius, that the church doth not Judaize by the sacrament of unction or anointing, because it doth figure and work another thing in the New Testament than it did in the Old. Rainold answereth,² that though it were so, yet is the ceremony Jewish; and mark his reason (which carrieth a fit proportion to our present purpose), "I trust (saith he) you will not maintain but it were Judaism for your church to sacrifice a lamb in burnt-offering, though you did it to signify, not Christ that was to come, as the Jews did, but that Christ is come," &c. "St. Peter did constrain the Gentiles to Judaize, when they were induced by his example and authority to follow the Jewish rite in choice of meats; yet neither he nor they allowed it in that meaning which it was given to the Jews in; for it was given them to betoken that holiness, and train them up into it, which Christ by his grace should bring to the faithful. And Peter knew that Christ had done this in truth, and taken away that figure, yea the whole yoke of the law of Moses; which point he taught the Gentiles also. Wherefore, although your church do keep the Jewish rites with another meaning than God ordained them for the Jews, &c., yet this of Peter sheweth that the thing is Jewish, and you to Judaize who keep them." By the very same reasons prove we that Formalists do Romanise by keeping the popish

¹ De Imag. Sanct., cap. 29.

² Proc. in Perth Assemb., part 2, p. 22.

³ Rhem. Annot. on Act. ii. 1.

¹ Rain. Confer. with J. Hart, cap. 8, divis. 4, p. 496.

¹ Usher, of the Relig. Prof. by the Anc. Irish, cap. 4.

² Apud Hosp. de Orig. Imag., p. 200.

³ De Vit. Pil. 4.

⁴ Bel. de Effect. Sacr., lib. 2, cap. 31.

⁵ Annot. in illum locum.

⁶ Annot. ibid.

⁷ Com. ibid.

ceremonies, though with another meaning, and to another use, than the Romanists do. The very external use, therefore, of any sacred ceremony of human institution, is not to be suffered in the matter of worship, when in respect of this external use we are sorted with idolaters. 3. If conformity with idolaters in the external use of their ceremonies be lawful, if so be there be a difference in the substance of the worship and object whereunto they are applied, then why were Christians forbidden of old (as we have heard before) to keep the calends of January, and the first day of every month, forasmuch as the pagans used so? Why was trin-immersion in baptism, and fasting upon the Lord's day forbidden, for that the heretics did so? Why did the Nicene fathers inhibit the keeping of Easter upon the fourteenth day of the month,¹ so much the rather because the Jews kept it on that day? The Bishop must say there was no need of shunning conformity with pagans, Jews, heretics, in the external use of their rites and customs, and that a difference ought to have been made only in the object and use whereunto the same was applied. Nay, why did God forbid Israel to cut their hair as the Gentiles did? Had it not been enough not to apply this rite to a superstitious use, as Aquinas sheweth² the Gentiles did? Why was the very external use of it forbidden?

Sect. 14. There is yet another piece brought against us, but we will abide the proof of it, as of the rest. Nobis saith,³ *Saravia, satis est, modestis et piis Christianis satisfacere, qui ita recesserunt a superstitionibus et idololatrie Romanae ecclesiae, ut probatos ab orthodoxis patribus mores, non rejiciant.* So have some thought to escape by this postern, that they use the ceremonies, not for conformity with Papists, but for conformity with the ancient fathers. Ans. 1. When Rainold speaketh of the abolishing of popish ceremonies,⁴ he answereth this subtlety: "But if you say, therefore, that we be against the ancient fathers in religion, because we pluck down that which they did set up, take heed lest your speech do touch the Holy Ghost, who saith that Hezekiah (in breaking down the brazen serpent) did keep God's commandments which he com-

¹ Zanch., lib. 1, in 4 Præc., col. 674.

² Aquin., 1, 2æ, quest. 102, art. 6, resp. ad 11m.

³ N. Fratri et Amico, resp. ad art. 12m.

⁴ Ubi Supra, p. 510.

manded Moses," 2 Kings xviii. 6; and yet withal saith, "That he brake in pieces the serpent of brass which Moses had made," 2 Kings xviii. 4. 2. There are some of the ceremonies which the fathers used not, as the surplice (which we have seen before¹) and kneeling in the act of receiving the eucharist (as we shall see afterwards²). 3. Yielding by concession, not by confession, that all the ceremonies about which there is controversy now among us, were of old used by the fathers; yet that which these Formalists say, is (as Parker sheweth³) even as if a servant should be covered before his master, not as covering is a late sign of pre-eminence, but as it was of old, a sign of subjection; or as if one should preach that the prelates are *tyranni* to their brethren, *fures* to the church, *sophistæ* to the truth, and excuse himself thus: I use these words, as of old they signified a ruler, a servant, a student of wisdom. All men know that words and actions must be interpreted, used and received, according to their modern use, and not as they have been of old.

CHAPTER IV.

THAT THE CEREMONIES ARE IDOLS AMONG THE FORMALISTS THEMSELVES; AND THAT KNEELING IN THE LORD'S SUPPER BEFORE THE BREAD AND WINE, IN THE ACT OF RECEIVING THEM, IS FORMALLY IDOLATRY.

Sect. 1. My fourth argument against the lawfulness of the ceremonies followeth, by which I am to evince that they are not only idolatrous *reductivè*, because monuments of by-past, and *participativè*, because badges of present idolatry, but that likewise they make Formalists themselves to be formally, and in respect of their own using of them, idolaters, consideration not had of the by-past or present abusing of them by others. This I will make good: first, of all the ceremonies in general; then, of kneeling in particular. And I wish our opposites here look to themselves, for this argument proveth to them the box of Pandora, and containeth that which undoeth them, though this much be not seen before the opening.

¹ Supra, part 2, cap. 9, sect. 14.

² Infra, cap. 4, sect. 26-28.

³ Of the Cross, cap. 2, sect. 2.

First, then, the ceremonies are idols to Formalists. It had been good to have remembered that which Ainsworth noteth,¹ that idololithes and monuments of idolatry should be destroyed, lest themselves at length become idols. The idolothious ceremonies, we see now, are become idols to those who have retained them. The ground which the Bishop of Winchester taketh for his sermon *of the worshipping of imaginations*,—to wit, that the devil, seeing that idolatrous images would be put down, bent his whole device, in place of them, to erect and set up divers imaginations, to be adored and magnified instead of the former,—is, in some things, abused and misapplied by him. But well may I apply it to the point in hand; for that the ceremonies are the imaginations which are magnified, adored, and idolised, instead of the idolatrous images which were put down, thus we instruct and qualify:

Sect. 2. First, They are so erected and extolled, that they are more looked to than the weighty matters of the law of God: all good discipline must be neglected before they be not holden up. A covetous man is an idolater, for this respect among others, as Davenant noteth,² because he neglects the service which he oweth to God, and is wholly taken up with the gathering of money. And I suppose every one will think that those traditions, Mark vii. 8, 9, which the Pharisees kept and held, with the laying aside of the commandments of God, might well be called idols. Shall we not then call the ceremonies idols, which are observed with the neglecting of God's commandments, and which are advanced above many substantial points of religion? Idolatry, blasphemy, profanation of the Sabbath, perjury, adultery, &c., are overlooked, and not corrected nor reformed, nay, not so much as discountenanced in those who favour and follow the ceremonies; and if in the fellows and favourites, much more in the fathers. What if order be taken with some of those abominations in certain abject poor bodies? *Dat veniam corvis, vezat censura columbas.* What will not an episcopal conformist pass away with, if there be no more had against him than the breaking of God's commandments by open and gross wickedness? But O what narrow notice is taken of non-conformity! How mercilessly is it menaced!

¹ Upon Gen. xxiv. 4.
² Expos. in Col. iii. 6.

How cruelly corrected! Well, the ceremonies are more made of than the substance. And this is so evident, that Dr Burges himself lamenteth the pressure of conformity,¹ and denieth not that which is objected to him, namely, that more grievous penalties are inflicted upon the refusal of the ceremonies than upon adultery and drunkenness.

Sect. 3. Secondly, Did not Eli make idols of his sons, 1 Sam. ii. 29, when he spared them and bare with them, though with the prejudice of God's worship? And may not we call the ceremonies idols, which are not only spared and borne with, to the prejudice of God's worship, but are likewise so erected, that the most faithful labourers in God's house, for their sake, are depressed, the teachers and maintainers of God's true worship cast out? For their sake, many learned and godly men are envied, contemned, hated, and nothing set by, because they pass under the name (I should say the nickname) of puritans. For their sake many dear Christians have been imprisoned, fined, banished, &c. For their sake many qualified and well-gifted men are holden out of the ministry, and a door of entrance denied to those to whom God hath granted a door of utterance. For their sake, those whose faithful and painful labours in the Lord's harvest have greatly benefited the church, have been thrust from their charges, so that they could not fulfil the ministry which they have received of the Lord, to testify of the gospel of the grace of God. The best builders, the wise master-builders, have been over-turned by them. This is objected to Joseph Hall by the Brownists; and what can he say to it? Forsooth, "that not so much the ceremonies are stood upon as obedience. If God please to try Adam but with an apple, it is enough. What do we quarrel at the value of the fruit when we have a prohibition? Shemei is slain. What! merely for going out of the city? The act was little, the bond was great. What is commanded matters not so much as *by whom*." Ans. 1. If obedience be the chief thing stood upon, why are not other laws and statutes urged as strictly as those which concern the ceremonies? 2. But what means he? What would he say of those Scottish Protestants imprisoned in the castle of Scherisburgh in France,² who, being commanded by the cap-

¹ Of the Lawfulness of Kneeling, cap. 18, p. 62.
² History of the Church of Scotland, lib. 1, p. 181.
M

tain to come to the mass, answered, "That to do anything that was against their conscience, they would not, neither for him nor yet for the king?" If he approve this answer of theirs, he must allow us to say, that we will do nothing which is against our consciences. We submit ourselves and all which we have to the king, and to inferior governors we render all due subjection which we owe to them; but no mortal man hath domination over our consciences, which are subject to one only Lawgiver, and ruled by his law. I have shown in the first part of this dispute how conscience is sought to be bound by the law of the ceremonies; and here, by the way, no less may be drawn from Hall's words, which now I examine; for he implieth in them that we are bound to obey the statutes about the ceremonies merely for their authority's sake who command us, though there be no other thing in the ceremonies themselves which can commend them to us. But I have also proved before that human laws do not bind to obedience, but only in this case, when the things which they prescribe do agree and serve to those things which God's law prescribeth; so that, as human laws, they bind not, neither have they any force to bind, but only by participation with God's law. This ground hath seemed to P. Bayne¹ so necessary to be known, that he hath inserted it in his brief *Exposition of the Fundamental Points of Religion*. And besides all that which I have said for it before, I may not here pass over in silence this one thing, that Hall himself calleth it superstition to make any more sins than the ten commandments.² Either, then, let it be shown out of God's word that non-conformity, and the refusing of the English popish ceremonies, is a fault, or else let us not be thought bound by men's laws where God's law hath left us free. Yet we deal more liberally with our opposites; for if we prove not the unlawfulness of the ceremonies, both by God's word and sound reason, let us then be bound to use them for ordinance's sake. 3. His comparisons are far wide. They are so far from running upon four feet, that they have indeed no feet at all; whether we consider the commandments, or the breach of them, he is altogether extravagant. God might have commanded Adam to eat the

¹ Part 1, quest 3.

² Charact. of the Superstit., lib. 2.

apple which he forbade him to eat, and so the eating of it had been good, the not eating of it evil; whereas the will and commandment of men is not *regula regulans*, but *regula regulata*. Neither can they make good or evil, beseeming or not beseeming, what they list, but their commandments are to be examined by a higher rule. When Solomon commanded Shemei to dwell at Jerusalem, and not to go over the brook Kidron, he had good reason for that which he required; for as P. Martyr noteth,¹ he was a man of the family of the house of Saul, 2 Sam. xv. 5, and hated the kingdom and throne of David, so that *relictus liber multa fuisset molitus, vel cum Israelitis, vel cum Palestinis*. But what reason is there for charging us with the law of the ceremonies, except the sole will of the law-makers? Yet, say that Solomon had no reason for this his commandment, except his own will and pleasure for trying the obedience of Shemei, who will say that princes have as great liberty and power of commanding at their pleasure in matters of religion as in civil matters? If we consider the breach of the commandments, he is still at random. Though God tried Adam but with an apple, yet divines mark in his eating of that forbidden fruit many gross and horrible sins,² as infidelity, idolatry, pride, ambition, self-love, theft, covetousness, contempt of God, profanation of God's name, ingratitude, impostacy, murdering of his posterity, &c. But, I pray, what exorbitant evils are found in our modest and Christian-like denial of obedience to the law of the ceremonies? When Shemei transgressed king Solomon's commandment, besides the violation of this,³ and the disobeying of the charge wherewith Solomon (by the special direction and inspiration of God) had charged him, that his former wickedness, and that which he hath done to David, might be returned upon his head, the Divine Providence so fitly furnishing another occasion and cause of his punishment. There was also a great contempt and disregard showed to the king, in that Shemei, knowing his own evil-deservings, acknowledged (as the truth was) he had received no small favour, and therefore consented to the king's

¹ Com. in 1 Kings ii.

² A. Polan. Synt. Theol., lib. 6, cap. 3; D. Pareus Explic. Catech., part 1, quest. 71; Scarpus Curs. Theolog. de Peccato, cap. 8.

³ Ibid., ver. 44.

word as good, and promised obedience. Yet for all that, upon such a petty and small occasion as the seeking of two runagate servants, he reckoned not to despise the king's mercy and lenity, and to set at naught his most just commandment. What! Is non-conformity no less piacular? If any will dare to say so, he is bound to show that it is so. And thus have we pulled down the untempered mortar wherewith Hall would hide the idolising of the ceremonies.

Sect. 4. But Thirdly, Did not Rachel make Jacob an idol, when she ascribed to him a power of giving children? "Am I in God's stead?" saith Jacob, Gen. xxx. 1, 3. How much more reason have we to say that the ceremonies are idols, are set up in God's stead, since an operative virtue is placed in them, for giving stay and strength against sin and temptation, and for working of other spiritual and supernatural effects? Thus is the sign of the cross an idol to those who conform to Papists in the use of it. M. Ant. de Dominis holdeth,¹ *Crucis signum contra demones esse presidium*; and that even² *ex opere operato, effectus mirabiles signi crucis, etiam apud infideles, aliquando enturcunt*. "Shall I say (saith Mr Hooker),³ that the sign of the cross (as we use it) is a mean in some sort to work our preservation from reproach? Surely the mind which as yet hath not hardened itself in sin, is seldom provoked thereunto in any gross and grievous manner, but nature's secret suggestion objecteth against it ignominy as a bar, which conceit being entered into that place of man's fancy (the forehead), the gates whereof have imprinted in them that holy sign (the cross), which bringeth forth with to mind whatsoever Christ hath wrought and we vowed against sin; it cometh hereby to pass, that Christian men never want a most effectual, though a silent teacher, to avoid whatsoever may deservedly procure shame." What more do Papists ascribe to the sign of the cross, when they say, that by it Christ keeps his own faithful ones⁴ *contra omnes tentationes et hostes*. Now if the covetous man be called an idolater, Eph. v. 5, because, though he think not his money to be God, yet he trusteth to live and prosper by it (which confidence and hope we should repose in God only, Jer. xvii. 7), as

Rainold marketh,¹ then do they make the sign of the cross an idol who trust by it to be preserved from sin, shame, and reproach, and to have their minds stayed in the instant of temptation. For who hath given such a virtue to that dumb and idle sign as to work that which God only can work? And how have these good fellows imagined, that not by knocking at their brains, as Jupiter, but by only signing their foreheads, they can procreate some menacing Minerva, or armed Pallas, to put to flight the devil himself.

Sect. 5. The same kind of operative virtue is ascribed to the ceremony of confirmation or bishopping; for the English service book teacheth, that by it children receive strength against sin, and against temptation. And Hooker hath told us,² that albeit the successors of the apostles had but only for a time such power as by prayer and imposition of hands to bestow the Holy Ghost, yet confirmation hath continued hitherto for very special benefits; and that the fathers impute everywhere unto it "that gift or grace of the Holy Ghost, not which maketh us first Christian men, but when we are made such, assisteth us in all virtue, armeth us against temptation and sin." Moreover, whilst he is a-showing why this ceremony of confirmation was separated from baptism, having been long joined with it, one of his reasons which he giveth for the separation is, that sometimes the parties who received baptism were infants, at which age they might well be admitted to live in the family, but to fight in the army of God, to bring forth the fruits, and to do the works of the Holy Ghost, their time of liability was not yet come; which implieth, that by the confirmation men receive this liability, else there is no sense in that which he saith. What is idolatry, if this be not, to ascribe to rites of man's devising, the power and virtue of doing that which none but He to whom all power in heaven and earth belongs can do; and howbeit Hooker would strike us dead at once, with the high-sounding name of the fathers, yet it is not unknown, that the first fathers from whom this idolatry hath descended were those ancient heretics, the Montanists. For as Chemnitius marketh out of Tertullian and Cyprian,³ the Montanists were the first who began to ascribe any spi-

¹ Do Rep. Eccl., lib. 7, cap. 12, num. 88.

² Ibid., num. 89.

³ Eccl. Pol., lib. 5, sect. 65.

⁴ Cornel. a Lapide; Com. in Hag. ii. 24.

¹ Confer. with Hart, chap. 8, divis. 5, p. 509.

² Eccl. Pol., lib. 5, sect. 66.

³ Eram., part 2, de Rit. in Admin. Sacr., p. 32.

ritual efficacy or operation to rites and ceremonies devised by men.

Sect. 6. Fourthly, That whereunto more respect and account is given than God alloweth to be given to it, and wherein more excellency is placed than God hath put into it, or will at all communicate to it, is an idol exalted against God; which maketh Zanchius to say,¹ *Si Luthero vel Calvino tribuas, quod non potuerant errare, idola tibi fingis*. Now, when Hooker² accounteth festival days, for God's extraordinary works wrought upon them, to be holier than other days, what man of sound judgment will not perceive that these days are idolised, since such an eminence and excellency is put in them, whereas God hath made no difference betwixt them and any other days? We have seen also that the ceremonies are urged as necessary,³ but did ever God allow that things indifferent should be so highly advanced at the pleasure of men? And, moreover, I have shown⁴ that worship is placed in them; in which respect they must needs be idols, being thus exalted against God's word, at which we are commanded to hold us in the matter of worship. Last of all, they are idolatrously advanced and dignified, in so much as holy mystical significations are given them, which are a great deal more than God's word alloweth in any rites of human institution, as shall be shown⁵ afterwards; and so it appeareth how the ceremonies, as now urged and used, are idola.

Now to kneeling in the act of receiving the Lord's supper, which I will prove to be direct and formal idolatry; and from idolatry shall it never be purged while the world standeth, though our opposites strive for it, *tunquam pro aris et focis*.

Sect. 7. The question about the idolatry of kneeling betwixt them and us standeth in this: Whether kneeling, at the instant of receiving the sacrament, before the consecrated bread and wine,—purposely placed in our sight in the act of kneeling as signs standing in Christ's stead, before which we, the receivers, are to exhibit outwardly religious adoration,—be formally idolatry or not? No man can pick a quarrel at the stating of the question thus; for, 1. We dispute only about kneeling at the instant

of receiving the sacramental elements, as all know. 2. No man denies inward adoration in the act of receiving, for in our minds we then adore by the inward graces of faith, love, thankfulness, &c., by the holy and heavenly exercise whereof we glorify God; so that the controversy is about outward adoration. 3. No man will deny that the consecrated elements are purposely placed in our sight when we kneel, except he say, that they are in that action only accidentally present before us no otherwise than the table-cloth or the walls of the church are. 4. That the sacramental elements are in our sight (when we kneel) as signs standing in Christ's stead, it is most undeniable; for if these signs stand not in Christ's stead to us, the bread bearing *vicem corporis Christi*, and the wine *vicem sanguinis*, it followeth, that when we eat the bread and drink the wine, we are no more eating the flesh and drinking the blood of Christ, spiritually and sacramentally, than if we were receiving any other bread and wine not consecrated. I stay not now upon this head, because our opposites acknowledge it; for Dr Burges¹ calls the sacraments the Lord's images and deputies; and the Archbishop of Spalato saith,² that when we take the sacrament of Christ's body, we adore *Christum sub hac figura figuratum*. 5. That kneelers, at the instant of receiving, have the consecrated bread and wine in the eyes both of their bodies and minds, as things so stated in that action, that before them they are to exhibit outward religious adoration as well as inward, it is also most plain; for otherwise they should fall down and kneel only out of incogitancy, having no such purpose in their minds, or choice in their wills, as to kneel before these sacramental signs.

Sect. 8. The question thus stated, Formalists deny, we affirm. Their negative is destroyed, and our affirmative confirmed by these reasons:—

First, The kneelers worship Christ in or by the elements, as their own confessions declare. "When we take the encharist, we adore the body of Christ, *per suum signum*," saith the Archbishop of Spalato.³ "We kneel by the sacrament to the thing signified," saith the Bishop of Edinburgh.⁴ The

¹ Of the Lawfulness of Kneeling, p. 115, 116.

² De Rep. Eccl., lib. 5, cap. 6, num. 126.

³ De Rep. Eccl., lib. 5, cap. 6, num. 138.

⁴ Proc. in Perth Assembly, part 2, p. 22.

¹ Lib. 1, de Vit. Ext. Cult. Oppos., col. 505.

² Eccl. Pol., lib. 5, sect. 69.

³ Supra, part 1, cap. 1.

⁴ Supra, cap. 1.

⁵ Infra, cap. 6.

Archbishop of St Andrews¹ and Dr Burges² profess the adoring of Christ in the sacrament. Dr Mortoone maintaineth such an adoration in the sacrament as he calleth relative from the sign to Christ; and Paybody³ defendeth him herein. But the replyer⁴ to Dr Mortoone's *Particular Defence* inferreth well, that if the adoration be relative from the sign, it must first be carried to the sign as a means of conveyance unto Christ. Dr Burges⁵ alloweth adoration, or divine worship (as he calleth it), to be given to the sacrament respectively; and he allegeth a place of Theodoret,⁶ to prove that such an adoration as he there taketh for divine worship is done to the sacrament in relation to Christ, and that this adoration performed to the mysteries as types, is to be passed over to the archetype, which is the body and blood of Christ. Since, then, that kneeling about which our question is, by the confession of kneelers themselves, is divine worship given by the sign to the thing signified, and done to the sacrament respectively or in relation to Christ, he that will say that it is not idolatry must acquit the Papists of idolatry also in worshipping before their images; for they do in like manner profess that they adore *prototypum per imaginem, ad imaginem* or in *imagine*, and that they give no more to the image but relative or respective worship. The Rhemists⁷ tell us that they do no more but kneel before the creatures, at, or by them, adoring God. It availeth not here to excogitate some differences betwixt the sacramental elements and the popish images, for what difference soever be betwixt them when they are considered in their own natural being, yet as objects of adoration they differ not, because when they are considered in *esse adorabile*, we see the same kind of adoration is exhibited by Formalists before the elements which is by Papists before their images. To come nearer the point, Papists profess that they give to the outward signs in the sacrament no other adoration than the same which Formalists give to them. Franciscus⁸ a Sancta Clara saith,⁹ that divine worship doth not agree to the signs *per se*, but only

per accidens; and he allegeth for himself that the Council of Trent, can. 6. *de euchar.*, saith not that the sacrament, but that Christ in the sacrament, is to be adored with *latria*. To the same purpose I observe that Bellarmine¹ will not take upon him to maintain any adoration of the sacrament with *latria*, holding only that Christ in the eucharist is to be thus adored, and that *symbola externa per se et proprie non sunt adoranda*. Whereupon he determineth, *status questionis non est, nisi an Christus in eucharistia sit adorandus, cultu latriæ*. Now, albeit Papists understand by the outward sign of Christ's body in the eucharist nothing else but the species or accidents of the bread; yet since they attribute to the same *quod sub illis accidentibus ut vocant sit substantialiter corpus Christi vivum, cum sua Deitate conjunctum*;² and since they give adoration or *latria*³ to the species, though not *per se*, yet as *quid unum* with the body of Christ which they contain,—hereby it is evident that they worship idolatrously those very accidents. And I would understand, if any of our opposites dare say that Papists commit no such idolatry as here I impute to them? Or, if they acknowledge this idolatry of Papists, how make they themselves clean? for we see that the worship which Papists give to the species of the bread is only relative to Christ, and of the same kind with that which Formalists give to the bread and wine.

Sect. 9. Secondly, Religious kneeling before the bread which is set before us for a sign to stand in Christ's stead, and before which we adore whilst it is to us actually an image representing Christ,⁴ is the very bowing down and worshipping forbidden in the second commandment. The eucharist is called by the fathers *imago, signum, figura, similitudo*, as Hospinian⁵ instanceth out of Origen, Nazianzen, Augustine, Hilary, Tertullian, Ambrose. The Archbishop of Armagh hath also observed,⁶ that the fathers expressly call the sacrament an image of Christ's body; and well might they call it so, since the sacramental elements do not only represent Christ to us, but also stand

¹ Serm. at Perth Assembly.

² Of the Lawfulness of Kneeling, cap. 10, p. 17.

³ Apol., part 3, sect. 16.

⁴ Cap. 1, sect. 35.

⁵ Of the Lawfulness of Kneeling, cap. 22, p. 85.

⁶ Ibid., cap. 23.

⁷ Annot. on Heb. xi. 21.

⁸ Expos. Artic. Coofes. Angel., art. 28.

¹ De Sacr. Euchar., lib. 4, c. 29.

² Zanch., lib. 1, De Vit. Ext. Cult. Oppos., col. 504.

³ Bell. ubi supra.

⁴ Cartwright on 1 Cor. xi., sect. 8.

⁵ De Orig. Imag., p. 245.

⁶ Aas. to the Les. Chal. of the Real Pres., p. 74.

in Christ's stead, in such sort that by the worthy receiving of them we are assured that we receive Christ himself; and in eating of this bread, and drinking of this wine, we eat the flesh, and drink the blood of Christ spiritually, and by faith. Neither could the consecrated elements make a sacrament if they were not such images standing in Christ's stead. But what needeth any more? Dr Burges¹ himself calleth the sacraments the Lord's images. Now, that a man who adoreth before the painted or graven image of Christ, though he profess that he intendeth his whole adoration to Christ, and that he placeth the image before him only to represent Christ, and to stir up his mind to worship Christ, doth nevertheless commit idolatry, I trust none of our opposites will deny. Nay, Bishop Lindsey teacheth plainly,² that it is idolatry to set before the eyes of our minds or bodies any image as a mean or motive of adoration, even though the worship should be abstracted from the image, and not given unto it. Well, then, will it please him to let us see that kneeling before the actual images of Christ's body and blood in the sacrament, even though these images should be no otherwise considered in the act of adoration, but as active objects, motives and occasions which stir up the mind of the kneeler to worship Christ (for this is the best face which himself puts upon kneeling, though falsely, as we shall see afterward), is not so great idolatry as the other. All the difference which he maketh is,³ "that no true worship can be properly occasioned by an image, which is a doctor of lies, teaching nothing of God, but falsehood and vanities; but the blessed sacrament being instituted by Christ, to call to our remembrance his death, &c., gives us, so oft as we receive it, a most powerful and pregnant occasion of thanksgiving and praise." Dr Burges,⁴ intermeddling with the same difference-making, will not have the sacraments, which are images of God's making and institution, to be compared with images made by the lust of men. Two differences, then, are given us. 1. That the sacramental elements have their institution from God; images not so. 2. That the sacrament is an occasion of worship; an image not so. The first dif-

ference makes them no help; for though the ordinance and institution of God makes the use of sacramental images to be no will-worship, yet doth it not any whit avail to show that adoration before them is no idolatry. May I not commit idolatry with images of God's institution no less than with those invented by men, when (*cæteris paribus*) there is no other difference betwixt them, considered as objects of adoration, but that of the ordinance and institution which they have? What if I fall down at the hearing of a sermon, and religiously adore before the pastor, as the vicarious sign of Christ himself, who stands there, in Christ's stead, 2 Cor. v. 20, referring my adoration to Christ only, yet in or by that ambassador who stands in Christ's stead? If this my adoration should be called so great idolatry as if I should fall down before a graven image, to worship God in or by it (for it is, indeed, as great every way), our kneelers, I perceive, would permit me to answer for myself, that my worshipping of God by the minister cannot be called idolatrous, by this reason, (because the worshipping of God by a graven image is such, therefore also the worshipping of him by a living image is no other,) since images of God's institution must not be paralleled with those of men's invention. As to the second difference, I answer, 1. Though the Bishop muttereth here that no true worship can be occasioned by an image, yet belike he and his fellows will not stand to it, for many of them allow the historical use of images; and the Bishop hath not denied, though his antagonist objecteth it. Dr Mortoune¹ plainly alloweth of images for historical commemoration; and herein he is followed by Dr Burges.² 2. Whereas he saith that the blessed sacrament is instituted by Christ to call to our remembrance his death, this inferreth not that it is an occasion of thanksgiving and praise in the very act of receiving, as we shall see afterward. Our question is only about kneeling in the act of receiving. 3. We confess that the sacrament is an occasion of inward worship in the receiving of it; for in *eucharistia exercetur summa fides, spes, charitas, religio, cæteræque virtutes, quibus Deum colimus et glorificamus*.³ But the outward adoration of kneeling down upon our knees can be no

¹ Of the Lawfulness of Kneeling, p. 116.
² Proc. in Perth Assembly, part 2, p. 92.
³ Ubi supra.
⁴ Ubi supra.

¹ Gener. Def., cap. 3.
² Rejoyad., p. 286.
³ Cornel. à Lapide, Com. in Mal., rap. xi.

more occasioned by the blessed sacrament, in the act of receiving it, than by a graven image in the act of beholding it. The point which the Bishop had to prove is, that whereas an image cannot be the occasion of outward adoration and kneeling to God before it in the act of looking upon it, the sacrament may be, and is, an occasion of kneeling, when it is set before us in the act of receiving. This neither he, nor any for him, shall ever make good.

Sect. 10. Thirdly, Kneeling in the act of receiving the sacrament before the vicarious signs which stand in Christ's stead, and are purposely set before us in the act of adoration, that before them we may adore, wanteth nothing to make up idolatrous co-adoration or relative worship. Our opposites here tell us of two things necessary to the making up of idolatry, neither of which is found in their kneeling. First, they say, except there be an intention in the worshipper to adore the creature which is before his eyes, his kneeling before it is no idolatry. "What shall I say? (saith Paybody.)¹ What need I say in this place, but to profess, and likewise avouch, that we intend only to worship the Lord our God, when we kneel in the act of receiving? We worship not the bread and wine; we intend not our adoring and kneeling unto them. Give us leave to avouch our sincerity in this matter, and it will take away the respect of idolatry in God's worship." Ans. I showed before, that Paybody defendeth Dr Mortoune's adoration, which he calleth relative from the sign to Christ; yet let it be so, as here he pretendeth, that no adoration is intended to the sign; will this save their kneeling from idolatry? Nay, then, the three children should not have been idolaters, if they had kneeled before Nebuchadnezzar's image, intending their worship to God only, and not to the image. Our opposites here take the Nicodemites by the hand. But what saith Calvin?² *Si isti boni sapientesque sophistæ ibi tum fuissent, simplicitatem illorum trium scrvorum Dei irrisissent. Nam hujusmodi credo eos verbis objurgassent: miseri homines, istud quidem non est adorare, quum vos in rebus nullam fidem adhibetis: nulla est idololatria nisi ubi est*

¹ Part 3, cap. 3, sect. 29.
² De Fugleod. Idolatr., homil. 1.
³ Homines qui ex corpore et spiritu sunt constituti, corpore colunt materialiter, spiritu formaliter, as Junius saith upon Deut. xii.

devotio, hoc est quædam animi ad idola colenda venerandaque adjunctio atque applicatio, &c. If Paybody had been in Calvin's place, he could not have called the Nicodemites idolaters, forasmuch as they have no intention to worship the popish images when they kneel and worship before them. Nay, the grossest idolaters that ever were, shall by this doctrine be no idolaters, and Paul shall be censured for teaching that the Gentiles did worship devils, 1 Cor. x. 10, since they did not intend to worship devils. *Idolatræ nec olim in paganismo intendebant, nec hodie in papatu intendunt, dæmonibus offerre quid tum? Apostolus contrarium pronuntiat, quicquid illi intendunt, saith Pareus.*¹

Sect. 11. The other thing which our kneelers require to the making up of idolatry is, that the creature before which we adore be a passive object of the adoration; whereas, say they,² the sacramental elements are "no manner of way the passive object of our adoration, but the active only of that adoration which, at the sacrament, is given to Christ; that is, such an object and sign as moves us upon the sight, or by the signification thereof, to lift up our hearts and adore the only object of our faith, the Lord Jesus; such as the holy word of God, his works, and benefits are, by meditation and consideration whereof we are moved and stirred up to adore him. Ans. 1. That which he affirmeth is false, and out of one page of his own book I draw an argument which destroyeth it, thus: If the sacramental elements were only the active object of their adoration who kneel before them in the receiving, then their real presence should be but accidental to the kneelers. But the real presence of the elements, in the act of receiving, is not accidental to the kneelers; therefore, the proposition I draw from his own words: "We can neither (saith he³) pray to God, nor thank him, nor praise him, but ever there must be, before the eyes of our minds, at least something of his works, word, or sacraments, if not before our external senses." He confesseth it will be enough, that these active objects of worship be before the eyes of our minds, and that their real presence, before our external senses, is not necessary but accidental to us, whose minds are by their means stirred up to worship. And so

¹ Com. in illum locum.
² Lindsey, ubi supra, p. 18.
³ Ibid., p. 92.

it is indeed. For *esse scibile*, or *rememorativum* of an active object of adoration, is that which stirreth up the mind to worship, so that the real presence of such an object is but accidental to the worshipper. The assumption I likewise draw out of the Bishop's own words. For he saith¹ that we kneel before the elements, "having them in our sight, or object to our senses, as ordinary signs, means, and memorials, to stir us up to worship," &c. Now if we have them in our sight and before our senses for this purpose, that they may be means, signs, and memorials to stir us up to worship, then, sure, their being really before our senses, is not accidental to us when we kneel. Since Dr Burges² hath been so dull and sottish as to write that "signs are but accidentally before the communicants when they receive, he is to be ignominiously exsultat for making the sacred sacramental signs to be no otherwise present than the walls of the church, the nails and timber of the material table whereupon the elements are set, or anything else accidentally before the communicants. But, 2. Put the case, they did make the elements only active objects of worship when they kneel in the act of receiving them. What! Do some Papists make more of their images when they worship before them? They hold, as the Archbishop of Spalato noteth,³ that *Imago est medium duntaxat seu instrumentum quo exemplar occurrit suo honoratori, cultori, adoratori: imago excitat tantummodo memoriam, ut in exemplar feratur*. Will we have them to speak for themselves? Suarez will have *Imagines esse occasiones vel signa excitantia hominem ad adorandum prototypa*.⁴ Friar Pedro de Cabrera,⁵ a Spaniard, taketh the opinion of Durand and his followers to be this: That images are adored only improperly, because they put men in mind of the persons represented by them; and he reasoneth against them thus: "If images were only to be worshipped by way of remembrance and recordation, because they make us remember the samplers which we do so worship as if they had been then present, it would follow that all creatures should be adored with the same adoration

wherewith we worship God, seeing all of them do lead us unto the knowledge and remembrance of God." Whereby it is evident, that in the opinion of Durand,¹ and those who are of his mind, images are but active objects of adoration. Lastly, what saith Becane the Jesuit?² *Imago autem Christi non est occasio idololatriæ apud nos catholicos, quia non alium ob finem eam retinemus, quam ut nobis Christum salvatorem, et beneficia ejus representet*. More particularly he will have the image of Christ honoured for two reasons. 1. *Quia honor qui exhibetur imagini, redundat in eum cujus est imago*. 2. *Quia illud in pretio haberi potest, quod per se revocat nobis in memoriam beneficia Dei, et est occasio ut pro eis acceptis grati existamus*. At *imago Christi per se revocat nobis in memoriam beneficium nostræ redemptionis*, &c. That for this respect the image of Christ is honoured, he confirmed by this simile: *Quia ob eandem causam apud nos in pretio ac honore sunt sacra Biblia, itemque festa paschatis, pentecostes, nativitas, et passionis Christi*. What higher account is here made of images than to be active objects of worship? For even whilst it is said that the honour done to the image resulteth to him whose image it is, there is no honour ascribed to the image as a passive object; but they who honour an image for this respect, and with this meaning, have it only for an active object which represents and calls to their mind the first sampler, as the Archbishop of Spalato also observeth.³ Neither the Papists only, but some also of the very heathen idolaters, norunt in *imaginibus nihil deitatis inesse, meras autem esse rerum absentium representationes*,⁴ &c. And what if neither heathens nor Papists had been of this opinion, that images are but active objects of worship? Yet I have before observed, that the Bishop himself acknowledged it were idolatry to set before us an image as the active object of our adoration, though the worship should be abstracted from the image.

Sect. 12. Finally, To shut up this point, it is to be noted that the using of the sacra-

¹ Allud est picturam adorare: allud per picturam historiam quid sit adorandum addiscere, saith Durand, Ration., lib. 1, Tit. de Pictur.

² Manual, lib. 3, cap. 2, quest. 5.

³ Ubi supra.

⁴ Zauch., lib. 1, De Vit. Ext. Cult. Oppos., col. 510.

¹ Ibid.

² Of the Lawfulness of Kneeling, cap. 32, p. 115.

³ De Rep. Eccl., lib. 7, cap. 12, num. 42.

⁴ Com. 1, disp. 50, sect. 3.

⁵ See Dr Usher's Ans. to the Jesu. Chall. of Images, p. 499.

mental elements, as active objects of worship only, cannot make kneeling before them in the receiving to be no idolatry; for then might we lawfully, and without idolatry, kneel before every active object which stirreth up our minds to worship God. All the works of God are such active objects, as the Bishop also resolveth in the words before cited. Yet may we not, at the sight of every one of God's works, kneel down and adore, whilst the eyes, both of body and mind, are fixed upon it, as the means and occasion which stirreth us up to worship God. The Bishop, indeed, holdeth we may, only he saith this is not necessary,¹ because when, by the sight of the creatures of God, we are moved privately to worship, our external gesturo of adoration is arbitrary, and sometimes no gesture at all is required. But in the ordinary ministry, when the works of God or his benefits are propounded, or applied publicly, to stir us up to worship in the assemblies of the church, then our gesture ceaseth to be arbitrary; for it must be such as is prescribed and received in the church where we worship. Ans. 1. He shuffeth the point deceitfully, for when he speaks of being moved to worship at the sight of any creature, he means of inward worship, as is evident by these words, "Sometime no gesture at all is required;" but when he speaks of being moved to worship in the assemblies of the church, by the benefits of God propounded publicly (for example, by the blessed sacrament), then he means of outward worship, as is evident by his requiring necessarily a gesture. He should have spoken of one kind of worship in both cases, namely, of that which is outward; for of no other do we dispute. When we are moved by the sacrament to adore God in the act of receiving, this can be no other but that which is inward, and thus we adore God by faith, hope, and love, though neither the heart be praying, nor the body kneeling. That which we deny (whereof himself could not be ignorant) is, that the sacramental elements may be to us, in the receiving, active objects of outward adoration; or because they move us to worship inwardly, that therefore we should adore outwardly. 2. Whereas he teacheth that kneeling before any creature, when thereby we are moved to worship privately, is lawful; but kneeling before the sacramental

elements, when thereby we are moved to worship in the assemblies of the church, is necessary; that we may kneel there, but we must kneel here, he knew, or else he made himself ignorant that both these should be denied by us. Why, then, did he not make them good? Kneeling before those active objects which stir up our hearts to worship, if it be necessary in the church, it must first be proved lawful both in the church and out of it. Now, if a man meeting his lord riding up the street upon his black horse, have his heart stirred up to worship God, by something which he seeth either in himself or his horse, should fall down and kneel before him or his horse, as the active object of his worship, I marvel whether the Bishop would give the man leave to kneel, and stand still as the active object before the man's senses? As for us, we hold that we may not kneel before every creature which stirreth up our hearts to worship God; kneel, I say, whilst the eyes both of body and mind are fastened upon it as the active object of our adoration.

Sect. 13. The fourth reason whereby I prove the kneeling in question to be idolatry, proceedeth thus. Kneeling in the act of receiving, for reverence to the sacrament, is idolatry. But the kneeling in question is such; therefore, &c. The proposition is necessary. For if they exhibit divine adoration (such as their kneeling is confessed to be) for reverence of the sacrament, they do not only give, but also intend to give, divine adoration to the same. This is so undeniable that it dasheth Bishop Lindsey,¹ and makes him give a broad confession, that it is idolatry to kneel at the sacrament for reverence to the elements. The assumption I prove from the confession of Formalists. King Edward's book of Common Prayer teacheth, that kneeling at the communion is enjoined for this purpose, that the sacrament might not be profaned, but held in a reverent and holy estimation. So doth Dr Morton tell us, that the reason wherefore the church of England hath instituted kneeling in the act of receiving the sacrament, is, that thereby we might testify our due estimation of such holy rites. Paybody² makes one of the respects of kneeling to be the reverent handling and using of the sacrament. The Bishop of Winchester

¹ Ubi supra, p. 69.

² Partic. Def., cap. 3, sect. 20.

³ Part 3, cap. 3, sect. 46.

¹ Ubi supra, p. 88.

exclaimeth against such as do not kneel, for not regarding the table of the Lord, which hath ever been thought of all holies the most holy, and for denying reverence to the holy symbols and precious memorials of our greatest delivery, even the reverence which is given to prayer. Where, by the way, I observe, that when we kneel at prayer it is not to give reverence to prayer, but to God, whom then most immediately we adore; so that kneeling for reverence of the sacrament receiveth no commendation from kneeling at prayer. The Act of Perth about kneeling, when Bishop Lindsey had polished and refined it as well as he could, ordained us to kneel at the sacrament in due regard of so divine a mystery. And what think we is understood by this mystery, for reverence whereof we are commanded to kneel? The Bishop² expoundeth this mystery to be the receiving of the body and blood of Christ. But here he either means the spiritual receiving of the body and blood of Christ, or the sacramental. If the spiritual, why did not the Synod ordain us to kneel in hearing the gospel? for therein we receive spiritually the body and blood of Christ, and that as truly and really as in the sacrament. Whereupon the Archbishop of Armagh sheweth,³ that the spiritual and inward feeding upon the body and blood of Christ is to be found out of the sacrament; and that divers of the fathers do apply the sixth of John to the hearing of the word also; Clemens Alexandrinus, Origen, Eusebius, as Caesariensis, and others. Basilus Magnus likewise teacheth plainly,⁴ that we eat the flesh of Christ in his word and doctrine. This, I am sure, no man dare deny. The Bishop, then, must mean by this mystery the sacramental receiving of the body and blood of Christ. Now, the sacramental receiving of the body and blood of Christ, is the receiving of the sacramental signs of his body and blood. And as the Archbishop of Armagh also observeth,⁵ the substance which is outwardly delivered in the sacrament, is not really the body and blood of Christ. Again he saith,⁶ that the bread and wine are not really the body and blood of Christ, but figuratively and sacramentally. Thus he opposeth the sacramental

presence of the body and blood of Christ not only to bodily, but also to real presence; and by just analogy, sacramental receiving of the body and blood of Christ is not only to be opposed to a receiving of his body and blood into the hands and mouths of our bodies, but likewise to the real receiving of the same spiritually into our souls. It remaineth, therefore, that kneeling in due regard of the sacramental receiving of the body and blood of Christ, must be expounded to be kneeling in reverence of the sacramental signs of Christ's body and blood; and so Perth's canon, and the Bishop's commentary upon it, fall in with the rest of those Formalists cited before, avouching and defending kneeling for reverence to the sacrament.

Sect. 14. Those who speak out more plainly than Bishop Lindsey, do here object to us, that reverence is due to the sacrament, and that we ourselves do reverence it when we sit uncovered at the receiving of it. But Didoclavus¹ doth well distinguish betwixt veneration and adoration, because in civility we use to be uncovered, even to inferiors and equals, for the regard which we bear to them, yet do we not worship them as we worship the king, on our knees.² As, then, in civility, there is a respect and reverence different from adoration, so it is in religion also. Yea, Bellarmine³ himself distinguisheth the reverence which is due to holy things from adoration. Paybody⁴ and Dr Burges⁵ will by no means admit this distinction betwixt veneration and adoration. But since neither of them hath alleged any reason against it, I hope they will be weighed down by the authority of the Archbishop of Spalato⁶, and the Bishop of Edinburgh,⁷ both of whom agree to this distinction. So, then, we give no adoration at all to the sacrament, because neither by any outward or inward action do we perform any worship for the honour of the same. Burges himself hath noted to us,⁸ that the first Nicene council exhorteth that men should not be *humiliter intenti* to the things before them. We neither submit our minds nor humble

¹ Alt. Dam., p. 809.

² Ea (veneratio) potest esse etiam sine cultu, saith Scaliger, De Subtil. ad Card. exort. 317, dist. 3.

³ De Sacram. Confirm., cap. 13.

⁴ Part 3, cap. 3, sect. 50.

⁵ Of the Lawfulness of Kneeling, cap. 8.

⁶ De Rep. Eccl., lib. 5, cap. 6, num. 137, et lib. 7, cap. 12, num. 48.

⁷ Ubi supra, p. 70.

⁸ Ubi supra, cap. 21, p. 73.

our bodies to the sacrament, yet do we render to it veneration,¹ forasmuch as we esteem highly of it, as a most holy thing, and meddle reverently with it, without all contempt or unworthy usage. *Res profecto inanimatae*, saith the Archbishop of Spalato,² *sint sacrae quantum placet, aliud honorem a nobis non merentur, nisi in sensu negativo*, as that they be not contemned, nor unworthily handled. If it be said that we ought not to contemn the word, yet hath it not that respect given to it which the sacrament hath, at which we are uncovered, so that this veneration given to the sacrament must be somewhat more than *profanatio*.—I answer, as honour both in the positive and negative sense, has various degrees, and according to the more or less immediate manifestation of divine ordinances to us, so ought the degrees of our veneration to be intended or remitted; which is not so to be understood as if one part of God's sacred worship were to be less contemned than another (for none of God's most holy ordinances may be in any sort contemned), but that for the greater regard of those things which are more immediately divine, we are not in the usage of them, to take to ourselves so much scope and liberty as otherwise we may lawfully allow to ourselves in meddling with such things as are not merely but mixedly divine, and which are not from God so immediately as the other, but more by the intervention of means; and thus a higher degree of veneration is due to the sacrament than to the word preached, not by taking aught from the word, but by adding more respect to the sacrament than the word hath. The reason hereof is given to be this,³ because when we come to the sacrament, *nihil hic humanum, sed divina omnia*; for Christ's own words are, or at least should be spoken to us when we receive the sacrament, and the elements also are, by Christ's own institution, holy symbols of his blessed body and blood; whereas the word preached to us is but fixedly and mediately divine; and because of this intervention of the ministry of men, and mixture of their conceptions with the holy Scriptures of God, we are bidden try the spirits, and are required, after the example of the Bereans, to search the Scriptures daily, whether these things which we hear preached be so or not.

¹ Cartwright on 1 Cor. xi, sect. 18.

² De Rep. Eccl., lib. 7, cap. 12, num. 50.

³ Didoclav., ubi supra, p. 803.

Now we are not in the like sort to try the elements, and the words of the institution, whether they be of God or not, because this is sure to all who know out of Scripture the first principles of the oracles of God. The consideration hereof warneth us, that the sacrament given, according to Christ's institution, is more merely and immediately divine than is the word preached; but others (I hear) object, that if a man should uncover his head at the sight of a graven image, we would account this to be an adoring of the image; and why then shall not we call our uncovering at the sacrament adoration also? *Ans.* Though veneration and adoration be distinguished in holy things to show that adoration given to them is idolatry, but veneration given to them is not idolatry, yet in profane things, such as images are, veneration given to them is idolatry, as well as adoration; and we are idolaters for doing so much as to respect and reverence them as things sacred or holy; for, as I touched before, and as Zanchius evidenceth by sundry instances,¹ idolatry is committed when more estimation is had of anything, more dignity and excellency placed in it, and more regard had to it than God alloweth, or than can stand with God's revealed will; for a thing thus regarded, though it be not exalted *ut Deus simpliciter*, yet it is set up *tantum Deus ex parte*.

Sect. 15. Now Fifthly, If the kneeling in question be not idolatrously referred to the sacrament, I demand whereunto is it specially intended? We have heard the confession of some of our opposites (and those not of the smallest note) avouching kneeling for reverence of the sacrament. Neither can the mystery spoken of in the Act of Perth (in due regard whereof we are ordained to kneel), be any other than the sacrament. Yet because Bishop Lindsey, and some of his kind who desire to hide the foul shape of their idolatry with the trimmest fainling they can, will not take with the kneeling in reverence of the sacrament, let them show us which is the object which they do specially adore, when they kneel in receiving of the same; for this their kneeling at this time ariseth from another respect than that which they consider in other parts of God's worship, let two of our prelates tell it out: Archbishop of St. Andrews would teach out of Mouline that we ought to adore the flesh

¹ Lib. 1, De Viti. Ext. Cult. Oppos., col. 504, 505.

¹ Sermon on Luke 1. 74, p. 991.

² Ubi supra, p. 72, 73.

³ Ans. to the Chall. of the Real Pres., p. 50, 51.

⁴ Epist. 141, ad Caesarian.

⁵ Ubi supra, p. 55.

⁶ Ibid., p. 61.

of Jesus Christ in the eucharist;¹ the Bishop of Edinburgh also will have us to worship the flesh and blood of Christ in the sacrament,² because the humanity of Christ is there present, being ever and everywhere joined with the divinity. But a twofold idolatry may be here deprehended. 1. In that they worship the flesh and blood of Christ. 2. In that they worship the same in the sacrament. As touching the first, albeit we may and should adore the man Christ with divino worship, yet we may not adore his manhood, or his flesh and blood. 1. Because though the man Christ be God, yet his manhood is not God, and by consequence cannot be honoured with divine worship. 2. If adorability agree to the humanity of Christ, then may his humanity help and save us: idolaters are mocked by the Spirit of God for worshipping things which cannot help nor save them. But the humanity of Christ cannot save us nor help us, because *omnis actio est suppositi*, whereas the human nature of Christ is not *suppositum*. 3. None of those who defend the adoring of the humanity of Christ with divine worship, do well and warrantably express their opinion. First, some of the schoolmen have found no other respect wherefore the manhood of Christ can be said to be adored,³ except this, that the flesh of Christ is adored by him who adores the word incarnate, even as the king's clothes are adored by him who adores the king. And thus they make the flesh of Christ to be adored only *per accidens*. *Ego vero*, saith the Archbishop of Spalato,⁴ *non puta a quoquam regis vestimenta quibus est indutus, adorari*. And, I pray, why doth he that worships the king worship his clothes more than any other thing which is about him, or beside him, perhaps a hawk upon his hand, or a little dog upon his knee? There is no more but the king's own person set by the worshipper to have any state in the worship, and therefore no more worshipped by him. Others devise another respect wherefore the manhood of Christ may be said to be worshipped,⁵ namely, that as divine worship agrees only to the Godhead, and not *personis divinis præcise sumptis*, i.e., *sub ratione formali constitutiva personarum quæ est*

relatio: but only as these relations *identificantur* with the essence of the Godhead; so the manhood of Christ is to be adored *non per se præcise, sed prout suppositatur à Deo*. I answer, if by *suppositatur* they mean (as they must mean) that the manhood is assumed into the unity of the person of the Son of God (for otherwise if they mean that the manhood is made a person, they are Nestorians), that which they say cannot warrant the worshipping of the manhood with divine worship, because the manhood, even after this assumption and hypostatical union, and being considered by us as now assumed into this personal union, is still for all that a creature, and a distinct nature from the Godhead (except we will be Eutychians), so that it cannot yet be said to be worshipped with divine worship. Dr Field layeth out a third way;⁶ for whilst he admitteth the phrase of the Lutherans, who say not only concretely that the man Christ is omnipresent, but the humanity also, he forgeth a strange distinction. "When we speak (saith he) of the humanity of Christ, sometimes we understand only that human created essence of a man that was in him, sometimes all that is implied in the being of a man, as well subsistence as essence." By the same distinction would Field defend the attributing of the other divine properties (and adorability among the rest) to the human nature. But this distinction is no better than if a man should say, by blackness sometimes we understand blackness, and sometimes whiteness. Who ever confounded *abstractum* and *concretum*, before that in Field's field they were made to stand for one? It is the tenet of the school, that though in God *concretum* and *abstractum* differ not, because *Deus* and *Deitas* are the same, yet in creatures (whereof the manhood of Christ is one) they are really differenced. For *concretum* signifieth *aliquid completum subsistens*, and *abstractum* (such as humanity) signifieth⁷ something, *non ut subsistens, sed in quo aliquid est*, as whiteness doth not signify that thing which is white, but that whereby it is white. How comes it then that Field makes humanity, in the abstract, to have a subsistence? Antonius Sadeel censures Turrianus⁸ for saying that *albedo eum pariete, idem est atque paries albus*: his reason is, because *albedo dicitur*

¹ Of the Church, lib. 5, sect. 15.

² Aquin. 1, quest. 13, art. 1.

³ Cent. Flosc. Tur. Disput. Flosc., 26.

¹ Sermon at Perth Assembly.

² Ubi supra, p. 142.

³ Aquin. 3, quest. 25, art. 2.

⁴ De Rep. Eccl., lib. 7, cap. 12, num. 43.

⁵ Frauc. & S. Clara, Expos. Artic. Confess. Angl., art. 28.

esse, non cum pariete sed in pariete. An abstract is no more an abstract if it have a subsistence.

There is yet a fourth sense remaining, which is Augustine's, and theirs who speak with him. His sentence which our opposites cite for them is, that it is sin not to adore the flesh of Christ, howbeit very erroneously he groundeth that which he saith upon these words of the psalm, "Worship at his footstool," taking this footstool to be the flesh of Christ. Yet that his meaning was better than his expression, and that he meant not that adoration should be given to the flesh of Christ, but to the Godhead, whose footstool the flesh is, it is plain from those words which Burges himself citeth out of him:¹ "To whatsoever earth, i.e., flesh of Christ, thou bowest and prostrate thyself, look not on it as earth, i.e., as flesh; but look at that Holy One whose footstool is that thou dost adore, i.e., look to the Godhead of Christ, whose flesh thou dost adore in the mysteries." Wherefore if we would give any sound sense to their words who say that the flesh of Christ is to be adored, we must note with A. Polanus,² that *cum dicitur carnem Christi adorari, non est propria sed figurata enunciatio; quia non adoratur proprie caro secundum se, quia creatura est, sed Deus in carne manifestatis, seu Deus carne vestitus*. But two things I will here advertise my reader of.

1. That though this form of speaking, which saith that the flesh of Christ is to be adored, being thus expounded, receiveth a sound sense, yet the expression is very bad, and violence is done to the phrase when such a meaning is drawn out of it. For how can we, by the flesh of Christ, understand his Godhead? The communion of properties admitteth us to put the man Christ for God, but not his manhood. And Hooker teacheth rightly,³ "that by force of union, the properties of both natures (and by consequence, adorability, which is a property of the divine nature) are imputed to the person only in whom they are, and not what belongeth to the one nature really conveyed or translated into the other."

2. Yet our kneelers who say they adore the flesh of Christ in the sacrament, have no such orthodox (though forced) meaning whereby to expound themselves. For Bi-

shop Lindsey will have us,⁴ in receiving the sacrament, to bow our knees and adore the humanity of Christ, by reason of the personal union that it hath with the Godhead; therefore he means that we should, and may adore with divine worship, that which is personally united with the Godhead. And what is that? Not the Godhead sure, but the created nature of the manhood (which not being God but a creature only, cannot without idolatry be worshipped with divino worship). I conclude, therefore, that by the flesh of Christ, which he will have to be adored in the sacrament, he understands not the Godhead, as Augustine doth, but that created nature which is united with the Godhead.

Sect. 16. But, Secondly, As we have seen what is to be thought of worshipping the flesh of Christ, so let us next consider what may be thought of worshipping his flesh in the sacrament; for this was the other head which I proposed. Now, they who worship the flesh of Christ in the sacrament, must either consider it as present in the sacrament, and in that respect to be adored, because of the personal union of it with the word, or else because of the sacramental union of it with the outward sign, which is a respect supervenient to that of the ubiquity of it in the person of the word. First, then, touching the former of those respects, the personal union of the flesh with the word can neither infer the presence of the flesh in the sacrament to those who worthily receive, nor yet can it make anything for the adoration of the flesh. Not the former; for in respect of the ubiquity of the flesh in the person of the word, it is ever and alike present with the communicants, whether they receive worthily or not, and with the bread and wine, whether they be consecrated to be the signs of his body and blood or not. Therefore divines rightly hold *presentiam corporis Christi in æna, non ab ubiquitate, sed à verbis Christi pendere*.⁵ Not the latter neither; for (as I have showed already) notwithstanding of the personal union, yet the flesh of Christ remaineth a creature, and is not God, and so cannot at all be worshipped with divine worship. And if his flesh could be at all so worshipped,⁶

¹ Ubi supra.

² Zanchi, tom. 8, col. 521.

³ We adore Christ as well in the preaching of the gospel and sacrament of baptism, as in the sacrament of the supper, saith Cartwright on 1 Cor. xi. sect. 18.

¹ Of the Lawfulness of Kneeling, cap. 23, p. 88.

² Syst., lib. 6, cap. 16, col. 125.

³ Eccl. Pol. lib., sect. 55.

yet were there no reason for worshipping it in the sacrament (in respect of its personal union with the word) more than in all other actions, and at all other times; for ever and always is the flesh of Christ personally united with the word, and in that respect present to us. There remaineth therefore nothing but that other respect of the sacramental union of the flesh of Christ with the sacramental sign, which they can have for worshipping his flesh in the sacrament. Whereas Bishop Lindsey saith,¹ "that it is no error to believe the spiritual, powerful, and personal presence of Christ's body at the sacrament, and in that respect to worship his flesh and blood there,"—he means, sure, some special respect, for which it may be said that Christ's body is present at the sacrament (so as it is not present out of the sacrament), and in that respect to be there adored. Now Christ's body is spiritually and powerfully present to us in the word (as I showed before), yea, as often as looking by faith upon his body broken and blood shed for us, we receive the sense and assurance of the remission of our sins through his merits; and as for this personal presence of Christ's body which he speaketh of, I have showed also that the adoring of the flesh of Christ in the sacrament cannot be inferred upon it; wherefore he can tell us nothing which may be thought to infer the presence of Christ's flesh in the sacrament, and the adoration of it in that respect, save only the sacramental union of it with the outward sign. Now adoration in this respect, and for this reason, must suppose the bodily presence of Christ's flesh in the sacrament. Whereupon the Archbishop of Spalato saith,² that the Papists adore the body of Christ in the sacrament, only because of the supposition of the bodily presence of it; and if they knew that the true body of Christ is not under the species of the bread and wine, they would exhibit no adoration. And elsewhere he sheweth,³ that the mystery of the eucharist cannot make the manhood of Christ to be adored, *quia in pane corporalis Christi presentia non est*: implying, that if the flesh of Christ be adored in respect of the mystery of the eucharist, then must it be bodily present in the sign, which is false; and hereupon he

gathereth truly, that it cannot be adored in respect of the mystery of the eucharist.

Further, It is to be remembered (which I have also before noted out of Dr Usher)⁴ that the sacramental presence of the body of Christ, or that presence of it which is inferred upon that sacramental union which is betwixt it and the outward sign, is not the real or spiritual presence of it (for in this manner it is present to us out of the sacrament, even as oft as by faith we apprehend it and the virtue thereof); but it is figuratively only so called, the sense being this, that the body of Christ is present and given to us in the sacrament, meaning by his body, the sign of his body. These things being so, whosoever worshippeth Christ's body in the eucharist, and that in respect of the sacramental presence of it in the same, cannot choose but hold that Christ's body is bodily and really under the species of the bread, and so fall into the idolatry of bread-worship; or else our divines⁵ have not rightly convinced the Papists, as idolatrous worshippers of the bread in the eucharist, forasmuch as they attribute to it that which it is not, nor hath not, to wit, that under the accidents thereof is contained substantially the true and living body of Christ, joined and united to his Godhead. What can Bishop Lindsey now answer for himself, except he say with one of his brethren,⁶ that we should adore the flesh of Christ in the sacrament, because *corporalis presentia Christi, sed non modo corporalis, comitatur sacramentum eucharistiae*. And Christ is there present *corporaliter, modo spirituali*? But this man contradicts himself miserably; for we had him a little before acknowledging that *in pane corporalis Christi presentia non est*. How shall we then reconcile him with himself? He would say that Christ is not bodily present in the sacrament after a bodily manner, but he is bodily present after a spiritual manner. Why should I blot paper with such a vanity, which implieth a contradiction, bodily and not bodily, spiritually and not spiritually.

Sect. 17. The sixth and last argument whereby I prove the kneeling in question to be idolatry, is taken from the nature and kind of the worship wherein it is used. For

¹ Supra, sect. 13.

² Zauch., lib. 1, De Vitit. Ext. Cult. Oppos., col. 501.

³ Marc. Ant. de Dom. Ostens. Error. Fr. Suarez, cap. 2, num. 13.

⁴ Ubi supra.

⁵ De Rep. Eccl., lib. 7, cap. 11, num. 7.

⁶ Ostens. Error. Fr. Suarez, cap. 2, num. 13.

the receiving of the sacrament being a mediate worship of God, wherein the elements come between God and us, in such sort that they belong to the substance of the worship (for without the elements, the sacrament is not a sacrament), and withal are susceptible of co-adoration, forasmuch as in the act of receiving, both our minds and our external senses are, and should be, fastened upon them; hereby we evince the idolatry of kneeling in the receiving. For in every mediate worship, wherein some creature is purposely set between God and us to have state in the same, it is idolatry to kneel before such a creature, whilst both our minds and senses are fastened upon it. Our opposites have talked many things together to infringe this argument. First, They allege the bowing of God's people before the ark,¹ the temple, the holy mountain, the altar, the bush, the cloud, the fire which came from heaven. Ans. 1. Where they have read that the people bowed before the altar of God, I know not. Bishop Lindsey indeed would prove² from 2 Chron. vi. 12, 13, and Mich. vi. 6, that the people bowed before the altar and the offering. But the first of those places speaks nothing of kneeling before the altar, but only of kneeling before the congregation, that is, in the sight of the congregation. And if Solomon had then kneeled before the altar, yet the altar had been but occasionally and accidentally before him in his adoration; for to what end and use could he have purposely set the altar before him, whilst he was kneeling and praying? The place of Micah cannot prove that God's people did kneel before the offerings at all (for it speaks only of bowing before God), far less, that they kneeled before them in the very act of offering, and that with their minds and senses fixed upon them, as we kneel in the very act of receiving the sacrament, and that at that instant when our minds and senses are fastened upon the signs, that we may discern the things signified by them, for the exercising of our hearts in a thankful meditation upon the Lord's death. 2. As for the other examples here alleged, God was immediately present, in and with the ark, the temple, the holy mountain, the bush, the cloud, and the fire which came from heaven, speaking and manifesting himself to his people by his

own immediate voice, and miraculous extraordinary presence; so that worshipping before these things had the same reason which makes the twenty-four elders in heaven worship before the throne, Rev. iv. 10; for in these things God did immediately manifest his presence as well as in heaven. Though there be a difference in the degrees of the immediate manifestation of his presence in earth and in heaven, yet *magis et minus non variant speciem*. Now God is present in the sacrament, not extraordinarily, but in the way of an ordinary dispensation, not immediately, but mediately. They must therefore allege some commendable examples of such a kneeling as we dispute about, in a mediate and ordinary worship, else they say nothing to the point.

Sect. 18. Yet to no better purpose they tell us,³ that when God spake, Abraham fell on his face; and when the fire came down at Elijah's prayer, the people fell on their faces. What is this to the purpose? And how shall kneeling in a mediate and ordinary worship be warranted by kneeling in the hearing of God's own immediate voice, or in seeing the miraculous signs of his extraordinary presence. Nowbeit it cannot be proved, neither, that the people fell on their faces in the very act of seeing the fire fall (when their eyes and their minds were fastened upon it), but that after they had seen the miracle wrought, they so considered of it as to fall down and worship God.

But further, it is objected,⁴ "that a penitentiary kneels to God purposely before the congregation, and with a respect to the congregation, &c. When we come to our common tables before we eat, either sitting with our heads discovered, or standing, or kneeling, we give thanks and bless, with a respect to the meat, which is purposely set on table, &c. The pastor, when he begins the holy action, hath the bread and the cup set before him purposely upon the table, and with respect to them he gives thanks." &c.

Ans. Though a penitentiary kneel to God purposely in the presence and sight of the congregation, that he may make known to them his repentance for the sin whereby he hath scandalised them, yet is the confessing of his sin to God, kneeling there upon his knees, an immediate worship, neither doth

¹ Burges, of the Lawfulness of Kneeling, cap. 32, p. 113; Paybody, part 3, cap. 3, sect. 4.

² Ubi supra, p. 94.

³ Bishop Lindsey, ubi supra, p. 76.

⁴ Ibid., p. 91.

the congregation come betwixt him and God, as belonging to the substance of this worship, for he kneeleth to God as well, and maketh confession of his sin, when the congregation is not before him. But I suppose our kneelers themselves will confess, that the elements come so betwixt God and them when they kneel, that they belong to the essence of the worship in hand, and that they would not, nor could not, worship the flesh and blood of Christ in the sacrament, if the elements were not before them.

To be short, the case of a penitentiary standeth thus, that not in his kneeling *simpliciter*, but in his kneeling publicly and in sight of the congregation, he setteth them before him purposely, and with a respect to them; whereas our kneelers do kneel in such sort that their kneeling *simpliciter*, and without an adjection or adjunct, hath a respect to the elements purposely set before them; neither would they at all kneel for that end and purpose for which they do kneel, namely, for worshipping the flesh and blood of Christ in the sacrament,¹ except the elements were before the eyes both of their minds and bodies, as the penitentiary doth kneel for making confession of his sin to God, when the congregation is not before him.

And if one would say, that in kneeling at the sacrament he worshippeth not the flesh and blood of Christ, but the Lord his God only, yet is the same difference to be put betwixt his kneeling before the elements, and the kneeling of a penitentiary before the congregation; for the very kneeling itself (simply considered) before the elements, respecteth them as then purposely set in our sight that we may kneel before them; whereas, in the case of the penitentiary, it is not his kneeling to confess his sin to God which hath a respect to the congregation as set in his sight for that purpose, but some circumstances of his kneeling only, to wit, *when*? At that time when the congregation is assembled. And *where*? Publicly in sight of the congregation! In regard of these circumstances, he hath the congregation purposely in his sight, and so respecteth them; but in regard of the kneeling itself simply, the presence of the congregation is but accidental to him who kneeleth and confesseth his sin before God. As touching giving thanks before the meat set on our common

¹ Ubi supra, sect. 15.

tables, though a man should do it kneeling, yet this speaketh not home to the point now in controversy, except a man so kneel before his meat, that he have a religious respect to it as a thing separated from a common use and made holy, and likewise have both his mind, and his external senses of seeing, touching, and tasting, fastened upon it in the act of his kneeling. And if a man should thus kneel before his meat, he were an idolater.

Lastly, Giving thanks before the elements of bread and wine, in the beginning of the holy action, is as far from the purpose; for this giving of thanks is an immediate worship of God, wherein we have our minds and senses, not upon the bread and wine as upon things which have a state in that worship of the Lord's supper, and belong to the substance of the same (for the very consecration of them to this use is but then *in fieri*), but we worship God immediately by prayer and giving of thanks, which is all otherwise in the act of receiving.

Sect. 19. Moreover it is objected¹ out of Lev. ix. 24; 2 Chron. vii. 3; Mich. vi. 6; 2 Chron. xxix. 28—30, that all the people fell on their faces before the legal sacrifices, when the fire consumed the burnt-offering.

Whereunto it may be answered, that the fire which came from God and consumed the burnt-offerings, was one of the miraculous signs of God's extraordinary and immediate presence (as I have said before), and therefore kneeling before the same hath nothing to do with the present purpose.

But if we will particularly consider all these places, we find in the first two, that beside the fire, the glory of the Lord did also appear in a more miraculous and extraordinary manner, Lev. ix. 23, "The glory of the Lord appeared to all the people;" 2 Chron. vii. 1, 12, "The glory of the Lord filled the house." They are therefore running at random who take hold of those places to draw out of them the lawfulness of kneeling in a mediate and ordinary worship.

The place of Micah I have answered before; and here I add, that though it could be proved from that place (as it cannot), that the people have bowed before the offerings, and that in the very act of offering, yet how shall it be proved, that in the act of their kneeling they had the offerings

¹ Paybody, part 3, cap. 3, sect. 4.

purposely before them, and their minds and senses fixed upon them in the very instant of their worshipping.

This I make clear by the last place, 2 Chron. xxix., out of which no more can be drawn but that the people worshipped whilst the priests were yet offering the burnt-offering. Now the burnt-offering was but accidentally before the people in their worshipping, and only because it was offered at the same time when the song of the Lord was sung, ver. 27. Such was the forwardness of zeal in restoring religion and purging the temple, that it admitted no stay, but eagerly prosecuted the work till it was perfected; therefore the thing was done suddenly, ver. 36. Since, then, the song and the sacrifice were performed at the same time, we must note that the people worshipped at that time, not because of the sacrifice, which was a mediate worship, but because of the song of the Lord, which was an immediate worship. Now we all commend kneeling in an immediate worship. But this cannot content our opposites; they will needs have it lawful to kneel, in the hearing of the word, purposely, and with a respect to the word preached (though this be a mediate worship only). Their warrants¹ are taken out, Exod. iv. 30, 31; Exod. xii. 27; 2 Chron. xx. 18; Matt. xvii. 6. From the first three places no more can be inferred but that these hearers bowed their heads and worshipped, after that they heard the word of the Lord; neither shall they ever warrant bowing and worshipping in the act of hearing.

In the fourth place, we read that the disciples fell on their faces when they heard God's own immediate voice out of the cloud. What maketh this for falling down to worship at the hearing of the word preached by men? How long shall our opposites not distinguish betwixt mediate and immediate worship?

Lastly, It is alleged² that God, in his word, allows not only kneeling at prayer, but also at circumcision, passover, and baptism. The reason of this assertion is given to be this, that a bodily gesture being necessary, God not determining man upon any one, leaves him at plain liberty. *Ans.* Whether we be left at plain liberty in all things which being in the general necessary,

are not particularly determined in God's word, it shall be treated of elsewhere in this dispute. In the meantime, whatsoever liberty God leaves man in bodily gestures, he leaves him no liberty of an unlawful and idolatrous gesture, such as kneeling in the instant of receiving a sacrament, when not only we have the outward sign purposely before us, and our minds and senses fastened upon it, for discerning the signification thereof, and the analogy betwixt it and the thing signified, but also to look upon it as an image of Christ, or as a vicarious sign standing there in Christ's stead. The indifferency of such a gesture in such a mediate worship should have been proved before such a rule (as this here given us for a reason) had been applied to it.

Sect. 20. But the kneelers would yet make more ado to us, and be still stirring if they can do no more. Wherefore one of our doctors objecteth,¹ that we lift up our eyes and our hands to heaven, and worship God, yet we do not worship the heaven; that a man going to bed, prayeth before his bed; that David offered the sacrifices of thanksgiving, in the presence of all the people, Psal. cxvi.; that Paul, having taken bread, gave thanks before all them who were in the ship, Acts xxvii. 36; that the Israelites worshipped before Moses and Aaron, Exod. iv. 31. Hereupon another doctor, harping upon the same string, tells us,² that when we kneel in the act of receiving the sacrament, "we kneel no more to bread than to the pulpit when we join our prayers with the minister's." Oh, unworthy instances, and reproachful to doctors! All these things were and are accidentally present to the worshippers, and not purposely before them, nor respected as having a religious state in the worship. What? Do we worship before the bread in the sacrament, even as before a pulpit, a bed, &c.? Nay, graduate men should understand better what they speak of.

Another objection is,³ that a man who is admitted to the office of a pastor, and receiveth imposition of hands, kneeleth still on his knees till the ordination be ended, the rest about him being standing or sitting.

Ans. Kneeling in receiving imposition of hands, which is joined with prayer and invocation, hath nothing ado with kneeling in

¹ Paybody, *ibid.*, sect. 5.

² *ib.*, part 2, cap. 1, sect. 7.

³ Dr Forbasse, *Iren.*, lib. 1, cap. 1.

⁴ Jos. Hall, *Apol. against Brown*, sect. 36.

⁵ Dr Forbasse, *ubi supra*.

a mediate worship; for in this case a man kneels because of the immediate worship of invocation; but when there is no prayer, I suppose no man will kneel religiously, and with a religious respect to those persons or things which are before him, as there purposely in his sight, that before them he may adore (which is the kind of kneeling now in question), or if any did so, there were more need to give him instruction than ordination.

It is further told us, that he who is baptized,¹ or he who offers him that is to be baptized, humbleth himself, and prayeth that the baptism may be saving unto life eternal, yet worshippeth not the bason nor the water. But how long shall simple ones love simplicity, or rather, scorners hate knowledge? Why is kneeling in the immediate worship of prayer, wherein our minds do purposely respect no earthly thing (but the soul, Psal. xxv. 1, the heart, the hands, Lam. iii. 41, the eyes, Psal. cxxiii. 1, the voice, Psal. v. 3, all directed immediately to heaven) paralleled with kneeling in the mediate worship of receiving the sacrament, wherein we respect purposely the outward sign, which is then in our sight, that both our minds and our external senses may be fastened upon it? Our minds, by meditation, and attentive consideration of that which is signified, and of the representation thereof by the sign. Our senses, by seeing, handling, breaking, tasting, eating, drinking.

Sect. 21. Thus we see that in all these examples alleged by our opposites, there is nothing to prove the lawfulness of kneeling in such a mediate worship, wherein something belonging to the substance of the worship comes between God and us, and is not accidentally, but purposely before us, upon which also our minds and senses in the action of worship are fast fixed. Howbeit there is another respect, wherefore none of these examples can make ought for kneeling in the act of receiving the sacrament (which I have showed before), namely, that in the instant of receiving the sacrament, the elements are actually images and vicarious signs standing in Christ's stead. But be like our kneelers have not satisfied themselves with the roving rabble of these impertinent allegations which they have produced to prove the lawfulness of kneeling in

a mediate worship, they have prepared another refuge for themselves, which had been needless, if they had not feared that the former ground should fail them.

What then will they say next to us? Forsooth, that when they kneel in the act of receiving, they are praying and praising, and so worshipping God immediately. And if we would know what a man doth then pray for, it is told us, that he is praying and earnestly crying to God,¹ *ut eum faciat dignum convivam*. To us it seems very strange how a man, when he is actually a banqueter, and at the instant of his communicating can be made in any other sort a banqueter than he is; for *quicquid est, dum est, non potest non esse*. Wherefore if a man in the instant of his receiving be an unworthy banqueter, he cannot at that instant be made any other than he is.

Sect. 22. The truth is, we cannot lawfully be either praying or praising in the very act of receiving, because our hearts and minds should then be exercised in meditating upon Christ's death, and the inestimable benefits which comes to us thereby. 1 Cor. xi. 23, "Do this in remembrance of me."

This remembrance is described, ver. 26, "Ye do shew the Lord's death." Now one of the special ways whereby we remember Christ, and so do show forth his death, is by private meditation upon his death, as Pareus resolveth.²

This meditation is a speech of the soul to itself; and though it may stand with short ejaculations, which may and should have place in all our actions, yet can it not stand with an ordinary and continued prayer purposely conceived, as Bishop Lindsey would maintain.³ For how can we orderly both speak to God by prayer, and to ourselves by meditation, at one instant of time? If therefore prayer be purposely and orderly conceived, it banisheth away meditation, which should be the soul's exercise in the receiving of the sacrament. And by the contrary, if meditation be entertained as it should be, it admitteth not prayer to have place at that time. For it is well said,⁴ that *Dum auribus, oculis, manibus, dentibus exterius, auribus, oculis, manibus, dentibus fidei interius occupamur, orationem continuam et durabilem, absque mentis divagatione*

¹ Dr Forbasse, ubi supra.

² Com. in 1 Cor. xi. 26.

³ Ubi supra, p. 104.

⁴ Didac. Alt. Dam., p. 803.

ab opere præcepto et imperato, instruere non possumus.

Sect. 23. But let us hear how the Bishop proveth that we should be praying and praising in the act of receiving the sacrament. "Whatsoever spiritual benefit (saith he)¹ we should receive with a spiritual hunger and thirst, and with a spiritual appetite and desire after the grace and virtue that is therein to salvation, the same we should receive with prayer, which is nothing else but such an appetite and desire; but the body and blood of Christ is such a benefit," &c.

Ans. 1. Why did not he prove his proposition? Thought he his bare assertion should suffice? God's word is a spiritual benefit, which we should receive with spiritual hunger and thirst; yet the Bishop will not say that we should be praying all the while we are hearing and receiving it, for then could not our minds be attentive. His proposition therefore is false; for though prayer should go before the receiving of such a spiritual benefit as the word or the sacrament, yet we should not pray in the act of receiving. For how can the heart attend, by serious consideration, to what we hear in the word, or what is signified and given to us in the sacrament, if in the actions of hearing the word and receiving the sacrament, it should be elevated out of the world by prayer?

2. Why saith he that prayer is nothing else but a spiritual appetite or desire? He thought hereby to strengthen his proposition, but we deny all. He said before,² that every prayer is a meditation, and here he saith, that prayer is nothing else but a spiritual desire. These are uncouth descriptions of prayer. Prayer is not meditation, because meditation is a communing with our own souls, prayer a communing with God. Nor yet can it be said that prayer is nothing else but a spiritual desire; for prayer is the sending up of our desires to God, being put in order.

Sect. 24. He speeds no better in proving that we should receive the sacrament with thanksgiving. "Whatsoever benefit (saith he) we should receive by extolling, and praising, and magnifying, and praising the inestimable worth and excellency thereof, the same we ought to receive with thanks-

giving. But in the sacrament we should receive the blood of Christ with extolling and preaching," &c. The assumption he confirms by the words of our Saviour, "Do this in remembrance of me;" and by the words of St. Paul, "So oft as ye shall eat this bread and drink this cup, ye shall declare, that is, extol, magnify, and praise the Lord's death, till he come again."

Ans. His assumption is false, neither can his proofs make it true.

1. We remember Christ in the act of receiving by meditation, and not by praise.

2. We show forth the Lord's death in the act of receiving, by using the signs and symbols of his body broken, and his blood shed for us, and by meditating upon his death thereby represented.

3. We deny not that by praise we show forth the Lord's death also, but this is not in the act of receiving. It is to be marked with Pareus,¹ that the showing forth of the Lord's death, must not be restricted to the act of receiving the sacrament, because we do also show forth his death by the preaching of the gospel, and by private and public celebration of it, yea, by a perpetual study of sanctification and thankfulness. So that the showing forth of the Lord's death, by extolling, preaching, magnifying, and praising the same, according to the twenty-third section of the Confession of Faith, to which his argument hath reference, may not be expounded of the very act of receiving the sacrament. Neither do the words of the institution refuse, but easily admit, another showing forth of the Lord's death than that which is in the very act of receiving; for the word is not *quando*, but *quoties*. It is only said, "As often as ye eat this bread, and drink this cup, ye do show," &c. Which words cannot be taken only of the instant of eating and drinking.

Sect. 25. Now having so strongly proved the unlawfulness and idolatry of kneeling in the act of receiving the holy communion, let me add, *corollarii loco*, that the reader needs not to be moved with that which Bishop Lindsey, in the tail of his dispute about the head of kneeling, offers at a dead lift, namely, the testimonies of some modern doctors.

For, 1. What can human testimony avail against such a clear truth? 2. We have more testimonies of divines against kneeling

¹ Ubi supra, p. 112.

² Ibid., p. 101.

¹ Ubi supra.

than he hath for it. And here I perceive Dr Mortuone, fearing we should come to good speed this way,¹ would hold in our travel: "We are not ignorant (saith he) that many Protestant authors are most frequent in condemning the gesture of kneeling at the receiving of the holy communion."² 3. Testimonies against kneeling are gathered out of those very same divines whom the Bishop allegeth for it; for Didoclavius³ hath clear testimonies against it out of Calvin, Beza, and Martyr, whom yet the Bishop taketh to be for it.

Sect. 26. Neither yet need we here to be moved with Dr Burges's⁴ adventurous undertaking to prove that, in the most ancient times, before corruption of the sacrament began, the sacrament was received with an adoring gesture.

He shoots short of his proofs, and hits not the mark. One place in Tertullian, *de Oratione*, he hammers upon: *Similiter de stationum diebus non putant plerique sacrificiorum orationibus interveniendum, quod statio solvenda sit accepto corpore Domini. Ergo devotum Deo obsequium eucharistiae resolvit, an magis Deo obligat? Nonne solennior, erit statio tua, si et ad aram dei steteris? Accepto corpore Domini et reservato, utrumque salvum est, et participatio sacrificii, et executio officii.*

To these words the Doctor giveth this sense: That many withdrew themselves when they came to the celebration of the supper, because the body of our Lord, that is, the sacramental bread, being taken of the minister's hand, the station, i. e., standing, must be dissolved and left; and because standing on those days might not be left (as they thought), therefore they rather left the sacrament on those days than they would break the rule of standing on those days; therefore they forbore:

Which can have no reason but this, that taking the holy things at the table standing, yet they used not to partake them, i. e., eat the bread or drink the wine, in any other gesture than what was on the station days then forbidden, kneeling; and that Tertullian wishes them to come, though they might not then kneel, and to take the bread in public, standing at the table, and reserve it, and carry it away with them, and receive

¹ Partic. Def., cap. 3, sect. 38.

² Alt. Dam., p. 756, 782, 794.

³ Of the Lawfulness of Kneeling, cap. 22.

it at their own houses as they desired, kneeling.

Ans. The Doctor by this puts a weapon in our hands against himself; for if, when they had taken the bread of the minister's hand, their standing was to be left and dissolved, and Tertullian, by commending to them another gesture in the eating of the bread, not standing, then whether urgeth he that other gesture to be used in the public eating of the bread or the private? Not in the private; for his advice of reserving and eating it in private, cometh after, and is only put for a remedy or next best, in case they would not condescend to this course in public, *quod statio solvenda sit accepto corpore domini*. Needs, then, it must be understood of the public. Now, if in the public eating of the bread standing was to be left, which gesture was to come in place of it? Not kneeling.

For, 1. Tertullian saith¹ elsewhere: *Diebus dominicis jejuna ne fas ducimus, vel de geniculis adorare; eadem immunitate a die Paschæ ad Pentecostem usque gaudemus.*

2. The doctor himself saith, that upon these station days kneeling was restrained, not only in prayer, but in all divine service.

Wherefore, if, according to the Doctor's gloss, the gesture of standing was left or dissolved, that gesture which had come in place of it to be used in the partaking of the sacrament, can hardly be imagined to have been any other nor sitting.

Well, the doctor hath unhappily raised this spirit to disquiet himself: let him be-think how to lay him again. If he cannot, I will assay to make some help, and to lay him in this fashion. The station days were not the Lord's days, together with those fifty betwixt Easter and Pentecost (on which both fasting and kneeling were forbidden), as the Doctor thinketh, but they were certain set days of fasting; for they appointed the fourth and sixth day of the week (that is, Wednesday and Friday) for their stations, as Tertullian saith;² whose words we may understand by another place of Epiphanius,³ who writeth that the fast of the fourth and the sixth day was kept throughout all churches, and held to be an apostolical constitution. Howbeit herein they did err; for to appoint a certain time

¹ De Corona Militis.

² De Jejun., cap. 2, 14.

³ Hæres. 75.

of fasting to be kept by the whole church agreeth not with Christian liberty, and wanteth the example of Christ and his apostles, as Osiander noteth.¹ Always we see what was meant by station days, to wit, their set days of fifty, fasting, which were called station days, by a speech borrowed from a military custom, as Tertullian teacheth. For as soldiers kept those times and places which were appointed for their watches, and fasted all the while they continued in them, so did Christians upon their station days resort and meet in the place appointed, and there remained fasting till their station dissolved. The Doctor taketh upon him to confute those who understand by the station days set days of fasting; but all which he allegeth to the contrary is, that he findeth somewhere in Tertullian *statio* and *jejunia* put for different things. Now this helpeth him not, except he could find that *statio* and *stata jejunia* are put for different things; for no man taketh the stations to have been occasional, but only set fasts. Touching the meaning, then, of the words alleged by the Doctor (to give him his own reading of them, howbeit some read otherwise), thus we take it. There were many who came not to the sacrament upon the station days, because (in their opinion) the receiving thereof should break the station, i. e., the service of the day, and that because it should break their fast, a principal duty of the same. Tertullian sheweth they were in error, because their partaking of the sacrament should not break their station, but make it the more solemn and remarkable. But if they could not be drawn from that false persuasion of theirs, that the sacrament should break their fast, yet he wisheth them at least to come and stand at the table, and receive the sacrament into their hands, and take it away to eat after (for permitting whereof he had no warrant), so should they both partake the sacrament and also (according to their mind, and to their full contentment) keep their stations, which were often prorogated till even,² but ever and at least till the ninth hour.³ Finally, from this place, which the Doctor perverteth for kneeling, it appeareth that the gesture or posturo in receiving the sacrament used in that place where Tertullian lived, was standing; because, speaking of the receiving

of the sacrament, he saith, *Si et ad aram Dei steteris.*

Sect. 27. As for the rest of the testimonies Dr Burges produceth out of the fathers for kneeling,⁴ I need not insist upon them, for either they speak of the inward adoration of the heart, which we ought to direct unto Christ when we receive the sacrament (and this none of us denieth), or else they speak of adoring the sacrament; where, by the word *adoration*, we may not understand any divine worship, inward or outward, but a reverence of another nature called *veneration*. That this (which we deny not neither), and no more, is meant by the fathers when they speak of the adoration of the sacrament, Antonius de Dominis sheweth more copiously.⁵ And thus we have suffered the impetuous current of the Doctor's audacious promises, backed with a verbal discourse to go softly by us. *Quid dignum tanto tulit hic promissor hiatu?*

Sect. 28. Finally, If any be curious to know what gesture the ancient church did use in the receiving of the eucharist, to such I say, first of all, that Didoclavius maintaineth⁶ that which none of our opposites are able to intringe, namely, that no testimony can be produced which may evince that ever kneeling was used before the time of Hænorius III., neither is it less truly observed by the author of the *History of the Waldenses*,⁷ that bowing of the knees before the host was then only enjoined when the opinion of transubstantiation got place.

Next I say, the ancient gesture, whereof we read most frequently, was standing. Chrysostom, complaining of few communicants, saith⁸, *Frustra habetur quotidiana oblatio; frustra stamus ad altare, nemo est qui simul participet.* The century writers⁹ make out of Dionysius Alexandrinus's epistle to Xistus, bishop of Rome, that the custom of the church of Alexandria in receiving the sacrament, was, *ut mensæ assisterent.* It is also noted by Hospinian,⁷ that in the days of Tertullian the Christians *stantes sacramenta percipiebant.*

Thirdly, I say, since we all know that the primitive Christians did take the holy communion mixedly, and together with their

¹ Ubi supra, cap. 22, et 23.

² Rep. Eccl., lib. 5, cap. 6.

³ Alt. Dam., p. 784.

⁴ Lib. 1, cap. 1.

⁵ In Eph. i., serm. 3.

⁶ Cent. Magd., 3, cap. 6, col. 133.

⁷ De Orig. Templ., lib. 2, cap. 28.

¹ Hist. Eccl., cent. 4, lib. 2, cap. 22, p. 150.

² Magd., cent. 3, cap. 6, col. 135.

³ Epiphanius, ubi supra.

love-feasts, in imitation of Christ,¹ who, whilst he did eat his other supper, did also institute the eucharist; and since (as it is observed from 1 Cor. xi. 21, 33²) there was a twofold abuse in the church of Corinth: "one in their love-feasts, whilst that which should have served for the knitting of the knot of love was used to cut the cords thereof, in that every one (as he best liked) made choice of such as he would have to sit at table with him (the other either not tarried for, or shut out when they came, especially the poor). The other abuse (pulled in by the former) was, for that those which were companions at one table in the common feast communicated also in the sacred with the same separation, and severally from the rest of the church (and the poor especially) which was in their former banquets."

Since also we read that the same custom of joining the Lord's supper together with common feasts continued long after; for Socrates reporteth,³ that the Egyptians adjoining unto Alexandria, together with the inhabitants of Thebes, used to celebrate the communion upon the Sunday,⁴ after this manner, "when they have banqueted, filled themselves with sundry delicate dishes, in the evening, after service, they use to communicate." How, then, can any man think that the gesture then used in the Lord's supper was any other, than the same which was used in the love-feast or common supper? And what was that but the ordinary fashion of sitting at table? Since the Laodicean canon,⁵ which did discharge the love-feasts about the year 368, importeth no less than that the gesture used in them was sitting: *Non oportet in Basilicis seu ecclesiis Agapen facere et intus manducare, vel accubitus sternere*. Now, if not only divines of our side, but Papists also, put it out of doubt that Christ gave the eucharist to his apostles sitting, because being set down to the preceding supper, it is said, "*while as they did eat, he took bread,*" &c. (of which things I am to speak after-

ward), what doth hinder us to gather, in like manner, that forasmuch as those primitive Christians did take the Lord's supper whilst they did eat their own love-feasts, therefore they sat at the one as well as the other? And so I close with this collection. Whatsoever gesture in process of time crept into the Lord's supper otherwise than sitting, of it we may truly say, "from the beginning it was not so."

CHAPTER V.

THE FIFTH ARGUMENT AGAINST THE LAWFULNESS OF THE CEREMONIES TAKEN FROM THE MYSTICAL AND SIGNIFICANT NATURE OF THEM.

Sect. 1. That mystical significations are placed in the controverted ceremonies, and that they are ordained to be sacred signs of spiritual mysteries, to teach Christians their duties, and to express such holy and heavenly affections, dispositions, motions and desires, as are and should be in them,—it is confessed and avouched by our opposites. Saravia holdeth,¹ that by the sign of the cross we profess ourselves to be Christians; Bishop Mortoune calleth² the cross a sign of constant profession of Christianity; Hooker calleth³ it "Christ's mark applied unto that part where bashfulness appeareth, in token that they which are Christians should be at no time ashamed of his ignominy; Dr Burges⁴ maintaineth the using of the surplice to signify the pureness that ought to be in the minister of God; Paybody⁵ will have kneeling at the Lord's supper to be a signification of the humble and grateful acknowledging of the benefits of Christ. The prayer which the English service book appointeth bishops to use after the confirming of children by the imposition of hands, avoucheth that ceremony of confirmation for a sign whereby those children are certified of God's favour and good-will towards them. In the general, our opposites defend⁶

¹ Pareus in 1 Cor. xi. 21; et Calv., *ibid.*

² Cartwright in 1 Cor. xi., sect. 6.

³ Lib. 5, c. 22.

⁴ Quia Paulus has epulas sacramentum vocavit: Et quia scriptum est apud Lucam, similiter et calicem postquam cenavit.

⁵ Quæ etiam fuerunt ut arbitror causæ, cur illi Aegyptii de quibus loquitur Socrates, lib. 5, priusquam ad mysteria accederent, laute cenarent, scilicet Casanbon. Exerc. 16. 31.

⁶ Conc. Laodic., can. 28.

¹ N. Fratrl et Amico, art. 17.

² Patric. Def., cap. 1, sect. 6.

³ Eccl. Pol., lib. 5, sect. 65.

⁴ Of the Lawfulness of Kneeling, cap. 17, p. 52.

⁵ Apol. for Kneeling, part 3, cap. 2, sect. 15.

⁶ Sarav. de Divers. Grad. Minist. Evang., cap. 24, sect. 25; Dr Field, of the Church, lib. 4, cap. 31, p. 395; Ant. de Dom. Rep. Eccl., lib. 5, cap. num. 48, sect. 2.

that the church hath power to ordain such ceremonies, as by admonishing men of their duty, and by expressing such spiritual and heavenly affections, dispositions, motions, or desires, as should be in men, do thereby stir them up to greater fervour and devotion.

Sect. 2. But against the lawfulness of such mystical and significant ceremonies, thus we dispute: First, A chief part of the nature of sacraments is given unto those ceremonies when they are in this manner appointed to teach by their signification. This reason being alleged by the *Abridgement of the Lincoln ministers*, Paybody answereth,¹ that it is not a bare signification that makes a thing participate of the sacrament's nature, but such a signification as is sacramental, both in what is signified and how. *Ans.* 1. This is but to beg the question; for what other thing is alleged by us, but that a sacramental signification is placed in those ceremonies we speak of? 2. What calls he a sacramental signification, if a mystical resemblance and representation of some spiritual grace which God hath promised in his word be not it? and that such a signification as this is placed in the ceremonies, I have already made it plain, from the testimonies of our opposites. This, sure, makes those ceremonies so to encroach upon the confines and precincts of the nature and quality of sacraments, that they usurp something more than any rites which are not appointed by God himself can rightly do. And if they be not sacraments, yet, saith Hooker,² they are as sacraments. But in Augustine's dialect, they are not only as sacraments, but they themselves are sacraments. *Signa* (saith the father) *cum ad res divinas pertinent, sacramenta appellantur*; which testimony doth so master Dr Burges, that he breaketh out into this witless answer,³ That the meaning of Augustine was to show that the name of sacraments belongeth properly to divine things, and not to all signs of holy things. I take he would have said, "belongeth properly to the signs of divine things."

And here, beside that which Ames hath said against him, I add these two things: 1. That this distinction cannot be conceived which the Doctor maketh betwixt the signs of divine things and the signs of holy things. 2. That his other distinction

can as little be conceived, which importeth that the name of sacraments belongeth to divine things properly, and to all signs of holy things improperly.

Lastly, If we call to mind that which hath been evinced before, namely, that the ceremonies are not only thought to be mystically significant for setting forth and expressing certain spiritual graces, but also operative and available to the begetting of those graces in us, if not by the work wrought, at least by the work of the worker; for example, that the sign of the cross is not only thought by our opposites to signify that at no time we should be ashamed of the ignominy of Christ, but is also esteemed¹ to be a means to work our preservation from shame, and a most effectual teacher to avoid that which may deservedly procure shame; and that bishopping is not only thought to be a sign for certifying young children of God's favour and good-will towards them, but also an exhibitive sign,² whereby they receive strength against sin and temptation, and are assisted in all virtue.

If these things, I say, we call to mind, it will be more manifest that the ceremonies are given out for sacred signs of the very same nature that sacraments are of. For the sacraments are called by divines commemorative, representative and exhibitive signs; and such signs are also the ceremonies we have spoken of, in the opinion of Formalists.

Sect. 3. Mystical and significant ceremonies (to proceed to a second reason), ordained by men, can be no other than mere delusions, and serve only to feed men's minds with vain conceits. For to what other purpose do *signa instituta* serve, if it be not in the power of him who gives them institution to give or to work that which is signified by them?

Now, it is not in the power of prelates, nor of any man living, to give us these graces, or to work them in us, which they will have to be signified by their mystical and symbolical ceremonies. Wherefore Beza saith,³ well of such human rites as are thought to be significant: *Quoniam nulla res signis illis subit, propterea quod unius Dei est promittere, et suis promissionibus sigillum suum opponere; consequitur omnia illa commenta, inanes esse larvas,*

¹ Supra, cap. 4, sect. 4.

² *Ibid.*, sect. 5.

³ Antith. Papal. et Christian., art. 11.

¹ Apol., part 3, cap. 2.

² Eccl. Pol., lib. 4, sect. 1.

³ Ames. Fresh Sute, p. 223.

et vana opinione miseros homines illis propositis signis deludi. Dr Fulk thinks¹ he hath alleged enough against the significative and commemorative use of the sign of the cross, when he hath said that it is not ordained of Christ, nor taught by his apostles; from which sort of reasoning it followeth, that all significant signs which are not ordained of Christ, nor taught by his apostles, must be vain, false, and superstitious.

Sect. 4. Thirdly, To introduce significant sacred ceremonies into the New Testament other than the holy sacraments of God's own institution, were to reduce Judaism, and to impose upon us again the yoke of a ceremonial law, which Christ hath taken off.

Upon this ground doth Amianus Polanus reprehend the popish clergy,² for that they would be distinguished from laics by their priestly apparel in their holy actions, especially in the mass: *Illa vestium sacerdotalium distinctio et varietas, erat in veteri Testamento typica; veritate autem exhibita, quid amplius typos requirunt?*

Upon this ground also doth Perkins³ condemn all human significant ceremonies. "Ceremonies (saith he) are either of figure and signification, or of order. The first are abrogated at the coming of Christ," &c.

Upon the same ground doth Chemnitius condemn them,⁴ *Quod vero prætenditur, &c.* "But, whereas (saith he) it is pretended that by those rites of men's addition, many things are probably signified, admonished and taught,—hereto it may be answered, that figures do properly belong to the Old Testament, but those things which Christ would have to be taught in the New Testament, he would have them delivered and propounded, not by shadows, but by the light of the word; and we have a promise of the efficacy of the word, but not of figures invented by men."

Upon the same ground Junius⁵ findeth fault with ceremonies used for signification: *Istis elementis mundi (ut vocantur Col. ii.) Dominus et servator noluit nec docuit, ecclesiam suam informari.*

Lastly, We will consider the purpose of Christ whilst he said to the Pharisees,⁶ "Tho law and the prophets were until

John: from that time the kingdom of God is preached." He had in the parable of the unjust steward, and in the application of the same, spoken somewhat contemptibly of riches, which, when the Pharisees heard, they derided him, and that for this pretended reason (as is evident from the answer which is returned unto them), because the law promises the world's goods as rewards and blessings to the people of God, that by the temporal things which are set forth for types and shadows of eternal things, they might be instructed, helped, and led, as it were by the hand, to the contemplation, desire and expectation, of those heavenly and eternal things which are not seen. Now Christ did not only rip up the hypocrisy of their hearts, ver. 15, but also gave a formal answer to their pretended reason, by shewing how the law is by him perfected, ver. 16, yet not destroyed, ver. 17. Then will we observe how he teacheth that the law and the prophets are perfected, and so our point shall be plain. "The law and the prophets were until John," i. e., they did typify and prophesy concerning the things of the kingdom until John; for before that time the faithful only saw those things afar off, and by types, shadows, and figures, and the rudiments of the world, were taught to know them. "But from that time the kingdom of God is preached," i. e., the people of God are no longer to be instructed concerning the things of the kingdom of God by outward signs, or visible shadows and figures, but only by the plain word of the gospel; for now the kingdom of God *ἐγγελεῖται* is not typified as before, but plainly preached, as a thing exhibited to us, and present with us. Thus we see that to us, in the days of the gospel, the word only is appointed to teach the things belonging to the kingdom of God.

Sect. 5. If any man reply, that though after the coming of Christ we are liberated from the Jewish and typical significant ceremonies, yet ought we to embrace those ceremonies wherein the church of the New Testament placeth some spiritual signification:

I answer, 1. That which hath been said in this argument holdeth good against significant ceremonies in general. Otherwise, when we read of the abrogation of the ceremonial law, we should only understand the abrogation of those particular ordinances which Moses delivered to the Jews con-

cerning the ceremonies that were to endure to the coming of Christ, and so, notwithstanding all this, the church should still have power to set up new ceremonial laws instead of the old, even which and how many she listeth.

2. What can be answered to that which the *Abridgement* propoundeth¹ touching this matter? "It is much less lawful (say those ministers) for man to bring significant ceremonies into God's worship now than it was under the law. For God hath abrogated his own (not only such as prefigured Christ, but such also as served by their signification to teach moral duties), so as now (without great sin) none of them can be continued in the church, no, not for signification." Whereupon they infer: "If those ceremonies which God himself ordained to teach his church by their signification may not now be used, much less may those which man hath devised."

Sect. 6. Fourthly, Sacred significant ceremonies devised by man are to be reckoned among those images forbidden in the second commandment. Polanus saith,² that *omnis figura illicita* is forbidden in the second commandment. The Professors³ of Leyden call it *imaginem quamlibet, sive mente conceptam, sive manu effectam*.

I have showed elsewhere,⁴ that both in the writings of the fathers, and of Formalists themselves, sacraments get the name of images; and why, then, are not all significant and holy ceremonies to be accounted images? Now, the second commandment forbiddeth images made by the lust of man (that I may use Dr Burges's phrase⁵), therefore it forbiddeth also all religious similitudes, which are homogeneous unto them. This is the inference of the *Abridgement*, whereat Paybody starteth,⁶ and replieth, that the gestures which the people of God used in circumcision and baptism, the rending of the garment used in humiliation and prayer, Ezra ix. 5; 2 Kings xxii. 19, Jer. xxxvi. 24, lifting up the hands, kneeling with the knees, uncovering the head in the sacrament, standing and sitting at the sacrament, were, and are, significant in worship-

ping, yet are not forbidden by the second commandment.

Ans. There are three sorts of signs here to be distinguished. 1. Natural signs: so smoke is a sign of fire, and the dawning of the day a sign of the rising of the sun. 2. Customable signs; and so the uncovering of the head, which of old was a sign of pre-eminence, hath, through custom, become a sign of subjection. 3. Voluntary signs, which are called *signa instituta*; these are either sacred or civil. To appoint sacred signs of heavenly mysteries or spiritual graces is God's own peculiar, and of this kind are the holy sacraments. Civil signs for civil and moral uses may be, and are, commendably appointed by men, both in church and commonwealth; and thus the tolling of a bell is a sign given for assembling, and hath the same signification both in ecclesiastical and secular assemblies. Now, besides the sacred signs of God's own institution, we know that natural signs have also place in divine worship; thus kneeling in time of prayer signifieth the submission of our hearts and minds, the lifting up of our eyes and hands signifieth the elevation of our affections; the rending of the garments signified the rending of the heart by sorrow; standing with a religious respect to that which is before us signifieth veneration or reverence; sitting at table signifieth familiarity and fellowship. "For which of you (saith our Master), Luke xvii. 7, having a servant ploughing, or feeding cattle, will say unto him by and by, when he is come from the field, Go and sit down to meat?" All these signs have their significations from nature. And if it be said that howbeit sitting at our common tables be a sign natural to signify familiarity amongst us, yet nature hath not given such a signification to sitting at the Lord's table,—I answer, that sitting is a natural sign of familiarity, at what table soever it be used. At the heavenly table in the kingdom of glory, familiarity is expressed and signified by sitting: "Many shall come from the east and west, and shall sit down with Abraham," &c., Matt. xviii. 11. Much more, then, at the spiritual table in the kingdom of grace.

The difference betwixt other common tables and the Lord's table can infer no more, but that with great humility we ought to address ourselves unto it; yet still we are to make use of our familiarity with Christ *ut tanquam in eodem toro accom-*

¹ On Luke xxiv. 50.

² Synt. Theol., lib. 9, cap. 38.

³ Com. on Gal. iii. 24.

⁴ Exam., part 2, De Rit. in Admin. Sacram., p. 32.

⁵ Animad. in Bell. de Cult. Sanct., cap. 5.

⁶ Luke xvi. 16.

¹ Ames, Fresh Suite, p. 266.

² Synt. Theol., lib. 6, cap. 10, p. 58, 59.

³ Synop. Pur. Theol., disp. 19, thes. 4.

⁴ Supra, cap. 4, sect. 9.

⁵ Of the Lawfulness of Kneeling, p. 116.

⁶ Apol., part 3, cap. 2, sect. 4.

bentes, as saith Chrysostom.¹ Wherefore we do not there so look to Christ in his princely throne and glorious majesty, exalted far above all principalities and powers, as to forget that he is our loving and kind banqueter, who hath admitted us to that familiar fellowship with him which is signified by our sitting at his table.

Secondly, Customable signs have likewise place in divine service; for so a man coming into one of our churches in time of public worship, if he see the hearers covered, he knows by this customable sign that sermon is begun.

Thirdly, Civil or moral signs instituted by men for that common order and decency which is respect both in civil and sacred actions, have also place in the acts of God's worship. Thus a bason and a laver set before a pulpit are signs of baptism to be ministered; but common decency teacheth us to make the same use of a bason and a laver in civility which a minister maketh of them in the action of baptising. All our question is about sacred mystical signs. Every sign of this kind which is not ordained of God we refer to the imagery forbidden in the second commandment; so that in the tossing of this argument Paybody is twice naught, neither hath he said aught for evincing the lawfulness of sacred significant ceremonies ordained of men, which we impugn.

Sect. 7. Fifthly, The significancy and teaching office of mystical ceremonies invented by men, must be drawn under those doctrines of men condemned in the gospel. Wherefore was it that the divers washings of the Pharisees were rejected by Christ as a vain worship? Was it not because they were appointed for doctrines? "In vain (saith he) do they worship me, teaching for doctrines the commandments of men," Mark vii. 7.

The divers washings commanded in the law were fore-signifying to the people, and for teaching them what true and inward holiness God required of them. Now, the Pharisees, when they multiplied their washings of hands, of cups and pots, brazen vessels and tables, had the same respect of significancy before their eyes. *Neque enim alio spectabant* (that I may use the words of a Formalist²) *quam ut se sanctitatis*

¹ Homil. 27, in 1 Cor.

² Camer. Prædict., tom. 3, p. 37.

studiosos hoc externu ritu probarent. Neither have we any warrant to think that they had another respect than this. But the error was in their addition to the law, and in that they made their own ceremonial washings, which were only the commandments of men, to serve for doctrines, instructions and significations. For those washings, as they were significant, and taught what holiness or cleanness should be among the people of God, they are called by the name of worship; and as they were such significant ceremonies as were only commanded by men, they are reckoned for vain worship.

And further, I demand why are the Colossians, Col. ii. 20—22, rebuked for subjecting themselves to those ordinances,—"Touch not, taste not, handle not?" We see that those ordinances were not bare commandments, but commandments under the colour of doctrines, to wit, as law commanded a difference of meats, for signifying that holiness which God would have his people formed unto; so these false teachers would have the same to be signified and taught by that difference of meats and abstinence which they of themselves, and without the commandment of God, had ordained.

Moreover, if we consider how that the word of God is given unto us "for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness, that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works," 2 Tim. iii. 16, 17, it cannot but be evident how superfluously, how superstitiously, the office of sacred teaching and mystical signification is given to dumb and lifeless ceremonies ordained of men, and, consequently, how justly they are taxed as vain worship. We hold, therefore, with the worthiest of our divines, *nullam doctrinam, nullum sacram signum debere inter pios admitti, nisi a Deo profecta esse constet.*

Sect. 8. To these reasons which I have put in order against men's significant ceremonies, I will add a pretty history before I go further.

When the Superior of the Abbey of St. Andrews² was disputing with John Knox about the lawfulness of the ceremonies devised by the church, to decorate the sacra-

¹ Calv. in Matt. xxi. 25.

² Hist. of the Church of Scotland, lib. 1, p. 157—159.

ments and other service of God, Knox answered: "The church ought to do nothing but in faith, and ought not to go before, but is bound to follow the voice of the true Pastor." The Superior replied, that "every one of the ceremonies hath a godly signification, and therefore they both proceed from faith, and are done in faith." Knox replieth: "It is not enough that man invent a ceremony, and then give it a signification according to his pleasure; for so might the ceremonies of the Gentiles, and this day the ceremonies of Mahomet be maintained. But if that anything proceed from faith it must have the word of God for the assurance," &c. The Superior answereth: "Will ye bind us so strait that we may do nothing without the express word of God? What, and I ask drink? think ye that I sin? and yet I have not God's word for me."

Knox here telleth him, first, that if he should either eat or drink without the assurance of God's word, he sinned; "for saith not the Apostle, speaking even of meat and drink, that the creatures are sanctified unto men by the word and prayer? The word is this: all things are clean to the clean: Now let me hear thus much of your ceremonies, and I shall give you the argument?"

But secondly, He tells him that he compared indiscreetly together profane things with holy; and that the question was not of meat and drink, wherein the kingdom of God consisteth not, but of matters of religion, and that we may not take the same freedom in the using of Christ's sacraments that we may do in eating and drinking, because Moses commanded, "All that the Lord thy God commanded thee to do, that do thou to the Lord thy God; add nothing to it, diminish nothing from it." The Superior now saith that he was dry, and thereupon desireth the grey friar Arbugkill to follow the argument; but he was so pressed with the same that he was confounded in himself, and the Superior ashamed of him:—

Dicite Io Pæan, et Io bis dicite Pæan.

Sect. 9. As for the examples alleged by our opposites out of Scripture for justifying their significant ceremonies, they have been by our propugners of evangelical simplicity so often and so fully answered, that here I need do no more but point at them. Of

the days of Purim and feast of dedication I am to speak afterward. In the meanwhile, our opposites cannot, by these examples, strengthen themselves in this present argument, except they could prove that the feast of dedication was lawfully instituted, and that the days of Purim were appointed for a religious festivity, and that upon no such extraordinary warrant as the church hath not ever and always. The rite which Abraham commanded his servant to use when he swore to him, namely, the putting of his hand under his thigh, Gen. xxiv. 2, maketh them as little help; for it was but a moral sign of that civil subjection, reverence and fidelity which inferiors owe unto superiors, according to the judgment of Calvin, Junius, Pareus, and Tremellius, all upon that place. That altar which was built by the Reubenites, Gadites, and half tribe of Manasseh, Josh. xxii., had (as some think) not a religious, but a moral use, and was not a sacred, but a civil sign, to witness that those two tribes and the half were of the stock and lineage of Israel; which, if it were once called in question, then their fear (deducing the connection of causes and consequents) led them in the end to forecast this issue: "In time to come your children might speak unto our children, saying, What have you to do with the Lord God of Israel? for the Lord hath made Jordan a border betwixt us and you," &c. Therefore, to prevent all apparent occasions of such doleful events, they erected the pattern of the Lord's altar, *ut vinculum sit fraternæ conjunctionis*.¹

And besides all this, there is nothing which can urge us to say that the two tribes and the half did commendably in the erecting of this altar.² Calvin finds two faults in their proceeding. 1. In that they attempted such a notable and important innovation without advising with their brethren of the other tribes, and especially without inquiring the will of God by the high priest. 2. Whereas the law of God commanded only to make one altar, forasmuch as God would be worshipped only in one place, they did inordinately, scandalously, and with appearance of evil, erect another altar; for every one who should look upon it could not but presently think that they had forsaken the law, and were setting up a strange

¹ Calv. in Josh. xxii.

² Ibid.

and degenerate rite. Whether also that altar which they set up for a pattern of the Lord's altar, was one of the images forbidden in the second commandment, I leave it to the judicious reader to ruminate upon. But if one would gather from ver. 33, that the priest, and the princes, and the children of Israel, did allow of that which the two tribes and the half had done, because it is said, "The thing pleased the children of Israel, and the children of Israel blessed God, and did not intend to go up against them in battle."

I answer, the Hebrew text hath it thus: "And the word was good in the eyes of the children of Israel," &c.; that is, the children of Israel blessed God for the word which Phinehas and the ten princes brought to them, because thereby they understood that the two tribes and the half had not turned away from following the Lord, nor made them an altar for burnt-offerings or sacrifice; which was enough to make them (the nine tribes and a half) desist from their purpose of going up to war against their brethren, to shed their blood. Again, when Phinehas and the ten princes say to the Reubenites, Gadites, and the half tribe of Manasseh, This day we perceive that the Lord is among us, "because ye have not committed this trespass against the Lord," they do not exempt them from all prevarication; only they say *signanter*, "this trespass," to wit, of turning away from the Lord, and building an altar for sacrifice, whereof they were accused. Thus we see that no approbation of that which the two tribes and the half did, in erecting the altar, can be drawn from the text.

Sect. 10. But to proceed, our opposites allege for another example against us, a new altar built by Solomon, 1 Kings viii. 64. In which place there is no such thing to be found as a new altar built by Solomon; but only that he sanctified the pavement of the inner court, that the whole court might be as an altar, necessity so requiring, because the brazen altar of the Lord was not able to contain so many sacrifices as then were offered. The building of synagogues can make as little against us.

For, 1. After the tribes were settled in the land of promise, synagogues were built, in the case of an urgent necessity, because all Israel could not come every Sabbath day to the reading and expounding of the law in the place which God had chosen that his

name might dwell there. What hath that case to do with the addition of our unnecessary ceremonies?

2. If Formalists will make any advantage of the building of synagogues, they must prove that they were founded, not upon the extraordinary warrant of prophets, but upon that ordinary power which the church retaineth still. As for the love-feasts used in the primitive church, 1. They had no religious state in divine worship, but were used only as moral signs of mutual charity. The Rhemists¹ will have them to be called *cœnas dominicas*. But what saith Cartwright against them? "We grant that there were such feasts used in times past, but they were called by the name of *ἀγάραι* or love-feasts, not by the name of the Lord's supper; neither could one without sacrilege give so holy a name to a common feast, which never had ground out of the word, and which after, for just cause, was thrust out by the word of God." 2. If it be thought that they were used as sacred signs of Christian charity because they were eaten in the church, I answer, the eating of them in the church is forbidden by the Apostle.² "What! (saith he) have ye not houses to eat and to drink in? or despise ye the church of God?" *Aperte vetat* (saith Pareus),³ *commensationes in ecclesia, quocunque fuco pingantur. Vocabant ἀγάρας charitates; sed nihil vinus erant. Erant schismatum fomenta. Singule enim secte suas instituebant.* And a little after: *Aliquæ ecclesiæ obtemperasse videntur. Nam Justinî temporibus Romana ecclesia ἀγάρας non habuit.* Concerning the kiss of charity used in those times, 2 Cor. xiii. 22, we say in like manner that it was but a moral sign of that reconciliation, friendship and amity, which showed itself as well at holy assemblies as other meetings in that kind and courtesy, but with all chaste salutation, which was then in use.

Sect. 11. As for the veils wherewith the Apostle would have women covered whilst they were praying (that is, in their hearts following the public and common prayer), or prophesying (that is, singing, 1 Sam. x. 10; 1 Chron. xxv. 1), they are worthy to be covered with shame as with a garment who allege this example for sacred significant ceremonies of human institution. This

¹ On 1 Cor. xi. sect. 6.
² Com. in illum locum.

covering was a moral sign for that comely and orderly distinction of men and women which civil decency required in all their meetings; wherefore that distinction of habits which they used for decency and comeliness in their common behaviour and conversation, the Apostle will have them, for the same decency and comeliness, still to retain in their holy assemblies. And further, the Apostle sheweth that it is also a natural sign, and that nature itself teacheth it; therefore he urgeth it both by the inferiority or subjection of the woman, ver. 3, 8, 9 (for covering was then a sign of subjection), and by the long hair which nature gives to a woman, ver. 25; where he would have the artificial covering to be fashioned in imitation of the natural. What need we any more? Let us see nature's institution, or the Apostle's recommendation, for the controverted ceremonies (as we have seen them for women's veils), and we yield the argument.

Last of all, the sign of imposition of hands helpeth not the cause of our opposites, because it has the example of Christ and the apostles, and their disciples, which our ceremonies have not; yet we think not imposition of hands to be any sacred or mystical sign, but only a moral, for designation of a person: let them who think more highly or honourably of it look to their warrants.

Thus have I thought it enough to take a passing view of these objected instances, without marking narrowly all the impertinencies and falsehoods which here we find in the reasoning of our opposites. One word more, and so an end. Dr Burges would comprehend the significancy of sacred ecclesiastical ceremonies, for stirring men up to the remembrance of some mystery of piety or duty to God, under that edification which is required in things that concern order and decency by all divines.

Alas! what a sorry conceit is this? Divines, indeed, do rightly require that those alterable circumstances of divine worship which are left to the determination of the church be so ordered and disposed as they may be profitable to this edification. But this edification they speak of is no other than that which is common to all our actions and speeches. Are we not required to do all things unto edifying, yea, to speak as that our speech may be profitable unto edifying? Now, such significations as we have

showed to be given to the ceremonies in question, as, namely, to certify a child of God's favour and goodwill towards him,—to betoken that at no time Christians should be ashamed of the ignominy of Christ,—to signify the pureness that ought to be in the minister of God,—to express the humble and grateful acknowledgments of the benefits of Christ, &c.,—belong not to that edification which divines require in things prescribed by the church concerning order and decency, except of every private and ordinary action, in the whole course of our conversation, we either deny that it should be done unto edifying, or else affirm that it is a sacred significant ceremony.

CHAPTER VI.

THAT THE LAWFULNESS OF THE CEREMONIES IS FALSELY GROUNDED UPON THE HOLY SCRIPTURE; WHERE SUCH PLACES AS ARE ALLEGED BY OUR OPPOSITES, EITHER FOR ALL THE CEREMONIES IN GENERAL, OR FOR ANY ONE OF THEM IN PARTICULAR, ARE VINDICATED FROM THEM.

Sect. 1. It remaineth now to examine the warrants which our opposites pretend for the lawfulness of the ceremonies. But I perceive they know not well what ground to take hold on. For instance whereof, Hooker defendeth the lawfulness of festival days by the law of nature.¹ Dr Downname groundeth the lawfulness of them on the law of God,² making the observation of the sabbaths of rest appointed by the church, such as the feasts of Christ's nativity, passion, &c., to be a duty commanded in the law of God, and the not observing of them to be a thing forbidden by the same law. But Bishop Lindsey proveth the lawfulness of those holidays³ from the power of the church to make laws in such matters. "As for the Lord's day (saith he) which has succeeded to the Jewish Sabbath, albeit God hath commanded to sanctify it, yet neither is the whole public worship, nor any part of it appropriated to that time; but lawfully the same may be performed upon any other convenient day of the week, of the month,

¹ Eccl. Pol. lib. 5, sect. 69.

² On Præc. 4.

³ Epist. to the Pastors of the Church of Scotland.

or of the year, as the church shall think expedient. Upon this ground Zanchius affirmed, *Ecclesie Christi liberum esse quos velit præter dominicos dies sibi sanctificandos deligere*. And by this warrant did the primitive church sanctify those five anniversary days of Christ's nativity," &c.

Nay, let us observe how one of them wavereth from himself in seeking here some ground to rest upon. Paybody groundeth the lawfulness of kneeling at the sacrament on nature, part 2, cap. 4, sect. 1; on the act of Parliament, part 3, cap. 1, sect. 31; on an ecclesiastical canon, part 3, cap. 1, sect. 33; on the king's sovereign authority, part 3, cap. 1, sect. 36. Yet again he saith, that this kneeling is grounded upon the commandment of God, part 3, cap. 3, sect. 11.

Well, I see our opposites sometimes warrant the lawfulness of the ceremonies from the law of God, sometimes from the law of man, and sometimes from the law of nature; but I will prove that the lawfulness of those ceremonies we speak of can neither be grounded upon the law of God, nor the law of man, nor the law of nature, and by consequence that they are not lawful at all; so that, besides the answering of what our opposites allege for the lawfulness of them, we shall have a new argument to prove them unlawful.

Sect. 2. I begin with the law of God. And, first, let us see what is alleged from Scripture for the ceremonies in general; then, after, let us look ever particulars. There is one place which they will have in mythology to stand for the head of Medusa, and it they still object to us for all their ceremonies: even that of the Apostle, "Let all things be done decently and in order," 1 Cor. xiv. 40. What they have drawn out of this place, Dr Burges¹ hath refined in this manner. He distinguisheth betwixt *præceptum* and *probatum*; and will have the controverted ceremonies to be allowed of God, though not commanded. And if we would learn how these ceremonies are allowed of God, he gives us to understand,² that it is by commanding the general kind to which these particulars do belong. If we ask what is this general kind commanded of God, to which these ceremonies do belong? he resolves us,³ that it is order and decency:

¹ Of the Lawfulness of Kneeling, p. 3.

² Ibid., p. 11.

³ Ibid., p. 4.

And if further we demand, how such ceremonies as are instituted and used to stir up men, in respect of their signification, unto the devout remembrance of their duties to God, are in such an institution and use, matters of mere order? as a magisterial dictator of *quodlibets*, he tells us¹ that they are matters of mere order, *sensu largo*, in a large sense. But lastly, if we doubt where he readeth of any worship commanded in the general, and not commanded, but only allowed in the particular, he informeth us,² that in the free-will offerings, when a man was left at liberty to offer a bullock, goat, or sheep at his pleasure, if he chose a bullock to offer, that sacrifice, in that particular, was not commanded, but only allowed. What should I do, but be *surdus contra absurdum*? Nevertheless, least this jolly fellow think himself more jolly than he this, I answer, 1st, How absurd a tenet is this, which holdeth that there is some particular worship of God allowed, and not commanded? What new light is this which maketh all our divines to have been in the mist, who have acknowledged no worship of God, but that which God hath commanded? Who ever heard of commanded and allowed worship? As for the instances of the free-will offerings, Ames hath answered sufficiently,³ "that though the particulars were not, nor could not be, determined by a distinct rule in general, yet they were determined by the circumstances, as our divines are wont to answer the Papists about their vows, councils, supererogations: *not by a general law, but by concurrence of circumstances*. So Dent. xvi. 10, Moses sheweth that the freest offerings were to be according as God had blessed them; from whence it followeth, it had been sin for any Israelite whom God had plentifully blessed, to offer a pair of pigeons, instead of a bullock or two, upon his own mere pleasure. Where that proportion was observed, the choice of a goat before a sheep, or a sheep before a goat, was no formal worship."

Sect. 3. How will Dr Burges make it appear that the English ceremonies do belong to that order and decency which is commanded? Bellarmine⁴ would have all the ceremonies of the church of Rome

¹ Ibid., p. 14.

² Ibid., p. 6, 7.

³ Fresh Suite, p. 153.

⁴ De Effect. Sacr., lib. 2, cap. 31.

comprehended under order and decency, and therefore warranteth them by that precept of the Apostle, "let all things be done decently and in order." The one shall as soon prove his point as the other, and that shall be never.

For, 1. The Apostle only commandeth that each action and ceremony of God's worship be decently and orderly performed, but gives us no leave to excogitate or devise new ceremonies, which have not been instituted before. He hath spoken in that chapter of assembling in the church, prophesying and preaching, praying and praising there.

Now let all these things, and every other action of God's worship, ceremonies and all, be done decently and in order. *Licit ergo Paulus*, &c. "Albeit, therefore (saith John Bastwick),¹ Paul hath committed to the church the judging both of decency and order, yet hath he not granted any liberty of such mystical ceremonies as by their more inward signification do teach the duty of piety; for since the whole liberty of the church, in the matter of divine worship, is exercised only in order and decency, it followeth that they do impudently scorn both God and the Scriptures, who do extend this liberty to greater things, and such as are placed above us. Most certain it is, that Christ, the doctor of the church, hath, by his own written and sealed word, abundantly expounded unto us the will of God. Neither is there further need of any ceremonies, which by a secret virtue may instruct us: neither is it less evident that order consisteth not in the institution or use of new things, but only in the right placing of things which have been instituted before." "Decency (saith Balduino)² is opposed to levity, and order to confusion." *Spectat autem hic ordo potissimum ad ritus ecclesie in officiis sacris in quibus nullum debet esse scandalum, nulla confusio*.

Then, in his judgment, order is not to the rites of the church a general kind, but only a concomitant circumstance; neither are the rites of the church comprehended under order as particulars under the general kind to which they belong; but order belongeth to the rites of the church as an adjunct to the subject. And, I pray, must not the rights of the church be managed

with decency and order? If so, then must our opposites either say that order is managed with order, which is to speak nonsense, or else, that the rights of the church are not comprehended under order. But if not, then it followeth that the rites of the church are to be managed with levity, confusion, and scandal; for every action that is not done in decency and in order must needs be done scandalously and confusedly. 2. Order and decency, whether taken *large* or *stricto sensu*, always signify such a thing as ought to be in all human actions, as well civil as sacred; for will any man say, that the civil actions of men are not to be done decently and in order? The directions of order and decency¹ are not (we see) *propria religionis*, but as Balduino sheweth² out of Gregory Nazianzen, order is in all other things as well as in the church. Wherefore sacred significant ceremonies shall never be warranted by the precept of order and decency, which have no less in civility than in religion.

Sect. 4. Now to the particulars. And first, that which Christ did, Matt. xix. 13, 15, cannot commend unto us the bishopping or confirmation of children by prayer and imposition of hands; for as Maldonat saith rightly,³ "*Hebræorum consuetudinem fuisse, ut qui majores erant et aliqua pollebant divina gratia, manuum impositione inferioribus benedicerent, constat ex Gen. xlviii. 14, 15, hac ergo ratione adducti parentes, infantes ad Christum afferbant, ut impositis manibus illis benediceret*. And as touching this blessing of children and imposition of hands upon them (saith Cartwright),⁴ it is peculiar unto our Saviour Christ, used neither by his disciples nor his apostles, either before or after his ascension, whereunto maketh that the children being brought, that he should pray over them, he did not pray for them, but blessed them, that is to say, commended them to be blessed, thereby to shew his divine power. These being also yet infants, and in their swaddling clouts, as by the word which the evangelist useth, and as by our Saviour Christ's taking them into his arms, doth appear, being also, in all likelihood, unbaptised. Last of all, their confirmation is a notable derogation unto the holy sa-

¹ Ames, Bell. Enerv., tom. I, lib. 3, cap. 7.

² Ubi supra.

³ Com. in illum locum.

⁴ On Matt. xix., sect. 9.

¹ In Prefat. Elench. Relig. Papistic.

² De Cas. Consc., lib. 4, cap. 11.

crament of baptism, not alone in that it presumeth the sealing of that which was sealed sufficiently by it; but also in that, both by asseveration of words, and by speciality of the minister that giveth it, it is even preferred unto it."

Sect. 5. The act of Perth about kneeling would draw some commendation to this ceremony from those words of the psalm, "O come let us worship and bow down, let us kneel before the Lord our Maker," Psal. xcv. 6. Which is as if one should argue thus: We may worship before the Lord, therefore before a creature; we may kneel in an immediate worship of God, therefore in a mediate; for who seeth not that the kneeling there spoken of is a kneeling in the action of solemn praise and joyful noise of singing unto the Lord? I wish you, my masters, more sober spirits, that ye may fear to take God's name in vain, even his word which he hath magnified above all his name.

Dr Forbesse goeth about to warrant private baptism,¹ by Philip's baptising the eunuch, there being no greater company present, so far as we can gather from the narration of Luke, Acts viii.; as likewise by Paul and Silas's baptising the jailer and all his in his own private house, Acts xvi. Touching the first of those places, we answer, 1. How thinks he that a man of so great authority and charge was alone in his journey? We suppose a great man travelling in a chariot must have some number of attendants, especially having come to a solemn worship at Jerusalem. 2. What Philip then did, tho extraordinary direction of the Spirit guided him unto it, ver. 29, 39. As to the other place, there was, in that time of persecution, no liberty for Christians to meet together in temples and public places, as now there is. Wherefore the example of Paul and Silas doth prove the lawfulness of the like deed in the like case.

Sect. 6. Hooker murthereth some such matter as a commendation of the sign of the cross from these two places, Ezek. ix. 4; Rev. vii. 3; alleging, that because in the forehead nothing is more plain to be seen than the fear of contumely and disgrace, therefore the Scripture describeth them marked of God in the forehead, whom his mercy hath undertaken to keep from final confusion and shame.² Bellarmine allegeth

¹ Iren., lib. 2, cap. 7, p. 6. 7.
² Eccl. Pol. lib. 5, sect. 65.

for the cross the same two places.¹ But for answer to the first, we say, that neither the sign whereof we read in that place, nor yet the use of it can make aught for them. As for the sign itself; albeit the ancients did interpret the sign of the letter *Tau*, to have been the sign of the cross, yet saith Junius, *Bona illorum venia; T quidem Græcorum, Latinorumque majusculum, crucis quodam modo signum videtur effingere, verum hoc ad litteram Hæbræorum Tau non potest pertinere. Deinde ne ipsum quidem Græcorum Latinorumque T, formam crucis quæ apud veteres in usu erat quum sumebantur supplicia, representat.*²

Whereupon dissenting from the ancients, he delivers his own judgment, that *tau* in this place is taken *technicos*, for that sign or mark of the letter wherewith the Lord commanded to mark the elect for their safety and preservation. And so there was no mystery to be sought in that letter more than in any other. As for the use of that mark wherewith the elect in Jerusalem were at that time sealed, it was only for distinction and separation. It had the same use which that sprinkling of the posts of the doors had, Exod. xii. 7, only the foreheads of men and women, and not the posts of doors were here marked, because only the remnant according to election, and not whole families promiscuously, were at this time to be spared, as Junius noteth.

But the use of the sign of the cross pretended by Formalists, is not to separate us in the time of judgment, but to teach that at no time we ought to be ashamed of the ignominy of Christ.

Shortly, the sign wherewith they in Jerusalem were marked, was for preservation from judgment; but the sign of the cross is used for preservation from sin. Thus we see, that neither the sign nor the use of it, had any affinity with the cross. Now, the surest interpretation of that place, Ezek. ix. 4, is to take *Tau* for an appellative noun, signifying generally and indefinitely a mark or sign, so that there is no mark determined by this word; only there was a commandment given to set a certain mark, some sign or other, upon the foreheads of the elect. So have our English translators taken the place.

This exposition is confessed by Gasper

¹ De Imag. Sanct., cap. 29.
² Com. in illum locum.

Sanctius,¹ to be followed almost by all the Hebrew masters, and by the most ancient interpreters, to wit, the Septuagint, Aquilla and Symmachus. The word beareth this gloss, even according to the confession of those who expound it otherwise in this place, to wit, for an image or representation of the cross. *Tau* (saith Sanctius) *commune nomen est, quod signum indefinite significat.*² *Tau* is expounded by Bellarmine³ to signify *signum* or *terminus*. Well then: our adversaries themselves can say nothing against our interpretation of the word *tau*. We have also Buxtorff for us, who in his Hebrew Lexicon turneth *tau* to *signum*, and for this signification he citeth both this place, Ezek. ix. 4, and Job. xxxi. 35. *Tau* *signum meum*.

Lastly, If *tau* be not put for a common appellative noun, signifying a mark or sign, but for the figure or character of the letter *tau* as an image of the cross, by all likelihood this character only should have been put in the Hebrew text, and not the noun fully written; *vehithvith a tau*, and mark a mark. As to the other place,⁴ Rev. vii. 3, Pareus observeth, that there is no figure or form of any sign there expressed, and he thinks that seal was not outward and visible, but the same whereof we read, 2 Tim. ii. 19, and Rev. xiv. 1, which cannot be interpreted *de signo transeunte; nam Christianum semper nomen filii, et patris in fronte oportet gerere*, saith Junius.⁵

Dr Fulk, on Rev. vii. 3, saith, that the sign here spoken of is proper to God's elect, therefore not the sign of the cross, which many reprobates have received.

Sect. 7. Bishop Andrews will have the feast of Easter drawn from that place,⁶ 1 Cor. v. 8, where he saith, there is not only a warrant, but an order for the keeping of it; and he will have it out of doubt that this feast is of apostolical institution, because after the times of the apostles, when there was a contention about the manner of keeping Easter, it was agreed upon by all, that it should be kept; and when the one side alleged for them St. John, and the other St. Peter, it was acknowledged by both that the feast was apostolical.

I answer, The testimony of Socrates deserveth more credit than the Bishop's naked conclusion.

"I am of opinion (saith Socrates¹), that as many other things crept in of custom in sundry places, so the feast of Easter to have prevailed among all people, of a certain private custom and observation."

But whereas Bishop Lindsey, in defence of Bishop Andrews, replieth, that Socrates propoundeth this for his own opinion only:

I answer, that Socrates, in that chapter, proveth his opinion from the very same ground which Bishop Andrews wresteth to prove that this feast is apostolical. For while as in that hot controversy about the keeping of Easter, they of the East alleged John the apostle for their author, and they of the West alleged Peter and Paul for themselves, "Yet (saith Socrates), there is none that can shew in writing any testimony of theirs for confirmation and proof of their custom. And hereby I do gather, that the celebration of the feast of Easter came up more of custom than by any law or canon."

Sect. 7. Downname (as I touched before) allegeth the fourth commandment for holidays of the church's institution. But Dr Bastwick allegeth more truly the fourth commandment against them:² "Six days shalt thou labour." This argument I have made good elsewhere; so that now I need not insist upon it. There are further two examples alleged against us for holidays, out of Esth. ix. 17, 18, 27, 28, and John x. 22.

Whereunto we answer, 1. That both those feasts were appointed to be kept with the consent of the whole congregation of Israel and body of the people, as is plain from Esth. ix. 32, and 1 Maccab. iv. 59. Therefore, they have no show of making aught of such feasts as ours, which are tyrannically urged upon such as in their consciences do condemn them.

2. It appears, that the days of Purim were only appointed to be days of civil mirth and gladness, such as are in use with us, when we set out bonfires, and other tokens of civil joy, for some memorable benefit which the kingdom or commonwealth hath received. For they are not called the holidays of Purim, but simply the days of Purim,—"A day of feasting and of sending portions one to another," Esth. ix. 19, 22. No

¹ Com. in Ezek. ix. 4.
² Ibid.
³ Gram. Hebr., part 1. cap. I.
⁴ Com. in illum locum.
⁵ Animad. ad Bell. de Imag. Sanct., cap. 29.
⁶ Serm. on that place.

¹ Lib. 5, cap. 22.
² In Epist. ad quendam qui a Reform. Relig. ad Papism. defecerat.

word of any worship of God in those days. And whereas it seemeth to Bishop Lindsey,¹ that these days were holy, because of that rest which was observed upon them; he must know that the text interpreteth itself, and it is evident from ver. 16 and 22, that this rest was not a rest from labour, for waiting upon the worshipping of God, but only a rest from their enemies.

Sect. 9. But Bishop Andrews goeth about to prove by six reasons, that the days of Purim were holidays, and not days of civil joy and solemnity only.²

First, saith he, it is plain by verse 31, they took it in *animas*, upon their souls,—a soul matter they made of it: there needs no soul for *feria* or *festum*, play or feasting. They bound themselves *super animas suas*, which is more than *upon themselves*, and would not have been put in the margin, but stood in the text: thus he reprehendeth the English translators, as you may perceive.

Ans. The Bishop could not be ignorant that *nepesch* signifieth *corpus animatum*, as well as *anima*, and that the Hebrews do not always put this word for our souls, but very often for ourselves. So Psal. vii. 2. and Psal. lix. 3, we read *naphschi*,—my soul for me; and Psal. xlv. 25,—*naphschenu*, our soul for we; and Gen. xlv. 26, *col-nepesch—omnis animæ*, for omnes homines.

What have we any further need of testimonies? Six hundred such are in the holy text. And in this place, Esth. ix. 31, what can be more plain, than that *nighal-naphscham*, upon their soul, is put for *nghalehem*, upon themselves, especially since *nghalehem* is found to the same purpose, both in ver. 27 and 31.

If we will make the text agree well with itself, how can we but take both these for one? But proceed we with the Bishop. Secondly, saith he, the bond of it reacheth to all that *religioni eorum voluerunt copulari*, ver. 27, then, a matter of religion it was, had reference to that: what need any joining in religion for a matter of good fellowship?

Ans. There is no word in the text of religion. Our English translation reads it, "all such as joined themselves unto them." Montanus, *omnes adjunctos*; Tremellius, *omnes qui essent se adjuncturi eis*. The

old Latin version read it indeed as the Bishop doth.

But no such thing can be drawn out of the word *hannilvinn*, which is taken from the radix *lava*, signifying simply, and without any adjection, *adhesit*, or *adjunxit se*. But let it be so, that the text meaneth only such as were to adjoin themselves to the religion of the Jews, yet why might not the Jews have taken upon them a matter of civility, not only for themselves, but for such also as were to be joined with them in religion. Could there be nothing premised for proselytes, but only a matter of religion?

Alas! Is this our antagonist's great Achilles, who is thus falling down and succumbing to me, a silly stripling? Yet let us see if there be any more force in the remnant of his reasons.

For a third, he tells us that it is expressly termed a *rite* and a *ceremony*, at verses 23 and 28, as the fathers read them.

In the 23rd verse we have no more but *susceperunt*, as Pagnini, or *reecerunt*, as Tremellius reads it: but to read, *susceperunt in solemnem ritum*, is to make an addition to the text.

The 28th verse calls not this feast a rite, but only *dies memorati*, or *celebres*. And what if we grant that this feast was a rite? might it not, for all that, be merely civil? No, saith the Bishop, "rites, I trust, and ceremonies, pertain to the church, and to the service of God."

Ans. The version which the Bishop followed, hath a rite, not a ceremony. Now, of rites, it is certain that they belong to the commonwealth as well as to the church. For *in jure politico, sui sunt imperati et solemnes ritus*, saith Junius.¹

Fourthly, saith the Bishop, they fast and pray here in this verse (meaning the 31st), fast the eve, the fourteenth, and so then the day following to be holiday of course.

Ans. The Latin version, which the Bishop followeth, and whereupon he buildeth this reason, readeth the 31st verse very corruptly, and no ways according to the original, as will easily appear to any who can compare them together. Wherefore the best interpreters take the fasting and prayer spoken of verse 31, to be meant of the time before their delivery. Now, after they were delivered, they decreed that the mat-

ters of their fasting and crying should be remembered upon the days of Purim, which were to solemnise that preservation, *quam jejunie et precibus fuerant a Deo consequenti*, as saith Tremellius.

But Fifthly, saith he, with fasting and prayer (here), alms also is enjoined (at ver. 22), these three will make it past a day of revels or mirth.

I have answered already, that their fasting and praying are not to be referred to the days of Purim, which were memorials of their delivery, but to the time past, when, by the means of fasting and prayer, they did impetrate their delivery, before ever the days of Purim were heard of; and as touching alms, it can make no holiday, because much alms may be, and hath been given upon days of civil joy and solemnity.

If the Bishop help not himself with his sixth reason, he is like to come off with no great credit. May we then know what that is?

Lastly, saith he, as a holiday the Jews ever kept it,—have a peculiar set service for it in their *Seders*, set psalms to sing, set lessons to read, set prayers to say, good and godly all,—none but as they have used from all antiquity.

Ans. 1. The Bishop could not have made this word good, that the Jews did ever and from all antiquity keep the days of Purim in this fashion.

2. This manner of holding that feast, whensoever it began, had no warrant from the first institution, but was (as many other things) taken up by the Jews in after ages; and so the Bishop proveth not the point which he taketh in hand, namely, that the days spoken of in this text were enacted or appointed to be kept as holidays.

3. The service which the Jews in latter times use upon the days of Purim is not much to be regarded. For as Godwin noteth out of Hespianian,¹ they read the history of Esther in their synagogues, and so often as they hear mention of Haman, they do with their fists and hammers beat upon the benches and boards, as if they did knock upon Haman's head. When thus they have behaved themselves, in the very time of their liturgy, like furious and drunken people, the rest of the day they pass over in outrageous revelling. And here I take leave of the Bishop.

Sect. 10. Thirdly, We say, whether the days of Purim were instituted to be holidays or not, yet there was some more than ordinary warrant for them, because Mordecai, by whose advice and direction they were appointed to be kept, was a prophet by the instinct and revelation of the Spirit, Esth. iv. 13. *Non multum fortasse aberraverimus*, saith Hespianian,¹ *si dicamus hoc a Mordechoe et Hesthera, ex peculiari Spiritus Sancti instinctu factum*.

Bishop Lindsey believeth² that they had only a general warrant, such as the church hath still, to put order to the circumstances belonging to God's worship, and all his reason is, because if the Jews had received any other particular warrant, the sacred story should not have passed it over in silence.

Ans. Thus much we understand from the sacred story, that the Jews had the direction of a prophet for the days of Purim; and that was a warrant more than ordinary, because prophets were the extraordinary ministers of God.

Sect. 11. Fourthly, As touching the feast of the dedication of the altar by Judas Maccabeus, 1. Let us hear what Cartwright very gravely and judiciously propoundeth:³ "That this feast was unduly instituted and ungroundly, it may appear by conference of the dedication of the first temple under Solomon, and of the second after the captivity returned from Babylon. In which dedication, seeing there was no yearly remembrance by solemnity of feasts, not so much as one day, it is evident that the yearly celebration of this feast for eight days, was not compassed by that Spirit that Solomon and the captivity were directed by; which Spirit, when it dwelt more plentifully in Solomon, and in the prophets that stood at the stern of the captivity's dedication, than it did in Judas, it was in him so much the more presumptuous, as having a shorter leg than they, he durst in that matter overstride them, and his rashness is so much the more aggravated, as each of them, for the building of the whole temple, with all the implements and furniture thereof, made no feast to renew the annual memory, where Judas only for renownment of the altar, and of certain other decayed places of the temple, instituted this great solemnity."

2. The feast of the dedication was not

¹ Proc. in Perth Assembly, part. 3, p. 30.

² Sermon on Esth. ix. 31.

³ De Pol. Mosis, cap. 7.

¹ Moses and Aaron, lib. 3, cap. 11.

¹ De Orig. Fæstor., cap. 2, ad finem.

² Ubi supra, p. 31.

³ Annot. on John x.

free of Pharisal invention. For as Tremellius observeth out of the Talmud,¹ *statuerunt sapientes illius seculi, ut recurrentibus annis, octo illi dies, &c.* Yet albeit the Pharisees were called *sapientes Israelis*, Bishop Lindsey will not grant that they were the wise men of whom the Talmud speaketh; for, saith he, it behoved those who appointed festivities, not only to be wise men, but men of authority also.²

But what do we hear? Were not the Pharisees men of authority? Why, saith not Christ they sat in Moses' chair? Matt. xxiii. 2. Saith not Calvin,³ *In ecclesie regimine et scriptura interpretatione, hæc secta primum tenebat?* Saith not Camero,⁴ *cum Phariseorum præcipua esset auctoritas (ut ubique docet Josephus)? &c.*

Doth not Josephus speak so much of their authority, that in one place he saith,⁵ *Nomen igitur regni, erat penes reginam (Alexandram) penes Phariseos vero administratio?* And in another place,⁶ *Erat enim quedam Judæorum secta exactiorem patrie legis cognitionem sibi vendicans? &c. Hi Pharisei vocantur, genus hominum astutum, arrogans, et interdum rebus quoque infestum, ut eos etiam aperte impugnare non vereatur?*

There is nothing alleged which can prove the lawfulness of this feast of the dedication.

It is but barely and boldly affirmed by Bishop Lindsey,⁷ that the Pharisees were not rebuked by Christ for this feast, because we read not so much in Scripture; for there were many things which Jesus did and said that are not written in Scripture, John xxi. 25; and whereas it seemeth to some, that Christ did countenance and approve this feast, because he gave his presence unto the same, John x. 22, 23, we must remember, that the circumstances only of time and place are noted by the evangelist, for evidence to the story, and not for any mystery, Christ had come up to the feast of tabernacles, John vii., and tarried still all that while, because then there was a great confluence of people in Jerusalem. Whereupon he took occasion to spread the net of the gospel for catching of many souls. And

whilst John saith, "It was at Jerusalem the feast of the dedication," he gives a reason only of the confluence of many people at Jerusalem, and sheweth how it came to pass that Christ had occasion to preach to such a great multitude; and whilst he addeth, "And it was winter," he giveth a reason of Christ's walking in Solomon's porch, whither the Jews' resort was. It was not thought becoming to walk in the temple itself, but in the porch men used to convene either for talking or walking, because in the summer the porch shadowed them from the heat of the sun, and in winter it lay open to the sunshine and to heat. Others think, that whilst he saith, it was winter, importeth that therefore Christ was the more frequently in the temple, knowing that his time was short which he had then for his preaching; for in the entry of the next spring he was to suffer. Howsoever, it is not certain of what feast of dedication John speaketh. Bullinger leaves it doubtful;¹ and Maldonat saith² that this opinion which taketh the dedication of the altar by Judas Maccabeus to be meant by John, hath fewest authors. But to let this pass, whereas the Rhemists allege,³ that Christ approved this feast, because he was present at it. Cartwright and Fulk answer them, that Christ's being present at it proveth not his approving of it. *Non festum proprie honoravit Christus, saith Junius,⁴ sed cætum piorum convenientem festo; nam omnes ejusmodi occasiones seminandi evangelii sui observabat et capiebat Christus.*

Quasi vero (saith Hospinian⁵) Christus Encenoirum casua Hierosolymam abierit. Nay, but he saw he had a convenient occasion, ad instituendam hominum multitudinem, ad illud festum confluentiam.

Even as Paul chose to be present at certain Jewish feasts,⁶ not for any respect to the feasts themselves, nor for any honour which he meant to give them, but for the multitudes' cause who resorted to the same, among whom he had a more plentiful occasion to spread the gospel at those festivities than at other times in the year.

I had thought here to close this chapter; but finding that, as the parrot, which other

¹ Annot. on John x. 22.

² Ubi supra, p. 31.

³ Com. in illum locum.

⁴ Prælect. in Matt. xix. 3, de Pharis.

⁵ Antiq. Jud., lib. 13, cap. 24.

⁶ Antiq. Jud., lib. 17, cap. 3.

⁷ Ubi supra, p. 32.

¹ In John x. 22.

² Com. ibid.

³ Annot. ibid.

⁴ Animad. in Bell., contr. 3, lib. 4, cap. 17, nota. 6.

⁵ De Orig. Templi, lib. 4, cap. 22.

⁶ Calv. in Act. xviii. 21.

while useth the form of a man's voice, yet being beaten and chaffed, returneth to his own natural voice, so some of our opposites, who have been but erst prating somewhat of the language of Canaan against us, finding themselves pressed and perplexed in such a way of reasoning, have quickly changed their tune, and begin to talk to us of warrants of another nature nor of the word of God. I am therefore to digress with them. And I perceive, ere we know well where they are, they are passed from Scripture to custom. For if we will listen, thus saith one of the greatest note among them, Bishop Andrews¹ I trow they call him: "We do but make ourselves to be pitied other while (well said) when we stand wringing the Scriptures (well said) to strain that out of them which is not in them (well said), and so can never come liquid from them (well said), when yet we have for the same point the church's custom clear enough. And that is enough by virtue of this text" (meaning 1 Cor. xi. 16). And after he saith, that we are taught by the Apostle's example in "points of this nature, of ceremony or circumstance, ever to pitch upon *habemus*, or *non habemus talem consuetudinem*."

Ans. 1. The text gives him no ground for this doctrine, that in matters of ceremony we are to pitch upon *habemus* or *non habemus talem consuetudinem*, so that he is wide away, whilst he spendeth the greatest part of his sermon in the pressing of this point, that the custom of the church should be enough to us in matters of ceremony, and particularly in the keeping of Easter; for the custom of the church there spoken of, is not concerning a point of circumstance, but concerning a very substantial and necessary point, namely, not to be contentious: neither doth the Apostle urge those orders of the men's praying uncovered, and the women's praying veiled, from this ground, because so was the church's custom (as the Bishop would have it), but only he is warning the Corinthians not to be contentious about those matters, because the churches have no such custom as to be contentious. So is the place expounded by Chrysostom, Ambrose, Calvin, Martyr, Bullinger, Marlorat, Beza, Fulk, Cartwright, Pareus, and our own Archbishop of St. Andrews, in his sermon upon that text. And for this ex-

position, it maketh that the Apostle, in the preceding part of the chapter, hath given sufficient reasons for that order of covering or veiling the women; wherefore, if any would contend about the matter, he tells them they must contend with themselves; for they nor the churches of God would not contend with them,—they had no such custom. But if we admit Bishop Andrews' gloss, then why doth the Apostle, after he hath given good "reason for the veiling of women, subjoin, if any man seem to be contentious," &c. The Bishop resolveth us, that the apostles saw that a wrangling wit would elude these reasons which he had given, and he had no other reasons to give, therefore he resolves all into the church's practice,—enough of itself to suffice any that will be wise to sobriety. *Ans.* If any seem to be blasphemous, we have no such custom, neither the churches of God. What! shall a wrangling wit elude the reasons given by the Spirit of God, in such sort, that he must give some other more sufficient proof for that which he teacheth? Then the whole Scriptures of God must yet be better proved, because the unstable do wrest them, as Peter speaks, 2 Pet. iii. 16.

Sect. 13. 2. The custom of the church is not enough to pitch on, and it is found oftentimes expedient to change a custom of the church.

Basilius Magnus¹ doth flatly refuse to admit the authority of custom: *Consuetudo sine veritate (saith Cyprian),² vetustas erroris est. Frustra enim qui ratione vincuntur (saith Augustine),³ consuetudinem nobis objiciunt, quasi consuetudo major sit veritate, &c. Nullus pudor est ad meliora transire, saith Ambrose⁴ to the Emperor Valentinian. Quælibet consuetudo (saith Gratian),⁵ veritati est postponenda.*

And again,⁶ *Corrigendum est quod illicite admittitur, aut a prædecessoribus admissum invenitur.* A politic writer admonisheth⁷ *retinere antiqua*, only with this caution, *Si proba.*

Calvin⁸ (speaking against human cere-

¹ Epist. 80, ad Eustath. Medice.

² Ad Pompelium contra Epist. Stephani.

³ De Bapt. contra Donatist., lib. 4, cap. 5.

⁴ Ep. 31.

⁵ Decr., part 1, dist. 8, cap. 7.

⁶ Decr., part 2, caus. 35, quest. 9, cap. 3.

⁷ J. Lips., Lib. de Una Relig. Advers. Dialogistam.

⁸ Calv. Epist. et Resp., col. 484, 485.

¹ Sermon on 1 Cor. xi. 16.

monies) saith, *Si objiciatur*, &c. "If (saith he) antiquity be objected (albeit they who are too much addicted to custom and to received fashions, do boldly use this buckler to defend all their corruptions), the refutation is easy; for the ancients also themselves, with heavy complaints, have abundantly testified that they did not approve of anything which was devised by the will of men." In the end of the epistle he allegeth this testimony of Cyprian: "If Christ alone be to be heard, then we ought not to give heed what any man before us hath thought fit to be done, but what Christ (who is before all) hath done; for we must not follow the customs of man, but the truth of God."

What can be more plain than that antiquity cannot be a confirmation to error, nor custom a prejudice to truth?

Wherefore Dr Forbese¹ also despiseth such arguments as are taken from the custom of the church.

Sect. 14. 3. There was a custom in the churches of God to give the holy communion to infants; and another custom to minister baptism only about Easter and Pentecost. Sundry such abuses got place in the church.

If, then, it be enough to pitch upon custom, why ought not those customs to have been commended and continued? But if they were commendably changed, then ought we not to follow blindly the bare custom of the church, but examine the equity of the same, and demand grounds of reason for it.

St. Paul (saith Dr Fulk²) doth give reason for that order of covering women's heads: "By whose example the preachers are likewise to endeavour to satisfy, by reason, both men and women, that humbly desire their resolution for quiet of their conscience, and not to beat them down with the club of custom only."

4. Whereas the custom of some churches is alleged for the ceremonies, we have objected the custom of other churches against them; neither shall ever our opposites prove them to be the customs of the church universal.

5. A great part of that ecclesiastical custom which is alleged for the ceremonies, resteth into that idolatrous and supersti-

tious use of them which hath long continued in the kingdom of antichrist; but that such a custom maketh against them, it hath been proved before.¹

6. If it were so that we ought to pitch upon the church's custom, yet (that I may speak with Mr Hooker) the law of common indulgence permitteth us to think of our own customs as half a thought better than the customs of others.

But why was there such a change made in the discipline, policy, and orders of the church of Scotland, which were agreeable to the word of God, confirmed and ratified by general assemblies and parliaments, used and enjoyed with so great peace and purity? Our custom should have holden the ceremonies out of Scotland, hold them in elsewhere as it may.

CHAPTER VII.

THAT THE LAWFULNESS OF THE CEREMONIES CANNOT BE WARRANTED BY ANY ECCLESIASTICAL LAW, NOR BY ANY POWER WHICH THE CHURCH HATH TO PUT ORDER TO THINGS BELONGING TO DIVINE WORSHIP.

Sect. 1. We have proved that the ceremonies cannot be warranted by the law of God. It followeth to examine whether any law of man, or power upon earth, can make them lawful or warrantable unto us.

We will begin with laws ecclesiastical, where, first of all, it must be considered well what power the church hath to make laws about things pertaining to religion and the worship of God, and how far the same doth extend itself. Dr Field's resolution touching this question is as followeth: "Thus (saith he²) we see our adversaries cannot prove that the church hath power to annex unto such ceremonies and observations as she deviseth, the remission of sins, and the working of other spiritual and supernatural effects, which is the only thing questioned between them and us about the power of the church. So that all the power the church hath, more than by her power to publish the commandments of Christ the Son of God, and by her censures to punish the offenders against the same, is only in

¹ Iren., lib. 1, cap. 8, sect. 3.
² Annot. on I Cor. xi. 16.

¹ Supra, cap. 2.
² Of the Church, lib. 4, cap. 31.

prescribing things that pertain to comeliness and order. Comeliness requireth that not only that gravity and modesty do appear in the performance of the works of God's service that besemeth actions of that nature, but also that such rites and ceremonies be used as may cause a due respect unto, and regard of, the things performed, and thereby stir men up to greater fervour and devotion."

And after: Order requireth that there be set hours for prayer, preaching, and ministering the sacraments; that there be silence and attention when the things are performed; that women be silent in the church; that all things be administered according to the rules of discipline.

This his discourse is but a bundle of incongruities. For, 1. He saith, that the church's power to annex unto the ceremonies which she deviseth the working of spiritual and supernatural effects, is the only thing questioned between our adversaries and us about the power of the church. Now, our adversaries contend with us also about the power of the church to make new articles of faith, and her power to make laws binding the conscience, both which controversies are touched by himself.¹

2. He saith, that comeliness requireth the use of such ceremonies as may cause a due respect unto, and regard of, the works of God's service, and thereby stir men up to greater fervour and devotion. But it hath been already showed² that the comeliness which the Apostle requireth in the church and service of God cannot comprehend such ceremonies under it, and that it is no other than that very common external decency which is beseeching for all the assemblies of men, as well civil as sacred.

3. Whilst he is discoursing of the church's power to prescribe things pertaining to order, contra-distinguished from her power which she hath to publish the commandments of Christ, he reckons forth among his other examples, women's silence in the church, as if the church did prescribe this as a matter of order left to her determination, and not publish it as the commandment of Christ in his word.

4. Whereas he saith that the church hath power to prescribe such rites and ceremonies as may cause a due respect unto,

and regard of, the works of God's service, and thereby stir men up to greater fervour and devotion, by his own words shall he be condemned: for a little before he reprehendeth the Romanists for maintaining that the church hath power to annex unto the ceremonies which she deviseth the working of spiritual and supernatural effects. And a little after he saith, that the church hath no power to ordain such ceremonies as serve to signify, assure, and convey unto men such benefits of saving grace as God in Christ is pleased to bestow on them. Now, to cause a regard of, and a respect unto the works of God's service, and thereby to stir up men to fervour and devotion, what is it but the working of a spiritual and supernatural effect, and the conveying unto men such a benefit of saving grace as God in Christ is pleased to bestow on them? In like manner, whereas he holdeth that the church hath power to ordain such ceremonies as serve to express those spiritual and heavenly affections, dispositions, motions, or desires, which are or should be in men, in the very same place he confuteth himself, whilst he affirmeth that the church hath no power to ordain such ceremonies as serve to signify unto men those benefits of saving grace which God in Christ is pleased to bestow on them. Now, to express such heavenly and spiritual affections, dispositions, motions, or desires, as should be in men, is (I suppose) to signify unto men such benefits of saving grace, as God in Christ is pleased to bestow on them. Who dare deny it?

Sect. 2. Bishop Lindsey's opinion touching the power of the church,¹ whereof we dispute, is, that power is given unto her to "determine the circumstances which are in the general necessary to be used in divine worship, but not defined particularly in the word."

I know the church can determine nothing which is not of this kind and quality. But the Prelate's meaning (as may be seen in that same epistle of his) is, that whatsoever the church determineth, if it be such a circumstance as is in the general necessary, but not particularly defined in the word, then we cannot say that the church had no power to determine and enjoin the same, nor be led by the judgment of our own consciences, judging it not expedient, but that in this

¹ Lib. 4, cap. 6, 34.

² Supra, cap. 6, sect. 3.

¹ Ep. to the Pastors of the Church of Scotland.

case we must take the church's law to be the rule of our consciences. Now, by this ground which the Prelate holdeth, the church may prescribe to the ministers of the gospel the whole habit and apparel of the Levitical high-priest (which were to Judaize). For apparel is a circumstance in the general necessary, yet it is not particularly defined in the word. By this ground, the church may determine that I should ever pray with my face to the east, preach kneeling on my knees, sing the psalms lying on my back, and hear sermons standing only upon one foot. For in all these actions a gesture is necessary; but there is no gesture particularly defined in the word to which we are adstricted in any of these exercises.

And further, because *uno absurdo dato, mille sequuntur*, by this ground the Prelate must say, that the church hath power to ordain three or four holidays every week (which ordinance, as he himself hath told us, could not stand with charity, the inseparable companion of piety), for time is a circumstance in the general necessary in divine worship, yet in his judgment we are not bound by the word to any particular time for the performance of the duties of God's worship.

By this ground we were to say, that Pope Innocent III. held him within the bounds of ecclesiastical power, when in the great *Lateran* council, anno 1215, he made a decree, that all the faithful of both sexes should once in the year at least, but it is not particularly defined in the word. It is left indefinite, 1 Cor. xi. 26, yet the church hath no power to determine Easter-day, either as the only time, or as the fittest time, for all the faithful of both sexes to receive the eucharist. What if faithful men and women cannot have time to prepare themselves as becometh, being avocated and distracted by the no less necessary than honest adoos of their particular callings?

What if they cannot have the sacrament upon that day administered according to our Lord's institution? What if they see Papists confirming themselves in their Easter superstition by our unnecessary practice? Shall

they swallow these and such-like soul-drestreyng camels, and all for straining out the gnat of communicating precisely upon Easter-day? But since time is a necessary circumstance, and no time is particularly defined, the Bishop must say more also, that the church may determine Easter-day for the only day whereupon we may receive the Lord's supper.

Last of all, if the church have power to determine all circumstances in the general necessary, but not particularly defined in the word, what could be said against that ancient order of solemn baptizing only at the holidays of Easter and Pentecost (whereby it came to pass that very many died unbaptized, as Socrates writeth¹)? Or, what shall be said against Tertullian's opinion,² which alloweth lay men, yea, women, to baptize. May the church's determination make all this good, forasmuch as these circumstances of the time when, and the persons by whom, baptism should be ministered, are in the general necessary, but not particularly defined in the word? *Ite leves nugæ.*

Sect. 3. Camero,³ as learned a Formalist as any of the former, expresseth his judgment copiously touching our present question. He saith, that there are two sorts of things which the church commandeth, to wit, either such as belong to faith and manners, or such as conduce to faith and manners; that both are in God's word prescribed *exserte*, plainly, but not one way, because such things that pertain unto faith and manners, are in the word of God particularly commanded, whereas those things which conduce to faith and manners are but generally commended unto us. Of things that pertain to faith and manners, he saith, that they are most constant and certain, and such as can admit no change; but as for things conducing to faith and manners, he saith, that they depend upon the circumstances of persons, place, and time, which being almost infinite, there could not be particular precepts delivered unto us concerning such things. Only this is from God commended unto the church, that whatsoever is done publicly be done with order, and what privately be decent.

These things he so applieth to his purpose, that he determineth, in neither of these

¹ Lib. 5, cap. 22.

² Lib. de Baptismo.

³ Præf., tom. 1, de Potest. Eccl., contr. 2.

kinds the church hath power to make laws, because in things pertaining to faith and manners the law of our Lord Jesus Christ is plainly expressed; and in those things, wherein neither faith nor manners are placed, but which conduce to faith and manners, we have indeed a general law, not having further any particular law, for that reason alleged, namely, because this depends upon the circumstances.

Therewith he addeth, *Quid sit fides, quid sit pietas, quid sit charitas, verbo Dei demonstratur. Quid ad hæc conducatur, seu reputando rem in universum, seu reputando rem quatenus singulis competit, pendet ex cognitione circumstantiarum. Jam id definire Deus voluit esse penes ecclesiam, hæc tamen lege, ut quod definit ecclesia, conveniat generali definitioni Dei.*

The matter he illustrates with this one example: God's word doth define in the general that we are to fast, and that publicly; but, in the particular, we could not have the definition of the word, because there are infinite occasions of a public fast, as it is said in the schools, *individua esse infinita*; so that it is the church's part to look to the occasion, and this depends upon the consideration of the circumstances. This discourse of his cannot satisfy the attentive reader, but deserveth certain animadversions.

Sect. 4. First, then, it is to be observed how he is drawn into a manifest contradiction; for whereas he saith, that God's word doth *exserte* and *diserte* commend unto us *generatim*, such things as conduce to faith and manners, and that concerning things of this nature we have a general law in Scripture, how can this stand with that which he addeth, namely, that it is in the church's power to define what things conduce to faith, piety, and charity, even *reputando rem in universum*?

2. Whereas he saith that the church hath no power to make laws, neither in things belonging to faith and manners, nor in things conducing to the same; I would also see how this agreeth with that other position, namely, that it is in the power of the church to define what things do conduce to faith, piety and charity.

3. What means he by his application of order to public, and decency to private actions, as if the Apostle did not require both these in the public words of God's service performed in the church?

4. Whereas he saith that such things as conduce to faith and manners do depend upon the circumstances, and so could not be particularly defined in the word, either he speaks of those things as they are defined in the general, or as they are defined in the particular. Not the first; for as they are defined in the general, they cannot depend upon changeable circumstances, and that because, according to his own tenet, the word defines them in the general, and this definition of the word is most certain and constant, neither can any change happen unto it. Wherefore (without doubt) he must pronounce this of the definition of such things in the particular. Now, to say that things conducing to faith and manners, as they are particularly defined, do depend upon circumstances, is as much as to say that circumstances depend upon circumstances. For things conducing to faith and manners, which the church hath power to determine particularly, what are they other than circumstances? Surely he who taketh not Camero's judgment to be, that the church hath power to determine somewhat more than the circumstances (and by consequence a part of the substance) of God's worship, shall give no sense to his words. Yet, if one would take his meaning so, I see not how he can be saved from contradicting himself; forasmuch as he holdeth that such things as pertain to faith and manners are particularly defined in the word. To say no more, I smell such things in Camero's opinion as can neither stand with reason nor with himself.

5. God's word doth not only define things pertaining to faith and manners, but also things conducing to the same, and that not only generally, but in some respects, and sometimes, particularly. And we take for example his own instance of fasting. For the Scripture defineth very many occasions of fasting; Ezra viii. 21; 2 Chron. xx.; Jonah iii.; Joel ii.; Acts xiii. 3; Josh. vii. 6; Judg. xx. 16; Esth. iv. 16; Ezra ix. x.; Zech. vii. From which places we gather that the Scripture defineth fasting to be used,

1. For supplication, when we want some necessary or expedient good thing.

2. For deprecation, when we fear some evil.

3. For humiliation, when, by our sins, we have provoked God's wrath. Neither can there be any occasion of fasting whereof I may not say that either it is particularly

designed in Scripture, or else that it may be by necessary consequence defined out of Scripture; or, lastly, that it is of that sort of things which were not determinable by Scripture, because circumstances are infinite, as Camero hath told us.

Sect. 5. Thus having failed by those rocks of offence, I direct my course straight to the dissecting of the true limits, within which the church's power of enacting laws about things pertaining to the worship of God is bounded and confined, and which it may not overleap nor transgress.

Three conditions I find necessarily requisite in such a thing as the church hath power to prescribe by her laws:

1st. It must be only a circumstance of divine worship; no substantial part of it; no sacred significant and efficacious ceremony. For the order and decency left to the definition of the church, as concerning the particulars of it, comprehendeth no more but mere circumstances. Bishop Lindsey¹ doth but unskillfully confound things different when he talketh of "the ceremonies and circumstances left to the determination of the church." Now, by his leave, though circumstances be left to the determination of the church, yet ceremonies, if we speak properly, are not.

Bishop Andrews avoucheth² that ceremonies pertain to the church only, and to the service of God, not to civil solemnities. But so much, I trust, he would not have said of circumstances which have place in all moral actions, and that to the same end and purpose for which they serve in religious actions, namely, for beautifying them with that decent demeanour which the very light and law of natural reason requireth as a thing beseeeming all human actions. For the church of Christ being a society of men and women, must either observe order and decency in all the circumstances of their holy actions, time, place, person, form, &c., or else be deformed with that disorder and confusion which common reason and civility abhorreth. Ceremonies, therefore, which are sacred observances, and serve only to a religious and holy use, and which may not, without sacrilege, be applied to another use, must be sorted with things of another nature than circumstances. *Ceremonie*, "ce-

remories (saith Dr Field¹) are so named, as Livy thinketh, from a town called Cære, in the which the Romans did hide their sacred things when the Gauls invaded Rome. Others think that ceremonies are so named a *carendo*, of abstaining from certain things, as the Jews abstained from swine's flesh, and sundry other things forbidden by God as unclean. Ceremonies are outward acts of religion," &c. *Quapropter etiam*, saith Junius,² *ritus et ceremonias inter se distinguimus, quia in jure politico sunt imperati et solennes ritus; ceremonie vero non nisi sacre observationes in cultu divino appellantur. Ceremonia*, saith Belarmine,³ *proprie et simpliciter sic vocata, est externa actio quæ non aliunde est bona et laudabilis, nisi quia fit ad Deum colendum.* From which words Amesius⁴ concludeth against him, that he, and others with him, do absurdly confound order, decency, and the like, which have the same use and praise in civil things which they have in the worship of God, with religious and sacred ceremonies. Yet Dr Burges⁵ rejecteth this distinction betwixt circumstances and ceremonies, as a mere nicety or fiction. And would you know his reason? "For that (saith he) all circumstances (I mean extrinsical) which incur not the substance of the action, when they are once designed or observed purposely in reference to such a matter, of whose substance they are not, they are then ceremonies." If this be not a nicety or fiction, I know not what is. For what means he here by a matter? An action sure, or else a nicety. Well, then, we shall have now a world of ceremonies. When I appoint to meet with another man at Berwick, upon the 10th day of May, because the place and the day are purposely designed in reference to such a matter, of whose substance they are not, namely, to my meeting with the other man, for talking of our business, therefore the town of Berwick, and the 10th day of May, must be accounted ceremonies. To me it is nice, that the Doctor made it not nice, to let such a nicety fall from his pen.

When I put on my shoes in reference to walking, or wash my hands in reference to eating, am I using ceremonies all the while?

¹ Of the Church, lib. 4, cap. 31.

² De Polit. Mos., cap. 7.

³ De Sacram., lib. 2, cap. 29.

⁴ Bell. Enerv., tom. 3, lib. 1, cap. 8.

⁵ Manuduct., p. 33.

The Doctor could not choose but say so, for as much as these circumstances are purposely designed and observed in reference to such matters, of whose substance they are not.

Sect. 6. 2d. That which the church may lawfully prescribe by her laws and ordinances, as a thing left to her determination, must be one of such things as were not determinable by Scripture, on that reason which Camero hath given us, namely, because *individua* are *infinita*. We mean not in any wise to circumscribe the infinite power and wisdom of God, only we speak upon supposition of the bounds and limits which God did set to his written word, within which he would have it contained, and over which he thought fit that it should not exceed. The case being thus put, as it is, we say truly of those several and changeable circumstances which are left to the determination of the church, that, being almost infinite, they were not particularly determinable in Scripture; for the particular definition of those occurring circumstances which were to be rightly ordered in the works of God's service to the end of the world, and that ever according to the exigency of every present occasion and different case, should have filled the whole world with books. But as for other things pertaining to God's worship, which are not to be reckoned among the circumstances of it, they being in number neither many, nor in change various, were most easily and conveniently determinable in Scripture. Now, since God would have his word (which is our rule in the works of his service) not to be delivered by tradition, but to be written and sealed unto us, that by this means, for obviating Satanical subtilty, and succouring human imbecility, we might have a more certain way for conservation of true religion, and for the instauration of it when it faileth among men,—how can we but assure ourselves that every such acceptable thing pertaining any way to religion, which was particularly and conveniently determinable in Scripture, is indeed determined in it; and consequently, that no such thing as is not a mere alterable circumstance is left to the determination of the church?

Sect. 7. 3d. If the church prescribe anything lawfully, so that she prescribe no more than she hath power given her to prescribe, her ordinance must be accompanied with some good reason and warrant given for the satisfaction of tender consciences. This

condition is, alas! too seldom looked unto by law-makers, of whom one fitly complaineth thus:—

*Lex quamvis ratio Ciceroni summa vocetur,
Et bene laudetur lex que ratione probatur,
Invenies inter legistas raro logistas:
Moris et exempli leges suat juraque templi.*

But this fashion we leave to them who will have all their anomalies taken for analogies. It becometh not the spouse of Christ, endued with the spirit of meekness, to command anything imperiously, and without a reason given.

Ecclesiæ enim est docere primum, tum præscribere, saith Camero.¹ And again: *Non enim dominatur cleris, nec agit cum iis quos Christus redemit, ac si non possent capere quod sit religiosum, quid minus.*

Tertullian's testimony² is known: *Nulla lex*, &c. "No law (saith he) owes to itself alone the conscience of its equity, but to those from whom it expects obedience. Moreover, it is a suspected law which will not have itself to be proved, but a wicked law, which not being proved, yet beareth rule."

It is well said by our divines,³ that in rites and ceremonies the church hath no power "to destruction, but to edification;" and that the observation of our ecclesiastical canons "must carry before them a manifest utility."⁴ *Piis vero fratribus durum est, subjicere se rebus illis quas nec rectas esse nec utiles animadvertunt.*⁵ If here it be objected, that some things are convenient to be done, therefore, because they are prescribed by the church, and for no other reason. For example, in two things which are alike lawful and convenient in themselves, I am bound to do the one and not the other, because of the church's prescription. So that, in such cases, it seemeth there can be no other reason given for the ordinance of the church but only her own power and authority to put to order things of this nature.

I answer, that even in such a case as this, the conveniency of the thing itself is anterior to the church's determination; anterior, I say, *de congruo*, though not *de facto*, that is to say, before ever the church pro-

¹ Prælect., tom. 1, p. 367.

² In Apologet.

³ Chemnit. Exam., part 2, p. 121.

⁴ Calv. Instit., lib. 4, cap. 10, sect. 32.

⁵ Calv. Epist. et Resp., col. 478.

¹ Epist. to the Pastors of the Church of Scotland.

² Sermon on Esth. ix. 31.

scribe it, it is such a thing as (when it falleth out to be done at all) may be done conveniently, though it be not (before the church's prescribing of it) such a thing as should and ought to be done as convenient. Which being so, we do still hold that the convenience of a thing must always go before the church's prescribing of it; go before, I mean, at least *de congruo*. Neither can the church prescribe anything lawfully which she sheweth not to have been convenient, even before her determination.

Sect. 8. These things being permitted, I come to extract my projection, and to make it evident that the lawfulness of the controverted ceremonies cannot be warranted by any ecclesiastical law; and this I prove by three arguments:—

1st. Those conditions which I have showed to be required in that thing which the church may lawfully prescribe by a law, are not quadrant nor competent to the cross, kneeling, surplice, holidays, &c.

For, 1. They are not mere circumstances, such as have place in all moral actions, but sacred, mystical, significant, efficacious ceremonies, as hath been abundantly shown in this dispute already. For example, Dr Burges¹ calleth the surplice a religious or sacred ceremony. And again,² he placeth in it a mystical signification of the pureness of the minister of God. Wherefore the replier³ to Dr Mortoune's *Particular Defence* saith well, that there is a great difference betwixt a grave civil habit and a mystical garment.

2. It cannot be said that these ceremonies are of that kind of thing which were not determinable by Scripture; neither will our opposites, for very shame, adventure to say that things of this kind, to which cross, kneeling, &c., do belong, viz., sacred significant ceremonies, left (in their judgment) to the definition of the church, are almost infinite, and therefore could not well and easily be determined in Scripture.

Since, then, such things as are not mere circumstances of worship can neither be many nor various (as I said before), it is manifest that all such things were easily determinable in Scripture.

3. Our ceremonial laws are not backed with such grounds and reasons as might be for the satisfying and quieting of tender

consciences, but we are borne down with will and authority; whereof I have said enough elsewhere.¹

Sect. 9. 2d. If the ceremonies be lawful to us because the law and ordinance of the church prescribes them, then either the bare and naked prescription of the church, having no other warrant than the church's own authority, makes them to be thus lawful; or else the law of the church, as grounded upon and warranted by the law of God and nature. Not the first; for divines hold,² *legem humanum ferri ab hominibus, cum ratione procedunt ab illis aliis antecessis legibus. Nam legis humane regula proxima est duplex. Una innata quam legem naturalem dicimus, altera inspirata, quam divinam, &c. Ex his ergo fontibus lex humana procedit: hæc incunabula illius a quibus si aberrat, lex degener est, indigna legis nomine*. We have also the testimony of an adversary; for saith not Paybody himself,³ "I grant it is unlawful to do in God's worship anything upon the mere pleasure of man?"

If they take them (as needs they must) to the latter part, then let them either say that the ceremonies are lawful unto us, because the church judgeth them to be agreeable to the law of God and nature, or because the church proveth unto us, by evident reasons, that they are indeed agreeable to these laws. If they yield us the latter, then it is not the church's law, but the church's reasons given for her law, which can warrant the lawfulness of them unto us; which doth elude and elide all that which they allege for the lawfulness of them from the power and authority of the church.

And further, if any such reasons be to be given forth for the ceremonies, why are they so long kept up from us? But if they hold them at the former, thereupon it will follow, that it shall be lawful for us to do every thing which the church shall judge to be agreeable to the law of God and nature, and consequently to all the Jewish, popish, and heathenish ceremonies, yea, to worship images, if it happen that the church judge these things to be agreeable to the law of God and nature.

It will be answered (I know), that if the church command anything repugnant to God's word we are not bound to do it, nor

to receive it as lawful, though the church judge so of it; but otherwise, if that which the church judgeth to be agreeable to the law of God and nature (and in that respect proscribeth) be not repugnant to the word of God, but in itself indifferent, then are we to embrace it as convenient, and consonant to the law of God and nature, neither ought we to call in question the lawfulness of it.

But I reply, that either we must judge a thing to be repugnant or not repugnant to the word, to be indifferent or not indifferent in itself, because the church judgeth so of it, or else because the church proveth unto us by an evident reason that it is so. If the latter, we have what we would; if the former, we are just where we were: the argument is still set afoot; then we must receive everything (be it ever so bad) as indifferent, if only the church happen so to judge of it; for *quod competit alicui quate, &c.* So that if we receive anything as indifferent, for this respect, because the church judgeth it to be so, then shall we receive everything for indifferent which the church shall so judge of.

Sect. 10. 3d. The church is forbidden to add anything to the commandments of God which he hath given unto us, concerning his worship and service, Deut. iv. 2; xii. 32; Prov. xxx. 6; therefore she may not lawfully prescribe anything in the works of divine worship, if it be not a mere circumstance belonging to that kind of things which were not determinable by Scripture.

Our opposites have no other distinctions which they make any use of against this argument, but the very same which Papists use in defence of their unwritten dogmatical traditions, namely, that *additio corrumpens* is forbidden, but not *additio perficiens*: that there is not alike reason of the Christian church and of the Jewish; that the church may not add to the essential parts of God's worship, but to the accidental she may add.

To the first of those distinctions, we answer, 1. That the distinction itself is an addition to the word, and so doth but beg the question.

2. It is blasphemous; for it argueth that the commandments of God are imperfect, and that by addition they are made perfect.

3. Since our opposites will speak in this dialect, let them resolve us whether the washings of the Pharisees, condemned by

Christ, were corrupting or perfecting additions. They cannot say they were corrupting, for there was no commandment of God which those washings did corrupt or destroy, except that commandment which forbiddeth men's additions. But for this respect our opposites dare not call them corrupting additions, for so they should condemn all additions whatsoever. Except, therefore, they can show us that those washings were not added by the Pharisees for perfecting, but for corrupting the law of God, let them consider how they rank their own ceremonial additions with those of the Pharisees. We read of no other reason wherefore Christ condemned them but because they were doctrines which had no other warrant than the commandments of men, Matt. xv. 9; for as the law ordained divers washings, for teaching and signifying that true holiness and cleanness which ought to be among God's people, so the Pharisees would have perfected the law by adding other washings (and more than God had commanded) for the same end and purpose.

Sect. 11. To the second distinction, we say that the Christian church hath no more liberty to add to the commandments of God than the Jewish church had; for the second commandment is moral and perpetual, and forbiddeth to us as well as to them the additions and inventions of men in the worship of God. Nay, as Calvin noteth,¹ much more are we forbidden to add unto God's word than they were. "Before the coming of his well-beloved Son in the flesh (saith John Knox),² severely he punished all such as durst enterprise to alter or change his ceremonies and statutes,—as in Saul, (1 Kings xiii. ; xv.) Uzziah, Nadab, Abihu, (Lev. x.) is to be read. And will he now, after that he hath opened his counsel to the world by his only Son, whom he commandeth to be heard, Matt. xvii.; and after that, by his holy Spirit speaking by his apostles, he hath established the religion in which he will his true worshippers abide to the end,—will he now, I say, admit men's inventions in the matter of religion? &c., 2 Cor. xi.; Col. i.; ii. For this sentence he pronounceth: 'Not that which seemeth good in thy eyes shalt thou do to the Lord thy God, but that which the Lord thy God commanded thee, that do thou: Add no-

¹ Manuduct., p. 37.

² Of the Lawfulness of Kneeling, p. 2.

³ Cap. 1.

¹ Supra, part 1, cap. 4, 6.

² Fr. Jun. de Polit. Mos., cap. 1.

³ Apol., part 3, cap. 1, sect. 25.

¹ Just., lib. 4, cap. 10, sect. 17.

² Letter to the Regent of Scotland.

thing unto it, diminish nothing from it,' Deut. iv. 12. Which, sealing up his New Testament, he repeateth in those words: 'That which ye have, hold till I come,' &c., Rev. ii.

Wherefore, whilst Hooker saith,¹ that Christ hath not, by positive laws, so far descended into particularities with us as Moses with the Jews; whilst Camero saith,² *Non esse disputandum ita, ut quoniam in veteri Testamento, de rebus aliqui adia-phoris certa fuit lex, &c., id in novo Testamento habere locum;* and whilst Bishop Lindsey saith,³ that in the particular circumstances of persons by whom, place where, time when, and of the form and order how, the worship and work of the ministry should be performed, the church hath power to define whatsoever is most expedient, and that this is a prerogative wherein the Christian church differeth from the Jewish synagogue, they do but speak their pleasure in vain, and cannot make it appear that the Christian church hath any more power to add to the commandments of God than the synagogue had of old.

It is well said by one:⁴ "There were many points of service, as sacrifices, washings, anniversary days, &c., which we have not; but the determination of such as we have is as particular as theirs, except wherein the national circumstances make impediment." For one place not to be appointed for the worship of God, nor one tribe for the work of the ministry among us, as among them, not because more power was left to the Christian church for determining things that pertain to the worship of God than was to the Jewish, but because the Christian church was to spread itself over the whole earth, and not to be confined within the bounds of one nation as the synagogue was.

Sect. 12. Let us then here call to mind the distinction which hath been showed betwixt religious ceremonies and moral circumstances; for as touching moral circumstances, which serve for common order and decency in the worship of God, they being so many and so alterable, that they could not be particularly determined in Scripture, for all the different and almost infinite cases which might occur, the Jewish syna-

gogue had the same power for determining things of this nature which the church of Christ now hath. For the law did not define, but left to be defined by the synagogue, the set hours for all public divine service, when it should begin, how long it should last, the order that should be kept in the reading and expounding of the law, praying, singing, catechising, excommunicating, censuring, absolving of delinquents, &c., the circumstances of the celebration of marriage, of the education of youth in schools and colleges, &c.

But as for ceremonies which are proper to God's holy worship, shall we say that the fidelity of Christ, the Son, hath been less than the fidelity of Moses, the servant? Heb. iii. 2, which were to be said, if Christ had not, by as plain, plentiful, and particular directions and ordinances, provided for all the necessities of the Christian church in the matter of religion, as Moses for the Jewish; or if the least pin, and the meanest appurtenance of the tabernacle, and all the service thereof, behooved to be ordered according to the express commandment of God by the hand of Moses, how shall we think, that in the rearing, framing, ordering, and beautifying of the church, the house of the living God, he would have less honour and prerogative given than to his own well-beloved Son, by whom he hath spoken to us in these last days, and whom he hath commanded us to hear in all things? Or that he will accept, at our hands, any sacred ceremony which men have presumed to bring into his holy and pure worship, without the appointment of his own word and will revealed unto us? Albeit the worship of God and religion, in the church of the New Testament, be accompanied without ceremonies, *numero paucissimis, observatione facillimis, significatione prestantissimis* (as Augustine speaketh of our sacraments¹), yet we have in Scripture, Eph. i. 18, no less particular determination and distinct direction for our few, easy, and plain ceremonies, than the Jews had for their many heavy and obscure ones.

Sect. 13. As for the third distinction, of adding to the accidentary parts of it, I remember that I heard in the logics, of *pars essentialis* or *physica*, and *pars integralis* or *mathematica*; of *pars similis* and *pars dissimilis*; of *pars continua* and

¹ 1 Epl. 118.

pars discreta; but of *pars accidentaria* heard I never till now. There is (I know) such a distinction of *pars integralis*, that it is either *principalis* and *necessaria*, or *minus principalis* and *non necessaria*; but we cannot understand their *pars cultus accidentaria* to be *pars integralis non necessaria*, because, then, their distribution of worship into essential and accidentary parts could not answer to the rules of a just distribution, of which one is, that *distributio debet exhaustire totum distributum*. Now, there are some parts of worship which cannot be comprehended in the foresaid distribution, namely, *partes integrales necessarias*. What then? Shall we let this wild distinction pass, because it cannot be well nor formally interpreted? Nay, but we will observe their meaning who make use of it; for unto all such parts of worship as are not essential (and which they are pleased to call accidentary), they hold the church may make addition, wherunto I answer, 1. Let them make us understand what they mean by those essential parts to which the church may add nothing, and let them beware lest they give us an identical description of the same.

2. That there are many parts of God's worship which are not essential, yet such as will not suffer any addition of the church: for proof whereof I demand, Were all the ceremonies commanded to be used in the legal sacraments and sacrifices essential parts of those worships? No man will say so. Yet the synagogue was tied to observe those (and no other than those) ceremonies which the word prescribed. When Israel was again to keep the passover, it was said, Num. ix. 3, "In the fourteenth day of this month at even, ye shall keep it in his appointed season, according to all the rites of it, and according to all the ceremonies of it, shall ye keep it." And again, ver. 5, "According to all that the Lord commanded Moses, so did the children of Israel." *Ritus et ceremoniis divinitus institutis, non licuit homini suo arbitrio aliquid adjicere aut detrachere*, saith P. Martyr.¹

Sect. 14. 3. If those accidentary parts of worship, which are commanded in the word, be both necessary to be used *necessitate precepti*, and likewise sufficient means fully adequate and proportioned to that end, for which God hath destined such parts of his

worship as are not essential (which must be granted by every one who will not accuse the Scripture of some defect and imperfection), then it followeth that other accidentary parts of worship, which the church addeth thereto, are but superfluous and superstitutions.

4. I call to mind another logical maxim: *Sublata una parte, tollitur totum*. An essential part being taken away, *totum essentialis* is taken away also. In like manner, an integrant part being taken away, *totum integrum* cannot remain behind. When a man hath lost his hand or his foot, though he be still a man physically, *totum essentialis*, yet he is not a man mathematically, he is no longer *totum integrale*. Just so if we reckon any additions (as the cross, kneeling, holidays, &c.) among the parts of God's worship, then put the case, that those additions were taken away, it followeth that all the worship which remaineth still will not be the whole and entire worship of God, but only a part of it, or at the best, a defective, wanting, lame, and maimed worship.

5. I have made it evident that our opposites make the controverted ceremonies to be worship,¹ in as proper and peculiar sense as anything can be; and that they are equalled to the chief and principal parts of worship, not ranked among the secondary or less principal parts of it.

6. Do not our divines condemn the addition of rites and ceremonies to that worship which the word prescribeth, as well as the addition of other things which are thought more essential? We have heard Martyr's words to this purpose.

Zanchius will have us to learn from the second commandment,² *in externo cultu qui Deo debetur, seu in ceremoniis nihil nobis esse ex nostro capite comminiscendum*, whether in sacraments or sacrifices, or other sacred things, such as temples, altars, clothes, and vessels, necessary for the external worship; but that we ought to be contented with those ceremonies which God hath prescribed.

And in another place,³ he condemneth the addition of any other rite whatsoever, to those rites of every sacrament which have been ordained of Christ, *Si ceremoniis cujusvis sacramenti, alios addas ritus, &c.*

¹ Supra, cap. 1, sect. 6.

² In 2 Præc., cot. 363.

³ Ib., col. 502.

¹ Com. in 1 Reg. viii. 65.

¹ Ecl. Pol., lib. 2.

² Prælect., tom. 1, p. 369.

³ Epist. to the Pastors of the Church of Scotland.

⁴ Course of Conformity, p. 153.

Dr Fulk pronounceth,¹ even of signs and rites, that "we must do in religion and God's service, not that which seemeth good to us, but that only which he commandeth," Deut. iv. 2; xii. 32.

And Calvin pronounceth generally,² *Cœnam domini rem adeo sacrosanctam esse, ut ullis hominum additamentis eam conspurcare sit nefas.*

Sect. 15. And thus have we made good our argument, that the lawfulness of the ceremonies cannot be warranted by any ecclesiastical law. If we had no more against them this were enough, that they are but human additions, and want the warrant of the word. When Nadab and Abihu offered strange fire before the Lord, and when the Jews burnt their sons and their daughters in the valley of the son of Hinnon, howsoever manifold wickedness might have been challenged in that which they did, yet if any would dispute with God upon the matter, he steppeth their mouths with this one answer: "I commanded it not, neither came it into my heart," Lev. x. 1; Jer. vii. 31. May we, last of all, hear what the canon law itself decreeth:³ *Is qui præest, si præter voluntatem Dei, vel præter quod in sanctis Scripturis evidenter præcipitur, vel dicit aliquid, vel imperat, tanquam falsus testis Dei, aut sacrilegus habeatur.*

CHAPTER VIII.

THAT THE LAWFULNESS OF THE CEREMONIES CANNOT BE WARRANTED BY ANY ORDINANCE OF THE CIVIL MAGISTRATE; WHOSE POWER IN THINGS SPIRITUAL OR ECCLESIASTICAL IS EXPLAINED.

Sect. 1. Now are we fallen upon the stronghold of our opposites, which is the king's majesty's supremacy in things ecclesiastical. If they did mean, in good earnest, to qualify the lawfulness of the ceremonies from holy Scripture, why have they not taken more pains and travail to debate the matter from thence? And if they meant to justify them by the laws and constitutions of the church, why did they not study to an orderly peaceable proceeding, and to have things concluded in a lawful national sy-

¹ Annot. on Phil. ii. 10.

² Epist. ad Protect. Angl.

³ Causa 11, quest. 3, cap. 101.

nod, after free reasoning and mature advisement? Why did they carry matters so factiously and violently? The truth is, they would have us to acquiesce, and to say no more against the ceremonies, when once we hear that they are enjoined by his Majesty, our only supreme governor. What I am here to say shall not derogate anything from his Highness's supremacy, because it includeth no such thing as a nomothetical power to prescribe and appoint such sacred and significant ceremonies as he shall think good.

The Archbishop of Armagh, in his speech which he delivered concerning the king's supremacy (for which king James returned him, in a letter, his princely and gracious thanks, for that he had defended his just and lawful power with so much learning and reason), whilst he treateth of the supremacy, and expoundeth that title of "the only supreme governor of all his Highness's dominions and countries, as well in all spiritual or ecclesiastical things or causes, as temporal," mentioneth no such thing as any power to dispose, by his laws and ordinances, of things external in the worship of God. Neither yet shall this following discourse tend to the cooling and abating of that care and zeal which princes owe to the oversight and promotion of religion. For alas! the corruptions which have stept into religion, and the decays which it hath felt since princes began to take small thought of it, and to leave the care of it to popes, bishops, monks, &c., can never be enough bewailed. *Nihil enim, &c.* "For there is nothing (saith Zanchius¹) more pernicious, either to the commonwealth or to the church, than if a prince do all things by the judgment of others, and he himself understand not those things which are propounded to be done."

Nor, lastly, are we to sound an alarm of rebellion; for to say that subjects are not bound to obey such laws and statutes of their prince, as impose upon them a yoke of ceremonies which he hath no power to impose, is one thing, and to say that they are not bound to subject themselves unto him faithfully and loyally, is another thing. *Recte Gerson: Qui abusui potestatis resistit, non resistit divinæ ordinationi*, saith the Bishop of Salisbury.² "Subjection (saith Dr Field³) is required generally and abso-

¹ In 4 Præc., col. 791.

² De Jud. Controv., cap. 14, p. 76.

³ Of the Church, lib. 4, cap. 34, p. 400.

lutely, where obedience is not." If we have leave to speak with divines,¹ the bond and sign of subjection is only homage, or the oath of fidelity, whereby subjects bind themselves to be faithful to their prince; and we take the Judge of all flesh to witness, before whose dreadful tribunal we must stand at that great day, how free we are of thoughts of rebellion, and how uprightly we mean to be his Majesty's most true and loyal subjects to the end of our lives, and to devote ourselves, our bodies, lives, goods, and estates, and all that we have in this world, to his Highness's service, and to the honour of his royal crown.

Sect. 2. Now, for the purpose in hand, we will first examine what the Archbishop of Spalato saith; for he discourseth much of the jurisdiction and office of princes, in things and causes ecclesiastical. The title of the first chapter of his sixth book, *de Rep. Eccl.*, holdeth, that it is the duty of princes *super ecclesiastica invigilare*; but in the body of the chapter he laboreth to prove that the power of governing ecclesiastical things belongeth to princes (which is far more than to watch carefully over them). This the reader will easily perceive. Nay, he himself, num. 115 and 174, professeth he hath been proving, that divine and ecclesiastical things are to be ruled and governed by the authority and laws of princes. The title prefixed to the sixth chapter of that same book is this, *Legibus et edictis principum laicorum, et ecclesiastica et ecclesiasticos gubernari*. So that in both chapters he treateth of one and the same office of princes about things ecclesiastical.

Now, if we would learn what he means by those *ecclesiastica* which he will have to be governed by princes, he resolves us that he means not things internal, such as the deciding of controversies in matters of faith, feeding with the word of God, binding and loosing, and ministering of the sacraments (for in *pure spiritualibus*, as he speaketh in *Summa*, cap. 5,) he yieldeth them not the power of judging and defining, but only things external, which pertain to the external worship of God, or concern external ecclesiastical discipline; such things he acknowledgeth to be *res spirituales*,² but *vera spiritualia* he will have to comprehend only things internal, which he re-

moveth from the power of princes. Thus we have his judgment as plain as himself hath delivered it unto us.

Sect. 3. But I demand, 1. Why yieldeth he the same power to princes in governing *ecclesiastica* which he yieldeth them in governing *ecclesiasticos*? For ecclesiastical persons, being members of the commonwealth no less than laics, have the same king and governor with them; for which reason it is (as the Bishop himself sheweth out of Molina¹) that they are bound to be subject to their prince's laws, which pertain to the whole commonwealth. But the like cannot be alleged for the power of princes to govern *ecclesiastica*; for the Bishop, I trust, would not have said that things ecclesiastical and things civil do equally and alike belong to their power and jurisdiction.

2. Why confoundeth he the governing of things and causes ecclesiastical with watching over and taking care for the same? Let us only call to mind the native signification of the word: *Kυβερνάω, gubernare* signifieth properly to rule or govern the course of a ship; and in a ship there may be many watchful and careful eyes over her course, and yet but one governor directing the same.

3. Why holdeth he that things external in the worship of God are not *vera spiritualia*? For if they be ecclesiastical and sacred ceremonies (not fleshly and worldly), why will he not also acknowledge them for true spiritual things? And if they be not *vera spiritualia*, why calls he them *res spirituales*? for are not *res* and *verum* reciprocal as well as *ens* and *verum*.

4. Even as a prince in his sea-voyage is supreme governor of all which are in the ship with him, and, by consequence, of the governor who directs her course, yet doth he not govern the actions of governing or directing the course of a ship; so, though a prince be the only supreme governor of all his dominions, and, by consequence, of ecclesiastical persons in his dominions, yet he cannot be said to govern all their ecclesiastical actions and causes. And as the governor of a ship acknowledgeth his prince for his only supreme governor even then whilst he is governing and directing the course of the ship (otherwise whilst he is governing her course he should not be his prince's subject), yet he doth not thereby acknowledge that his prince governeth his action of di-

¹ Gerard, Loc. Theol., tom. 6, p. 1280; Polan. Synt., lib. 10, cap. 162, col. 960.

² Lib. 6, cap. 5, num. 3, 174.

³ Osteas. Error. Fr. Suarez, cap. 3, num. 23.

¹ De Rep. Eccl., cap. 6, num. 38.

recting the course of the ship (for then should the prince be the pilot); so when one hath acknowledged the prince to be the only supreme governor upon earth of all ecclesiastical persons in his dominions, even whilst they are ordering and determining ecclesiastical causes, yet he hath not thereby acknowledged that the prince governeth the ecclesiastical causes. Wherefore, whilst the Bishop¹ taketh the English oath of supremacy to acknowledge the same which he teacheth touching the prince's power, he giveth it another sense than the words of it can bear; for it saith not that the king's majesty is the only supreme governor of all his Highness's dominions, and of all things and causes therein, as well ecclesiastical or spiritual as temporal, — but it saith that he is the only supreme governor of all his Highness's dominions in all things or causes, &c. Now, the spiritual guides of the church, substituted by Christ as deputies in his stead, who is the most supreme Governor of his own church, and on whose shoulder the government resteth, Isa. ix. 6, as his royal prerogative, even then, whilst they are governing and putting order to ecclesiastical or spiritual causes, they acknowledge their prince to be their only supreme governor upon earth, yet hereby they imply not that he governeth their governing of ecclesiastical causes, as hath been shown by that simile of governing a ship.

Sect. 4. 5. Whereas the Bishop leaveth all things external, which pertain to the worship of God, to be governed by princes, I object, that the version of the holy Scripture out of Hebrew and Greek into the vulgar tongue is an external thing, belonging to the worship of God, yet it cannot be governed by a prince who is not learned in the original tongues.

6. Whereas he yieldeth to princes the power of governing in *spiritualibus*, but not in *pure spiritualibus*, I cannot comprehend this distinction. All sacred and ecclesiastical things belonging to the worship of God are spiritual things.

What, then, understands he by things purely spiritual? If he mean things which are in such sort spiritual, that they have nothing earthly nor external in them, — in this sense the sacraments are not purely spiritual, because they consist of two parts; one earthly, and another heavenly, as Rheneus

saith of the eucharist; — and so the sacraments, not being things purely spiritual, shall be left to the power and government of princes. If it be said that by things purely spiritual he means things which concern our spirits only, and not the outward man, I still urge the same instance; for the sacraments are not in this sense spiritual, because a part of the sacraments, to wit, the sacramental signs or elements, concern our external and bodily senses of seeing, touching, and tasting.

7. The Bishop also contradicteth himself unawares; for in one place¹ he reserveth and excepteth from the power of princes the judging and deciding of controversies and questions of faith. Yet in another place² he exhorteth kings and princes to compel the divines of both sides (of the Roman and reformed churches) to come to a free conference, and to debate the matters controverted betwixt them; in which conference he requireth the princes themselves to be judges.

Sect. 5. It remaineth to try what force of reason the Bishop hath to back his opinion. As for the ragged rabble of human testimonies which he raketh together, I should but weary my reader, and spend paper and ink in vain, if I should insist to answer them one by one. Only thus much I say of all those sentences of the fathers and constitutions of princes and emperors about things ecclesiastical, together with the histories of the submission of some ecclesiastical causes to emperors, — let him who pleaseth read them; and it shall appear,

1. That some of those things whereunto the power of princes was applied were unlawful.

2. There were many of them things temporal or civil, not ecclesiastical or spiritual, nor such as pertain to the worship of God.

3. There were some of them ecclesiastical or spiritual things, but then princes did only ratify that which had been determined by councils, and punish with the civil sword such as did stubbornly disobey the church's lawful constitutions. Neither were princes allowed to do any more.

4. Sometimes they interposed their authority, and meddled in causes spiritual or ecclesiastical, even before the definition of councils; yet did they not judge nor decide

¹ Lib. 6, cap. 5, num. 174.

² Ibid., num. 177.

those matters, but did only convocate councils, and urge the clergy to see to the misordered and troubled state of the church, and by their wholesome laws and ordinances, to provide the best remedies for the same which they could.

5. At other times princes have done somewhat more in ecclesiastical matters; but this was only in extraordinary cases, when the clergy were so corrupted, that either through ignorance they were unable, or through malice and perverseness unwilling, to do their duty in deciding of controversies, making of canons, using the keys, and managing of other ecclesiastical matters, in which case princes might and did, by their coercive temporal jurisdiction, avoid disorder, error, and superstition, and cause a reformation of the church.

6. Princes have likewise, in rightly constituted and well reformed churches, by their own regal authority, straitly enjoined things pertaining to the worship of God, but those things were the very same which God's own written word had expressly commanded.

7. When princes went beyond those limits and bounds, they took upon them to judge and command more than God hath put within the compass of their power.

Sect. 6. But as touching the passages of holy Scripture which the Bishop allegeth, I will answer thereto particularly. And first, he produceth that place, Deut. xvii. 19, where the king was appointed to have the book of the law of God with him, that he might learn to fear the Lord his God, and to keep all the words of this law and these statutes to do them. What logic, I pray, can from this place infer that princes have the supreme power of governing all ecclesiastical causes? Next, the Bishop tells us of David's appointing of the offices of the Levites, and dividing of their courses, 1 Chron. xxiii. and his commending of the same to Solomon, 1 Chron. xxviii.; but he might have observed that David did not this as a king, but as a prophet, or man of God, 2 Chron. viii. 14, yea, those orders and courses of the Levites were also commanded by other prophets of the Lord, 2 Chron. xxix. 25. As touching Solomon's appointing of the courses and charges of the priests, Levites, and porters, he did not of himself, nor by his own princely authority, but because David, the man of God, had so commanded, 2 Chron. viii. 24. For So-

lomon received from David a pattern for all that which he was to do in the work of the house of the Lord, and also for the courses of the priests and Levites, 1 Chron. xxviii. 11—13.

Sect. 7. The Bishop comes on and tells us that Hezekiah did apply his regal power to the reformation of the Levites, and of the worship of God in their hands, saying, "Hear me, ye Levites, sanctify now yourselves, and sanctify the house of the Lord God of your fathers, and carry forth the filthiness out of the holy place."

Ans. He exhorted them to no more than God's law required of them, for the law ordained them to sanctify themselves, and to do the service of the house of the Lord, Num. viii. 6, 11, 15; xviii. 32; so that Hezekiah did here constitute nothing by his own arbitration and authority, but plainly sheweth his warrant, ver. 11, "The Lord hath chosen you to stand before him, to serve him, and that you should minister unto him."

But the Bishop further allegeth out of 2 Chron. xxxi. that Hezekiah appointed the courses of the priests and Levites, every man according to his service.

Ans. He might have read 2 Chron. xxix. 25, that Hezekiah did all this according to the commandment of David, and of Gad, the king's seer, and Nathan the prophet, "For so was the commandment of the Lord by his prophets." And who doubteth but kings may command such things as God hath commanded before them?

Sect. 8. The next example which the Bishop allegeth is out of 2 Chron. xxxv. where we read that Josias did set the priests and Levites again in their charges; which example cannot prove that kings have the supreme power of governing ecclesiastical causes, unless it be evinced that Josias changed those orders and courses of the Levites and priests which the Lord had commanded by his prophets, 2 Chron. xxix. 25, and that he did institute other orders by his own regal authority; whereas the contrary is manifest from the text; for Josias did only set the priests and Levites those charges and courses which had been assigned unto them after the writing of David and Solomon, ver. 4, and by the commandment of David, and Asaph, and Heman, and Jeduthun, the king's seer, ver. 15. Neither did Josias command the priests and Levites any other service than

¹ Ostens. Error. Fr. Suarez, cap. 3, num. 23.

that which was written in the book of Moses, ver. 12; so that, from his example, it only followeth, that when princes see the state of ecclesiastical persons corrupted, they ought to interpose their authority for reducing them to those orders and functions which God's word commandeth.

Sect. 9. Moreover, the Bishop objecteth the example of Joash, who, while he yet did right in the days of Jehoiada the priest, 2 Chron. xxiv. sent the priests and Levites to gather from all Israel money for repairing the house of the Lord, and when they dealt negligently in this business, he transferred the charge of the same unto others, and, making himself the keeper of the holy money, did both prescribe how it was to be disbursed, and likewise take from good Jehoiada the priest the administration of the same. Now, where he hath read that Joash made himself the keeper of the money, and prescribed how it should be disbursed, also that he took the administration from Jehoiada, I cannot guess; for the text hath no such thing in it, but the contrary, viz. that the king's scribe, and the high priest's officer, kept the money, and disbursed the same, as the king and Jehoiada prescribed unto them. As to that which he truly allegeth out of the holy text, I answer, 1. The collection for repairing the house of the Lord was no human ordinance, for Joash sheweth the commandment of Moses for it, ver. 6, having reference to Exod. xxx. 12—14. No other collections did Joash impose but those *quæ divino jure debebantur*.¹ 2. As for the taking of the charge of this collection from the priests, he be-hooved to do so, because they had still neglected the work, when the twenty-third year of his reign was come. And so say we, that when the ministers of the church fail to do their duty, in providing that which is necessary for the service of God, princes ought by some other means to cause these things to be redressed. 3. Joash did nothing with these monies without Jehoiada, but *Pontifex eas primum laborantibus tribuit, tum in ædis sacræ restaurationem maxime convertit*.² 4. And what if he had done this by himself? I suppose no man will reckon the hiring of masons and carpenters with such as wrought iron and brass, or the gathering of money for this purpose, among

¹ J. Wolph. in 2 Reg. xii.
² Id., ibid.

spiritual things or causes. 5. And if these employments about Solomon's temple were not to be called spiritual or ecclesiastical, far less about our material churches, which are not holy nor consecrated as Solomon's was for a typical use. Wherefore, without all prejudice to our cause, we may and do commend the building and repairing of churches by Christian princes.

Sect. 10. But the Bishop returneth to another example in Solomon, which is the putting of Abiathar, the chief priest, from his office, and surrogating of another in his place. Ans. Abiathar was civilly dead, as the lawyers used to speak, and it was only by accident or by consequent that Solomon put him from his office: he sent him away to Anathoth, because of his treasonable following and aiding of Adonijah, whereupon necessarily followed his falling away from the honour, dignity, and office of the high priest, whence it only followeth, that if a minister be found guilty of *læse majestæ*, the king may punish him either with banishment or proscription, or some such civil punishment, whereupon by consequence will follow his falling from his ecclesiastical office and dignity. 2. As for Solomon's putting of Zadok in the room of Abiathar, it maketh as little against us, for Zadok did fall to the place *jure divino*.

The honour and office of the high-priesthood was given to Eleazar, the elder son of Aaron, and was to remain in his family. How it came to pass that it was transferred to Eli, who was of the family of Ithamar, we read not. Always after that Abiathar, who was of the family of Ithamar and descended of Eli, had by a capital crime fallen from it, it did of very right belong to Zadok, who was chief of the family of Eleazar. And so all this flowed, not from Solomon's, but from God's own authority.

Sect. 11. The Bishop remembereth another example in Hezekiah too, telling us that he removed the high places, and brake the images, and cut down the groves, and brake in pieces the brazen serpent, when the children of Israel did burn incense unto it. Now, we wish from our hearts that from this example all Christian kings may learn to remove and destroy the monuments of idolatry out of their dominions. And if it be said that in so doing kings take upon them to govern by their princely authority an ecclesiastical or spiritual cause, it is easily answered, that when they destroy idolatrous

monuments, they do nothing by their own authority, but by the authority of God's law,¹ which commanded to abolish such monuments, and to root out the very names of idols; which commandment is to be executed by the coercion of temporal power.

Sect. 12. Finally, saith the Bishop, the kings of the Jews, 1 Kings xxiii.; 2 Chron. xix.; have in the temple propounded the law of the Lord to the people, renewed the covenant of religion, pulled down profane altars, broken down idols, slain idolatrous priests, liberated their kingdom from abomination, purged the temple, 2 Chron. xxxiv, xxxv; 1 Maceab. iv. 59; proclaimed the keeping of the passover, and of the feast of dedication, Esth. ix. 26; and have also instituted new feasts. For all which things they are in the Scriptures much praised by the Holy Spirit, 2 Chron. xxix. 2; xxxiv. 2, &c.

Ans. True it is, Josias did read the law of the Lord to the people in the temple, and made a covenant before the Lord; but, 1. he prescribed nothing at his own pleasure; only he required of the people to walk after the Lord, and to keep his commandments. 2. Neither did he this work by himself, but did convocate a council of the prophets, priests and elders of Israel, for the advancing of that reformation, 2 Kings xxiii. 1. 3. And if he had done it by himself, yet we are to remember that the reformation of a church generally and greatly corrupted, craveth the more immediate intermeddling of princes, and a great deal more than can be ordinarily and orderly done by them in a church already reformed. The slaying of the idolatrous priests had also the warrant and authority of the law of God, which appointed a capital punishment for blasphemers,¹ or such as, in contempt of God and to rub some ignominy upon his name, did traduce his doctrine and religion, and either detract from him, and attribute to idols that which appertained properly unto him, or else attributed unto him either by enunciation or imprecation, such things as could not stand with the glory of the Godhead. Concerning the abolishing of idolatry and all the relics thereof, we have answered that it was commanded by God. The keeping of the passover was also commanded in the law; so that when Hezekiah enjoined it, he did but publish God's own express ordinance.

¹ Zanch. in 3 Præc. 575—558.

Last of all, touching the two remanent examples: 1. The feast of the dedication was not ordained by the sole authority of Judas, but by his brethren and by the whole congregation of Israel;¹ and the days of Purim were established by Mordecai, a prophet. Esth. ix. 20, 21. 2. We have elsewhere made it evident, that the days of Purim, by their first institution, were only days of civil joy and solemnity, and that the feast of the dedication was not lawfully instituted.

Sect. 13. Thus having dismissed the Bishop, we will make us for clearing the purpose in hand. But before we come to show particularly what princes may do, and what they may not do, in making laws about things ecclesiastical, we will first of all lay down these propositions following:—

1. Whatsoever the power of princes be in things and causes ecclesiastical, it is not, sure, absolute nor unbounded. *Solius Dei est* (saith Stapleton),² *juxta suam sanctissimam voluntatem, actiones suas omnes dirigere, et omnia facere quæcunque voluit*. And again, *Vis tuam voluntatem esse regulam rerum omnium, ut omnia fiant pro tuo beneplacito*? Whether we respect the persons or the places of princes, their power is confined within certain limits, so that they may not enjoin whatsoever they list. As touching their persons, Bishop Spotswood would do no less than warrant the articles of Perth by king James's personal qualities: "His person (saith he³), were he not our sovereign, gives them sufficient authority, being recommended by him; for he knows the nature of things, and the consequences of them, what is fit for a church to have, and what not, better than we do all."

I mean not to derogate anything from king James's duly-deserved praise, nor to obscure his never-dying memory; only I say, that such a prince as the Bishop speaketh of, who knoweth what is fit for a church to have, and what not, better than many learned and godly pastors assembled in a synod, is *rara avis in terris nigroque simillima Cygno*. For a prince being but a man, and so subject to error, being but one man, and so in the greater hazard of error; for *plus videns oculi, quam oculus*; and, woe to him that is alone when he falleth, for he hath not another to help him up," saith the wisest of mortal kings, Eccl. iv. 10; being

¹ Supra, cap. 6.

² Prompt. Morall. in Domini. 1, quadrag. text. 10.

³ Sermon in Perth Assembly.

also compassed or assailed with so many temptations which other men are free of; and lastly, being so taken up and distracted with secular affairs and cares, that very seldom is he found well versed or singularly learned in the controversies of religion; may not such a one, in the common sense of Christians, be thought more like to fail and miscarry in his judgment about things ecclesiastical, than a whole synod, wherein there are many of the learned, judicious, and godly ministers of the church. Papists tell us, that they will not defend the personal actions of the Pope, *quasi ipse solus omnibus horis sapere potuerit, id quod recte nemini concessum perhibetur*.¹ Their own records let the world know the abominable vices and impieties of popes. Witness Platina, in the life of John X., Benedict IV., John XIII., Boniface VII., John XX., John XXII., Paul II., &c. And further, when our adversaries dispute of the Pope's infallibility, they grant, for his own person, he may be an heretic, only they hold that he cannot err *à cathedra*.

And shall we now idolise the persons of princes more than Papists do the persons of popes? Or shall Papists object to us, that we extol the judgment of our princes to a higher degree of authority and infallibility than they yield to the judgment of their popes? Alas, why would we put the weapons in the hands of our adversaries!

Sect. 14. But what say we of princes in respect of their place and calling? Is not their power absolute in that respect? *Recte quidam* (saith Saravia),² *illiberatis et inverecundi censet esse ingenii, de principum potestate et rebus gestis questionem movere, quando et imperator sacrilegium esse scribit, de eo quod à principe factum est disputare*. Camero holdeth,³ that in things pertaining to external order in religion, kings may command what they will *pro auctoritate*, and forbid to seek another reason beside the majesty of their authority; yea, that when they command *frivola, dura, et iniqua respectu nostri*, our consciences are bound by those their frivolous and unjust commandments, not only in respect of the end, because scandal should possibly follow in case we obey them not, but also *jubentis respectu*, because the Apostle biddeth us obey the magistrate for conscience' sake. At

the reading of these passages in Saravia and Camero, horror and amazement have taken hold on me. O wisdom of God, by whom kings do reign and princes decree justice, upon whose thigh and vesture is written, "King of kings and Lord of lords," make the kings of the earth to know that their laws are but *regule regulatæ*, and *mensuræ mensuratæ*! Be wise now, therefore, O ye kings; be instructed ye judges of the earth. Serve the Lord with fear, and rejoice with trembling. Kiss the Son, and lay down your crowns at the feet of the Lamb that sits upon the throne,¹ *discite justitiam moniti*; and remember that this is the beginning of wisdom, by casting pride away, to addict yourselves to the dominion of Christ; who, albeit he hath given the kingdoms of this world unto your hands, and *non auferet mortalia, qui regna datio cælestia*, yet hath he kept the government of his church upon his own shoulder, Psal. ix. 6; xxii. 21. So that *rex non est proprie rector ecclesiæ sed reipublicæ; ecclesiæ vero defensor est*. O all ye subjects of kings and princes, understand that in things pertaining to the church and kingdom of Christ, ye are not the servants of men, to do what they list, and that for their listing, 1 Cor. vii. 23. The Apostle, Rom. xiii. urgeth, not obedience to magistrates for conscience' sake, but only subjection for conscience' sake; for he concludeth his whole purpose,² vor. 7, "Render therefore to all their dues, tribute to whom tribute is due, custom to whom custom, fear to whom fear, honour to whom honour."³ There is not in all that chapter one word of obedience to magistrates.

And as touching the binding power of their laws, be they never so just, they cannot bind you any other way, nor in respect of the general end of them. For, *per se*, they cannot bind more than the church's laws can. Which things Dr Forbess⁴ hath also told you out of Calvin.

And hence it followeth, that whensoever you may omit that which princes enjoin, without violating the law of charity, you are not holden to obey them for the majesty of princely authority. Be ashamed, O ye Formalists, of your ascribing to princes a jurisdiction so absolute! Bury it in the grave of eternal silence. Tell it not in

¹ Calv. in Psal. II.

² Taylor on Tit. iii. 1, p. 543.

³ Pareus lo illum locum.

⁴ Iren., lib. 2, cap. 4, sect. 3.

¹ Onuphr. de Vit. Hadr., 6.

² De Imper. aut. lib. 2, cap. 55.

³ Prælect., tom. I, p. 370, 372; tom. 2, p. 41.

Rome; publish it not among the vassals of antichrist, lest the daughters of Babylon rejoice, lest the worshippers of the Beast triumph! O how small confidence have the cardinals, I say not now into the Pope's person, but even into his chair, when being entered in the conclave for the election of a new pope, they spend the whole day following in the making of laws belonging to the administration and handling of all things by him who shall be advanced to the popedom; which laws every one of them subscribeth, and sweareth to observe, if he be made pope, as Oneplirius writeth. Though the Pope's own creatures, the Jesuits, in their schools and books, must dispute for his infallibility *à cathedra*, yet we see what trust the wise cardinals, shut up in the conclave, do put in him, with what bond they tie him, and within what bounds they confine his power. Albeit the Pope, after he is created, observeth not strictly this oath, as that wise writer of the *History of the Council of Trent* noteth,¹ yet let me say once again, Shall we set up the power of princes higher, or make their power less limited than Papists do the power of popes? or shall they set bounds to popes and we set none to princes?

Sect. 15. But I find myself a little digressed after the roving absurdities of some opposites. Now, therefore, to return,—the second proposition which I am here to lay down, before I speak particularly of the power of princes, is this: Whatsoever princes can commendably either do by themselves, or command to be done by others, in such matters as any way appertain to the external worship of God, must be both lawful in the nature of it, and expedient in the use of it; which conditions, if they be wanting, their commandments cannot bind to obedience.

For, 1. The very ground and reason wherefore we ought to obey the magistrate² is, for that he is the minister of God, or a deputy set in God's stead to us. Now, he is the minister of God only for our good, Rom. xiii. 4. Neither were he God's minister, but his own master, if he should rule at his pleasure, and command things which serve not for the good of the subjects. Since, therefore, the commandments of princes bind only so far as they are the

ministers of God for our good,—and God's ministers they are not in commanding such things as are either in their nature unlawful, or in their use inconvenient,—it followeth that such commandments of theirs cannot bind.

2. Princes cannot claim any greater power in matters ecclesiastical than the apostle Paul had, or the church herself yet hath; that is to say, princes may not by any temporal or regal jurisdiction, urge any ceremony or form of ecclesiastical policy which the Apostle once might not, and the church yet may not, urge by a spiritual jurisdiction. But neither had the Apostle of old, nor hath the church now, power to urge either a ceremony or anything else which is not profitable for edifying. Paul could do nothing against the truth, but for the truth; and his power was given to him to edification, and not to destruction, 2 Cor. xiii. 8, 10; neither shall ecclesiastical persons, to the world's end, receive any other power beside that which is for the perfecting of the saints, and for the edifying of the body of Christ, Eph. iv. 12. Therefore, as the church's power¹ is only to prescribe that which may edify, so the power of princes is in like sort given to them for edification, and not for destruction; neither can they do aught against the truth, but only for the truth.

3. We are bound by the law of God to do nothing which is not good and profitable, or edifying, 1 Cor. vi. 12; xiv. 26. This law of charity is of a higher and straiter bond than the law of any prince in the world:—

"The general rule of all indifferent things, is, Let all things be done to edification; and, Rom. xv. 1, 2, 'Let every man please his neighbour to edification, even as Christ pleased not himself but others.' Whatsoever, then, is of this rank, which either would weaken or not edify our brother, be it ever so lawful, ever so profitable to ourselves, ever so powerfully by earthly authority enjoined,—Christians, who are not born unto themselves, but unto Christ, unto his church, and fellow-members, must not dare to meddle with it," saith one² well to our purpose.

Sect. 16. A third proposition I promit, which is this, Since the power of princes to

¹ Lib. 1.

² Pareus in Rom. xiii. 4.

¹ Dr Forb. Iren., lib. 2, cap. 4, sect. 10.

² Taylor on Tit. i. 15, p. 295.

make laws about things ecclesiastical is not absolute, but bound and adstricted unto things lawful and expedient, which sort of things, and no other, we are allowed to do for their commandments; and since princes many times may, and do, not only transgress those bounds and limits, but likewise pretend that they are within the same, when indeed they are without them, and enjoin things unlawful and inconvenient, under the name, title, and show of things lawful and convenient; therefore it is most necessary as well for princes to permit, as for subjects to take liberty to try and examine by the judgment of discretion, everything which authority enjoineeth, whether it be agreeable or repugnant to the rules of the word; and if, after trial, it be found repugnant, to abstain from the doing of the same.

For, 1. The word teacheth us, that the spiritual man judgeth all things, 1 Cor. ii. 15; trieth the things that are different, Phil. i. 10; hath his senses exercised to discern both good and evil, Heb. v. 14; and that every one who would hold fast that which is good, and abstain from all appearance of evil, must first prove all things, 1 Thess. v. 21.

2. Whatsoever is not of faith is sin, Rom. xiv. 23. But whatsoever a man doth without the trial, knowledge, and persuasion of the lawfulness of it by the word of God, that is not of faith; therefore a sin. It is the word of God, and not the arbitration of princes whereupon faith is grounded. And though the word may be without faith, yet faith cannot be without the word. By it therefore must a man try and know assuredly the lawfulness of that which he doth.

3. "Every one of us shall give account of himself to God." But as we cannot give an account to God of those actions which we have done in obedience to our prince, except we have examined, considered, and understood the lawfulness of the same; so an account could not be required of us for them, if we were bound to obey and to keep all his ordinances in such sort that we might not try and examine them, with full liberty to refuse those which we judge out of the word to be unlawful or inconvenient; for then princes' ordinances were a most sufficient warrant to us: we needed try no more. Let him make an account to God of his command; we have account to make of our obedience.

4. If we be bound to receive and obey the

laws of princes, without making a free trial and examining of the equity of the same, then we could not be punished for doing, unwillingly and in ignorance, things unlawful prescribed by them. Whereas every soul that sinneth shall die; and when the blind leads the blind, he who is lead falls in the ditch as well as his leader.

5. No man is permitted to do everything which seemeth right in his eyes, and to follow every conceit which takes him in the head; but every man is bound to walk by rule, Gal. vi. 6. But the law of a prince cannot be a rule, except it be examined whether it be consonant to the word of God, *index secundum legem*, and his law is only such a rule as is ruled by a higher rule. In so far as it is ruled by the own rule of it, in as far it is a rule to us; and in so far as it is not ruled by the own rule of it, in as far it is not a rule to us. *Quid ergo? an non licebit Christiano cuique convenientiam regulæ et regulati (ut vocant) observare?* saith Junius.¹

6. The rule whereby we ought to walk in all our ways, and according to which we ought to frame all our actions, is provided of God a stable and sure rule, that it being observed and taken heed unto, may guide and direct our practice aright about all those things which it prescribeth. But the law of a prince (if we should, without trial and examination, take it for our rule) cannot be such a stable and sure rule. For put the case that a prince enjoin two things which sometimes fall out to be incompatible and cannot stand together, in that case his law cannot direct our practice, nor resolve us what to do; whereas God hath so provided for us, that the case can never occur wherein we may not be resolved what to do if we observe the rule which he hath appointed us to walk by.

7. Except this judgment of discretion which we plead for be permitted unto us, it will follow that in point of obedience we ought to give no less, but as much honour unto princes as unto God himself. For when God publisheth his commandments unto us, what greater honour could we give him by our obedience than to do that which he commandeth, for his own sole will and authority, without making further inquiry for any other reason?

8. The Apostle, 1 Cor. vii. 23, forbiddeth

¹ Animad. in Bell. Cont. 1, lib. 3, cap. 10.

us to be the servants of men, that is, to do things for which we have no other warrant beside the pleasure and will of men. Which interpretation is grounded upon other places of Scripture, that teach us we are not bound to obey men in anything which we know not to be according to the will of God, Eph. vi. 6, 7; that we ought not to live to the lusts of men, but to the will of God, 1 Pet. iv. 2, and that, therefore, we ought in everything to prove what is acceptable to the Lord, Eph. v. 20.

9. They who cleanse their way must take heed thereto according to the word, Psal. cxix. 9; therefore, if we take not heed to our way, according to the word, we do not cleanse it. They who would walk as the children of light, must have the word for a lamp unto their feet, and a light unto their path, Psal. cxix. 105; therefore, if we go in any path without the light of the word to direct us, we walk in darkness and stumble, because we see not where we go. They who would not be unwise, but walk circumspectly, must understand what the will of the Lord is, Eph. v. 17; therefore, if we understand not what the will of the Lord is concerning that which we do, we are unwise, and walk not circumspectly.

10. *Dona Dei in sanctis non sunt otiosa.*¹ Whatsoever grace God giveth us, it ought to be used and exercised, and not to lie idle in us; but God giveth us *actionem cognoscendi, et hæc diaphoræ discernendi.*² &c. a certain measure of the spirit of discretion, to teach us what to choose as good, and what to refuse as evil, 1 John ii. 27, "The same anointing teacheth you of all things;" 1 Cor. ii. 15, "He that is spiritual judgeth all things." Therefore God would have us to exercise that measure of the gift of discretion which he hath bestowed on us, in discerning of things which are propounded to us, whether they ought to be done or not.

11. Do not our divines plead for this judgment of private discretion which ought to be permitted to Christians, when anything is propounded to be believed or done by them? And this their judgment is to be seen in their writings against Papists about the controversies *de interpretatione Scripturæ, de fide implicita*, &c.

12. The Bishop of Salisbury, in his pro-

lections *de Judice Controversiarum*, doth often and in many places commend unto Christians the same judgment of discretion which we stand upon, and holdeth it necessary for them to try and examine whatsoever either princes or prelates command them to do. *Coactiva*, &c. "The coactive power of a prince (saith he), doth not absolutely bind the subject, but only with this condition, except he would compel him to that which is unlawful. Therefore there is ever left unto subjects a power of proving and judging in their own mind, whether that which is propounded be ungodly and unlawful or not; and if it be ungodly, that which the king threateneth should be suffered, rather than that which he commandeth be done. This Augustine hath taught," &c. And whereas it may be objected, that this maketh a subject to be his prince's judge, he answereth thus.² *Non se*, &c. He maketh not himself another's judge, who pondereth and examineth a sentence published by another, in so far as it containeth something either to be done or to be believed by him; but only he maketh himself the judge of his own actions. For howsoever he who playeth the judge is truly said to judge, yet every one who judgeth is not properly said to play the judge. He playeth the judge who, in an external court pronounceth a sentence, which by force of jurisdiction toucheth another; but he judgeth, who in the inferior court of his own private conscience, conceiveth such a sentence of the things to be believed or done, as pertaineth to himself alone. This latter way private men both may and ought to judge of the sentences and decrees of magistrates, neither by so doing do they constitute themselves judges of the magistrates, but judges of their own actions.

Sect. 17. Finally, there is none of our opposites but saith so much as inferreth the necessity of this judgment of private and practical discretion; for every smatterer among them hath this much in his mouth, that if the king or the church command anything unlawful, then we ought to obey God rather than men; but when they command things indifferent and lawful, then their ordinance ought to be our rule. But (good men) will they tell us how we shall know whether the things which the king or the church (as they speak) do enjoin are lawful

¹ Zanch. in Phil. i. 10.

² Ibid.

¹ Cap. 14, p. 77.

² Ibid., cap. 26, p. 152.

or unlawful, indifferent or not indifferent? and so we shall be at a point. Dare they say, that they may judge these things indifferent which our superiors judge to be such? and those unlawful which our superiors so judge of? Nay, then, they should deliver their distinction in other terms, and say thus: If our superiors enjoin anything which they judge to be unlawful, and which they command us so to account of, then we ought to obey God rather than men; but if they enjoin such things as they judge to be indifferent, and which they command us so to account of, then we ought to obey their ordinance. Which distinction, methinks, would have made Heraclitus himself to fall a laughing with Democritus. What then remaineth? Surely our opposites must either say nothing, or else say with us, that it is not only a liberty but a duty of inferiors, not to receive for a thing lawful that which is enjoined by superiors, because they account it and call it such, but by the judgment of their own discretion following the rules of the word, to try and examine whether the same be lawful or unlawful.

Sect. 18. These *præcognita* being now made good, come we to speak more particularly of the power of princes to make laws and ordinances about things which concern the worship of God. The purpose we will unfold in three distinctions: 1. Of things; 2. Of times; 3. Of ties. First, Let us distinguish two sorts of things in the worship of God, viz., things substantial, and things circumstantial. To things substantial we refer as well sacred and significant ceremonies as the more necessary and essential parts of worship, and, in a word, all things which are not mere external circumstances, such as were not particularly determinable within those bounds which it pleased God to set to his written word, and the right ordering whereof, as it is common to all human societies, whether civil or sacred, so it is investigable by the very light and guidance of natural reason. That among this kind of mere circumstances sacred significant ceremonies cannot be reckoned, we have elsewhere made it evident. Now, therefore, of things pertaining to the substance of God's worship, whether they be sacred ceremonies, or greater and more necessary duties, we say that princes have not power to enjoin anything of this kind which hath not the plain and particular institution of God himself in Scripture. They may in-

deed, and ought to publish God's own ordinances and commandments, and, by their coactive temporal power, urge and enforce the observation of the same. Notwithstanding, it is a prince's duty, "that in the worship of God, whether internal or external, he move nothing, he prescribe nothing, except that which is expressly delivered in God's own written word."¹ We must beware we confound not things which have the plain warrant of God's word with things devised by the will of man. David, Jehoshaphat, Hezekiah, Josiah, and other kings among the people of God, did, as well laudably as lawfully, enjoin and command that worship and form of religion which God, in his law and by his prophets, commanded; and forbid, avoid, and abolish such corruptions as God had forbidden before them, and appointed to be abolished; whence it followeth not that kings may enjoin things which want the warrant of the word, but only this much, which all of us commend, viz., "That a Christian prince's office in religion,² is diligently to take care that, in his dominion or kingdom, religion out of the pure word of God, expounded by the word of God itself, and understood according to the first principles of faith (which others call the analogy of faith), either be instituted, or, being instituted, be kept pure, or, being corrupted, be restored and reformed, that false doctrines, abuses, idols, and superstitions, be taken away, to the glory of God, and to his own and his subjects' salvation."

Sect. 19. But in all the Scripture princes have neither a commendable example, nor any other warrant, for the making of any innovation in religion, or for the prescribing of sacred significant ceremonies of men's devising. Jeroboam caused a change to be made in the ceremonies and form of God's worship, whereas God ordained the ark of the covenant to be the sign of his presence, and that his glory should dwell between the cherubims. Jeroboam set up two calves to be the signs representative of that God who brought "Israel out of Egypt;" and this he means while he saith, "Behold thy gods," &c., 1 Kings xii. 28, giving to the signs the thing signified; whereas God ordained Jerusalem to be the place of worship, and all the sacrifices to be brought to

¹ Danæus Pol. Christ., lib. 6, cap. 3.

² Zanch. in 4 Præc., col. 791; Polan. Synt., lib. 10, cap. 65.

the temple of Solomon, Jeroboam made Dan and Bethel to be places of worship, and built there altars and high places for the sacrifices; whereas God ordained the sons of Aaron only to be his priests, Jeroboam made priests of the lowest of the people, which were not of the sons of Levi; whereas God ordained the feast of tabernacles to be kept on the fifteenth day of the seventh month, Jeroboam appointed it on the fifteenth day of the eighth month. Now, if any prince in the world might have fair pretences for the making of such innovations in religion, Jeroboam much more. He might allege for his changing of the signs of God's presence, and of the place of worship, that since Rehoboam's wrath was incensed against him, and against the ten tribes which adhered unto him (as appeareth by the accounting of them to be rebels, 2 Chron. xiii. 6, and by the gathering of a huge army for bringing the kingdom again to Rehoboam, 2 Chron. xi. 1), it was no longer safe for his subjects to go up to Jerusalem to worship, in which case God, who required mercy more than sacrifice, would bear with their changing of a few ceremonies for the safety of men's lives. For his putting down of the priests and Levites, and his ordaining of other priests which were not of the sons of Levi, he might pretend that they were rebellious to him, in that they would not assent unto his new ordinances,¹ which he had enacted for the safety and security of his subjects, and that they did not only simply refuse obedience to these his ordinances, but in their refusal show themselves so stedfastly minded, that they would refuse and withstand even to the suffering of deprivation and deposition; and not only so, but likewise drew after them many others of the rest of the tribes to be of their judgment, 2 Chron. xi. 16, and to adhere to that manner of worship which was retained in Jerusalem. Lastly, For the change which he made about the season of the feast of tabernacles, he might have this pretence, that as it was expedient for the strengthening of his kingdom² to draw and allure as many as could be had to associate and join themselves with him in his form of worship (which could not be done if he should keep that feast at the same time when it was kept at Jerusalem); so there

was no less (if not more) order and decency in keeping it in the eighth month, when the fruits of the ground were perfectly gathered in¹ (for thankful remembrance whereof that feast was celebrated) than in the seventh, when they were not so fully collected.

These pretences he might have made yet more plausible, by professing and avouching that he intended to worship no idols, but the Lord only; that he had not fallen from anything which was fundamental and essential in divine faith and religion; that the changes which he had made were only about some alterable ceremonies which were not essential to the worship of God, and that even in these ceremonies he had not made any change for his own will and pleasure, but for important reasons which concerned the good of his kingdom and safety of his subjects. Notwithstanding of all this, the innovations which he made about these ceremonies of sacred signs, sacred places, sacred persons, sacred times, are condemned for this very reason, because he devised them of his own heart, 1 Kings xii. 33, which was enough to convince him of horrible impiety in making Israel to sin. Moreover, when king Ahaz took a pattern of the altar of Damascus, and sent it to Urijah the priest, though we cannot gather from the text that he either intended or pretended any other respect beside the honouring and pleasuring of his patron and protector, the king of Assyria, 2 Kings xvi. 10, 18 (for of his appointing that new altar for his own and all the people's sacrifices, there was nothing heard till after his return from Damascus, at which time he began to fall back from one degree of defection to a greater), yet this very innovation of taking the pattern of an altar from idolaters is marked as a sin and a snare. Last of all, whereas many of the kings of Judah and Israel did either themselves worship in the groves and the high places, or else, at least, suffer the people to do so, howsoever they might have alleged² specious reasons for excusing themselves,—as namely, that they gave not this honour to any strange gods, but to the Lord only; that they chose these places only to worship in wherein God was of old seen and worshipped by the patriarchs; that the groves and the high places added a most amiable splendour and beauty to the wor-

¹ Martyr. in 1 Reg. viii. 31.

² Ibid., 1 Reg. viii. 32.

¹ Ibid.

² Hospin. De Orig. Templ., lib. 1, cap. 1; Wolph. in 2 Reg. xii. 4.

ship of God, and that they did consecrate these places for divine worship in a good meaning, and with minds wholly devoted to God's honour,—yet notwithstanding, because this thing was not commanded of God, neither came it into his heart, he would admit no excuses, but ever challengeth it as a grievous fault in the government of those kings, that those high places were not taken away, and that the people still sacrificed in the high places; from all which examples we learn how highly God was and is displeased with men for adding any other sacred ceremonies to those which he himself hath appointed.¹

Sect. 20. Now as touching the other sort of things which we consider in the worship of God, namely, things merely circumstantial, and such as have the very same use and respect in civil which they have in sacred actions, we hold that whensoever it happeneth to be the duty and part of a prince to institute and enjoin any order or policy in these circumstances of God's worship, then he may only enjoin such an order as may stand with the observing and following of the rules of the word, whereunto we are tied in the use and practice of things which are in their general nature indifferent.

Of these rules I am to speak in the fourth part of the dispute. And here I say no more but this: Since the word commandeth us to do all things to the glory of God, 1 Cor. x. 31; to do all things to edifying, 1 Cor. xiv. 29; and to do all things in faith, and full persuasion of the lawfulness of that which we do, Rom. xiv. 5, 23, therefore there is no prince in the world who hath power to command his subjects to do that which should either dishonour God, or not honour him; or that which should either offend their brother, or not edify him; or, lastly, that which their conscience either condemneth or doubteth of. For how may a prince command that which his subjects may not do? But a wonder it were if any man should so far refuse to be ashamed that he would dare to say we are not bound to order whatsoever we do according to these rules of the word, but only such matters of private action wherein we are left at full liberty, there being no ordinance of superiors to determine our practice, and that if such an ordinance be published and propounded unto us, we should take it alone

for our rule, and no longer think to examine and order our practice by the rules of the word;

For, 1. This were as much as to say, that in the circumstances of God's worship we are bound to take heed unto God's rules, then only and in that case when men give us none of their rules, which, if they do, God's rules must give place to men's rules, and not theirs to his.

2. If it were so, then we should never make reckoning to God, whether that which we had done in obedience to superiors was right or wrong, good or bad, and we should only make reckoning of such things done by us as were not determined by a human law.

3. The law of superiors is never the supreme but ever a subordinate rule, and (as we said before) it can never be a rule to us, except in so far only as it is ruled by a higher rule. Therefore we have ever another rule to take heed unto beside their law.

4. The Scripture speaketh most generally, and admitteth no exception from the rules which it giveth: "Whatsoever ye do (though commanded by superiors) do all to the glory of God. Let all things (though commanded by superiors) be done to edifying. Whatsoever is not of faith (though commanded by superiors) is sin."

5. We may do nothing for the sole will and pleasure of men, for this were to be the servants of men, as hath been shown. The Bishop of Salisbury also assenteth hereunto.¹ *Non enim (saith he) Deus vult, ut hominis alicujus voluntatem regulam nostrae voluntatis atque vitae faciamus: sed hoc privilegium sibi ac verbo suo reservatum voluit.* And again,² *Pio itaque animo haec consideratio semper adesse debet, utrum id quod praecipitur sit divino mandato contrarium necne: atque ne ex hac parte fallantur, adhibendum est illud judicium discretionis, quod nos tantopere urgemus.*

Sect. 21. These things if Saravia had considered,³ he had not so absolutely pronounced that the power of the kings may make constitutions of the places and times, when and where the exercises of piety may be conveniently had, also with what order, what rite, what gesture, what habit, the mysteries shall be more decently celebrated.

¹ De Justit. Actual., cap. 41.

² De Justice Controv., cap. 26, p. 153.

³ De Imper. Author, lib. 2, cap. 52.

But what! thought he this power of kings is not astricted to the rules of the word? Have they any power which is to destruction and not to edification? Can they command their subjects to do anything in the circumstances of divine worship which is not for the glory of God, which is not profitable for edifying, and which they cannot do in faith? Nay, that all the princes in the world have not such power as this, will easily appear to him who attendeth unto the reasons which we have propounded. And because men do easily and ordinarily pretend that their constitutions are according to the rules of the word, when they are indeed repugnant to the same, therefore we have also proved that inferiors may and must try and examine every ordinance of their superiors, and that by the judgment of private discretion, following the rules of the word. I say following the rules of the word, because we will never allow a man to follow Anabaptistical or Swenckfeldian-like enthusiasms and inspirations.

Sect. 22. Touching the application of what hath been said unto the controverted ceremonies, there needs nothing now to be added. For that they belong not to that sort of things which may be applied to civil uses, with the same respect and account which they have being applied to religious uses, the account I mean of mere circumstances serving only for that common order and decency which is and should be observed in civil no less than in sacred actions, but that they belong to the substance of worship, as being sacred significant ceremonies, wherein both holiness and necessity are placed, and which may not without his sacrilege be used out of the compass of worship, we have elsewhere plainly evinced. And this kind of things, whensoever they are men's devices, and not God's ordinances, cannot be lawfully enjoined by princes, as hath been showed.

But if any man will needs have these ceremonies in question to go under the name of mere circumstances, let us put the case they were no other, yet our conforming unto them, which is urged, cannot stand with the rules of the word.

It could not be for the glory of God, not only for that it is offensive to many of Christ's little ones, but likewise for that it ministereth occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme; to atheists, because by these naughty observances they see the command-

ments of God made of little or no effect, and many godly both persons and purposes despised and depressed, whereat they laugh in their sleeve and say, Ah! so would we have it; to Papists, because as by this our conformity they confirm themselves in sundry of their errors and superstitions, so perceiving us so little to abhor the pomp and bravery of their mother of harlots, that we care not to borrow from her some of her meretricious trinkets, they promise to themselves that in the end we shall take as great a draught of the cup of the wine of her fornications as they themselves.

Neither yet can our conforming unto the ceremonies pressed upon us be profitable for edifying, for we have given sufficient demonstration of manifold hurts and inconveniences ensuing thereon.

Nor, lastly, can we conform to them in faith; for as our consciences cannot find, so the word cannot afford, any warrant for them. Of all which things now I only make mention, because I have spoken of them enough elsewhere.

Sect. 23. The second distinction which may help our light in this question about the power of princes, is of times; for when the church and ministers thereof are corrupted and must be reformed, princes may do much more in making laws about things ecclesiastical than regularly they may, when ecclesiastical persons are both able and willing to do their duty, in rightly taking care of all things which ought to be provided for the good of the church, and conservation or purgation of religion. "For (saith Junius)¹ both the church, when the joining of the magistrate faileth, may extraordinarily do something which ordinarily she cannot; and again, when the church faileth of her duty, the magistrate may extraordinarily procure that the church return to her duty; that is, in such a case extraordinarily happening, these (ecclesiastical persons) and those (magistrates) may extraordinarily do something which ordinarily they cannot. For this belongeth to common law and equity, that unto extraordinary evils, extraordinary remedies must also be applied." We acknowledge that it belongeth to princes² "to reform things in the church, as often as the ecclesiastical persons shall, either through ignorance, disorder of the affliction of covetous-

¹ Animad. in Bell. contr. 4, lib. 1, cap. 12, 18.

² Cartwr. on Matt. xxii, sect. 3.

ness, or ambition, defile the Lord's sanctuary." At such extraordinary times, princes, by their coactive temporal power, ought to procure and cause a reformation of abuses, and the avoiding of misorders in the church, though with the discontent of the clergy, for which end and purpose they may not only enjoin and command the profession of that faith, and the practice of that religion which God's word appointeth, but also prescribe such an order and policy in the circumstances of divine worship as they in their judgment of Christian discretion, observing and following the rules of the word, shall judge and try to be convenient for the present time and case, and all this under the commination of such temporal losses, pains, or punishments as they shall deprehend to be reasonable. But at other ordinary times, when ecclesiastical persons are neither through ignorance unable, nor through malice and perverseness of affection unwilling, to put order to whatsoever requireth any mutation to be made in the church and service of God, in that case, without their advice and consent, princes may not make an innovation of any ecclesiastical rite, nor publish any ecclesiastical law.

Sect. 24. When Dr Field¹ speaketh of the power of princes to prescribe and make laws about things spiritual or ecclesiastical, he saith, That the prince may, with the advice and direction of his clergy, command things pertaining to God's worship and service, both for profession of faith, ministration of the sacraments, and conversation fitting to Christians in general, or men of ecclesiastical order in particular, under the pains of death, imprisonment, banishment, confiscation of goods, and the like; and by his princely power establish things formerly defined and decreed, against whatsoever error and contrary ill custom and observation. In all this the Doctor saith very right; but I demand, further, these two things: 1. What if the thing have not been decreed before? and what if the free assent of the clergy be not had for it? Would the Doctor have said that in such a case the prince hath not power by himself, and by his own sole authority, to enjoin it, and to establish a law concerning it? For example, that king James had not power by himself to impose the controverted ceremonies upon the church of Scotland at that time when

¹ Of the Church, lib. 5. cap. 53.

as no free assent (much less the direction) of the clergy was had for them, so neither had they been formerly decreed, but laws and decrees were formerly made against them. If the Doctor would have answered affirmatively that he had this power, then, why did he, in a scornful dissimulation, so circumscribe and limit the power of princes, by requiring a former decree, and the free assent of the clergy? If he would have answered negatively, that he had no such power, we should have rendered him thanks for his answer. 2. Whether may the clergy make any laws about things pertaining to the service of God which the prince may not as well by himself, and without them, constitute and authorise? If the affirmative part be granted unto us, we gladly take it. But we suppose Dr Field did, and our opposites yet do, hold the negative. Whereupon it followeth that the prince hath as much, yea, the very same power, of making laws in all ecclesiastical things which the clergy themselves have when they are convened in a lawful and free assembly, yet I guess from the Doctor's words that he would have replied, namely, that the difference is great betwixt the power of making laws about things ecclesiastical in the prince, and the same power in the clergy assembled together; for he describeth the making of a law to be the prescribing of something, under some pain or punishment, which he that so prescribeth hath power to inflict. Whereby he would make it appear that he yieldeth not unto princes the same power of spiritual jurisdiction, in making of ecclesiastical laws, which agreeth to the clergy; because, whereas a council of the clergy may frame canons about things which concern the worship of God, and prescribe them under the pain of excommunication, and other ecclesiastical censures, the ordinance of princes about such matters is only under the pain of some external or bodily punishment. But I answer, *potestas diarchica* is one thing, and *potestas ecclesiastica* is another thing. When the making of a law is joined either with the intention, or with the commination of a punishment, in case of transgression, this is but accidental and adventitious to the law, not naturally nor necessarily belonging to the essence of the same; for many laws there hath been, and may be, which prescribe not that which they contain under the same pain or punishment. Gratian distinguisheth three sorts of laws: *Omnis*,

&c. "Every law (saith he¹) either permits something; for example, let a valorous man seek a reward: or forbids; for example, let it be lawful to no man to seek the marriage of holy virgins: or punisheth; for example, he who committeth murder let him be capitally punished." And in this third kind only there is something prescribed under a pain or punishment. It is likewise holden by schoolmen,² that it is a law which permiteth something indifferent, as well as it which commandeth some virtue, or forbideth some vice. When a prince doth statute and ordain, that whosoever, out of a generous and magnanimous spirit, will adventure to embark and hazard in a certain military exploit against a foreign enemy, whom he intendeth to subdue, shall be allowed to take for himself in propriety all the rich spoil which he can lay hold on,—there is nothing here prescribed under some pain or punishment, yet it is a law, and properly so termed. And might not the name of a law be given unto that edict of king Darius, whereby he decreed that all they in his dominions should fear the God of Daniel, forasmuch as he is the living and eternal God, who reigneth for ever, Dan. vi.; yet it prescribed nothing under some pain or punishment to be inflicted by him who so prescribed. Wherefore, though the prince publisheth ecclesiastical laws under other pains and punishments than the clergy doth, this sheweth only that *potestas secularis* is not the same, but different, in the one and in the other; yet if it be granted that whatsoever ecclesiastical law a synod of the clergy hath power to make and publish, the prince hath power to make and publish without them, by his own sole authority, it followeth, that the power of the church to make laws which is called *potestas diarchica*, doth agree as much, as properly, and as directly to the prince, as to a whole synod of the church.

Sect. 25. Now, therefore, we firmly hold, 1. That the prince may not innovate any custom or rite of the church, nor publish any ecclesiastical law, without the free assent of the clergy, they being neither unable for, nor unwilling unto, their ecclesiastical functions and duties; yea, further, that so far as is possible, the consent of the whole church ought to be had whensoever any change is

to be made of some order or custom in the church; for that which toucheth the whole church, and is to be used by the whole church, *ab omnibus etiam merito curatur*.¹ Therefore, when there is any change to be made in the rites of the church, *merito fit hoc cum omnium ordinum ecclesie consensu*.² Neither was there ever a rightly reformed church which was helped and not hurt by such rites and customs as, to their grief and discontentment, princes did impose upon them. Whence it was, that "they who were orthodox did ever withstand such a magistrate as would have, by his commandments, tied the church to that which was burdensome to their consciences."³ That such inconveniences may be shunned, it is fit, that, when any change is to be made in the policy of a church, not the clergy alone, but the elders also, and men of understanding among the laity, in a lawful assembly, freely give their voices and consent thereunto. Good reason have our writers to hold against Papists, that laymen ought to have place in councils wherein things which concern the whole church are to be deliberated upon. 2. Lest it be thought enough that princes devise, frame, and establish, ecclesiastical laws as them best liketh, and then, for more show of orderly proceeding, some secret and sinister way extort and procure the assent of the synod of the church; therefore we add, that it belongeth to the synod (the clergy having the chief place therein, to give direction and advice), not to receive and approve the definition of the prince in things which concern the worship of God, but itself to define and determine what orders and customs are fittest to be observed in such things, that thereafter the prince may approve and ratify the same, and press them upon his subjects by his regal coactive power. To me it is no less than a matter of admiration how Camero could so far forget himself as to say,⁴ that in things pertaining unto religion, *dirigere atque disponere penes magistratum est proprium, penes ecclesiasticos ministerium atque executionem propriam*, telling us further, that the directing and disposing of such things doth then only belong to ecclesiastical persons when the church suffereth persecution, or when

¹ Decr., part 1, dist. 3, cap. 4.

² Aquin. 1a, 2a, quest. 92, art. 2.

¹ Bald. de Cas. Cons., lib. 4, cap. 11, cas. 1.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid., cas. 2.

⁴ Prælect., tom. 2, p. 50.

the magistrate permitteth that the matter be judged by the church.

Our writers have said much of the power of the church to make laws, but this man (I perceive) will correct them all, and will not acknowledge that the church hath any power of making laws about things pertaining to religion (except by accident, because of persecution or permission), but only a power of executing what princes please to direct. More fully to deliver our mind, we say, that in the making of laws about things which concern the worship of God, the prince may do much *per actus imperatos*, but nothing *per actus elicitos*. For the more full explanation of which distinction, I liken the prince to the will of man; the ministers of the church to man's particular senses; a synod of the church to that internal sense which is called *sensus communis*; the fountain and original of all the external things and actions ecclesiastical, or such as concern the worship of God, to the objects and actions of the particular senses; and the power of making ecclesiastical laws to that power and virtue of the common sense, whereby it perceiveth, discerneth, and judgeth of the objects and actions of all the particular senses. Now as the will commandeth the common sense to discern and judge of the actions and objects of all the particular senses, thereafter commandeth the eye to see, and the ear to hear, the nose to smell, &c., yet it hath not power by itself to exercise or bring forth any of these actions, for the will can neither see nor yet judge of the object and action of sight, &c. So the prince may command a synod of the church to judge of ecclesiastical things and actions, and to define what order and form of policy is most convenient to be observed in things pertaining to divine worship, and thereafter he may command the particular ministers of the church to exercise the works of their ministry, and to apply themselves unto that form of church regiment and policy which the synod hath prescribed, yet he may not by himself define and direct such matters, nor make any laws thereanent.

Sect. 26. For proof of these things I add, 1. Politic government, *versatur circa res terrenas et hominem externum* (saith one of our writers¹): *magistratus* (saith another²) *instituti sunt à Deo rerum humanarum*

quæ hominum societati necessarie sunt respectu, et ad eorum curam; but they are ecclesiastical ministers who are "ordained for men in things pertaining to God," Heb. v. 1, that is, in things which pertain unto God's worship. It belongeth not therefore to princes to govern and direct things of this nature, even as it belongeth not to pastors to govern and direct earthly things which are necessary for the external and civil society of men, I mean ordinarily and regularly, for of extraordinary cases we have spoken otherwise. But according to the common order and regular form we are ever to put this difference betwixt civil and ecclesiastical government, which one of our best learned divines hath excellently conceived after this manner:¹ *Altera differentia, &c.*, "The other difference (saith he) taken from the matter and subject of the administrations. For we have put in our definition human things to be the subject of civil administration, but the subject of ecclesiastical administration we have taught to be things divine and sacred. Things divine and sacred we call both those which God commandeth for the sanctification of our mind and conscience as things necessary, and also those which the decency and order of the church requireth to be ordained and observed for the profitable and convenient use of the things which are necessary; for example, prayers, the administration of the word and sacraments, ecclesiastical censure, are things necessary, and essentially belonging to the communion of saints; but set days, set hours, set places, fasts, and if there be any such like, they belong to the decency and order of the church, without which the church cannot be well edified, nor any particular member thereof rightly fashioned and fitly set in the body. But human things we call such duties as touch the life, the body, goods, and good name, as they are expounded in the second table of the Decalogue, for these are the things in which the whole civil administration standeth. Behold how the very circumstances which pertain to ecclesiastical order and decency are exempted from the compass of civil government."

2. "Natural reason (saith the Bishop of Salisbury) telleth,² that to judge of everything, and to instruct others, belongeth to

¹ Til. Synt., part 2, disp. 32, th. 33.
² Danaus Pol. Christ., lib. 6, cap. 1.

¹ Fr. Jun. Ecclesiast., lib. 3, cap. 4.
² De Jussu Controv., cap. 14, p. 70.

them who before others take pains and study to the care and knowledge of the same, so physicians judge which meat is wholesome, which noisome. Lawyers declare what is just, what unjust, and in all arts and sciences, they who professedly place their labour and study in the polishing and practising of the same, both use and ought to direct the judgments of others." Since therefore the ministers of the church are those *quibus ecclesiæ cura incumbit vel maxime*, since they do above and before the civil magistrate devote themselves to the care and knowledge of things pertaining to God and his worship, whereabout they profess to bestow their ordinary study and painful travail, were it not most repugnant to the law of natural reason to say that they ought not to direct, but be directed by, the magistrate in such matters?

3. The ministers of the church are appointed to be "watchmen in the city of God," Mic. vii. 4, and "overseers of the flock," Acts xx. 28; but when princes do, without the direction and definition of ministers, establish certain laws to be observed in things pertaining to religion, ministers are not then watchmen and overseers, because they have not the first sight, and so cannot give the first warning of the change which is to be made in the church. The watchmen are upon the walls, the prince is within the city. Shall the prince now view and consider the breaches and defects of the city better and sooner than the watchmen themselves? Or shall one, within the city, tell what should be righted and helped therein, before them who are upon the walls? Again, the prince is one of the flock, and is committed, among the rest, to the care, attendance, and guidance of the overseers; and, I pray, shall one of the sheep direct the overseers how to govern and lead the whole flock, or prescribe to them what orders and customs they shall observe for preventing or avoiding any hurt and inconveniency which may happen to the flock?

4. Christ hath ordained men of ecclesiastical order, not only "for the work of the ministry,"² that is, for preaching the word and ministering the sacraments, for warning and rebuking them who sin, for comforting the afflicted, for confirming the

weak, &c., but also for providing whatsoever concerneth either the private spiritual good of any member of the church, which the Apostle calleth "the perfecting of the saints," or the public spiritual good of the whole church, which he calleth the "edifying of the body of Christ," Eph. iv. 12. Since, therefore, the making of laws about such things, without which the worship of God cannot be orderly nor decently (and so not rightly) performed, concerneth the spiritual good and benefit of the whole church, and of all the members thereof, it followeth that Christ hath committed the power of judging, defining, and making laws about those matters, not to magistrates, but to the ministers of the church.

5. The Apostle, speaking of the church ministers, saith, "Obey them that have the rule over you; and submit yourselves: for they watch for your souls as they that must give account," Heb. xiii. 17. Whence we gather, that in things pertaining to God, and which touch the spiritual benefit of the soul, the ministers of the church ought to give direction, and to be obeyed, as those who, in things of this nature, have the rule over all others of the church (and by consequence over princes also), so that it be in the Lord. And lest this place and power which is given to ministers, should either be abused by themselves to the commanding of what they will, or envied by others, as too great honour and pre-eminence, the Apostle sheweth what a painful charge lieth on them, and what a great reckoning they have to make. They watch for your souls, saith he, not only by preaching and warning every one, and by offering up their earnest prayers to God for you, but likewise by taking such care of ecclesiastical discipline, order, and policy, that they must provide and procure whatsoever shall be expedient for your spiritual good, and direct you in what convenient and be-seeing manner you are to perform the works of God's worship, as also to avoid and shun every scandal and inconveniency which may hinder your spiritual good. And of these things, whether they have done them or not, they must make account before the judgment seat of the great Bishop of your souls. Surely, if it belong to princes to define and ordain what order and policy should be observed in the church, what forms and fashions should be used, for the orderly and right managing of the exercises of God's worship, how scandals and disorders are to

¹ Gerard. locor. Theol., tom. 6, p. 840.
² Zanch. in Eph. iv. 12.

be shunned, how the church may be most edified, and the spiritual good of the saints best helped and advanced, by wholesome and profitable laws, concerning things which pertain to religion, then must princes take also upon them a great part of that charge of pastors, to watch for the souls of men, and must liberate them from being liable to a reckoning for the same.

Sect. 27. 6. Constantine the Great, Theodosius, both the one and the other, Martinus, Charles the Great, and other Christian princes, when there was any change to be made of ecclesiastical rites, did not, by their own authority, imperiously enjoin the change, but convocate synods for deliberating upon the matter, as Balduine noteth.¹ The great Council of Nice was assembled by Constantine, not only because of the Arrian heresy, but, also (as Socrates witnesseth²), because of the difference about the keeping of Easter; and though the bishops, when they were assembled, did put up to him libels of accusation, one against another, so that there could be no great hope of their agreement upon fit and convenient laws; yet, notwithstanding, he did not interpose his own definition and decree, for taking up that difference about Easter, only he exhorted the bishops convened in the council to peace, and so commended the whole matter to be judged by them.

7. We have for us the judgment of worthy divines. A notable testimony of Junius we have already cited. Danæus will not allow princes by themselves to make laws about ecclesiastical rites,³ but this he will have done by a synod. *Porro quod ad ritus, &c.* "Furthermore (saith he), for rites and ceremonies, and that external order which is necessary in the administration of the church, let a synod of the church convene, the supreme and godly magistrate both giving commandment for the convening of it, and being present in it; and let that synod of the church lawfully assembled define what should be the order and external regiment of the church. This decree of the ecclesiastical synod shall the godly and supreme magistrate afterward confirm, establish, and ratify by his edict." Joh. Wolpius observeth of king Joash,⁴ that he did not by himself take order for the reparation

¹ De Cas. Consc., lib. 6, cap. 11, cas. 2.

² Lib. 1, cap. 8.

³ Pol. Christ., lib. 6, cap. 3.

⁴ In 2 Reg. xii. 5.

of the temple; nor define what was to be done unto every breach therein, but committed this matter to be directed and cared for by the priests, whom it chiefly concerned, commanding them to take course for the reparation of the breaches of the house, wheresoever any breach should be found, and allowing them money for the work. Whereupon he further noteth, that as the superior part of man's soul doth not itself hear, see, touch, walk, speak, but commandeth the ears, eyes, hands, feet, and tongue, to do the same; so the magistrate should not himself either teach or make laws, but command that these things be done by the doctors and teachers. Cartwright and Pareus upon Heb. xiii. 17, tell the Papists, that we acknowledge princes are holden to be obedient unto pastors in things that belong unto God, if they rule according to the word, which could not be so, if the making of laws about things pertaining to God and his worship did not of right and due belong unto pastors, but unto princes themselves. Our Second Book of Discipline, chap. 12, ordaineth, "That ecclesiastical assemblies have their place, with power to the kirk to appoint times and places convenient for the same, and all men, as well magistrates as inferiors, to be subject to the judgment of the same in ecclesiastical causes." Balduine holdeth,¹ that a prince may not by himself enjoin any new ecclesiastical rite, but must convocate a synod for the deliberation and definition of such things. And what mean our writers when they say,² that kings have no spiritual but only a civil power in the church? As actions are discerned by the objects, so are powers by the actions: if, therefore, kings do commendably by themselves make laws about things pertaining to God's worship, which is a spiritual action, then have they also a spiritual power in the church; but if they have no spiritual power, that is, no power of spiritual jurisdiction, how can they actually exercise spiritual jurisdiction? That the making of laws about things pertaining to God's worship is an action of spiritual jurisdiction, it needeth no great demonstration; for, 1. When a synod of the church maketh laws about such things, all men know that this is an action of spiritual jurisdiction flowing from that power of spiritual jurisdiction which is called *potestas*

¹ Ubi supra.

² Perk. on Rev. iii. 7.

diararchicā. And how then can the prince's making of such laws be called an action of civil, not of spiritual jurisdiction? I see not what can be answered, except it be said, that the making of those laws by a synod is an action of spiritual jurisdiction, because they are made and published with the commination of spiritual and ecclesiastical punishments in case of transgression, but the making of them by the prince is an action of jurisdiction only, because he proscribeth and commandeth, under the pain of some temporal loss or punishment. But I have already confuted this answer, because notwithstanding of the different punishments which the one and the other hath power to threaten and inflict, yet, at least, that part of spiritual jurisdiction which we call *potestas diararchicā* remaineth the same in both, which power of making laws must not (as I shew) be confounded with that other power of judging and punishing offenders. 2. Actions take their species or kind from the object and the end, when other circumstances hinder not. Now, a prince's making of laws about things pertaining to religion, is such an action of jurisdiction, as hath both a spiritual end, which is the edification of the church and spiritual good of Christians, and likewise a spiritual object; for that all things pertaining to divine worship, even the very external circumstances of the same, are rightly called things spiritual and divine, not civil or human, our opposites cannot deny, except they say, not only that such things touch the lives, bodies, estates, or names of men, and are not ordained for the spiritual benefit of their souls, but also that the synod of the church, whose power reacheth only to things spiritual, not civil or human, can never make laws about those circumstances which are applied unto, and used in the worship of God; and as the prince's making of laws about things of this nature, is in respect of the object and end, an action of spiritual jurisdiction, so there is no circumstance at all which varieth the kind, or maketh it an action of civil jurisdiction only. If it be said, that the circumstance of the person changeth the kind of the action, so that the making of laws about things pertaining to religion, if they be made by ecclesiastical persons, is an action of spiritual jurisdiction; but if, by the civil magistrate, an action of civil jurisdiction, this were a most extremely unadvised distinction; for so might Uzziah the king have answered

for himself, 2 Chron. xxvi. 18, that, in burning incense, he did not take upon him to execute the priest's office, because he was only a civil person; so may the Pope say, that he might not take upon him the power of emperors and monarchs, because he is an ecclesiastical person. Many things men do *de facto*, which they cannot *de jure*. Civil persons may exercise a spiritual jurisdiction and office, and, again, ecclesiastical persons may exercise a civil jurisdiction *de facto*, though not *de jure*. Wherefore the prince's making of laws about things spiritual remaineth still an action of spiritual jurisdiction, except some other thing can be alleged to the contrary, beside the circumstance of the person. But some man, peradventure, will object that a prince, by his civil power, may enjoin and command not only the observation of those ecclesiastical rites which a synod of the church prescribeth, but also that a synod (when need is) prescribe new orders and rites, all which are things spiritual and divine. And why then may he not, by the same civil power, make laws about the rites and circumstances of God's worship, notwithstanding that they are (in their use and application to the actions of worship) things spiritual, not civil.

Ans. The schoolmen say,¹ that an action proceedeth from charity two ways, either *elicitivè* or *imperative*, and that those actions which are immediately produced and wrought out by charity, belong not to other virtues distinct from charity, but are comprehended under the effects of charity itself, such as are the loving of good and rejoicing for it. Other actions, say they, which are only commanded by charity, belong to other special virtues distinct from charity. So, say I, an action may proceed from a civil power either *elicitivè* or *imperative*. *Elicitivè* a civil power can only make laws about things civil or human; but *imperative* it may command the ecclesiastical power to make laws about things spiritual, which laws thereafter it may command to be observed by all who are in the church.

Sect. 28. 8. Our opposites themselves acknowledge no less than that which I have been pleading for. "To devise new rites and ceremonies (saith Dr Bilson²), is not the prince's vocation, but to receive and allow such as the Scriptures and canons commend,

¹ Aquin., 3a, quest. 85, art. 2.

² Apud Parker of the Cross, cap. 5, sect. 6.

and such as the bishops and pastors of the place shall advise." And saith not the Bishop of Salisbury, *Ceremonias utiles et decoras excogitare, ad ecclesiasticos pertinere; tamen easdem comprobare, et toti populo observandas imponere, ad reges spectat?* Camero saith,² that it is the part of a prince to take care for the health of men's souls, even as he doth for the health of their bodies, and that as he provideth not for the curing or preventing of bodily diseases directly and by himself, but indirectly and by the physicians, so he should not by himself prescribe cures and remedies for men's spiritual maladies. *Perinde principis est curare salutem animarum, ac ejusdem est saluti corporum prospicere: non est autem principis providere ne morbi grassentur directe, esset enim medicus, at indirecte tamen princeps id studere debet.* Whence it followeth, that even as when some bodily sickness spreadeth, a prince's part is not to prescribe a cure, but to command the physicians to do it; just so, when any abuse, misorder, confusion, or scandal in the church, requireth or maketh it necessary that a mutation be made of some rite or order in the same, and that wholesome laws be enacted, which may serve for the order, decency, and edification of the church, a prince may not do this by himself, but may only command the pastors and guides of the church, who watch for the souls of men as they who must give account, to see to the exigency of the present state of matters ecclesiastical, and to provide such laws as they, being met together in the name of the Lord, shall, after due and free deliberation, find to be convenient, and which, being once prescribed by them, he shall by his royal authority confirm, establish, and press.

Sect. 29. Needs now it must be manifest, that the lawfulness of our conforming unto the ceremonies in question can be no way warranted by any ordinance of the supreme magistrate, or any power which he hath in things spiritual or ecclesiastical; and if our opposites would ponder the reasons we have given, they should be quickly quieted, understanding that, before the prince's ordinance about the ceremonies can be said to bind us, it must first be showed that they have been lawfully prescribed by

a synod of the church, so that they must retire and hold them as the church's ordinance. And what needeth any more? Let us once see any lawful ordinance of the synod or church representative for them, we shall, without any more ado, acknowledge it to be out of all doubt that his Majesty may well urge conformity unto the same.

Now, of the church's power we have spoken in the former chapter; and if we had not, yet that which hath been said in this chapter maketh out our point. For it hath been proved, that neither king nor church hath power to command anything which is not according to the rules of the word; that is, which serveth not for the glory of God, which is not profitable for edifying, and which may not be done in faith; unto which rules, whether the things which are commanded us be agreeable or not, we must try and examine by the private judgment of Christian discretion, following the light of God's word.

Sect. 30. Resteth the third distinction, whereof I promised to speak, and that was of ties or bonds. *Quedam obligatio, &c.* "Some bond (saith Gerhard¹) is absolute, when the law bindeth the conscience simply, so that, in no respect, nor in no case, without the offence of God and wound of conscience, one may depart from the prescript thereof; but another bond is hypothetical, when it bindeth not simply, but under a condition, to wit, if the transgression of the law be done of contempt,—if for the cause of lucre or some other vicious end,—if it have scandal joined with it." The former way, he saith that the law of God and nature bindeth, and that the law of the civil magistrate bindeth the latter way; and with him we hold that whatsoever a prince commandeth his subjects in things any way pertaining to religion, it bindeth only this latter way, and that he hath never power to make laws binding the former way, for confirmation wherefore we say,

1. The laws of an ecclesiastical synod, to the obedience whereof, in things belonging to the worship of God, we are far more strictly tied than to the obedience of any prince in the world, who (as hath been showed) in this sort of things hath not such a vocation nor power to make laws. The laws, I say, of a synod cannot bind absolutely, but only conditionally, or in case

¹ De Jure Controv., cap. 16, p. 92.

² Prælect, tom. 1, p. 25.

¹ Locor. Theol., tom. 6, p. 963.

they cannot be transgressed without violating the law of charity, by contempt showed or scandal given, which, as I have made good in the first part of this dispute, so let me now produce for it a plain testimony of the Bishop of Salisbury,¹ who holdeth that the church's rites and ordinance do only bind in such sort, *ut si extra, &c.*, "That if, out of the case of scandal or contempt, through imprudence, oblivion, or some reasonable cause enforcing, they be omitted, no mortal sin is incurred before God; for as touching these constitutions, I judge the opinion of Gerson to be most true, to wit, that they remain inviolated so long as the law of charity is not by men violated about the same." Much less, then, can the laws of princes about things spiritual or ecclesiastical bind absolutely, and out of the case of violating the law of charity.

2. If we be not bound to receive and acknowledge the laws of princes as good and equitable, except only in so far as they are warranted by the law of God and nature, then we are not bound in conscience to obey them, except only conditionally, in case the violating of them include the violating of the law of God and nature; but the former is true, therefore the latter. It is God's peculiar sovereignty, that his will is a rule ruling, but not ruled, and that therefore a thing is good because God will have it to be good. Man's will is only such a rule as is ruled by higher rules, and it must be known to be *norma recta* before it can be to us *norma recti*.

3. If we be bound to try and examine, by the judgment of discretion (following the rules of the word), whether the things which princes command be right, and such as ought to be done; and if we find them not to be such, to neglect them, then their laws cannot bind absolutely and by themselves, (else what need were there of such trial and examination?) but only conditionally, and in case they cannot be neglected without violating some other law, which is of a superior bond. But the former we have proved by strong reasons, therefore the latter standeth sure.

4. If neither princes may command, nor we do anything which is not lawful and expedient, and according to the other rules of the word, then the laws of princes bind not absolutely, but only in case the neglecting

of them cannot stand with the law of charity and the rules of the word; but the former hath been evinced and made good, therefore the latter necessarily followeth.

5. If the laws of princes could bind absolutely and simply, so that in no case, without offending God and wounding our conscience, we could neglect them, this bond should arise either from their own authority, or from the matter and thing itself which is commanded; but from neither of these it can arise, therefore from nothing. It cannot arise from any authority which they have, for if, by their authority, we mean their princely pre-eminence and dignity, they are princes when they command things unlawful as well as when they command things lawful; and so if, because of their pre-eminence, their laws do bind, then their unlawful ordinances do bind no less than if they were lawful; but if by their authority we mean the power which they have of God to make laws, this power is not absolute (as hath been said) but limited; therefore from it no absolute bond can arise, but this much at the most, that "kings on earth must be obeyed," so far as they command in Christ.

Neither yet can the bond be absolute in respect of the thing itself which is commanded.

When princes publish the commandments of God, the things themselves bind whether they should command them or not; but we speak of such things as God's word hath left in their nature indifferent, and of such things we say, that if being enjoined by princes they did absolutely bind, then they should be in themselves immutably necessary, even secluding as well the laws of princes which enjoin them, as the end of order, decency, and edification, whereunto they are referred. To say no more, hath not Dr Forbess told us in Calvin's words,² *Notatu dignum, &c.*? "It is worthy of observation, that human laws, whether they be made by the magistrate or by the church, howsoever they be necessary to be observed (I speak of such as are good and just), yet they do not, therefore, by themselves bind the conscience, because the whole necessity of observing them looketh to the general end, but consisteth not in the things commanded."

6. Whatsoever bond of conscience is not confirmed and warranted by the word is,

¹ De Jure Controv., cap. 16, p. 86, 87.

¹ Perkins on Rev. i. 5.

² Iren., lib. 2, cap. 4, sect. 3.

before God, no bond at all. But the absolute bond wherewith conscience is bound to the obedience of the laws of princes is not confirmed nor warranted by the word; therefore the proposition no man can deny, who acknowledgeth that none can have power or dominion over our consciences but God only, the great Lawgiver, who alone can save and destroy, James iv. 12. Neither doth any writer, whom I have seen, hold that princes have any power over men's consciences, but only that conscience is bound by the laws of princes, for this respect, because God, who hath power over our consciences, hath tied us to their laws. As to the assumption, he who denyeth it must give instance to the contrary. If those words of the Apostle be objected, Rom. xiii. 5, "Ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience' sake,"

I answer, 1. The Apostle saith not that we must obey, but that we must be subject, for conscience' sake; and how oft shall we need to tell our opposites that subjection is one thing, and obedience another?

2. If he had said that we must obey for conscience' sake, yet this could not have been expounded of an absolute bond of conscience, but only of an hypothetical bond, in case that which the magistrate commandeth cannot be omitted without breaking the law of charity. If it be said again, that we are not only bidden be subject, but likewise to obey magistrates, Tit. iii. 1: *Ans.* And who denyeth this? But still I ask, are we absolutely and always bound to obey magistrates? Nay, but only when they command such things as are according to the rules of the word, so that either they must be obeyed or the law of charity shall be broken; in this case, and no other, we are bidden obey.

Sect. 31. Thus have we gained a principal point, viz., that the laws of princes bind not absolutely but conditionally, not *propter se*, but *propter aliud*. Whereupon it followeth, that except the breach of those ceremonial ordinances wherewith we are pressed include the breach of the law of charity, which is of a superior bond, we are not holden to obey them. Now that it is not the breach, but the obedience of those ordinances which violateth the law of charity, we have heretofore made manifest, and in this place we will add only one general: Whosoever the laws of princes about things ecclesiastical do bind the conscience

conditionally, and because of some other law of a superior bond, which cannot be observed if they be transgressed (which is the only respect for which they bind, when they bind at all), then the things which they prescribe belong either to the conservation or purgation of religion; but the controverted ceremonies belong to neither of these, therefore the laws made thereanent bind not, because of some other law which is of a superior bond. As to the proposition, will any man say that princes have any more power than that which is expressed in the twenty-fifth article of the Confession of Faith, ratified in the first parliament of king James VI., which saith thus: "Moreover, to kings, princes, rulers, and magistrates, we affirm that chiefly and most principally, the conservation and the purgation of the religion appertains, so that not only they are appointed for civil policy, but also for maintenance of the true religion, and for suppressing of idolatry and superstition whatsoever?" *Hoc nomine*, saith Calvin,¹ *maxime laudantur sancti reges in scriptura, quod Dei cultum corruptum vel eversum restituerint, vel curam gesserint religionis, ut sub illis pura et incolumis floreret.* The twenty-first Parliament of king James, holden at Edinburgh 1612, in the ratification of the acts and conclusions of the General Assembly, kept in Glasgow 1610, did innovate and change some words of that oath of allegiance which the General Assembly, in reference to the conference kept 1751, ordained to be given to the person provided to any benefice with cure, in the time of his admission, by the ordinate. For the form of the oath, set down by the Act of the Assembly, beginneth thus: "I, A. B., now nominate and admitted to the kirk of D., utterly testify and declare in my conscience, that the right excellent, right high, and mighty prince, James VI., by the grace of God king of Scots, is the only lawful supreme governor of this realm, as well in things temporal as in the conservation and purgation of religion," &c. But the form of the oath set down by the Act of Parliament beginneth thus: "I, A. B., now nominate and admitted to the kirk of D., testify and declare in my conscience, that the right excellent, &c., is the only lawful supreme governor of this realm, as well in matters spiritual and eccle-

¹ Just., lib. 4, cap. 20, sect. 9.

siastical, as in things temporal," &c. Yet I demand, whether or not do the matters spiritual and ecclesiastical, of which the Act of Parliament speaketh, or those all spiritual or ecclesiastical things or causes, of which the English oath of supremacy speaketh, comprehend any other thing than is comprehended under the conservation and purgation of religion, whereof the Act of Assembly speaketh? If it be answered affirmatively, it will follow that princes have power to destruction, and not to edification only; for whatsoever may edify or profit the church, pertaineth either to the conservation or the purgation of religion. If negatively, then it cannot be denied that the conservation and purgation of religion do comprehend all the power which princes have in things ecclesiastical.

Sect. 32. Now to the assumption. And first, that the controverted ceremonies pertain not to the conservation of religion, but contrariwise to the hurt and prejudice of the same, experience hath, alas! made it too manifest; for O what a doleful decay of religion have they drawn with them in this land! Let them who have seen Scotland in her first glory tell how it was then, and how it is now. Idle and idol-like bishopping hath shut too the door of painful and profitable catechising.¹ The keeping of some festival days is set up instead of the thankful commemoration of God's inestimable benefits, howbeit the festivity of Christmas hath hitherto served more to bacchanalian lasciviousness than to the remembrance of the birth of Christ.² The kneeling down upon the knees of the body hath now come in place of that humiliation of the soul wherewith worthy communicants addressed themselves unto the holy table of the Lord; and, generally, the external show of these fruitless observances hath worn out the very life and power of religion. Neither have such effects ensued upon such ceremonies among us only, but let it be observed everywhere else, if there be not least substance and power of godliness among them who have most ceremonies, whereunto men have, at their pleasure, given some sacred use and signification in the worship of God; and most substance among them who have fewest shows of external rites. No man of sound judgment (saith Beza³) will deny,

Jesum Christum quo nudior, &c., "that Jesus Christ, the more naked he be, is made the more manifest to us; whereas, contrariwise, all false religions use by certain external gesturings to turn away men from divine things." Zanchius saith well of the surplice and other popish ceremonies, *Quod hæc nihil ad pietatem accendendam, multum autem ad restinguendam valeant.* Bellarmine,² indeed, pleadeth for the utility of ceremonies, as things belonging to the conservation of religion. His reason is, because they set before our senses such an external majesty and splendour, whereby they cause the more reverence. This he allegeth for the utility of the ceremonies of the church of Rome. And I would know what better reason can be alleged for the utility of ours. But if this be all, we throw back the argument, because the external majesty and splendour of ceremonies doth greatly prejudice and obscure the spirit and life of the worship of God, and diverteth the minds of men from adverting unto the same, which we have offered to be tried by common experience. Durand himself, for as much as he hath written in the defence of ceremonies, in his unreasonable *Rationale*, yet he maketh this plain confession:³ *Sane in primitiva ecclesia, sacrificium fiebat in vasis ligneis et vestibus communibus: tunc enim erant lignei calices et auri sacerdotes: nunc vero è contra est.* Behold what followeth upon the majesty and splendour which ceremonies carry with them, and how religion, at its best and first estate, was without the same!

Sect. 33. Neither yet do the ceremonies in question belong to the purgation of religion; for wheresoever religion is to be purged in a corrupted church, all men know that purgation standeth in putting something away, not in keeping it still; in voiding somewhat, nor in retaining it; so that a church is not purged, but left unpurged, when the unnecessary monuments of by-past superstition are still preserved and kept in the same. And as for the church of Scotland, least of all could there be any purgation of it intended by the resuming of those ceremonies; for such was the most glorious and ever memorable reformation of Scotland, that it was far better purged than any other neighbour church. And of Mr

¹ Cart. on Acts viii. seq. 7.

² G. Buchan. Hist. Rer. Scot., lib. 5, p. 152.

³ Confess., cap. 5, art. 20.

¹ Epist. ad Regin. Elisab. Epistolar., lib. 1, p. 112.

² De Effect. Sacr., cap. 31.

³ Rat., lib. 1; Tit. de Pictur. et Cortin.

Hooker's jest we may make good earnest; for, in very deed, as the reformation of Geneva did pass the reformation of Germany, so the reformation of Scotland did pass that of Geneva.

Sect. 34. Now hitherto we have discoursed of the power of princes, in making of laws about things which concern the worship of God; for this power it is which our opposites allege for warrant of the controverted ceremonies, wherefore to have spoken of it is sufficient for our present purpose. Nevertheless, because there are also other sorts of ecclesiastical things beside the making of laws, such as the vocation of men of ecclesiastical order, the convocation and moderation of councils, the judging and deciding of controversies about faith, and the use of the keys, in all which princes have some place and power of intermeddling, and a mistaking in one may possibly breed a mistaking in all; therefore I thought good here to digress, and of these also to add somewhat, so far as princes have power and interest in the same.

DIGRESSION I.

OF THE VOCATION OF MEN OF ECCLESIASTICAL ORDER.

In the vocation and calling of ecclesiastical persons, a prince ought to carry himself *ad modum procurantis speciem, non designantis individuum*. Which shall be more plainly and particularly understood in these propositions which follow.

Propos. 1. Princes may and ought to provide and take care that men of those ecclesiastical orders, and those only which are instituted in the New Testament by divine authority, have vocation and office in the church.

Now, beside the apostles, prophets, and evangelists, which were not ordained to be ordinary and perpetual offices in the church, there are but two ecclesiastical orders or degrees instituted by Christ in the New Testament,¹ viz., elders and deacons. *Excellentior canones duos tantum sacros ordines appellari censet, diaconatus scilicet et presbyteratus, quia hos solos primitiva ecclesia legitur habuisse, et de his solis preceptum apostoli habemus*, saith the Master of sentences.² As for the order and decree

of bishops superior to that of elders, that there is no divine ordinance nor institution for it, it is not only holden by Calvin, Beza, Bucer, Martyr, Sadeel, Luther, Chemnitius, Gerhard, Balduine, the Magdeburgians, Musculus, Piscator, Hemmingius, Zanchius, Polanus, Junius, Pareus, Fennerus, Danaeus, Morney, Whittakers, Willets, Perkins, Cartwright, the Professors of Leyden, and the far greatest part of writers in reformed churches, but also by Jerome, who, upon Tit. i., and in his epistle to Evagrius, speaketh so plainly, that the Archbishop of Spalato is driven to say,¹ *Deserimus in hac parte Hieronymum, neque ei in his dictis assentimus*; also by Ambrose on 1 Tim. iii.; Augustine in his Book of Questions out of both Testaments, quest. 101; Chrysostom on 1 Tim. iii.; Isidore, dist. 21, cap. 1; the Canon Law, dist. 93, cap. 24, and dist. 95, cap. 5; Lombard., lib. 4, dist. 24. And after him, by many schoolmen, such as Aquinas, Alensis, Albertus, Bonaventura, Richardus, and Dominicus Soto, all mentioned by the Archbishop of Spalato, lib. 2, cap. 4, num. 25. Gerhard² citeth for the same judgment, Anselmus, Sedulius, Primasius, Theophylactus, Oecumenius, the Council of Basil, Arelatensis, J. Parisiensis, Erasmus, Medina, and Cassander, all which authors have grounded that which they say upon Scripture; for beside that Scripture maketh no difference of order and degree betwixt bishops and elders, it sheweth also that they are one and the same order. For in Ephesus and Crete, they who were made elders were likewise made bishops, Acts xx. 17, 28; Tit. i. 5, 7. And the Apostle, Phil. i. 1, divideth the whole ministry in the church of Philippi into two orders, bishops and deacons. Moreover, 1 Tim. iii., he giveth order only for bishops and deacons, but saith nothing of a third order. Wherefore it is manifest, that beside those two orders of elders and deacons, there is no other ecclesiastical order which hath any divine institution, or necessary use in the church; and princes should do well to apply their power and authority to the extirpation and rooting out of popes, cardinals, patriarchs, primatos, archbishops, bishops, suffragans, abbots, deans, vice-deans, priors, archdeacons, subdeacons, abbots, chancellors, chantors, subchantors, exorcists, monks, eremites, acoloths, and all

¹ De Rep. Eccl., lib. 2, cap. 3, num. 47.

² Loc. Theol., tom. 6, p. 374–376.

¹ Fr. Jun. Animad. in Bell., con. 5, lib. 1, cap. 11.

² Lib. 4, dist. 24.

the rabble of popish orders, which undo the church, and work more mischief in the earth than can be either soon seen or shortly told.

But, contrariwise, princes ought to establish and maintain in the church, elders and deacons, according to the apostolical institution. Now elders are either such as labour in the word and doctrine, or else such as are appointed for discipline only. They who labour in the word and doctrine are either such as do only teach, and are ordained for conserving, in schools and seminaries of learning, the purity of Christian doctrine, and the true interpretation of Scripture, and for detecting and confuting the contrary heresies and errors, whom the Apostle calleth doctors or teachers; or else they are such as do not only teach, but also have a more particular charge to watch over the flock, to seek that which is lost, to bring home that which wandereth, to heal that which is diseased, to bind up that which is broken, to visit every family, to warn every person, to rebuke, to comfort, &c., whom the Apostle called sometimes pastors, and sometimes bishops or overseers. The other sort of elders are ordained only for discipline and church government, and for assisting of the pastors in ruling the people, overseeing their manners, and censuring their faults. That this sort of elders is instituted by the Apostle, it is put out of doubt, not alone by Calvin, Beza, and the divines of Geneva, but also by Chemnitius (*Exam.* part 2, p. 218), Gerhard (*Loc. Theol.*, tom. 6, p. 363, 364), Zanchius (in 4 *Præc.*, col. 727), Martyr (in 1 Cor. xii. 28), Bullinger (in 1 Tim. v. 17), Junius (*Animad. in Bell.*, contr. 5, lib. 1, cap. 2), Polanus (*Synt.*, lib. 7, cap. 11), Pareus (in Rom. xii. 8; 1 Cor. xii. 28), Cartwright (on 1 Tim. v. 17), the Professors of Leyden (*Syn. Pur. Theol.* disp. 42, thes. 20), and many more of our divines, who teach that the Apostle, 1 Tim. v. 17, directly implieth that there were some elders who ruled well, and yet laboured not in the word and doctrine; and those elders he meaneth by them that rule, Rom. xii. 8; and by governments, 1 Cor. xii. 28, where the Apostle saith not, *helps in governments*, as our new English translation corruptly readeth, but *helps, governments*, &c. plainly putting governments for a different order from helps or deacons. Of these elderst

speaketh Ambrose,¹ as Dr Fulk also understandeth him,² showing that with all nations eldership is honourable; wherefore the synagogue also, and afterwards the church, hath had some elders of the congregation, without whose council and advice nothing was done in the church; and that he knew not by what negligence this had grown out of use, except it had been by the sluggishness of the teachers, or rather their pride, whilst they seemed to themselves to be something, and so did arrogate the doing of all by themselves.

Deacons were instituted by the apostles³ for collecting, receiving, keeping, and distributing ecclesiastical goods, which were given and dedicated for the maintenance of ministers, churches, schools, and for the help and relief of the poor, the stranger, the sick, and the weak; also for furnishing such things as are necessary to the ministration of the sacraments.⁴ Besides which employments, the Scripture hath assigned neither preaching, nor baptising, nor any other ecclesiastical function to ordinary deacons.

Propos. 2. Princes, in their dominions, ought to procure and effect, that there be never wanting men qualified and fit for those ecclesiastical functions and charges which Christ hath ordained, and that such men only be called, chosen, and set apart for the same.

There are two things contained in this proposition. 1. That princes ought to procure that the church never want men qualified and gifted for the work and service of the holy ministry, for which end and purpose they ought to provide and maintain schools and colleges, entrusted and committed to the rule and oversight of orthodox, learned, godly, faithful, and diligent masters, that so qualified and able men may be still furnished and sent to take care that the ministers of the church neither want due reverence, 1 Tim. v. 17; 1 Heb. xiii. 17, nor sufficient maintenance, 1 Cor. ix., that so men be not scarred from the service of the ministry, but rather encouraged unto the same, 2 Chron. xxxi. 4.

2. That princes ought also to take order and course, that well-qualified men, and no others, be advanced and called to bear charge and office in the church, for which

¹ On 1 Tim. v. 1.

² On 1 Tim. v. 17.

³ Zanch. in 4 *Præc.*, col. 766, 767.

⁴ Jun. Anim. in Bell., cont. 5, lib. 1, cap. 13.

¹ Tertullian also maketh mention of them, Apologet., cap. 39; and Clemens, epist. 1, ad Jacob.

purpose they should cause not one disdainful prelato, but a whole presbytery or company of elders, to take trial of him who is to be taken into the number of preaching elders, and to examine well the piety of his life, the verity of his doctrine, and his fitness to teach. And further, that due trial may be continually had of the growth or decay of the graces and utterance of every pastor, it is the part of princes to enjoin the visitation of particular churches, and the keeping of other presbyterial meetings, likewise the assembling of provincial and national synods, for putting order to such things as have not been helped in the particular presbyteries. And as for the other sort of elders, together with deacons, we judge the ancient order of this church to have been most convenient for providing of well-qualified men for those functions and offices; for the eighth head of the First Book of Discipline, touching the election of elders and deacons, ordaineth that only men of best knowledge and cleanest life be nominate to be in election, and that their names be publicly read to the whole church by the minister, giving them advertisement that from among them must be chosen elders and deacons, that if any of these nominate be noted with public infamy, he ought to be repelled; and that if any man know others of better qualities within the church than those that be nominate, they shall be put in election, that the church may have the choice.

If these courses, whereof we have spoken, be followed by Christian princes, they shall, by the blessing of God, procure that the church shall be served with able and fit ministers; but though thus they may *procurare speciem*, yet they may not *designare individuum*, which now I am to demonstrate.

Propos. 3. Nevertheless,¹ princes may not design nor appoint such or such particular men to the charge of such or such particular churches, or to the exercise of such or such ecclesiastical functions, but ought to provide that such an order and form be kept in the election and ordination of the ministers of the church, as is warranted by the example of the apostles and primitive church.

The vocation of a minister in the church is either inward or outward. The inward

calling which one must have in finding himself, by the grace of God, made both able and willing to serve God and his church faithfully in the holy ministry, lieth not open to the view of men, and is only manifest to him from whom nothing can be hid; the outward calling is made up of election and ordination: that signified in Scripture by *χειρονομία*, this by *χειροθεσία* concerning which things we say with Zanchius,¹ *Magistratus*, &c.: "It pertaineth to a Christian magistrate and prince to see for ministers unto his churches. But how? Not out of his own arbitrement, but as God's word teacheth; therefore let the Acts of the Apostles and the epistles of Paul be read, how ministers were elected and ordained, and let them follow that form."

The right of election pertaineth to the whole church, which as it is maintained by foreign divines who write of the controversies with Papists, and as it was the order which this church prescribed in the Books of Discipline, so it is commended unto us by the example of the apostles, and of the churches planted by them. Joseph and Matthias were chosen and offered to Christ by the whole church, being about 120 persons, Acts i. 15, 23; the apostles required the whole church and multitude of disciples, to choose out from among them seven men to be deacons, Acts vi. 2, 3; the Holy Ghost said to the whole church at Antioch, being assembled together to minister unto the Lord, "Separate me Barnabas and Saul," Acts xiii. 1, 2; the whole church chose Judas and Silas to be sent to Antioch, Acts xv. 22; the brethren who travelled in the church's affairs were chosen by the church, and are called the church's messengers, 2 Cor. viii. 19, 23; such men only were ordained elders by Paul and Barnabas who were chosen and approved by the whole church, their suffrages being signified by the lifting up of their hands, Acts xiv. 23. Albeit, Chrysostom and other ecclesiastical writers use the word *χειρονομία* for ordination and imposition of hands, yet when they take it in this sense, they speak it figuratively and synecdochically, as Junius sheweth.² For these two, election by most voices, and ordination by laying on of hands, were joined together, did cohere, as an antecedent and a consequent, whence the use ob-

¹ In 4 Præc., col. 794.

² Anim. in Bell., cont. 5, lib. 1, cap. 7, nota. 59.

¹ Jun. ubi sup., cap. 7, nota. 17; Bald. de Cas. Cons., lib. 4, cap. 5, cas. 5; Ger. Loc. Theol., tom. 6, p. 835, 132.

tained, that the whole action should be signified by one word, *per modum intellectus*, collecting the antecedent from the consequent, and the consequent from the antecedent. Nevertheless, according to the proper and native signification of the word, it noteth the signifying of a suffrage or election by the lifting up of the hand, for *χειρονομία* is no other thing nor *χείρας reireiv* or *ἀναιρεiv*, to lift or hold up the hands in sign of a suffrage; and so Chrysostom himself useth the word when he speaketh properly, for he saith that the senate of Rome took upon him *χειρονομία* δεός; that is (as D. Potter turneth his words¹), to make gods by most voices.

Bellarmino² reckoneth out three significations of the word *χειρονομία*: 1. To choose by suffrages; 2. Simply to choose which way soever it be; 3. To ordain by imposition of hands. Junius answereth him,³ that the first is the proper signification; the second is metaphorical; the third synecdochical.

Our English translators, 2 Cor. i. 19, have followed the metaphorical signification, and in this place, Acts xiv. 23, the synecdochical. But what had they to do either with a metaphor or a synecdoche when the text may bear the proper sense? Now that Luke, in this place, useth the word in the proper sense, and not in the synecdochical, Gerhard⁴ proveth from the words which he subjoineth, to signify the ordaining of those elders by the laying on of hands; for he saith that they prayed, and fasted, and commended them to the Lord, in which words he implieth the laying on of hands upon them, as may be learned from Acts vi. 6, "When they had prayed, they laid their hands on them;" Acts xiii. 3, "When they had fasted, and prayed, and laid their hands on them;" so Acts viii. 15, 17, prayer and laying on of hands went together. Wherefore by *χειρονομία* Luke pointeth at the election of those elders by voices, being, in the following words, to make mention of their ordination by imposition of hands.

Cartwright⁵ hath for the same point other weighty reasons: "It is absurd (saith he) to imagine that the Holy Ghost, by Luke,

speaking with the tongues of men, that is to say, to their understanding, should use a word in that signification in which it was never used before his time by any writer, holy or profane; for how could he then be understood, if using the note and name they used, he should have fled from the signification whereunto they used it, unless therefore his purpose was to write that which none could read? It must needs be that as he wrote so he meant the election by voices. And if Demosthenes, for knowledge in the tongue, would have been ashamed to have noted the laying down of hands by a word that signifieth the lifting of them up, they do the Holy Ghost (which taught Demosthenes to speak) great injury in insing this impropriety and strangeness of speech unto himself, which is yet more absurd, considering that there were both proper words to utter the laying on of hands by, and the same also was used in the translation of the LXX., which Luke, for the Gentiles' sake, did, as it may seem (where he conveniently could), most follow. And yet it is most of all absurd that Luke, which straiteneth himself to keep the words of the seventy interpreters, when as he could have otherwise uttered things in better terms than they did, should here forsake the phrase wherewith they noted the laying on of hands, being most proper and natural to signify the same. The Greek Scholiast also, and the Greek Ignatius, do plainly refer this word to the choice of the church by voices."

But it is objected, that Luke saith not of the whole church, but only of Paul and Barnabas, that they made them by voices elders in every city.

Ans. But how can one imagine that betwixt them two alone the matter went to suffrages? Election by most voices, or the lifting up of the hand in taking of a suffrage, had place only among a multitude assembled together. Wherefore we say with Junius,¹ that *τὸ χειρονομία* is both a common and a particular action whereby a man chooseth, by his own suffrage in particular, and likewise with others in common, so that in one and the same action we cannot divide those things which are so joined together.

From that which hath been said, it plainly appeareth that the election of ministers, according to the apostolic institution, per-

¹ Charity Mistaken, sect. 5, p. 145.

² De Cleric., lib. 1, cap. 7.

³ Ubi supra., nota. 55.

⁴ Loc. Theol., tom. 6, p. 151.

⁵ On Acts xiv. 23.

¹ Ubi supra., nota. 63, 64.

taineth to the whole body of that church where they are to serve; and that this was the apostolic and primitive practice, it is acknowledged even by some of the Papists, such as Lorinus, Salmeron, and Gaspar Sanctius, all upon Acts xiv. 23. The canon law¹ itself commendeth this form and saith, *Electio clericorum est petitio plebis*. And was he not a popish archbishop² who condescended that the city of Magdeburg should have *jus vocandi ac constituendi ecclesie ministros*? Neither would the city accept of peace without this condition.

That in the ancient church, for a long time, the election of ministers remained in the power of the whole church or congregation, it is evident from Cypr., lib. 1, epist. 4, 68; August., epist. 106; Leo I., epist. 95; Secret., lib. 4, cap. 30; and lib. 6, cap. 2; Possidon, in *Vita Aug.*, cap. 4. The testimonies and examples themselves, for brevity's cause, I omit. As for the thirteenth canon of the Council of Laodicea, which forbiddeth to permit to the people the election of such as were to minister at the altar, we say with Osiander,³ that this canon cannot be approved, except only in this respect, that howbeit the people's election and consent be necessary, yet the election is not wholly and solely to be committed to them, excluding the judgment and voice of the clergy. And that this is all which the Council meant, we judge with Calvin⁴ and Gerhard.⁵ That this is the true interpretation of the canon, Junius⁶ proveth both by the words *ὁχλος ἐπιτρέπειν, permittere turbis*, for *ἐπιτρέπειν* signifieth to quit and leave the whole matter to the fidelity and will of others; and, likewise, by the common end and purpose of that Council which was to repress certain faults of the people which had prevailed through custom. Indeed, if the whole matter were altogether left to the people, contentions and confusions might be feared; but whilst we plead for the election of the people, we add,

1. Let the clergy of the adjacent bounds, in their presbyterial assembly, try and judge who are fit for the ministry; thereafter let a certain number of those who are by them approved as fit, be offered and propounded

to the vacant church, that a free election may be made of some one of that number, providing always that if the church or congregation have any real reason for refusing the persons nominate and offered unto them, and for choosing of others, their lawful desires be herein yielded unto.

2. Even when it comes to the election,¹ yet *populus non solus judicat, sed præunte et moderante actionem clero et presbyterio*, let the elders of the congregation, together with some of the clergy concurring with them, moderate the action, and go before the body of the people.

Would to God that these things were observed by all who desire the worthy office of a pastor; for neither the patron's presentation, nor the clergy's nomination, examination and recommendation, nor the bishop's laying on of hands and giving of institution, nor all these put together, can make up to a man's calling to be a pastor to such or such a particular flock, without their own free election. Even, as in those places where princes are elected, the election gives them *jus ad rem* (as they speak), without which the inauguration can never give them *jus in re*; so a man hath, from his election, power to be a pastor so far as concerneth *jus ad rem*, and ordination only applieth him to the actual exercising of his pastoral office, which ordination ought to be given unto him only who is elected, and that because he is elected. And of him who is obtruded and thrust upon a people, without their own election, it is well said by Zanchius, that he can neither with a good conscience exercise his ministry, nor yet be profitable to the people, because they will not willingly hear him, nor submit themselves unto him.

Furthermore, because patronages and presentation to benefices do often prejudice the free and lawful election which God's word craveth, therefore the Second Book of Discipline, chap. 12, albeit it permitteeth and alloweth the ancient patrons of prebendaries, and such benefices as have not *curam animarum*, to reserve their patronages, and to dispoise thereupon to benefices that have *curam animarum*, may have no place in this light of reformation. Not that we think a man presented to a benefice that hath *curam animarum* cannot be lawfully elected, but because of the often and ordi-

¹ Dec., part. I, dist. 62.

² Thuar. Hist., lib. 83, p. 85.

³ Hist. Eccl., cent. 4, lib. 3, cap. 38.

⁴ In Acts xiv. 23.

⁵ Ubi supra, p. 178.

⁶ Ubi supra, nota. 16.

¹ Jun., ubi supra, nota. 24.

nary abuse of this unnecessary custom, we could wish it abolished by princes.

It followeth to speak of ordination, wherein, with Calvin,¹ Junius,² Gerson Bucer,³ and other learned men, we distinguish betwixt the act of it and the rite of it. The act of ordination standeth in the mission to the deputation of a man to an ecclesiastical function, with power and authority to perform the same; and thus are pastors ordained when they are sent to a people with power to preach the word, minister the sacraments, and exercise ecclesiastical discipline among them. For "How shall they preach except they be sent?" Rom. x. 15. Unto which mission or ordination neither prayer nor imposition of hands, nor any other of the church's rites, is essential and necessary, as the Archbishop of Spalato sheweth,⁴ who placeth the essential act of ordination in *missione potestativa*, or a simple deputation and application of a minister to his ministerial function with power to perform it. This may be done, saith he, by word alone, without any other ceremony, in such sort that the fact should hold, and the ordination thus given should be valid enough. When a man is elected by the suffrages of the church, then his ordination is *quasi solennis missio in possessionem honoris illius, ex decreto*, saith Junius.⁵ Chemnitius noteth,⁶ that when Christ, after he had chosen his twelve apostles, ordained them to preach the gospel, to cast out devils, and to heal diseases, we read of no ceremony used in this ordination, but only that Christ gave them power to preach, to heal, and to cast out devils, and so sent them sway to the work. And howsoever the church hath for order and decency used some rite in ordination, yet there is no such rite to be used with opinion of necessity, or as appointed by Christ or his apostles. When our writers prove against Papists that order is no sacrament, this is one of their arguments, that there is no rite instituted in the New Testament to be used in the giving of orders. Yet because imposition of hands was used in ordination not only by the apostles, who had power to give extraordinarily the gifts of the Holy Ghost, but like-

wise by the presbytery or company of elders; and Timothy did not only receive the gift that was in him, by the laying on of Paul's hands, 2 Tim. i. 16, as the mean, but also with the laying on of the hands of the presbytery, 1 Tim. iv. 14, as the rite and sign of his ordination; therefore the church, in the after ages, hath still kept and used the same rite in ordination, which rite shall, with our leave, be yet retained in the church, providing, 1. It be not used with opinion of necessity; for that the church hath full liberty either to use any other decent rite (not being determined by the word to any one), or else to use no rite at all, beside a public declaration that the person there presented is called and appointed to serve the church in the pastoral office, together with exhortation to the said person, and the commending of him to the grace of God, the church not being tied by the word to use any rite at all in the giving of ordination. 2. That it be not used as a sacred significant ceremony to represent and signify either the delivering to the person ordained authority to preach and to minister the sacraments, or the consecration and mancipation of him to the holy ministry; or, lastly, God's bestowing of the gifts of his Spirit upon him, together with his powerful protection and gracious preservation in the performing of the works of his calling, but only as a moral sign, solemnly to assign and point out the person ordained; which, also, was one of the ends and uses whereunto this rite of laying on of hands was applied by the apostles themselves, as Chemnitius sheweth.¹ And so Joshua was designed and known to be the successor of Moses, by that very sign, that Moses laid his hands on him, Deut. xxxiv.

As a sacred significant ceremony we may not use it, 1. Because it hath been proved,² that men may never, at their pleasure, ascribe to any rite whatsoever, a holy signification of some mystery of faith or duty of piety. The apostles, indeed, by laying on of their hands, did signify their giving of the gift of the Holy Ghost; but, now, as the miracle, so the mystery hath ceased, and the church not having such power to make the signification answer to the sign, if now a sacred or mystical signification be placed in the rite, it is but an empty and

¹ In Tim. iv. 14.

² Ubi supra, cap. 3.

³ De Gubern. Eccl.

⁴ De Rep. Eccl., lib. 2, cap. 3, num. 54; et cap. 4, num. 13, 19; et lib. 2, cap. 5, num. 48.

⁵ Ubi supra, cap. 7, nota. 59.

⁶ Exam., part 2, p. 221.

¹ Ubi supra.

² Supra, cap. 5.

void sign, and rather minical than mystical. 2. All such sacred rites as have been notoriously abused to superstition, if they have no necessary use, ought to be abolished, as we have also proven;¹ therefore, if imposition of hands in ordination be accounted and used as a sacred rite, and as having a sacred signification (the use of it not being necessary), it becometh unlawful, by reason of the bygone and present superstitious abuse of the same in Popery.

Now the right and power of giving ordination to the ministers of the church belongeth primarily and wholly to Christ, who communicateth the same with his bride the church. Both the bridegroom for his part, and the bride for her part, have delivered this power of ordination to the presbytery *jure divino*. Afterward the presbytery conferred, *jure humano*, this power upon them, who were specially called bishops, whence the tyrannical usurpation of bishops hath in process followed, claiming the proper right and ordinary position of that which at first they had only by free concession; and thus that great divine, Franciscus Junius,² deriveth the power of ordination. All which, that it may be plain unto us, let us observe four several passages.

1. The whole church³ hath the power of ordination communicated to her from Christ, to whom it wholly pertaineth; for, 1. It is most certain (and among our writers agreed upon) that, to the whole church collectively taken, Christ hath delivered the keys of the kingdom of heaven with power to use the same, promising that whosoever the church bindeth on earth, shall be bound in heaven, and whosoever she looseth on earth, shall be loosed in heaven, Matt. xviii. 18; therefore he hath also delivered unto the whole church power to call and ordain ministers for using the keys, otherwise the promise might be made void, because the ministers which she now hath may fail. 2. Christ hath appointed a certain and an ordinary way how the church may provide herself of ministers, and so may have over in herself the means of grace and comfort sufficient to herself, according to that of the Apostle, 1 Cor. iii. 21, 22, "All things are yours, whether Paul or Apollos," &c. But if she had not the power of ordaining mi-

nisters unto herself when she needeth, then might she sometimes be deprived of such an ordinary and certain way of providing herself. 3. When the ministry of the church faileth or is wanting, Christian people have power to exercise that act of ordination which is necessary to the making of a minister. Dr Fulk⁴ sheweth out of Ruffinus and Theodoret, that Aedesius and Frumentius, being but private men, by preaching of the gospel, converted a great nation of the Indians; and that the nation of the Iberians being converted by a captive woman, the king and the queen became teachers of the gospel to the people. And might not, then, the church in those places both elect and ordain ministers?

2. The church hath, by divine institution, delivered the power of ordaining ordinary ministers to the presbytery, whereof the church consisteth *representative*. And so saith Pareus,⁵ that the power of mission (which is *ordination*) belongeth to the presbytery. *Scriptura*, saith Balduino,⁶ *ordinationem tribuit toti presbyterio, non seorsim episcopo*. With whom say the Professors of Leyden in like manner.⁷ Now when the divines of Germany and Belgia speak of a presbytery, they understand such a company as hath in it both those two sorts of elders which we speak of, viz., some who labour in the word and doctrine, whom the Apostle calleth bishops, and others who labour only in discipline. The apostolic and primitive times knew neither parished nor diocesan churches. Christians lived then in cities only, not in villages, because of the persecution; and it is to be remembered, that in Rome, Corinth, Ephesus, Colosse, Philippi, Thessalonica, and such other cities inhabited by Christians, there were more pastors than one. The Apostle called unto him the elders (not elder) of the church of Ephesus, Acts xx. 17; he writeth to the bishops (not bishop) of the church at Philippi, Phil. i. 1; he biddeth the Thessalonians know them (not him) which laboured among them, 2 Thess. v. 12. Now that number of pastors or bishops which was in one city, did in common govern all the churches within the city, and there was not any one pastor who, by himself, governed a certain part of the city particularly assigned to his charge,

¹ Supra, cap. 2.

² Animad. in Bell., cont. 5, lib. 1, cap. 3.

³ Ger. Loc. Theol., tom. 6, p. 135; Bald. de Cas. Consc., lib. 4, cap. 6, cas. 4.

⁴ On Rom. x. 15.

⁵ On Rom. x. 15.

⁶ Ubi supra.

⁷ Syo. Pur. Theol., disp. 42, thes. 32, 37.

to which purpose the Apostle exhorteth the elders of the church at Ephesus, to take heed to all the flock, *πασιν τῷ ποιμνί*, Acts xx. 28. And to the same purpose it is said by Jerome,¹ that before schemes and divisions were, by the devil's instigation, made in religion, *communi presbyterorum consilio ecclesie gubernabantur*.

This number of preaching elders in one city, together with those elders which, in the same city, laboured for discipline only, made up that company which the Apostle,² 1 Tim. iv. 14, calleth a presbytery, and which gave ordination to the ministers of the church. To the whole presbytery, made up of those two sorts of elders, belonged the act of ordination, which is mission; howbeit the right,³ which was imposition of hands, belonged to those elders alone which laboured in the word and doctrine. And so we are to understand that which the Apostle there saith of the presbytery's laying on of hands upon Timothy. As for Dr Downe's⁴ two glosses upon that place, which he borroweth from Bellarmine, and whereby he thinketh to elude our argument, we thank Dr Forbess⁵ for confuting them. *Quod autem*, &c.: "But whereas (saith he) some have expounded the presbytery in this place to be a company of bishops, except by bishops thou wouldst understand presbyteries, it is a violent interpretation, and an insolent meaning; and whereas others have understood the degree itself of eldership, this cannot stand, for the degree hath not hands, but hands are men's." Wherefore the Doctor himself, by the presbytery whereof the Apostle speaketh, understandeth (as we do) *confessus presbyterorum*.

But since we cannot find, in the apostles' times, any other presbytery or assembly of elders beside that which hath been spoken of, how cometh it, nay, some say that the church of Scotland, and other reformed churches, did appoint two sorts of presbyterial assemblies, one (which here we call sessions) wherein the pastor of the parish, together with those elders within the same, whom the Apostle calleth governments and presidents, put order to the government of that congregation; another (which here we call presbyteries) wherein the pastors of sim-

dry churches, lying near together, do assemble themselves? Which difficulty yet more increaseth, if it be objected that neither of these two doth in all points answer or conform itself unto that primitive form of presbytery whereof we speak. *Ans.* The division and multiplication of parishes, and the appointment of particular pastors to the peculiar oversight of particular flocks, together with the plantation of churches in villages as well as in cities, hath made it impossible for us to be served with that only one form of presbytery which was constitute in the apostles' times. But this difference of the times being (as it ought to be) admitted, for an inevitable cause of the differences of the former, both those two forms of presbyterial meetings appointed by the church of Scotland do not only necessarily result from that one apostolic form, but likewise (the actions of them both being laid together) do accomplish all these ordinary ecclesiastical functions which were by it performed.

And first, Sessions have a necessary use, because the pastors and those elders who assist them in the governing of their flocks must, as well conjunctly as severally, as well publicly as privately, govern, admonish, rebuke, censure, &c. As for presbyteries, because the parishes being divided in most places, there is but one pastor in a parish, except there should be a meeting of a number of pastors out of divers parishes, neither could trial be well had of the growth or decay of the gifts, graces, and utterance of every pastor; for which purpose the ninth head of the First book of Discipline appointed the ministers of adjacent churches to meet together at convenient times, in towns and public places, for the exercise of prophecying and interpreting of Scripture, according to that form commended to the church at Corinth, 1 Cor. xiv. 29—32. For yet could the churches be governed by the common council and advice of presbyteries, which being necessary by apostolic institution, and being the foundation and ground of our presbyteries, it maketh them necessary too.

3. After the golden age of the apostles was spent and away, presbyteries, finding themselves disturbed with emulations, contentions, and factions, for unity's sake, chose one of their number to preside among them, and to confer, in name of the rest, the rite and sign of initiation (which was in-

¹ Com. in Tit. 1.

² Gerhard Loc. Theol., tom. 6, p. 134, 164.

³ Jan., ubi sup., nota. 5, 12; Syo. Pur. Theol., disp. 42, thes. 37.

⁴ Sermon on Rev. i. 20.

⁵ Iren., lib. 2, cap. 11, p. 161.

position of hands) on them whom they ordained ministers. This honour did the presbyters yield to him who was specially and peculiarly called bishop, *jure humano*; yet the act of ordination they still reserved in their own power. And whosoever the act doth thus remain in the power of the whole presbytery, the conferring of the outward sign or rite by one in the name of the rest, none of us condemneth, as may be seen in Beza, Didoclavius, and Gerson Bucar. Neither is there any more meant by Jerome¹ when he saith, "What doth a bishop (ordination being excepted) which a presbyter may not do?" For, 1. He speaketh not of the act of ordination, which remained in the power of the presbytery, but of the outward sign or rite, which synodically he calls ordination.² 2. He speaketh only of the custom of that time, and not of any divine institution; for that the imposition of hands pertained to the bishop alone, not by divine institution, but only by ecclesiastical custom, Junius proveth³ out of Tertullian, Jerome and Ambrose.

4. Afterward bishops began to appropriate to themselves that power which pertained unto them *jure devoluto*, as if it had been their own *jure proprio*. Yet so that some vestiges of the ancient order have still remained; for both Augustine and Ambrose (whose words, most plain to this purpose, are cited by Dr Forbess⁴) testify that, in their time, in Alexandria and all Egypt, the presbyters gave ordination when a bishop was not present. The canon law⁵ ordaineth that, in giving of ordination, presbyters lay on their hands, together with the bishop's hands. And it is holden by many Papists (of whom Dr Forbess⁶ allegeth some for the same point) that any simple presbyter (whom they call a priest) may, with the Pope's commandment or concession, give valid ordination. That which maketh them grant so much is, because they dare not deny that presbyters have the power of ordination *jure divino*. Yet saith Panormitanus,⁷ *Olim presbytery in communi regebant ecclesiam, et ordinabant sacerdotes*. The Doctor himself hold-

eth, that one simple presbyter howsoever having, by virtue of his presbyterial order, power to give ordination, *quod ad actum primum sive aptitudinem*, yet *quo ad exercitium* cannot validly give ordination without a commission from the bishop or from the presbytery, if either there be no bishop, or else he be a heretic or wolf. But I would learn why may not the presbytery validly ordain, either by themselves, or by any one presbyter with commission and power from them, even where there is a bishop (and he no heretic) who consenteth not thereto; for the Doctor¹ acknowledgeth, that not only *quo ad aptitudinem*, but even *quo ad plenariam ordinationis executionem*, the same power pertaineth to the presbytery *collegialiter*, which he allegeth (but proveth not) that the apostles gave to bishops *personaliter*.

Now from all these things princes may learn how to reform their own and the prelates' usurpation, and how to reduce the orders and vocation of ecclesiastical persons unto conformity with the apostolic and primitive pattern, from which if they go on either to enjoin or to permit a departing, we leave them to be judged by the King of terrors.

DIGRESSION II.

OF THE CONVOCATION AND MODERATION OF SYNODS.

Touching the convocation of synods, we resolve with the Professors of Leyden,² that if a prince do so much as tolerate the order and regiment of the church to be public, his consent and authority should be craved, and he may also design the time, place, and other circumstances; but much more,³ if he be a Christian and orthodox prince, should his consent, authority, help, protection, and safeguard be sought and granted. And that according to the example, both of godly kings in the Old Testament, and of Christian emperors and kings in the New.⁴ Chiefly, then, and justly⁵ the magistrate may and ought to urge and require synods, when they of the ecclesiastical order cease from

¹ Epist. ad Evagr.

² Jun., ubi sup., nota. 22.

³ Ibid., nota. 10.

⁴ Iren., lib. 2, cap. 11, p. 165.

⁵ Dist. 23, cap. 8.

⁶ Ubi sup., p. 175, et seq.

⁷ Apud Forbess, ubi sup., p. 177.

¹ Ibid, p. 194—196.

² Disp. 49, thes. 20.

³ Ibid, thes. 21.

⁴ Thes. 22.

⁵ Thes. 23.

doing their duty. *Veruntamen si contra*,¹ &c. "Nevertheless (say they), if, contrariwise, the magistrate be an enemy and persecutor of the church and of true religion, or cease to do his duty; that is, to wit, in a manifest danger of the church, the church notwithstanding ought not to be wanting to herself, but ought to use the right and authority of convocation, which first and foremost remaineth with the rulers of the church, as may be seen, Acts xv."

But that this be not thought a tenet of anti-episcopal writers alone, let us hear what is said by one of our greatest opposites:² *Neque defendimus ita*, &c.: "Neither do we so defend that the right of convoking councils pertaineth to princes, as that the ecclesiastical prelates may no way either assemble themselves together by mutual consent, or be convoked by the authority of the metropolitan, primate, or patriarch. For the apostles did celebrate councils without any convocation of princes. So many councils that were celebrate before the first Nicen, were, without all doubt, gathered together by the means alone of ecclesiastical persons; for to whom directly the church is fully committed, they ought to bear the care of the church. Yet princes in some respect indirectly, for help and aid, chiefly then when the prelates neglect to convocate councils, or are destitute of power for doing of the same, of duty may, and use to convocate them." Where we see his judgment to be, that the power of convoking councils pertaineth directly to ecclesiastical persons, and to princes only indirectly, for that they ought to give help and aid to the convocation of the same, especially when churchmen either will not or cannot assemble themselves together. His reasons whereupon he groundeth his judgment are two, and those strong ones.

1. The apostolical councils, Acts vi. 2; xv. 16, and so many as were assembled before the first council of Nice, were not convoked by princes, but by ecclesiastical persons without the leave of princes; therefore, in the like cases, the church ought to use the like liberty, that is, when there is need of synods, either for preventing or reforming some corruptions in the doctrine or policy of the church; and for avoiding such inconveniences as may impede the course of

the gospel (princes in the meantime being hostile opposites to the truth of God and to the purity of religion), then to convocate the same without their authority and leave.

2. The church is fully committed (and that directly) to the ministers whom Christ hath set to rule over the same; therefore they ought to take care and to provide for all her necessities as those who must give account, and be answerable to God for any hurt which she receiveth in things spiritual or ecclesiastical, for which (when they might) they did not provide a remedy, which being so, it followeth, that when princes will neither convocate synods, nor consent to the convoking of them, yet if the convoking of a synod be a necessary mean for healing of the church's hurt, and ecclesiastical persons be able (through the happy occasion of a fit opportunity) synodically to assemble themselves, in that case they ought by themselves to come together, unless one would say that princes alone, and not pastors, must give account to God how it hath gone with the church in matters spiritual and ecclesiastical.

If it be objected that our divines maintain against Papists, that the right and power of convoking synods pertaineth to princes: *Ans.*, And so say I; but for making the purpose more plain I add three directions: 1. In ordinary cases, and when princes are not enemies to the truth and purity of the gospel, ecclesiastical persons should not do well to assemble themselves together in a synod, except they be convocate with the authority or consent of princes. Yet, as Junius sheweth,¹ in extraordinary cases, and when the magistrate will not concur nor join with the church, the church may well assemble and come together beside his knowledge, and without his consent, for that extraordinary evils must have extraordinary remedies. 2. Ecclesiastical persons may convocate councils simply, and by a spiritual power and jurisdiction; but to convocate them by a temporal and coactive power, pertaineth to princes only. "Ecclesiastical power (saith the Archbishop of Spalato²) may appoint and convocate councils; but yet the ecclesiastical power itself cannot, with any effect or working, compel bishops, especially if the bishops of another province, or kingdom, or patriarchship, be to be con-

¹ Thes. 24.

² M. Ant. de Dom. de Rep. Eccl., lib. 6. cap. 5, num. 89.

¹ Animad. in Bell., cont. 4, lib. 1, cap. 12, not. 4, 18.

² De Rep. Eccl., lib. 6, cap. 5, num. 16.

vocated. For because the church can work by her censures, and deprive them who refuse of her communion, if they come not, yet they shall not therefore come to the council if they contemn the censure; therefore that no man may be able to resist, it is necessary that they be called by a coactive authority, which can constrain them who gainstand, both with banishments and bodily punishments, and compel the bishops, not only of one province, but also of the whole kingdom or empire, to convene." 3. In the main and substantial respects, the convocations of councils pertaineth to the ministers of the church, that is, as councils are ecclesiastical meetings, for putting order to ecclesiastical matters, they ought to be assembled by the spiritual power of the ministers, whose part it is to espy and note all the misorders and abuses in the church, which must be righted; but because councils are such meetings as must have a certain place designed for them in the dominions and territories of princes, needing further, for their safe assembling, a certification of their princely protection; and, finally, it being expedient for the better success of councils, that Christian princes be present therein, either personal or by their commissioners, that they may understand the councils, conclusions, and decrees, and assenting unto the same, ratify and establish them by their regal and royal authority, because of these circumstances it is, that the consent and authority of Christian princes is, and ought to be, sought and expected for the assembling of synods.

As for the right of presidency and moderation, we distinguish, with Junius¹, two sorts of it, both which have place in councils, viz., the moderation of the ecclesiastical action, and the moderation of the human order; and with him we say, that in councils, the whole ecclesiastical action ought to be moderated by such a president as is elected for the purpose; even as Hosius, bishop of Corduba, was chosen to preside in the first council of Nice: which office agreeth not with princes; for in the point of propounding rightly the state of questions and things to be handled, and of containing the disputation in good order, *certe presidere debet persona ecclesiastica, in sacris literis erudita*, saith the Archbishop of Spalato.² The

presiding and moderating in the human order, that is, by a coactive power to compass the turbulent, to avoid all confusion and contention, and to cause a peaceable proceeding and free deliberation, pertaineth indeed to princes, and so did Constantine preside in the same council of Nice.

DIGRESSION III.

OF THE JUDGING OF CONTROVERSIES AND QUESTIONS OF FAITH.

There is a twofold judgment which discerneth and judgeth of faith. The one absolute, whereby the Most High God, whose supreme authority alone bindeth us to believe whatsoever he propoundeth to be believed by us, hath in his written word pronounced, declared, and established, what he would have us to believe concerning himself or his worship; the other limited and subordinate, which is either public or private. That which is public is either ordinary or extraordinary. The ministerial or subordinate public judgment, which I call ordinary, is the judgment of every pastor or doctor, who, by reason of his public vocation and office, ought by his public ministry to direct and instruct the judgments of other men in matters of faith, which judgment of pastors and doctors is limited and restricted to the plain warrants and testimonies of Holy Scripture, they themselves being only the ambassadors¹ of the Judge to preach and publish the sentence which he hath established, so that a pastor is not properly *judex* but *index*. The subordinate public judgment, which is extraordinary, is the judgment of a council assembled for the more public and effectual establishment and declaration of one or more points of faith and heads of Christian doctrine, and that in opposition to all contrary heresy or error, which is broached and set a-foot in the church. From which council,² no Christian man who is learned in the Scriptures may be excluded, but ought to be admitted to utter his judgment in the same; for in the indagation or searching out of a matter of faith, they are not the persons of men which give authority to their sayings, but

¹ Jun., cont. 1, lib. 3, cap. 4, not. 17.

² M. Ant. de Dom. de Rep. Eccl., lib. 7, cap. 3, not. 32.

¹ Animad. in Bell., cont. 4, lib. 1, cap. 19, not. 12.

² De Rep. Eccl., lib. 7, cap. 3, not. 43.

the reasons and documents which every one bringeth for his judgment. The subordinate judgment, which I call private, is the judgment of discretion whereby every Christian,¹ for the certain information of his own mind, and the satisfaction of his own conscience, may and ought to try and examine, as well the decrees of councils as the doctrines of particular pastors, and in so far to receive and believe the same, as he understandeth them to agree with the Scriptures.

Besides these, there is no other kind of judgment which God hath allowed to men in matters of faith, which being first observed, we say next, concerning the part of princes, that when questions and controversies of faith are tossed in the church, that which pertaineth to them is, to convocate a council for the decision of the matter, civilly to moderate the same, by causing such an orderly and peaceable proceeding as is alike necessary in every grave assembly, whether of the church or of the commonwealth; and, finally, by their coactive temporal power to urge and procure that the decrees of the council be received, and the faith therein contained professed, by their subjects.

But neither may they, by their own authority and without a council, decide any controverted matter of faith, nor yet having convocated a council, may they take upon them to command, rule, order, and dispose the disputes and deliberations according to their arbitrement; nor, lastly, may they, by virtue of their regal dignity, claim any power to examine the decrees concluded in the council, otherwise than by the judgment of private discretion which is common to every Christian.

First, I say, they may not by themselves presume, publicly and judicially, to decide and define any matter of faith, which is questioned in the church; but this definition they ought to remit unto a lawful and free council. Ambrose would not come to the court to be questioned and judged by the emperor Valentinian in a matter of faith, whenever he heard that emperors judged bishops in matters of faith, seeing, if that were granted, it would follow that laymen should dispute and debate matters, and bishops hear, yea, that bishops should learn of laymen.

The true ground of which refusal (clear

enough in itself) is darkened by Dr Field,¹ who allegeth, 1. That the thing which Valentinian took on him was, to judge of a thing already resolved in a general council called by Constantine, as if it had been free, and not yet judged of at all. 2. That Valentinian was known to be partial; that he was but a novice; and the other judges which he meant to associate himself suspected; but howsoever these circumstances might serve the more to justify Ambrose's not compearing to be judged in a matter of faith by Valentinian, yet the Doctor toucheth not that which is most considerable, namely, the reason which he alleged for his not compearing, because it hath been at no time heard of that emperors judged bishops in matters of faith, and if that were granted, it would follow that bishops should learn of laymen; which reason holdeth ever good, even though the thing hath not been formerly judged by a council.

And, furthermore, if these (which the Doctor mentioneth) were the true reasons of his refusing to be judged by Valentinian, then why did he pretend another reason (whereof we have heard), and not rather defend himself with the real and true reason? Wherefore we gather, that the reason which made Ambrose refuse to be judged by him was no other than this, because he considered that princes, neither by themselves, nor by any whom they please to choose, may, without a lawfully assembled and free council, usurp a public judgment and decisive sentence in controversies of faith, which, if they arrogate to themselves, they far exceed the bounds of their vocation; for it is not said of princes, but of priests, that their lips should preserve knowledge, and that they should seek the law from their mouths, Mal. ii. 7. And the priests did Jehoshaphat set in "Jerusalem, for the judgment of the Lord, and for controversies," 2 Chron. xix. 8, 10, and for judging betwixt law and commandment, statutes and judgments.

In the meanwhile we deny not but that in extraordinary cases, when lawful councils cannot be had, and when the clergy is universally corrupted through gross ignorance, perverse affections, and incorrigible negligence, in such a case the prince, notwithstanding the defect of the ordinary and regular judges, may yet, by the power of the civil sword, repress and punish so many as

¹ Davenant de Jud. Controv., cap. 25; Jun., ubi supra.

¹ Of the Church, lib. 5, cap. 53.

publish and spread such doctrines as both he and other Christians, by the judgment of discretion, plainly understand from Scripture to be heretical.

Next, I say, that the prince, having assembled a council, may not take so much upon him as imperiously to command what he thinketh good in the disputes and deliberations, and to have everything ordered, disposed, and handled according to his mind. "To debate and define theological controversies, and to teach what is orthodox, what heretical, is the office of divines, yet, by a coactive authority, to judge this orthodox faith to be received by all, and heretical pravity to be rejected, is the office of kings, or the supreme magistrates, in every commonwealth," saith the Bishop of Salisbury.¹ And, again,² "In searching, directing, teaching, divines ordinarily, and by reason of their calling, ought to go before kings themselves; but in commanding, establishing, compelling, kings do far excel:" where he sheweth how, in defining of the controversies of religion, in one respect ecclesiastical persons, and in another respect kings, have the first place.

In the debating of a question of faith, kings have not, by virtue of their princely vocation, any precedency or chief place, the action being merely ecclesiastical. For howbeit kings may convocate a council, preside also and govern the same as concerning the human and political order, yet, saith Junius,³ *Actiones, deliberationes, et definitiones, ad substantiam rei ecclesiasticæ pertinentes, a sacerdotio sunt, a cætu servorum Dei, quibus rei suæ administrationem mandavit Deus.* And, with him, the Archbishop of Spalato saith, in like manner,⁴ that howbeit Christian princes have convocated councils, and civilly governed the same, yet they had no power nor authority in the very discussing, handling and deciding of matters of faith.

What then? In the handling of controversies of faith, have princes no place nor power at all beside that of political government only? Surely, by virtue of their princely authority, they have no other place in the handling of these matters. Yet, what if they be men of singular learning and understanding in the Scriptures? Then

let them propound their own suffrage, with the grounds and reasons of it, even as other learned men in the council do. But neither as princes, nor as men singularly learned, may they require that others in the council shall dispute and debate matters, and that they themselves shall sit as judges having judicial power of a negative voice; for in a council no man's voice hath any greater strength than his reasons and probation have. *Non enim admitto, &c.* "For I admit not in a council (saith the same prelate¹) some as judges, others as disputators, for I have showed that a conciliary judgment consisteth in the approbation of that sentence which, above others, hath been showed to have most weight, and to which no man could enough oppose. Wherefore no man in the council ought to have a judiciary voice, unless he be withal a disputator, and assigns a reason wherefore he assigns to that judgment and repels another, and that reason such a one as is drawn from the Scripture only, and from antiquity."

Lastly, I hold, that, after the definition and decision of a council, princes may not take upon them, by any judicial power or public vocation, to examine the same, as if they had authority to pronounce yet another decisive sentence, either ratifying or reversing what the council hath decreed. Most certain it is, that, before princes give their royal assent unto the decrees of any council whatsoever, and compel men to receive and acknowledge the same, they ought, first of all, carefully to try and examine them whether they agree with the Scriptures or not; and, if they find them not to agree with the Scriptures, then to deny their assent and authority thereto. But all the princes do not by any judicial power or public authority, but only by the judgment of private discretion, which they have as Christians, and which, together with them, is common also to their subjects; for neither may a master of a family commend to his children and servants the profession of that faith which is published by the decrees of a council, except, in like manner, he examine the same by the Scriptures.

¹ De Rep., num. 33.

¹ De Jud. Controv., cap. 16, p. 92.

² Ibid., cap. 14, p. 75.

³ Animad. in Bell., cont. 4, lib. 1, cap. 23, nota. 15.

⁴ De Rep. Eccl., lib. 6, cap. 5, num. 8, 30.

DIGRESSION IV.

OF THE POWER OF THE KEYS, AND ECCLESIASTICAL CENSURES.

Ecclesiastical censures and punishments, wherewith delinquents are bound, and from which, when they turn penitents, they are loosed, are of two sorts: either such as are common, and agree unto all, as excommunication and absolution; or such as are peculiar, and agree only to men of ecclesiastical order, as suspension, deprivation, &c.

As touching the power of the keys, to bind and loose, excommunicate and absolve; first of all, princes are to remember, that neither they may, by themselves, exercise this power (for *regum est corporalem irrogare penam; sacerdotum spiritualem inferre vindictam*), nor yet by their deputies or commissioners in their name, and with authority from them; because, as they have not themselves the power of the keys, so neither can they communicate the same unto others. Secondly, Ferasmuch as princes are the wardens, defenders, and revengers of both the Tables, they ought, therefore, to provide and take course that neither laymen be permitted to have and exercise the power of excommunication, nor yet that the prelates themselves be suffered, in their particular dioceses, to appropriate this power and external jurisdiction, as peculiar to themselves; but that it remain in their hands to whom it pertaineth by divine institution. What a woeful abuse is it, that, in our neighbour churches of England and Ireland, the bishop's vicar-general, or official, or commissary, being oftentimes such a one as hath never entered into any holy orders, shall sit in his courts to use (I should have said abuse) the power of excommunication and absolution? And what though some silly presbyter be present in the court? Doth not the bishop's substitute, being a layman, examine and judge the whole matter, decree, and give sentence what is to be done? Hath he not the presbyter's tongue tied to his belt? And what doth the presbyter more but only pronounce the sentence according to that which he who sitteth judge in the court hath decreed and decreed? As touching the prelates themselves, I pray, by what warrant have they appropriated

to themselves the whole external jurisdiction of binding and loosing, excommunicating and absolving? But that we may a little scan this their usurpation, and discover the iniquity thereof to the view of the princes, whose part it is to cause the same to be reformed, let us consider to whom Christ himself, who hath the key of David (Rev. iii. 7), who openeth and no man shutteth, and shutteth and no man openeth, hath committed this power of the keys to be used on earth. And, first, Let us distinguish betwixt the power itself, and the execution of it.

The power and authority of binding and loosing Christ hath delivered to the whole church, that is, to every particular church collectively taken. "The authority of excommunication pertaineth to the whole church," saith Dr Fulk.¹ *Jus excommunicandi*, saith Balduino,² *non est penes quamvis privatum, sive ex ordine sit ecclesiasticum, sive politico, &c. Sed hoc jus pertinet ad totam ecclesiam.* So say Zanchius (in 4 Præc., col. 756), Polanus (*Synt.*, lib. 7, cap. 18), Pareus (in 1 Cor. v., *De Excom.*), Cartwright (on 1 Cor. v. 4), Perkins (on Jude 3): and, generally, all our sound writers. The Magdeburgians³ cite, for the same judgment, Augustine and Primatius. Gerhard⁴ citeth also some popish writers assenting hereunto. The reasons which we give for confirmation hereof are these:—

1. It pertaineth to the whole church, collectively taken, to deny her Christian communion to such wicked persons as add contumacy to their disobedience: therefore, it pertaineth to the whole church to excommunicate them. Again, it pertaineth to the whole church to admit and receive one into her communion and familiar fellowship: therefore, to the whole church it likewise pertaineth to cast one out of her communion. Sure, the sentence of excommunication is pronounced in vain, except the whole church cut off the person thus judged from all communion with her: and the sentence of absolution is to as little purpose pronounced, except the whole church admit one again to have communion with her. Shortly, the whole church hath the power of punishing a man, by denying her communion unto him: therefore, the whole church hath the power of judging that he

¹ On 1 Cor. v. 4.

² De Cas. Consc., lib. 4, cap. 10, cas. 9.

³ Cent. 5, cap. 4, col. 383.

⁴ Loc. Theol., tom. 6, p. 236, 237.

¹ Decr., part 2, causa 2, quest. 7, cap. 41.

ought to be so punished. The whole church hath the power of remitting this punishment again: therefore, the whole church hath the power of judging that it ought to be remitted.

2. The Apostle, in 1 Cor. v., sheweth that the Israelites' purging away of leaven out of their dwellings in the time of the passover, was a figure of excommunication, whereby disobedient and obstinate sinners, who are as leaven to infect other men, are to be avoided and thrust out of the church. Now, as the purging away of the leaven did not peculiarly belong unto any one, or some few, among the Israelites, but unto the whole congregation of Israel; so the Apostle, writing to the whole church of Corinth, even to as many as should take care to have the whole lump kept unleavened, saith to them all, "Know ye not that a little leaven leaveneth the whole lump? Purge out, therefore, the old leaven. Put away from among yourselves that wicked person," 1 Cor. v. 6, 7, 13.

3. Christ hath delivered the power of binding and loosing to every particular church or congregation, collectively taken, which thus we demonstrate:—If our brother who trespasseth against us will neither be reclaimed by private admonition, nor yet by a rebuke given him before some more witnesses, then, saith Christ, "Tell it unto the church; but if he neglect to hear the church, let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican. Verily, I say unto you, whatsoever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven," Matt. xviii. 17, 18: where he sheweth, that, in the Christian church (which he was to plant by the ministry of the apostles), excommunication was to be used as the last remedy for curing of the most deadly and desperate evils; which excommunication he setteth forth by allusion unto the order and custom of the Jews in his time, among whom they who were cast out, and excommunicate from the synagogue, were accounted as heathens and publicans. And so when he saith, "Let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican," he presupposeth that the church hath excommunicated him for his contumacy, which he hath added to his disobedience. For, as Pareus saith,¹ "If by me, and thee, and every one, he is to be ac-

¹ In Matt. xviii. 17.

counted for such a man, it must needs be that the judgment of the church be, by public declaration, made known to me, and thee, and every one. And this meaning is thoroughly drawn out of the following verse,—"For whatsoever ye shall bind on earth," &c.; therefore, the church ought first to bind him before he ought to be accounted by me or thee for one bound, that is, excommunicate." Now, what meaneth Christ by the church, to which he giveth the power of binding and loosing? Not the church universal, sure; for I cannot tell the church universal (whether it be understood *collective* or *representative*) whensoever my brother trespasseth against me, and will not be reformed. He meaneth, therefore, the particular church, whereof, for the time, it shall happen one to be a member. "The power of the keys (saith Perkins¹) is given to all ministers, churches, and congregations." Neither could there, otherwise, an ordinary, perpetual, and ready course be had, for the correcting of all public contumacy and scandal, by the means of ecclesiastical discipline. But it will be said, when he biddeth us tell that particular church whereof we are members, he meaneth not that we should tell the whole body of that church *collective*, but that we should tell the governors of the church, who are the church *representative*.

How, then, is this place alleged to prove that the whole church *collective* hath power and authority to bind and loose?

Ans. Christ meaneth, indeed, that we should tell those governors who represent the church; but whilst he calleth them by the name of the church, and sendeth us to them as to those who represent the church, he plainly insinuateth that they exercise the power of the keys (as in his name, so) in the name of the church, and that this power and authority pertaineth to the whole church, even as when one man representeth another man's person, whatsoever power he exerciseth *eo nomine*, doth first of all agree to the man who is represented.

4. The Apostle, in his own proper person, writing to the whole church at Corinth, 1 Cor. v. 4, 5, will have them (being gathered together) to deliver that incestuous person to Satan; therefore, every particular church or congregation hath power to excommunicate such a contuma-

¹ On Jude 3.

cious sinner as that incestuous person was. It is the common answer of Papists, that albeit the Apostle commanded the act should be done in face of the church, yet the judgment and authority of giving sentence was in himself alone, and not in the church of Corinth, whereupon they would make it to follow, that the power of excommunication pertaineth to the bishop alone, and not the church. And the same answer doth Saravia return to Beza;¹ but, howsoever, the Apostle saith, that he had already judged concerning the incestuous person, yet he did not hereby seclude the church of Corinth from the authority of excommunicating him. "It is to be observed (saith Calvin²) that Paul, albeit he was an apostle, doth not for his own will excommunicate alone, but communicateth his council with the church, that the thing may be done by common authority. Himself, indeed, goeth before and sheweth the way, but whilst he adjoineth to himself other partakers, he significeth sufficiently that it is not the private power of one man." Nay, let us farther observe with Junius,³ that the apostles hath a twofold power: one common to them with other presbyters, 1 Pet. v. 1; another, singular, proper, and extraordinary, which they had as apostles. By this singular power Paul saith, "What will ye? shall I come unto you with a rod?" 1 Cor. iv. 21; but by the common power it was that he said, "When ye are gathered together, and my spirit," &c., 1 Cor. v. 4. By no other power than that which was common to him with the rest of the presbyters or bishops in Corinth did he judge the incestuous person to be excommunicated; and thus, as though he had been present in body among the other presbyters of that church, and assembled together with them in their ordinary council or consistory (in which *fuertur liberi apostoli, alii vero presbyteri ex vocatione propria, et necessitate officii*), so he both pronounceth his own judgment, and likewise goeth before, by pronouncing that judgment which was to be in common by them pronounced. Furthermore, that the Apostle would not have that incestuous man to be excommunicate by his own authority alone, but by the authority of the church of Corinth, thus it appeareth:

¹ De Tripl. Episc. Gen., p. 42. 43.

² In 1 Cor. v. 4.

³ Animad. in Bell., cont. 4, lib. 2, cap. 16, n. 6.

⁴ Jus. ubi supra., n. 7.

⁵ Id., cont. 3, lib. 4, cap. 16, n. 37.

1. The Apostle challengeth and condemneth the Corinthians, 1 Cor. v. 2, 6, 9, because they had not excommunicate him before his writing unto them, which he would never have done if that church had not had power and authority of excommunication.

2. Howbeit the Apostle gave his judgment, that he should be excommunicate, because he ought not to have been tolerated in the church, yet, for all that, he should not have been indeed excommunicate and thrust out of the church of Corinth, except the ministers and elders of that church had, in name of the whole body of the same, judicially cast him forth and delivered him to Satan, which plainly argueth that he should not have been excommunicate by the Apostle's authority alone, but by the authority of the church of Corinth.

3. The Apostle only sheweth that he should be excommunicate, but referreth the giving of sentence and judgment upon him to the Corinthians; for he saith not that the Corinthians, being gathered together, should declare or witness that such an one was delivered to Satan by Paul's own power and authority, but that they themselves should deliver him to Satan, ver. 4, 5. And again, "Purge out, therefore, the old leaven; put away from among yourselves that wicked person," ver. 7, 13. But, saith Saravia,¹ *partes apostoli in illa actione fuerunt authoritatis, ecclesiae vero Corinthiacae, obedientiae*. *Ans.* That the action was done by the authority of the church of Corinth, it is manifest both from that which hath been said, and likewise if further we consider that the Apostle ascribeth to the Corinthians as much authority in this action as he assumeth to himself. For he saith of himself, that he had judged concerning him that had done this deed, ver. 3; and so he saith of them, "Do not ye judge them that are within?" ver. 12. Where he speaketh not of the judgment of private discretion (for so they might have judged them that were without also), but even of the external and authoritative judgment of ecclesiastical discipline. The Apostle, indeed, saith, 2 Cor. ii. 9, that he wrote to the Corinthians to excommunicate that person, that he might know them, whether they were obedient in all things; but this proveth not that the authority of the excommunication was not theirs; for their part in

¹ Ubi supra.

this action proceeded both from authority and from obedience: from authority, absolutely; from obedience in, in some respect. *De jure* they had no liberty nor power not to excommunicate him, but were bound to do that which Paul pointed out to be their duty, and in that respect he calleth them obedient; yet absolutely and *de facto* it was free to them (notwithstanding of Paul's writing to them) either to excommunicate him or not to excommunicate him, and if they had not by their authority excommunicate him, he had not been at all excommunicate by any virtue of Paul's adjudging of him.

4. When the Corinthians proceeded to excommunicate him, the Apostle calleth this a censure which was inflicted of many, ver. 6, which could not be said if he was to be excommunicate by the Apostle's authority alone.

5. The Apostle, ver. 7, writeth again to the Corinthians, to forgive the incestuous man, to receive him into their communion, and to remit the punishment of his excommunication, because he was won to repentance. And he addeth, ver. 10, "To whom ye forgive anything, I forgive also." Now, who can remit the punishment and save one from underlying the censure, except such as have the power and authority of judgment?

Hitherto we have proven that the power of binding and loosing pertaineth to every particular church collectively taken; but the execution and judicial exercising of this power pertaineth to that company and assembly of elders in every church which the Apostle, 1 Tim. iv. 14, calleth a presbytery. In Scotland we call it a session; in France it is called a consistory; in Germany and Belgia, according to the Scripture phrase, it is termed a presbytery. It is made up of the pastor or pastors of every congregation, together with those governing elders which labour there (not in doctrine, but) in discipline only, of which things we have spoken before.¹ That unto this company or consistory of elders pertaineth the power of binding and loosing, it is averred by the best divines: Calvin (on Matt. xviii. 17, 18, *et Lib. Epist.*, col. 168, 169), Beza (*Contra Saraviam de Divers. Minist. Grad.*), Zanchius (in 4 *Præc.*, col. 756), Junius (*Animad. in Bell.*, cont. 5, lib. 1, cap. 14, nota 28), Polanus (*Synt.*, lib. 7, cap. 18),

¹ Supr. Digr.

Tilen (*Synt.*, part 2, disp. 28), the Professors of Leyden (*Syn. Pur. Theol.*, disp. 48), Gerhard (*Loc. Theol.*, tom. 6, p. 137, 138), Balduine (*de Cas. Cons.*, lib. 4, cap. 11, cas. 11), Pareus (in Matt. xviii. 17, 18; and in 1 Cor. v.), Cartwright (in Matt. xviii., sect. 7), Fennerus (*Theol.*, lib. 7, cap. 7, p. 152, 153), Alstedius (*Theol. Casuum*, cap. 27), Daneus (*Pol. Christ.*, lib. 8, p. 452, 464), Hemmingius (*Enchirid.*, class. 3, cap. 11, p. 388), Martyr (in 1 Cor. v.), and sundry others. Bullinger recordeth¹ that this was the manner of the particular churches in Helvetia, to choose unto themselves a certain senate of elders, or company of the best men in the church, which might, according to the canon of holy Scripture, exercise the discipline of excommunication, which form is well warranted by the Scriptures; for when Christ committeth the authority of binding and loosing unto the church, Matt. xviii. 17, 18, however the power and authority itself pertain to any particular church collectively taken, as hath been said, yet the execution of the same is committed to the consistory or senate of elders which representeth that church, and which Paul calleth a presbytery. Zanchius saith that Chrysostom,² Bullinger, and all good interpreters, understand the presbytery to be there meant by Christ when he saith, "Tell the church." Chrysostom saith *ποίους καὶ προεστώτας*, that is, saith Junius,³ the ecclesiastical sanhedrim made up of pastors and elders. Thus Camero likewise expoundeth the place.⁴ *Ecclesiae nomine*, saith he, *videtur Christus significasse collegium presbyterorum qui ecclesiae Christianae erant praefuturi, cujus presbyterii mentio fit*, 1 Tim. iv. Now if Christ hath committed the power of excommunication unto the church, what have bishops to say for themselves who appropriate this power unto themselves, each one in his diocese? For when we cannot give the name of the church unto a bishop,⁵ because he is but one man, and the church is a company of many men; nay, nor yet can we give the name of the church unto a company of bishops, for if they might be called the church, it should be for this respect alone, because they represent the church: but *soli episcopi*, &c., "Bishops alone (saith Gerhard),

¹ Apud Zanch. in 4 *Præc.*, col. 745.

² In 4 *Præc.*, col. 741.

³ Cont. 3, lib. 1, cap. 6, p. 19.

⁴ *Prælect.*, tom. 1, p. 23.

⁵ Calv. et Cart. on Matt. xviii. 17; Par. in 1 Cor. v.

⁶ Loc. Theol., tom. 6, p. 137.

or they who teach, cannot represent the church, since hearers also pertain to the definition thereof, but the presbytery can represent the church, whereunto not only they pertain who labour in the word, but also elders or governors put in authority for expediting of ecclesiastical matters in name of the whole church: we grant, then, that by the church, Christ meaneth that company of church governors whereby a certain particular church is represented;¹ but forasmuch as the church consisteth of two integrant parts, viz., pastors and sheep, teachers and hearers, we therefore deny that the representative church whereof Christ speaketh, can be any other than that ecclesiastical consistory whereof we have spoken.

Moreover, albeit the Apostle wrote to the whole church of Corinth to deliver the incestuous man to Satan, because the matter could not be otherwise done, but only in the name and with the consent of that whole church; yet he never meant that the common promiscuous multitude should, by their suffrages and voices, examine and judge that cause. But, saith Calvin,² "Because the multitude, unless it be governed by council, never doth anything moderately nor gravely, there was ordained in the ancient church (meaning the apostolic church) a presbytery; that is, a company of elders which, by the consent of all, had the first judgment and examination of things; from it the matter was carried to the people, but being already determined before." Again, when the Apostle writeth to them in his second epistle that they should forgive him, because he hath repented, thus he reasoneth: "Sufficient to such a man is this censure which was inflicted of many," 2 Cor. ii. 6. Which words, that we may the better understand, it is worthy of observation (which not Calvin only,³ but Saravia also noteth⁴), that it appeareth from this place, he was not to excommunicate, but, by sharp rebukes, timely win to repentance, whereby the Apostle sheweth it to be needless, yea, most inconvenient, to proceed against him to the extremity of discipline. The word *ἐκκλήσια*, there used by the Apostle, signifieth rebuke, reprehension, or chiding, saith Dr Fulk;⁵ and so Scapula taketh it to be the same with

ἐκτίμησις, and to signify another thing than *ἐκτίμησις* or *ἐκτίμησις*. Beza and Tremellius turn *ἐκτίμησις* by *inrepatio*; Ar. Montanus readeth *objurgatio*. This chiding or threatening of the man proceeded not from the whole church of Corinth, but only from many therein, as is plain from the text, and as Saravia also granteth.¹ And who were the *πλείονες*, those many of whom the Apostle speaketh? Not such as, from Christian and brotherly charity, did privately chide and rebuke him, for the matter was not then depending in private rebukes, but by the Apostle's direction it was brought to the church's part and to public discipline, the scandal itself being so public and notoriously manifest; they were, therefore, such as had public office and authority to chide him. And who were those but the consistory of pastors and elders which represented the whole church, and were set in authority for judging and managing of things pertaining to ecclesiastical discipline? They (no doubt) being met together, called the man before them, and did most sharply rebuke him and chide with him, and threatened that they would not only debar him from the Lord's table (which is called lesser excommunication, but more properly a step or degree tending next to excommunication), but also wholly cast him out of the church and deliver him to Satan. Whereupon the man being made to see the grievousness of his sin, and the terrible punishment which was to follow upon it, becometh most sorrowful, humble, and penitent. And this moved the Apostle to say, "Sufficient to such a man," &c., as if he would say, What needeth him now to be excommunicate, and so to be corrected and put to shame by you all, when every one of you shall deny to him your Christian communion, as one wholly cast out of the church? Is it not enough that many among you, even your whole presbytery, hath put him to such public shame by their sharp reprehensions, and to so great fear by their dreadful threatenings? And since, through the blessing of God upon these means, he is already won to repentance, why would you have him yet more publicly corrected and rejected by all and every one.

And further, the Apostle addeth, that now they should not only forgive and comfort him, ver. 7, but also confirm (*κρῖναι*)

¹ Treleat. Inst. Theol., lib. 1, p. 291.

² In 1 Cor. v. 4.

³ Com. in illam locum.

⁴ De Divers. Minist. Grad., cap. 8, p. 85.

⁵ On 2 Cor. ii. 6.

¹ Ubi supra.

their love towards him, ver. 8. Now *κρίνω* signifieth to confirm or ratify by authority; and so Chemnitius,¹ Bullinger,² and Cartwright,³ expoundeth it in this place. It cometh from *κρίσις*, *authority*, whence cometh also *κύριος*, a *lord*, or one having authority. As, therefore, the presbytery, or company of pastors and elders, had, by their authority, established that he was to be excommunicate, and determined to proceed to the execution of extreme discipline against him, so now the Apostle would have them, by the same authority, to ratify and establish the remission of this punishment unto him, and to decree that the church should not deny her communion unto him. For this authority of binding and loosing, though it pertained to the whole church, in *actu primo sive in esse*, yet it pertained to the presbytery alone, in *actu secundo sive in operari*; and even as the act of speaking pertaineth to a man, as *principium quod*, but to the tongue alone, as *principium quo*; so albeit the power of the keys doth primarily and principally belong to the church, collectively taken, yet the actual execution of this power belongeth only to the presbytery which representeth the church, and unto which the church hath committed her authority to bind and loose. Wherefore, since the Apostle writeth to the whole church of Corinth to confirm, by their authority, their love to the penitent man; and since this authority, in the actual execution of it (which the Apostle craveth) did not agree to that whole church, collectively taken, we must needs understand his meaning to be, that their love towards that man, and their forgiving of him, should be ratified and confirmed by the authority of those church governors, *qui ecclesiae nomen ad cæterum representant, totius nimirum presbyterii autoritate atque consensu*.

Thus have we showed that the actual use of the keys, or the execution of the authority of binding and loosing, pertaineth to that ecclesiastical senate in every particular church, which the Apostle calleth a presbytery. For further illustration of the truth whereof, I add these four observations:—

1. We must distinguish⁴ a twofold power

¹ Exam., part 4; de Indulg., p. 53.

² Com. in hunc locum.

³ Annot., ibid.

⁴ Treecat. Inst. Theol., lib. 2, p. 287, 288; Pareus in 1 Cor. v., de Excom.

of the keys: the one is executed in doctrine; the other in discipline: the one *concionalis*; the other *judicialis*. Touching the former, we grant it is proper for pastors alone, whose office and vocation it is, by the preaching and publishing of God's word, to shut the kingdom of heaven against impenitent and disobedient men, and to open it unto penitent sinners; to bind God's heavy wrath upon the former, and (by application of the promises of mercy) to loose the latter from the sentence and fear of condemnation. When we ascribe the power of binding and loosing to that whole consistory, wherein governing elders are joined together with pastors, we mean only of the keys of external discipline, which are used in ecclesiastical courts and judicatories.

2. When we teach that the pastor or pastors of every particular church and congregation, with the elders of the same, being met together, have power to bind and loose, we understand this only of such places wherein a competent number of understanding and qualified men may be had to make up an eldership; otherwise let there be one eldership made up of two or three of the next adjacent parishes, according as was ordained by the Church of Scotland, in the 7th chapter of the Second Book of Discipline. *Sine totius*, &c.: "Without the consent of some whole church (saith Zanchius¹) no man ought to be excommunicate. Yea, I add, if it be a small church, and not consisting of many learned and skilful men, excommunication ought not to be done, except the neighbour churches be asked counsel of." And, as touching the pastor's part, Calvin saith well, *Nunquam*, &c.:² "I never thought it expedient the liberty of excommunicating should be permitted to every pastor." The fear of great inconveniences, which he thought likely to follow upon such a custom, if once it were permitted, makes him confess, in that epistle, that he durst not advise Liserus to excommunicate any man without taking counsel of other pastors. Now, I much marvel what butt Dr Forbess³ shot at when he entitleth one of his chapters *De Potestate Excommunicandi*, and then, in the body of the chapter, doth no more at all but only quote those two testimonies of Zanchius and Calvin; both of which do utterly con-

¹ In 4 Præc., col. 756.

² Lib. Epistolar., col. 180.

³ Ireo., lib. 2, cap. 12.

demn the usurpation of bishops who appropriate to themselves the power of excommunication, and ascribe this power to the consistory of pastors and elders in every particular church; and, in the forequoted places, do only (for preventing of abuses) set some bounds to the execution of their power; which bounds we also think good to be kept, viz., that if a church be so small that it hath not so many well-qualified men as may be sufficient to assist the pastor in the government thereof, then let one common eldership be made up out of it and some other neighbour churches: by which means it shall moreover come to pass (which is the other caution to be given), that not every pastor (no not with the elders of his congregation) shall be permitted to have full liberty of binding and loosing, but shall, in those matters, receive counsel and advice from other pastors. Howbeit, for this latter purpose, the church of Scotland hath profitably provided another remedy also, namely, that, in certain chief places, all the pastors in the adjacent bounds shall, at set and ordinary times, assemble themselves (which assemblies, in this nation, we call presbyteries), that so the churches may be governed *communis presbyterorum consilio*, as Jerome speaketh of the primitive times of the church.

3. Though the execution of the discipline of excommunication and absolution pertain to the consistory of the pastor and elders in every church, yet this discipline is to be by them executed in name of the whole church.¹ Saravia is bold to affirm,² that he who receiveth a sinner, or casteth him out of the church, doeth this in the name and authority of God alone. We have proven, by strong arguments, that the authority of excommunication pertaineth to the whole church; which, though he contradicteth, yet, in one place,³ forgetting himself, he acknowledgeth that the authority of the church of Corinth was to intervene in the excommunication of the incestuous man. Wherefore, as in the name of God, so in the name and authority of the whole church, must one be cast out or received.

4. To the right execution of this discipline the manifest consent of the whole

church is also necessary: the truth whereof, beside that it appeareth from that which hath been said concerning the church's authority, it is further confirmed, if we consider either the importance of the thing, or the good of the person. Touching the importance of the thing, *Gravissima*, &c.: "Most weighty matters in the church," saith Gerhard,² and the same saith Zanchius also,³ "ought not to be undertaken without the consent of the whole ecclesiastical body;" and, as Pope Leo writeth, "Such things as pertain unto all ought to be done with the consent of all. But what can be more weighty, and what doth more pertain to the body of the church, than to cut off some member from the body?" And, touching the good of the person, Augustine sheweth⁴ that then only a sinner is both stricken with fear and healed with shame, when, seeing himself anathematised by the whole church, he cannot find a fellow multitude together wherewith he may rejoice in his sin and insult upon good men. And that otherwise, if the tares grow so rank that they cannot be pulled up, and if the same evil disease take hold of so very many that the consent of the church cannot be had to the excommunication of a wicked person, then good men must grieve and groan, and endure what they cannot help. Therefore that excommunication may fruitfully succeed, the consent of the people is necessary: *Frustra enim ejicitur ex ecclesia, et consortio fidelium privatur, quem populus, abigere, et a quo abstinere recuset*.⁵ Howbeit, even in such cases, when the consent of the church cannot be had to the execution of this discipline, faithful pastors and professors must, every one for his own part, take heed that he have no fellowship with the unfruitful works of darkness, but even reprove them; yea, they ought, in *sensu negativo*, excommunicate those who should be (but are not) excommunicate positively, which negative excommunication is not an ecclesiastical censure, but either a bare punishment, or a cautel and animadversion; and so saith the Archbishop of Spalato,⁶ not only one brother may refuse

¹ Zanch., ubi supra; Synop. Par. Theol., disp. 48, thes. 9.

² Loc. Theol., tom. 6, p. 463.

³ Ubi Supra.

⁴ Lib. 3. Contra. Epist. Parmen.

⁵ Ant. de Dom. de Rep. Eccl., lib. 5, cap. 12, n. 67.

⁶ Ib. cap. 9, n. 8.

¹ Zanch. in 4 Præc., col. 756; Dr Fulk on 1 Cor. v. 4.

² De Tripl. Episc. Gener., p. 43.

³ De Divers. Minist. Grad., p. 85, 86.

to communicate with another, but a people, also, may refuse to communicate with their pastor, which he confirmeth by certain examples. But the public censure of positive excommunication should not be inflicted without the church's consent, for the reasons foresaid. Cyprian writeth to Cornelius, bishop of Rome, that he had much laboured with the people that peace might be given to them who had fallen; that is, that they might be again received into the communion of the church; which, if he might have done by himself, why did he labour and deal so much with the people in that business? And as they were not received into the church's communion without the people's consent, so neither were they without their consent excommunicate. Chrysostom sheweth,¹ concerning his time, that when one was to be excommunicate, the whole church was humbled in prayer to God for him; and, when he was again released, they did all kindly salute him, and wish him peace. Tertullian also writeth,² that he who was to be excommunicate in the public assembly of the church, was, by the common consent of all, stricken with judgment, and that all the approved and well-liked elders had the precedence or direction of the rest of the church in these matters.

Now, from all this which hath been said of the power and authority to excommunicate and absolve, it is manifest how unjustly usurping prelates do arrogate and appropriate to themselves this power, which Christ hath committed to every particular church or congregation, and ordained to be executed by the ecclesiastical consistory within the same. Which episcopal usurpation, as it hath been showed to be most contrary to divine institution, so doth it also depart from the manner of the ancient church: for it may be seen, in Cyprian,³ that the authority of reconciling and receiving into the church such as had fallen, was not proper to the bishop, but, with him, common to his clergy and presbytery, and that *jus communicationis* was given them by the clergy as well as by the bishop. We have heard, out of Jerome,⁴ that a bishop did nothing which a presbyter did not also, ex-

cept only that he gave rite or sign of ordination, that is, imposition of hands. Whereby we understand that as all other things, beside ordination, so the power of excommunication, among the rest, was alike common to bishops and presbyters. Whence it is, that the same Jerome, writing to Demetriades, calleth excommunication *Episcoporum et Presbyterorum censura*. And elsewhere, *Alligat vel solvit Episcopus et Presbyter*.¹ Justinian (*Novel. 123, cap. 11*) saith, *Omibus autem Episcopis et Presbyteris interdiximus segregare aliquem a sacra communione, antequam causa monstretur, &c.*, certifying them, if they do otherwise, that he whom they excommunicate should be loosed from excommunication *a majore sacerdotia*. Whence we see, that presbyters also were wont to excommunicate, and that this power was common to them with the bishops. The First Council of Carthage, can. 23, decreeth that a bishop hear no man's cause without the presence of his clergy; and that otherwise his sentence shall be void, except it be confirmed by the presence of his clergy. The canon law itself hath some vestiges of the ancient order: it ordaineth,² that when a bishop either excommunicateth or absolveth any man, twelve of the clergy be present, and concur with him. Dr Forbesse now also acknowledgeth,³ that it is not lawful for a bishop to exercise the power of public jurisdiction by himself, and without the presbytery; and, under this power of jurisdiction, whereof he speaketh,⁴ he comprehendeth the visitation of churches, ordination, suspension, and deposition of ministers, the excommunicating of contumacious persons, and the reconciling of them when they become penitent, the calling of the fellow-presbyters to a synod, the making of ecclesiastical canons, &c.; which power of jurisdiction, saith he,⁵ remaineth one and the same, whole and entire, both in the bishop, and in the presbytery: in him personally; in it collegially. His confession of the presbytery's power and authority, we catch and lay hold on; but whereas he would have this power any way proper and personal to bishops, he is confuted by our former arguments.

¹ In Matt. xvi.

² Decr., part 2, causa 11, quest. 3, cap. 108, 110.

³ Iren., lib. 2, cap. 11, p. 195.

⁴ Ib., p. 191.

⁵ P. 195, n. 25.

And thus far have we demonstrated to princes, who be they to whom Christ hath committed the power of excommunication, that with them they may cause it to remain, and correct the usurpation of prelates, who bereave them of it. Let us next consider what princes may, or should do, after that the sentence of any man's excommunication or reconciliation is given forth by them to whom the power of this discipline pertaineth. The Archbishop of Spalato is of opinion,¹ that not only it is free to princes to communicate with excommunicate persons, but also, that if they shall happen to communicate with them, the church (for the reverence she oweth to princes) should straight absolve them, and that her sentence of excommunication should no longer have any strength. What! Shall the church draw and put up again the spiritual sword at the pleasure of princes? Or because princes will perhaps cast holy things to dogs, must others do so likewise? O prodigious licentiousness, and hellish misorder, worthy to be drowned in the lake of Lethe! But what, then, is the part of the prince, after that the church hath given judgment? Surely, whensoever need is, he ought, by the private judgment of Christian discretion, to try and examine whether this discipline be rightly executed or not. If he find the execution thereof to be unprovable, and that yet the sinner goeth on in his contumacy, then, by his civil power,² he ought further to punish him in his person or worldly estate, that he may either reform or repress such an one as hath not been terrified by the church's censures. But if, after trial, he understand that the sentence given forth is unjust and erroneous, either through the ignorance or the malice of the ecclesiastical and regular judges, then he ought to interpose his authority, and cause a due proceeding; for, in such extraordinary cases of the failing of ecclesiastical persons, princes may do much in things spiritual, which, ordinarily, they cannot.

It remaineth to show who have the power of those censures and punishments which are proper to ecclesiastical persons. Where, first, we are to consider, that there are two sorts of faults which make ecclesiastical men worthy to be punished, viz., either such as

violate sacred, or such as violate civil and human duties: the one is to be judged by ecclesiastical judges alone, and that according to the laws of God and the church; the other by civil judges alone, and that according to the civil and municipal laws of the commonwealth. This latter form, again, is twofold; for either the fault is such, that, though a man be condignly punished for it by the civil magistrate, yet he doth not, therefore, fall from his ecclesiastical office or dignity; of which sort experience sheweth many; or else such as being punished according to their quality and demerit, a man, by necessary consequence, falleth from the ecclesiastical function and dignity which before he had: this was Abiathar's case, and the case of so many as, being justly punished by proscription, incarceration, or banishment, are *secundario et ex consequenti* shut from their bearing office in the church. "If Abiathar had sinned in a sacred matter, the cognition thereof (saith Junius¹) had pertained to the priests; but because he sinned against the commonwealth and the king's majesty, it was necessary to deal with him civilly, and not ecclesiastically. What! Are no ecclesiastical men in this time also thought to be lawfully judged by the civil magistrate, if, at any time, they be found guilty of appaired majesty?" As for the other sorts of faults, whereby (as we have said) sacred and ecclesiastical duties are violated, such as the teaching of false and heretical doctrine, neglecting of discipline, unbecoming and scandalous conversation, &c.; which things (if they be not mended) they who have the execution of ecclesiastical jurisdiction committed to them ought to punish by suspension, deposition, &c. Now, as when one is called to the work of the ministry, his fitness and qualification for that work should be tried and judged by the clergy of the adjacent bounds assembled in their classical presbytery, to whom it also appertaineth (after that he is by them tried and approved, and after that he is elected by the church where he is to serve) to send him out from them with power to exercise the office of a pastor; so when there is just cause of suspending and depriving him, it belongeth to the same presbytery to consider and judge hereof; and, according to his offence, to give judgment against him. For who should recal

¹ Lib. 6, cap. 9.

² Calv., Lib. Epistolar. Lar., col. 169; Gratian, caus. 11, quest. 1, cap. 20.

³ Contr. 4, lib. 1, cap. 20, n. 8.

¹ In 2 Cor., hom. 18.
² Apologet., cap. 39; See Rhenanus' Annotation upon that place, and M. Aut. de Dom. de Rep. Eccl., lib. 5, cap. 12, n. 6, 7.

³ Lib. 3, epist. 14—16, et lib. 5, epist. 12.

⁴ Epist. ad Evagr.

him but they that sent him? Or who should discharge him his ministerial function, except they who ordained him to exercise the same? And who may take the power from him but they who gave the power unto him? That ordination pertaineth to the whole presbytery, and not to the bishop alone, we have showed before; and now, by the same reason, we say suspension and deposition pertaineth to the presbytery also, and are not in the power of the bishop. And that, in the ancient church, as bishops gave not ordination, so neither did they suspend nor depose any man without the common counsel, advice, and concurrence of the presbytery, yea, and sometimes of a synod, it is clear from Cypr. (lib. 1, epist. 9; lib. 3, epist. 2, 10), Council Carthag. 3 (can. 8), Council Carthag. 4 (can. 22, 23), Council African. (can. 20), Council Hispan. 2 (can. 6), Justin. (Novel. 42, cap. 1), Jerome (Comment. ad Isa. 3), Siricius (Epist. ad Ambros. inter Ambros. Epist.). So, touching the suspension and deposition of ministers, the Assembly at Glasgow, anno 1610, ordained that the bishop should associate to himself the ministry of those bounds where the delinquent served, that is, the presbytery whereof he hath been a member, and, together with them, there take trial of the fact, and, upon just cause found, to deprive or suspend: which Act was ratified in the 12th parliament of king James, anno 1612. Nevertheless, if any man think the sentence of the bishop and the presbytery, given forth against him, to be unjust, he ought to have liberty of recourse to the synod, and there to be heard, according as it was decreed by the Fourth Council of Carthage, can. 66. But oftentimes the matter is of such difficulty or importance that the bishop and the presbytery may not give out any peremptory sentence of suspension or deprivation till the matter be brought to the synod of the province,¹ where, according to the ancient order, the matter is to be handled,² not "by the censure of one bishop, but by the judgment of the whole clergy gathered together."

Princes, therefore, may not suffer bishops to usurp the power of suspending and depriving at their pleasure, and whensoever they commit any such tyranny in smiting of

their fellow-servants, it is the part of princes to cause these things to be redressed, and for this end graciously to receive the grievances of oppressed ministers. The Arians of old, being assembled in a council at Antioch, decreed, that if any ecclesiastical person should, without the advice and the letters of the bishops of the province, and chiefly of the metropolitan, go to the emperor to put up any grievance unto him, he should be cast out, not only from the holy communion, but from his proper dignity which he had in the church. Whereupon Osiander hath this observation: "This canon also was composed against holy Athanasius; for Athanasius being expelled by the Arians, had fled to the emperor Constantine the younger, and had from him obtained a return to his own church. Now this canon is very unjust, which forbids that a bishop, or any other minister of the church, being unjustly oppressed, flee to his godly civil magistrate; since it was lawful to the apostle Paul to appeal to the Roman emperor wicked Nero, as the Acts of the Apostles witness. But it may be seen in this place, that bishops were very soon seeking dominion, yea, tyranny over the church, and over their colleges." Besides all this, there is yet another thing which ought to have a very principal consideration in the deposition of a minister, and that is, the consent of the church and congregation where he hath served. Let the magistrate know, saith Gerhard,³ "that as the vocation of ministers pertaineth to the whole church, so to the same also pertaineth the removing of ministers; therefore, as a minister ought not to be obtruded upon an unwilling church, so the hearers, being unwilling and striving against it, a fit minister ought not to be plucked away from them." The deposing of a minister, whom the church loves and willingly hears, Balduine accounteth to be high sacrilege, and holdeth that, as the calling, so the dismissing of ministers pertaineth to the whole church; and so teacheth Junius.⁴ Shortly, as a man is rightly called to the ministerial office and dignity when he is elected by the church and ordained by the presbytery, so is he rightly deposed and put from the same

¹ Can. 11.

² Hist. Ecc., cent. 4, lib. 2, cap. 48, p. 242.

³ Loc. Theol., tom. 6, p. 838.

⁴ De Cas. Consc., lib. 4, cap. 5, cas. 12.

⁵ Ecclesiast., lib. 3, cap. 3.

¹ Fenner, Theol., lib. 7, cap. 7, p. 153.

² Hemmin. Enchir., class. 3, cap. 11, p. 390, 391.

when he is rejected by the church and discharged by the presbytery.

Now there was brought forth in Scotland, anno 1610, a certain amphibian brood, sprung out of the stem of Neronian tyranny, and in manners like to his nearest kinsman, the Spanish Inquisition. It is armed with a transcendent power, and called by the dreadful name of the *High Commission*. Among other things, it arrogateth to itself the power of deposing ministers; but how unjustly, thus it appeareth:

1. If those commissioners have any power at all to depose ministers, they have it from the king, whose commissioners they are: but from him they have it not; therefore they have none at all. The proposition is most certain; for they sit not in that commission to judge in their own name, nor by their own authority, (*quum nihil exercent delegatus nomine proprio*, as Panormitan saith,¹) but by virtue only of the commission and delegation which they have of the king. Yea, bishops themselves exercise not any jurisdiction in the High Commission as bishops, but only as the king's commissioners, as Dr Downname acknowledgeth.² The assumption is grounded upon this reason: The king hath not power to depose ministers; therefore he cannot give this power to others. For *nemo potest plus juris transferre in alium quam sibi competere dignoscatur*,³ the king may sometimes inflict such a civil punishment upon ministers, whereupon, secondarily and accidentally, will follow their falling away from their ecclesiastical office and function (in which sense it is said that Solomon deposed Abiathar, as we heard before), but to depose them directly and formally (which the High Commission usurped to do) he hath no power, and that because this deposition is an act of ecclesiastical jurisdiction; whereas the power of ecclesiastical jurisdiction doth no more agree to the king than the power of ecclesiastical order: his power is civil and temporal, not spiritual and ecclesiastical. Dr Field also confesseth,⁴ that none may judicially degrade, or put any one, lawfully admitted, from his degree and order, but the spiritual guides of the church alone.

2. The deposing of ministers pertaineth

to classical presbyteries, or (if the matter be doubtful and difficult) to synods, as hath been showed. And who, then, can give the High Commission such authority as to take this power from them and assume it unto itself. These commissioners profess that they have authority to discharge other ecclesiastical judicatories within the kingdom from meddling with the judging of anything which they shall think impertinent for them, and which they shall think good to judge and decide by themselves in their commission: which, if it be so, then, when it pleaseth them, they may make other ecclesiastical judicatories to be altogether useless and of no effect in the church.

3. In this commission ecclesiastical and temporal men are joined together, and both armed with the same power; therefore it is not right nor regular, nor in any ways allowable. For even, as when a minister hath offended in a civil matter, his fault is to be judged by civil judges according to the civil laws, and by no other; so, when he offendeth in an ecclesiastical matter, his fault is to be judged only by ecclesiastical persons according to ecclesiastical laws; and, in such case, Justinian forbiddeth civil men to be joined with ecclesiastical men in judgment. They are ecclesiastical things or causes which are handled and examined by the High Commission in the process of deposing ministers; and a shame it is to ecclesiastical men, if they cannot, without the help and joining of temporal men, judge and decide things of this quality.

4. As in the matters to be judged, so in the censures and punishments to be inflicted, ecclesiastical and civil men have, in this commission, alike power and authority; for ecclesiastical men therein have power of fining, confining, warding, &c., common to them with the temporal men; and, again, the temporal men have power of excommunication, suspension, deprivation, &c., common to them with the ecclesiastical men. For they all sit there as the king's commissioners, and *eo nomine*, they exercise this jurisdiction; which commission being alike discharged by them all, it is manifest that both temporal men take hold of the keys and ecclesiastical men take hold of the civil sword. And this monstrous confusion and mixture giveth sufficient demonstration that

¹ Apud Forb. Ireo., lib. 2, cap. 11, p. 177.

² Defens., lib. 1, p. 8.

³ Boufac. VIII., De Regul. Juris, reg. 79.

⁴ Of the Church, lib. 5, cap. 53, p. 682.

¹ Novel. 83, cap. 1.

such a form of judgment is not from the God of order.

Of the abuses and irregularities of the High Commission we may not now speak at greater length, but are hasted to make forward.

CHAPTER IX.

THAT THE LAWFULNESS OF THE CEREMONIES
CANNOT BE WARRANTED BY THE LAW OF
NATURE.

Sect. 1. What our opposites have alleged for the ceremonies, either from the law of God, or the law of man, we have hitherto answered; but we heard the law of nature also alleged¹ for holidays, and for kneeling at the communion. And when Hooker² goeth about to commend and defend such visible signs, "which, being used in performance of holy actions, are undoubtedly most effectual to open such matter, as men, when they know and remember carefully, must needs be a great deal the better informed to what effect such duties serve," he subjoineth: "We must not think but that there is some ground of reason even in nature," &c. This is a smoke to blind the eyes of the unlearned. Our opposites have taken no pains nor travail to make us see any deduction of those ceremonies from the law of nature: we desire proofs, not words. In the meanwhile, for giving further evidence to the truth, we will express our own mind touching things warranted by the law of nature.

Sect. 2. And, first, we must understand aright what is meant by the law of nature: to wit, that law which God writeth and imprinteth in the nature of man,³ so that it is as it were co-natural and born together with man. Now, if we consider what law was written in the nature of man in his first creation, it was no other than the decalogue, or the moral law.⁴ But the law which we are here to inquire of is that law which, after the fall, God still writeth in the heart of every man; which (we all

know) cometh far short, and wanteth much of that which was written in the heart of man before his fall. That we may understand what this law of nature is which is written in all men's hearts since the fall, we must distinguish *jus naturale* from *jus divinum naturale*. For that law which is simply called *jus naturale* is *innatum*, and layeth before the minds of men that way wherein, by the guidance and conduct of nature,¹ they may be led to that good which is, in the end, proportionate to nature; whereas *jus divinum* is *inspiratum*, and layeth before us another way, wherein, by a supernatural guidance,² we may be led to a supernatural good, which is an end exceeding the proportion of nature. As for that part of the law of God which is called *jus divinum naturale*, it is so called in opposition to *jus divinum positivum*.

Sect. 3. *Jus naturale*, saith Justinian,³ *est quod naturo omnia animalia docuit*. This the lawyers take to be the law of nature, which nature, by its sole instinct, teacheth as well to other living creatures as to men; for nature teacheth all living creatures to save and preserve their own being, to decline things hurtful, to seek things necessary for their life, to procreate their like, to care for that which is procreated by them, &c. The Archbishop of Spalato⁴ liketh to speak with the lawyers. *Jus naturale*, saith he, *simpliciter ponitur in omnibus animalibus*. *Videntur autem*, saith Joachinus Mynsingerus,⁵ *juris consulti, valde in hoc abuti vocabulo juris, cum exempla prædicta sint potius affectus et inclinationes naturales, quæ cum quibusque animantibus enascuntur; quas philosophi στροφὰς φύσεως appellant. In brutis enim cum nulla sit ratio, igitur nec ullum jus esse potest*.

Aquinas also sheweth⁶ that beasts are not properly governed by the law of nature, because *lex is aliquid rationis*. Wherefore they err who would make the law of nature to differ in kind from *jus gentium*, which natural reason hath taught to all nations. For this law of nations *per se speciem non facit*, as saith Mynsingerus.⁷ And the law of nature is also, by the hea-

¹ Fr. Irn. de Pol. Mos.

² Id. ibid.

³ Instit., lib. 1, tit. 2.

⁴ De Rep. Ecccl., lib. 6, cap. 2, n. 35.

⁵ Schol. in Instit., lib. 1, tit. 2.

⁶ 1, 2, quest. 91, art. 2.

⁷ Ubi supra.

¹ Supra, cap. 6, sect. 1.

² Eccl. Pol., lib. 4, sect. 1.

³ Zanch., lib. 1, De Lege Dei. Thess., col. 190.

⁴ A. Pol. Synl., lib. 6, cap. 9, col. 49; D. Pau., Explic. Catech., part. 3, quest. 92, p. 503.

then writers, often called *jus gentium*, as Rosinus noteth.¹ If any will needs have the law of nature distinguished from the law of nations, let them either take Aquinas' distinction,² who maketh the law of nature to contain certain principles, having the same place in practical reason which the principles of scientific demonstrations have in speculative reason; and the law of nations to contain certain conclusions drawn from the said principles: or, otherwise, embrace the difference which is put betwixt those laws by Mattheus Wesenbecius:³ *Quæ bestiae naturali concitatione; ea, saith he, homines ex eodem sensu ac affectione, cum moderatione tamen ratione si faciunt, jure naturæ faciunt. Quæ bruta non faciunt, sed sola ratione hominis propria, non affectione communis naturæ, omnes homines faciunt, fierique oportere intelligunt hoc fit jure gentium*.

Sect. 4. For my part, I take the law of nature and the law of nations to be one and the same. For what is the law of nations but that which nature's light and reason hath taught so to all nations? Now this is no other than the law of nature. We think, therefore, they have well said,⁴ who comprehend under the law of nature both the common principles of good and evil, virtue and vice, right and wrong, things be- seeming and things not be- seeming, and likewise the general conclusions which, by necessary consequences, are drawn from the said principles. To come to the particulars, there are three sort of things which the law of nature requireth of man, as both schoolmen⁵ and modern doctors⁶ have rightly taught. The first, it requireth as he is *ens*; the second, as he is *animal*; and the third, as he is *homo ratione præditus*. First, As he is *ens*, the law of nature requireth him to seek the conservation of his own being, and to shun or repel such things as may destroy the same. For so hath nature framed not only all living creatures, but other things also which are without life, that they seek their own conservation, and flee (if they can) from apparent destruction.

Let us take one example out of subtle Scaliger,¹ which is this: If a small quantity of oil be poured upon a sound board, let a burning coal be put in the midst of it, and the oil will quickly flee back from its enemy, and seek the conservation of itself. This is, therefore, the first precept of the law of nature, that man seek his own conservation, and avoid his own destruction. Whereupon this conclusion necessarily followeth, that he may repel violence with violence. Secondly, As man is a living creature, the law of nature teacheth him to propagate and conserve his kind. Whereupon these conclusions do follow, viz., the commixion of male and female, the precreation of children, the educating of them, and providing for them. This nature hath taught to man, as a thing common to him with other living creatures.

Sect. 5. Thirdly, As a man is a creature endowed with reason, the law of nature teacheth him, 1. Something concerning God; 2. Something concerning his neighbour; 3. Something concerning himself. I mean some general notions concerning good and evil, in respect of each of these; whereof the Apostle meaneth whilst he saith that the Gentiles "show the work of the law written in their hearts," Rom. ii. 15. First, then, the law of nature teacheth man to know that there is a God, and that this God is to be worshipped; whereupon it followeth that man should seek to know God and the manner of his worship. Now that which may be known of God is showed even unto the Gentiles. The Apostle saith *signanter, το γνωσθὲν τοῦ θεοῦ*, Rom. i. 19, meaning those few and small sparkles of the knowledge of God which nature's inbred light discovered unto the Gentiles, for making them inexcusable, namely, that there is an eternal power and Godhead, which men ought to reverence and to worship. 2. The law of nature teacheth man to hold fast friendship and amity with his neighbours, forasmuch as he is *animal sociale*. *Violare alterum*, saith Cicero, *naturæ legæ prohibemur*.² For the law of nature biddeth us do to others as we would have others to do unto us, Luke vi. 31. And from these precepts it followeth, that we should not offend other men; that we should keep promises; stand to bargains;

¹ Antiquit. Rom., lib. 8, cap. 1.

² Ubi supra, quest. 95, art. 4.

³ Schol. in Instit., lib. 1, tit. 2.

⁴ Rosin. ubi supra; Syoops. Pur. Theol., disp. 18, thes. 16; Til. Synl., part 1, disp. 35, thes. 16; Jun. de Pol. Mos., cap. 1.

⁵ Aquin. ubi supra, quest. 94, art. 2.

⁶ Zanch. ubi supra, col. 188, 189; Jun. ubi supra; Sharp. Curse Theol. de Lege Dei., p. 299.

¹ De Subtil., exerc. 9, dist. 8.
² Lib. 3, Offic.

give to every man his own, &c. 3. As touching a man's self, the law of nature teacheth him that he should not live as a reasonless creature, but that all his actions should be such as may be congruous and becoming for a creature endued with reason: Whereupon it followeth, that he should live honestly and virtuously, that he should observe order and decency in all his actions, &c. Hence the Apostle saith, that nature itself teacheth that it is a shame for a man to have long hair, 1 Cor. xi. 14, because it is repugnant to that decency and comeliness which the law of nature requireth. For, among other differences which nature hath put betwixt men and women, this is one, that it hath given to women thicker and longer hair than to men, that it might be as a veil, to adorn and cover them. The reason whereof nature hath hid in the complexion of a woman, which is more humid than the complexion of a man; so that, if a man should take him to this womanish ornament, he should but against nature transform himself (in so far) into a woman.

Sect. 6. These things being premittid, I will add four reasons to prove that neither sacred significant ceremonies in general, nor kneeling, holidays, &c., in particular, can be warranted unto us by the law of nature. 1. The law of nature cannot direct us unto a supernatural end, as is acknowledged not only by our divines,¹ but by Aquinas also.² It only teacheth us to seek and to do *bonum, velut finem naturæ*,³ such a good as is an end proportioned to nature. All these precepts of the law of nature which we have spoken of could never lead men to a supernatural good. It is only the divine law,⁴ revealed from God, which informeth the minds of men with such notions as are *supra naturam*, and which may guide them *ad finem supernaturalem*. But all sacred significant ceremonies which, by their holy and spiritual significations, express to us some mysteries of grace, and of the kingdom of God, must be thought to direct us unto a supernatural good; therefore they are not of that sort of things which the law of nature requireth; for this law goeth no higher than

to teach men that there is a God, and that this God is to be worshipped, the knowledge of which things is not a good exceeding the proportion of nature: for it was found in the Gentiles themselves, who knew no other spiritual and supernatural good than that which was proportioned to nature. Let me now conclude this reason with Scalliger's words, *Neque enim quæ supra naturæ leges sunt, ex naturæ legibus judicanda censentur*.⁵

Sect. 7. 2. As the ceremonies, by their sacred, spiritual, and mystical significations, direct us unto a supernatural good, so they are thought to guide us unto the same by a way which nature's light could never discover unto men. But, in the law of nature, as we are directed unto no other good than such as is proportioned to nature, so are we guided unto the same *natura duce*,² that is to say, by such common notions as God hath imprinted in the nature of all men. Now, I suppose our opposites will not unwillingly reckon their sacred significant ceremonies among those things of the Spirit of God which a natural man cannot receive, because they are spiritually discerned, 1 Cor. ii. 14. What then have they to do with the law of nature? If it be said, that they necessarily follow upon those first principles and conclusions which a natural man receiveth, I answer; This shall never be proved. They will say, perhaps, that nature teacheth us to use certain rites in the worship of God, to observe set times for his worship, also to kneel down in reverence of God whom we worship. Ans. Be it so: but how make they up a necessary connection betwixt certain rites and significant ceremonies of human institution; betwixt set times, and some mere days than one of seven; betwixt kneeling in the worship of God in *genere*, and kneeling at the sacrament in *specie*, unless they say that nature requireth us to kneel in every act of worship, and never to worship God without kneeling on our knees?

Sect. 8. 3. *Jus naturæ* is *ubique idem*, as Rosinus:³ it is approved *communi omnium gentium judicio atque assensu*, as the Professors of Leyden:⁴ it is one and the same among all nations, in respect of the principles of it, as Aquinas⁵ and Zanchius:⁶

- ¹ De Subtil., exerc. 77, dict. 2.
- ² Jun. ubi supra.
- ³ Ubi supra.
- ⁴ Disp. 18, thes. 26.
- ⁵ Ia., 2æ., quest. 94, art. 4.
- ⁶ Ubi supra., thes. 9.

the law of nature *fixa est cordibus nostris*, as Stella:¹ yea, it is "so written in our hearts that iniquity itself cannot blot it out," as Augustine saith;² and we learn from the Apostle, that the law of nature is manifest in the Gentiles, for God hath showed it unto them, Rom. i. 19; therefore there is none ignorant, saith Pareus.³ Whatsoever, then, the law of nature requireth, it doth clearly and necessarily follow upon those principles which are written in every man's conscience, unless we set up new divinity, and either say that the principles of the law of nature are not written in every man's conscience, or else that they may be at some time abolished and rased out of the consciences of men; which were to leave men without a witness. Nay, saith Augustine,⁴ the heaven and the earth, and all that is in them, on every side, cease not to bid all men love God, that they be made inexcusable. Now if all the principles of the law of nature be firmly and clearly written in every man's conscience, and cannot but be known to every man who has the use of natural judgment and reason, it followeth, that they who will prove or warrant anything by the law of nature, must only take their premises from every man's conscience, and say, as the Apostle saith, "Judge in yourselves," &c., "doth not even nature itself teach you," &c., 1 Cor. xi. 13, 14; as if the Apostle said, This principle of nature is fixed in all your hearts, that men should affect honesty and comeliness. Go to reason in yourselves, from the judgment of nature, whether it follow not, upon this principle, that a man should not wear long hair, forasmuch as his wearing of long hair is repugnant to the principle of nature. *Committit ipsis judicium*, saith Pareus; *ipsos testes, imo iudices appellat*;⁵ so that, if the ceremonies be warranted unto us by the law of nature, the judgment must be committed to every man's conscience, and so should every man be convinced in himself, by such a principle of nature, from which the ceremonies have a necessary and manifest deduction. Yet we attest the Searcher of all hearts, that we have never been convinced in ourselves, by such a prin-

ciple of nature, no, not after diligent search and inquiry.

Sect. 9. 4. Let our opposites say to us, once for all, upon what precept of the law of nature do they ground the ceremonies; for I have before opened up all sorts of things which the law of nature requireth of man as he is *ens*; and as he is *animal* belongeth not to our purpose. As for that which it requireth of him as he is a creature endued with reason, there is one part of it that concerneth ourselves, viz., that we should live honestly, and *secundum modum rationis*, that we should observe order and decency in all our actions. This order and decency do not respect our holy duties to God, nor comprehend any sacred ceremony in his worship; but they look to usward, and are referred only to such be-seeing qualities as are congruous and convenient to a reasonable nature in all its actions. Yea, even generally, we may say with Scalliger,¹ *Ordinem dico sine quo natura constare non potest. Nihil enim absque ordine vel modum tata est vel efficit illa*. Another part of that which nature requireth of man, as he is a creature endued with reason, concerneth (as we showed) our neighbours, whom it teacheth us not to harm nor offend, &c. And if our opposites would reckon with us here, their ceremonies will appear repugnant to nature, because of the detriment and offence which they offer unto us, whereof we have spoken in our argument of scandal. But there was a third part, concerning God and his worship; and here must our opposites seek a warrant for the ceremonies. Now, albeit nature (as was said) teaches all men that there is an eternal and mighty God, who should be worshipped and honoured by them, yet it descendeth not unto such particular precepts as can have any show of making aught for significant ceremonies. *Omnibus enim innatum est et in animo quasi insculptum, esse deos*; but yet *quales sint*, saith Cicero, *varium est*.² And as nature hath not taught men to know the nature and attributes of the Godhead, together with the sacred Trinity of persons in the same; so neither hath it taught what sort or manner of worship should be given unto God. *Lex naturalis rerum communium est*,³ and doth only

- ¹ Ia. Luke vi. 31.
- ² Lib. 2, Confess., cap. 4.
- ³ Com. in illum locum.
- ⁴ Lib. 10, Confess., cap. 6.
- ⁵ Com. in illum locum.

- ¹ De Subtil., exerc. 2.
- ² Lib. 2, de Nat. Deor.
- ³ Jun. ubi supra.

- ¹ Par. Com. in illum locum.
- ² Jun. de Pol. Mos. cap. 1; Par. Com. in Rom. i. 19.
- ³ Ia., 2æ., quest. 91, art. 4.
- ⁴ Jun., ubi supra.
- ⁵ Jun., ibid.

inform us with those common notions called *vox et error*. Concerning the worship of God, it speaks only *de genere*, not *de specie*: wherefore there can be no inference from that worship which the law of nature

requireth, either of any distinct kind of worship or of any ceremony in that kind, no more than it followeth, *Si est animal, est Asinus*; for *a genere ad speciem non valet consequentia affirmando*.

THE FOURTH PART.

AGAINST THE INDIFFERENCY OF THE CEREMONIES.

CHAPTER I.

OF OUR OPPOSITES' PLEADING FOR THE INDIFFERENCY OF THE CEREMONIES.

IF it seem to any that it is a strange method to speak now of indifferency, in the end of this dispute, which ought rather to have been handled in the beginning of it, they may consider, that the method is not ours, but our opposites'; for they have been fleeing upon Icarus' wings, and soaring so high that their wings could not but melt from them: so have they, from necessity fallen down to expediency; from it to lawfulness; and from thence to indifferency.

I knew certain of them, who, after reasoning about the ceremonies with some of our side, required, in the end, no more but that they would only acknowledge the indifferency of the things in themselves. And so being wooed and solicitously importuned by our former arguments against the ceremonies, they take them to the weaving of Penelope's web, thereby to suspend us, and to gain time against us: this indifferency, I mean, which they shall never make out, and which themselves, otherwhiles, unweave again. Always, so long as they think to get any place for higher notions about the ceremonies, they speak not so meanly of them as of things indifferent; but when all their forces of arguments and answers are spent in vain, then are our ears filled with uncouth outcries and declamations, which tend to make themselves appear blameless for receiving, and us blameworthy for refusing matters of rite and indifferency.

Upon this string they harp ever and over

again, in books, in sermons, in private discourses. Mr G. Powell (in his book *De Adiaphoris*), and Tilen (in the 12th and 17th chapters of his *Parænesis*), condemn those who make sought ado about the controverted English ceremonies, for so much as they are things indifferent. Paybody, in his Apology for kneeling at the communion, standeth much upon the indifferency of this gesture, both in every worship of God, and in that sacrament namely. The Archbishop of St. Andrews, in his sermon at Perth Assembly, because he could not prove this indifferency, he chose to suppose it. "Of the indifferency of these articles (saith he) I think there is little or no question amongst us." Whether he spake this of ignorance or of policy, I leave it to be guessed at. Howsoever, if we should thus compose our controversy about the ceremonies, embrace them, and practise them, so being that they be only called things indifferent, this were to cure our church, as L. Sylla cured his country, *durioribus remediis quam pericula erant*, saith Seneca.¹ Wherefore we will debate this question of indifferency also.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE NATURE OF THINGS INDIFFERENT.

Sect. 1. To say nothing here of the homonymy of the word *indifferent*, but to take it in that signification which concerneth our present purpose, it signifieth such a mean

betwixt good and evil in human actions, as is slike distant from both these extremes, and yet susceptible of either of them. *Indifferens*, saith Calepin, is that *quod sua natura neque bonum est neque malum*. Aquinas¹ calleth that an indifferent action which is neither good nor evil. *Rem indifferentem voco quæ neque bona neque mala in se est*, saith a later writer.²

But Dr Forbesse³ liketh to speak in another language. He will have that which is indifferent to be opposed to that which is necessary; and a thing indifferent he taketh to be such a thing as is neither necessarily to be done, nor yet necessarily to be omitted, in respect of any necessity of the commandment of God; or such a thing as is neither remunerable with eternal life, and commendeth a man unto the reward of God, nor yet is punishable with eternal death, and polluteth a man with guiltiness. Now, because he knew that divines define a thing indifferent to be that which is neither good nor evil, he therefore distinguisheth a twofold goodness of an individual action.⁴ The one he calleth *bonitas generalis, concomitans, et sine qua non*; by which goodness is meant the doing of an action in faith, and the doing of it for the right end, as he expoundeth himself. This goodness, he saith, is necessary to every human action, and hindereth not an action to be indifferent. The other he calleth *bonitas specialis, causans, et propter quam*. This goodness he calleth legal, and saith that it maketh an action necessary; in which respect indifferent actions are not good, but those only which God in his law hath commanded, and which are remunerable with eternal life.

Sect. 2. But that we may have the vanity of these quiddities discovered to us, let us only consider how falsely he supposeth that there are some things which we do neither laudably nor culpably, and for which we shall neither be rewarded (it is his own phrase which I use) nor yet punished by God. I thought we had learned from Scripture that we must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ, to give an account of every word which we speak, and of every deed which we do in the flesh, and accordingly to receive either a reward or a punish-

ment. What! Could the Doctor say that these good actions which he calleth indifferent, and of which he saith that they are done in faith, and for the right end, are not laudable nor remunerable? Nay, but he saith that the general goodness which accompanieth the action is remunerable, because it is necessary; but the action itself is not necessary, because that general goodness may be had as well in the omission of it, or in the doing of the contrary, as in the doing of it, whereupon he would have it to follow that the action itself is not remunerable.

Ans. 1. The Doctor had done well to have remembered that he is speaking only of individual actions, and that *actus induatur à circumstantiis et adjecto modo*, so that whilst all that he saith turneth to this, that one action considered in itself, without the circumstances and concomitant goodness, is not remunerable, he maketh not out his point; for he saith no more in effect, but that *actus quo ad speciem* is not remunerable, which none of us denieth.

2. An individual good action of that kind which the Doctor calleth necessary, is no otherwise remunerable and laudable than an individual good action of that kind which he calleth indifferent; for example, when I go to hear God's word upon the Lord's day, let this action of mine be considered *quo ad individuum*, is it any otherwise remunerable than in respect of the goodness which accompanieth it? Whence it is that the hearing of hypocrites, not being accompanied with such goodness, is not remunerable, yet the hearing of the word is an action necessary, because commanded? Now may we know wherein standeth the difference betwixt the remunerable good of this action of hearing, and remunerable good of one of those actions which the Doctor calleth indifferent; for example, a woman's action of marrying.

I perceive what the Doctor would answer; for he saith,⁵ if a woman marry in the Lord, this action is good *respectu adjecti modi, quamvis in se sit media et libera, etiam quo ad individuum*, implying that if, on the other part, an individual action be necessary (as for example the action of hearing the word), then it is in itself good, *etiam quo ad individuum*.

But, I reply, what means he by these

¹ 1, 2æ., quest. 18, art. 9.

² Bald. de Cas. Cons., lib. 2, cap. 9, cas. 9.

³ Iren., lib. 1, cap. 13, sect. 7.

⁴ Ibid., sect. 10.

⁵ Ubi supra.

⁶ Ubi supra., ap. 13, sect. 7.

¹ De Benef., lib. 5, cap. 16.

words, *in se*? Means he the individual nature of the action? Nay; then the sense shall be no other than this, *quo ad individuum, etiam quo ad individuum*. And, besides, the Doctor cannot define to us any other nature in an individual thing than the nature of the species or kind.

Is it not holden *individuum non posse definiri, nisi definitione speciei*?¹ Sure a perfect definition, expressing the nature of the thing defined, cannot be given to any individual thing other than the definition of the species; needs, therefore, must the Doctor, by *in se*, understand the specific nature; and, indeed, when divines speak of things indifferent, *in se, per se, or sua natura*, they mean only things indifferent *quo ad speciem*. Yet thus also the Doctor hath said nonsense; for so we should take his words, *quavis quoad speciem sit media et libera, etiam quo ad individuum*.

Sect. 3. But to let his manner of speaking pass, we will consider what he would or could have said. There is no difference which can here be imagined except this: That the individual action of hearing the word (when one heareth aright) is good and remunerable in a double respect, namely, because it is both good in itself, or *quo ad speciem*, and likewise *respectu adjecti modi*; whereas a woman's action of marrying (when she marrieth in the Lord) is only good and remunerable in the last respect, namely, *respectu modi*; for, *in se, or, quo ad speciem*, it hath no remunerable goodness in it.

Ans. What do we hear of any difference betwixt these actions *quo ad speciem*? That which we crave is, that a difference may be showed betwixt the remunerable goodness of the one and of the other, both being considered *quo ad individuum*.

That whereby the Doctor either was deceived, or would deceive, appeareth to be this: That he taketh everything which agreeth to an individual thing to agree to it *quo ad individuum*, as if to speak of *Poter quatenus est homo*, and to speak of him *quatenus est individuum signatum*, or *res singularis sub specie hominis*, were all one thing. Even so, to say of my individual action of hearing the word, that it is necessary

because of the commandment of God (and in that respect remunerable), is not to speak of it *quo ad individuum*, but as the specific nature of that action of hearing the word (which God hath commanded) is found in it; for if we speak of this individual action, *quo ad individuum*, we cannot consider it otherwise than *respectu adjecti modi*, because, in moral actions, *modus adjectus* is *principium individuationis*, and nothing else doth individualise a moral action.

Sect. 4. Thus shall my position stand good, namely, that those individual actions which the Doctor calleth necessary, because their species is commanded of God, and those individual actions which he calleth indifferent, because their species is not commanded, both being considered *quo ad individuum*, the former hath no other remunerable good in them than the latter, and the whole remunerable good which is in either of them standeth only in *objecto modo*; which being so, it is all one when we speak of any individual moral action *quo ad individuum*, whether we say that it is good, or that it is remunerable and laudable, both are one. For, as is well said by Aquinas,¹ *Necessarium est omnem actum hominis, ut bonum vel malum, culpabilis vel laudabilis rationem habere*. And again: *Nihil enim est aliud laudari vel culpam, quam imputari alicui malitiam vel bonitatem sui actus*; wherefore that distinction of a twofold goodness, *causans* and *concomitans*, which the Doctor hath given us, hath no use in this question, because every action is laudable and remunerable which is morally good, whether it be necessary or not. Now moral goodness, saith Scalliger,² *est perfectio actus cum recta ratione*. Human moral actions are called good or evil, *in ordine ad rationem, quæ est proprium principium humanorum actuum*, saith Aquinas,³ thereupon inferring that *illis mores dicuntur boni, qui rationi congruunt; mali autem, qui a ratione discordant*. Dr Forbess doth therefore pervert the question whilst he saith,⁴ *in hac cum fratribus questione, hoc bonum est quod necessarium*. Nay, those actions we call morally good which are agreeable to right reason, whether they be necessary or not. Since, then, those actions are laudable and remunerable which

¹ Aquinas 1, 2, quest. 21, art. 2.

² De Subtil., exerc. 307, diet. 27.

³ Ia., 2æ, quest. 100, art. 1.

⁴ Ubi supra., cap. 13, sect. 7.

are morally good, and those are morally good which are agreeable to right reason, it followeth, that forasmuch as those actions which the Doctor calleth indifferent, are agreeable to right reason, they are, therefore, not only morally good, but also laudable and remunerable, and so not indifferent. Yea, those actions which he calleth necessary, being considered *quo ad individuum*, are no otherwise laudable and remunerable than those which he calleth indifferent, being considered in like manner *quo ad individuum*, as hath been showed.

Sect. 5. And besides all this, we have somewhat more to say of the Doctor's speculation about the nature of things indifferent.

For, 1. The Doctor maketh that which is indifferent to be opposed to that which is necessary, and yet he maketh both these to be morally good. Now albeit in natural things one good is opposed to another good, as that which is hot to that which is cold, yet *bonum bona non contrariatur in moralibus*.¹ The reason of the difference is, because *bonitas physica, or relativa est congruentia nature quædam*, saith Scalliger;² and because two natures may be contrary one to another, therefore the good which is congruous to the one may be contrary to the good which is congruous to the other; but *bonum virtutis*, saith Aquinas,³ *non accipitur nisi per convenientiam ad aliquid unum, scilicet rationem*; so that it is impossible for one moral good to be opposed to another.

2. Since divines take a thing indifferent to be *medium inter bonum et malum morale*; and since (as the very notation of the word sheweth) it is such a means as cometh not nearer to the one extreme than to the other, but is alike distant from both, how comes it that the Doctor so far departeth both from the tenet of divines and from the notation of the word, as to call some such actions indifferent as have a moral remunerable goodness, and yet not evil in them? or where learned he such a dialect as giveth to some good things the name of the things indifferent?

3. Why doth he also waver from himself; for he citeth⁴ out of the Helvetic Confessor Jerome's definition of a thing in-

different, and approveth it. *Indifferens, saith he, illud est quod nec bonum nec malum est, ut sive feceris sive non feceris, nec justitiam habes nec injustitiam*. Behold the goodness which is excluded from the nature of a thing indifferent is not only necessity but righteousness also, yet hath the Doctor excluded only the good of necessity from things indifferent, making the other good of righteousness to stand with them; for things which are done in faith, and done for the right end (such as he acknowledgeth these things to be which he calleth indifferent), have righteousness in them, as all men know.

CHAPTER III.

WHETHER THERE BE ANYTHING INDIFFERENT IN ACTU EXERCITO.

Sect. 1. For our better light in this question I will premit these considerations, 1. When we measure the goodness or the badness of a human action, we must not only measure it by the object and the end, but by all the circumstances which accompany it. Fed. Morellus,¹ upon those words of Seneca, *Refert quid, cui, quando, quare, ubi, &c.*, saith, that without those circumstances of things, persons, times, places, *facti ratio non constat*. Circumstances sometimes constitute *rerum earum quæ aguntur speciem*, say our divines,² meaning that circumstances do make an action good or bad. *Humani actus*, say the schoolmen,³ *non solum ex objectis, verum ex circumstantiis boni vel mali esse dicuntur*. It is not every man's part, saith one of our opposites,⁴ to judge *de circumstantia, quæ reddit actionem vel bonam vel malam*. "Some circumstances, saith another of them,⁵ are intrinsical and essential to actions, and specially making up their nature." The principal circumstances which here we speak of, are comprehended in this versicle:—

Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur quomodo, quando.

The first circumstance which maketh an action good or bad is *quis*, which design-

¹ Sebol. in lib. 2, de Benif.

² Jun. de Pol. Mos., cap. 5.

³ Aquin. 1, 2, quest. 18, art. 3.

⁴ Camer. Præf., tom. 2, p. 49.

⁵ Dr Burges of the Law. of Kneel., cap. 1.

¹ Aquin. 1, 2, quest. 31, art. 8.

² Ubi supra.

³ Ubi supra.

⁴ Ubi supra., lib. 2, cap. 5, num. 1.

¹ Questio, quid est; de quolibet Individuo contento sub specie, non petit quidditatem ejus singularem, sed communem totius speciei, saith P. Fonseca, Com. in Metaph. Arist., lib. 7, cap. 15, quest. unic., sect. 2.

eth the person: If a magistrate put to death a malefactor, the action is good; but if a private person put him to death, it is evil.

The second is *quid*, which noteth the quality or condition of the object: If a man take *sua*, the action is good; if *aliena*, it is evil.

The third is *ubi*: If men banquet in their own houses, the action is good; if in the church, it is evil.

The fourth is *quibus auxiliis*: If men seek health by lawful means, the action is good; if by the devil, or his instruments, it is evil.

The fifth is *cur*: If I rebuke my brother for his fault, out of my love to him, and desire to reclaim him, the action is good; if out of hatred and spleen, the action is evil.

The sixth is *quomodo*: For he who doth the work of the Lord carefully doth well; but he who doth it negligently doth evil.

The seventh is *quando*: To do servile work upon the six days of labour, is good; but to do it upon the Lord's Sabbath, is evil.

2. There is another consideration which followeth upon the former; and it is this: The goodness or badness of a human action may be considered two ways, viz., either in *actu signato*, and *quo ad speciem*; or in *actu exercito*, and *quo ad individuum*; for an action is said to be specified by its object, and individuated by its circumstances; so that, when an action is good or evil in respect of the object of it, then it is called good or evil *quo ad speciem*: when it is good or evil in respect of the circumstances of it, then it is said to be good or evil *quo ad individuum*.

3. Human actions, whether considered *quo ad speciem*, or *quo ad individuum*, are either such as proceed from the deliberation of reason, or from bare imagination only. To this latter kind we refer such actions as are done through incogitancy, while the mind is taken up with other thoughts; for example, to scratch the head, to handle the beard, to move the foot, &c.; which sort of things proceed only from a certain stirring or fleeting of the imagination.

4. Let it be remembered, that those things we call morally good, which agree to right reason; those morally evil which disagree from right reason; and those in-

different which include nothing belonging to the order of reason, and so are neither consonant unto nor dissonant from the same.

5. When we speak of the indifferency of an individual action, it may be conceived two ways: either *absolute et sine respectu ad aliud*; or *comparate et cum respectu ad aliud*. In the free-will offerings, if so be a man offered according as God had blessed and prospered his estate, it was indifferent to offer either a bullock, or a sheep, or a goat; but if he chose to offer any of them, his action of offering could not be indifferent, but either good or evil. When we speak of the indifferency of an action *comparate*, the sense is only this, that it is neither better nor worse than another action, and that there is no reason to make us choose to do it more than another thing; but when we speak of the indifferency of an action considered absolutely and by itself, the simple meaning is, whether it be either good or evil, and whether the doing of the same must needs be either sin or evil doing.

6. Every thing which is indifferent in the nature of it, is not by and by indifferent in the use of it. But the use of a thing indifferent ought evermore to be either chosen or refused, followed or forsaken, according to these three rules delivered to us in God's word: 1. The rule of piety; 2. The rule of charity; 3. The rule of purity.

The first of these rules we find, 1 Cor. x. 31, "Whether, therefore, ye eat or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God;" and Rom. xiv. 7, 8, "For none of us liveth to himself, and no man dieth to himself. For whether we live, we live unto the Lord, and whether we die, we die unto the Lord:" where the Apostle, as Calvin noteth,¹ reasoneth from the whole to the part. Our whole life, and, by consequence, all the particular actions of it, ought to be referred to God's glory, and ordered according to his will. Again, Col. iii. 17, "And whatsoever ye do, in word or deed, do all in the name of the Lord Jesus." In the expounding of which words Dr Davenant saith well, that *Etiam ille actiones quæ sunt sua natura adiaphoræ, debent tamen à Christianis fieri in nomine Christi, hoc est, juxta voluntatem Christi, et ad gloriam Christi.*

¹ Com. in illum locum.

The second rule is the rule of charity; which teacheth us not to use anything indifferent when scandal riseth out of it: Rom. xiv. 21, "It is good neither to eat flesh, nor to drink wine, nor anything whereby thy brother stumbleth, or is offended, or is made weak;" yea, though it do not weaken, if it be not expedient for edifying our brother, be it never so lawful or indifferent in its own nature, the law of charity bindeth us to abstain from it: Rom. xiv. 19, "Let us therefore follow after the things which make for peace, and the things wherewith one may edify another;" Rom. xv. 2, "Let every one of us please his neighbour for his good to edification;" 1 Cor. x. 23, "All things are lawful for me, but all things are not expedient: all things are lawful for me, but all things edify not:" where the Apostle teacheth, that in *cibo*, &c.,¹ "In meat, drink, and the whole kind of things indifferent, it is not enough to look whether they be lawful, but that, farther, we are to look whether to do or omit the same be expedient, and may edify." The Bishop of Winchester, preaching upon John xvi. 7, "I tell you the truth: it is expedient for you that I go away," &c., marketh, that Christ would not go away without acquainting his disciples with the reason of it; and that reason was, because it was for their good: whereupon he inferreth, 1. That we should avoid Hophni's *non vult enim*, and make our *vult* our *enim*, 1 Sam. ii. 15; that is, that we should not give our will for a reason, but a reason for our will; 2. That we should not, with the Corinthians, stand upon *licet*,—it is lawful, but frame our rule by *expedit*,—it is expedient, 1 Cor. vi. 13; x. 23; 3. That our rule should not be Caiaphas' *expedit nobis*, but Christ's *expedit vobis*,—for you it is good, you, the disciples, John xi. 50; and make that the rule of our going out and our coming in. The heathens themselves could say that we are born, partly for God, partly for our country, partly for our friends, &c. How much more ought Christians to understand that we are not born for ourselves, but for Christ and his church. And as in the whole course of our life, so especially in the policy of the church, we may do nothing (be it never so indifferent in itself) which is not profitable for edification: 1 Cor. xiii. 26, "Let all things be done to edifying."

¹ Pareus Com. in illum locum.

From which precept Pareus inferreth, that nothing ought to be done in the church which doth not manifestly make for the utility of all and every one; and that therefore not only unknown tongues, but cold ceremonies and idle gestures should be exploded out of the church.

The third rule is the rule of purity, which respecteth our peace and plerophory of conscience, without which anything is unclean to us, though it be clean and lawful in its own nature: Rom. xiv. 14, "To him that esteemeth anything to be unclean, to him it is unclean;" therefore *si quis aliquam in cibo immunditiam imagineter, eo libere uti non potest*.¹ Whatsoever indifferent thing a man in his conscience judgeth to be unlawful, he may not lawfully do it: Rom. xiv. 5, "Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind;" and verse 23, "He that doubteth is damned if he eat, because he eateth not of faith; for whatsoever is not of faith is sin." *Nefas est omnino*, saith Calvin,² *quipiam aggredi quod putes illi (domino) displicere, imo quod non persuasus sis illi placere*. Now if a thing indifferent be used according to these three rules, the use of it is not only lawful but expedient also; but if it be not used according to these rules, the use of it is altogether unlawful.

Sect. 3. And since a thing indifferent in the nature of it can never be lawfully used, except according to these rules, hence it followeth, that the use of a thing indifferent is never lawful to us when we have no other warrant for using the same beside our own will and arbitrement.

Dr Forbese speaks unadvisedly whilst he saith,³ *Evenit nonnunquam*, &c.: "It falleth out sometimes that that which was expedient for thee to do yesterday, and to omit this day, thou mayest, notwithstanding, afterward either do it, or not do it, according to thy arbitrement." As if, forsooth, our using of things indifferent should not evermore be determined by the rule of expediency which God's word giveth us, but sometimes by our own will. Dr Davenant⁴ could not dream that any, except the ignorant common people, could be of this opinion which Dr Forbese holdeth. *Fallitur vulgus*, saith he, *dum judicat licere*

¹ Calv. Com. in illum locum.

² Jo Rom. xiv. 7, 8.

³ Iron., lib. 1, cap. 12, sect. 18.

⁴ Expos. in Col. iii. 17.

sibi, uti victu, vestitu, sermone, aut quacunque re adiaphora pro arbitrio suo; nam hæc omnia ad regulam adhibenda sunt.

Moreover, as we may not use any indifferent thing at our own pleasure; so neither may the church, at her will and pleasure, command the use of it: but as our practice, so the church's injunction must be determined and squared according to the former rules. And if any man think that, in the using of things indifferent, he may be led and ruled by the church's determination, without examining any further, let him understand that the church's determination is but a subordinate rule, or a rule ruled by higher rules.

Dr Forbesse, perceiving how these rules of Scripture may subvert his cause, desireth to subject them to the church's determination, and to make it our highest rule. *Jam autem, saith he, in talium rerum usu, id edificat, quod pacificum; illud est pacificum quod est ordinatum; is autem decens ordo est in ecclesia ab ipso Christo constitutus, ut in talibus non suo quisque se gerat arbitratu, sed audiat ecclesiam, et exhibeatur prepositis obedientia.*

He hath been speaking of the rules which God's word giveth us concerning the use of things indifferent; and all of them he comprehendeth under this rule, that we should hear the church, and obey them who are set over us, as if God's rules were subordinated to men's rules, and not theirs to his. We say not that every man may use things indifferent *sua arbitratu*, but we say withal, that neither may the church command the use of things indifferent *suo arbitratu*. Both she in commanding and we in obeying must be guided by the rules of Scripture.

They who are set over us in the church have no power given them of Christ which is not for edifying, Eph. iv. 12. The counsel of the apostles and elders at Jerusalem (which is a lively pattern of a lawful synod to the world's end) professed they would lay no other burden upon the disciples except such things as the law of charity made necessary for shunning of scandal, Acts xv. 28; and so that which they decreed had force and strength to bind *a charitate propter scandalum*, saith Sanctius;² but *suo arbitratu* they enjoined nothing. Cartwright saith, "It appeareth by this place that there may be no

abridgement of liberty simply decreed, but in regard of circumstance, according to the rule of edification."¹ And if the church's decrees and canons be not according to the rules of the word; yet, forasmuch as every one of us shall give account of himself and his own deeds, we must look that whatsoever the church decree, yet our practice, in the use or omission of a thing indifferent, be according to the foresaid rules.

We may not, for the commandment of men, transgress the rule of piety, by doing anything which is not for God's glory, and ordered according to his will; neither ought any of us to obey men, except "for the Lord's sake," 1 Pet. ii. 13, and "as the servants of Christ, doing the will of God," Eph. vi. 6; which teacheth us the manner how we ought to obey men, namely, *propter Christum et sicut Christus præcipit*;³ for if we should know no more but the will of man for that which we do, then we should be the "servants of men," not the servants of Christ. Neither yet may we for any human ordinance break the rule of charity; "But whatsoever either would weaken, or not edify our brother, be it never so lawful, never so profitable to ourselves, never so powerfully by earthly authority enjoined, Christians, who are not born unto themselves, but unto Christ, unto his church, and unto the fellow-members, must not dare to meddle with it."⁴

Nor, lastly, may we obey men, so as to break the law of purity, and "perform any action with a doubtful conscience; that is, whereof either the world hath not,⁵ nor we out of it have no warrant, in which case tender consciences must be tendered rather than be racked by authority, for be the things in themselves never so lawful, &c., they are utterly unlawful to me without such information." Whereas, therefore, some say, that in the use of matters indifferent, the laws of those who are set over us ought to rule us; we still answer that our practice may not be ruled by any law of man, except it be according to the rules of the word, whereof one is this, *Tantum oportere esse obedientie studium in Christianis, ut nihil agant, quod non existiment vel potius certi sint placere Deo.*

¹ Annot. on Acts xv., sect. 10.

² Zanch. in Eph. vi. 5, 6.

³ Taylor on Tit. i. 15, p. 295.

⁴ Id. Ibid., p. 289.

⁵ Cal. in Rom. iv. 5.

Sect. 4. These considerations being permitted, for resolution of the question in hand, we say, 1. As touching these actions which proceed from bare imagination, whether they be evil and inordinate *quo ad speciem*, forasmuch as the imagination from which they have their original doth not in those actions subject itself to the conduct and moderation of reason, but is like Gehazi, running away without his master's leave, let the learned give their judgment. Howsoever, it cannot be denied, that such actions may be and are of a civil *quo ad individuum*,¹ or in respect of the circumstances, which show forth in them reprobable temerity, incogitancy, levity, and indecency. But such actions belong not to our purpose. 2. As for those actions which proceed from the deliberation of reason, howbeit many of them be indifferent, *quo ad speciem*, yet none of them are, nor can be indifferent, *quo ad individuum*. The reason of this difference and distinction is, because every action hath its species or kind,² from the object, and a human moral action hath its species or kind from the object referred to the original of human actions, which is reason. Whereupon it cometh, that if the object of the action include something that agreeth to the order of reason, it shall be a good action, according to its kind; for example, to give alms to an indigent man. But if it include something that is repugnant to the order of reason, it shall be an evil action according to its kind; as to steal or take away another man's goods. Now sometimes it happeneth that the object of an action doth not include something that belongeth to the order of reason; as to lift a straw from the ground, to go to the field, &c., such actions are indifferent, according to their kind. But we must pronounce far otherwise of them when we speak of them *quo ad individuum*, because as they are individuated by their circumstances, so in their individual being, they have their goodness or badness from the same circumstances, as hath been showed. So that no such action as is deliberated upon can be indifferent, *quo ad individuum*; because *oportet* (saith Thomas³) *quod quilibet individualis actus habeat aliquam circumstantiam, per quam trahetur ad bonum vel malum, ad minus ex parte intentionis finis.*

Friar Ambrosius Catarinus, following the doctrine of Thomas, maintained in the Council of Trent,⁴ that to do good was a work, the concurrences of all circumstances is necessary, but the want of one only is sufficient for an evil, so that howsoever among the works considered in general, some are indifferent, yet in the singular there is no medium between having all the circumstances and wanting some; therefore every particular action is good or evil; and because among the circumstances the end is one, all works referred to a bad end are infected. He further alleged St. Augustine, that it is sin not only to refer the action to a bad end, but also not to refer it to a good end. Thus spake the learned friar very appositely; and the same is the judgment of our own divines. *De his rebus indifferentibus* (saith Martyr⁵) *statuendum est, quod tantummodo ex genere atque natura sua indifferentiam habeant, sed quando ad electionem descenditur nihil est indifferens*; and so saith Pareus likewise.⁶

Sect. 5. These things are so plain and undeniable, that Dr Forbesse⁷ himself acknowledged no less than that every individual human action is either good or bad morally; and that there is a goodness which is necessary to every action, namely, the referring of it to the last end, and the doing of it in faith; which goodness, if it be wanting, the action is evil. Notwithstanding, he will have some actions, even *quo ad individuum*, called indifferent, for this respect, because they are neither commanded of God, and so necessary to be done, nor yet forbidden, and so necessary to be omitted.

Of an individual action of this kind, he saith: *Manet homini respectu istius actus plena arbitrii libertas moralis; tum quæ exercitii seu contradictionis dicitur, tum etiam ea quæ specificationis seu contrarietatis libertas appellatur.* He holdeth, that though such an action be done in faith, and for the right end (which general goodness, he saith, is necessary to the action, and commendeth a man to God), yet the action itself is indifferent, because it is not necessary; for a man hath liberty to omit the same, or to do another thing; which he illustrateth by this example:—

If the widow Sempronia marry at all, it is

¹ Ames, lib. 3; de Consc., cap. 8, quest. 5.

² Aquin. 1, 2, quest 18, art. 8.

³ Ibid., art. 9.

⁴ Hist. of the Council of Trent, lib. 2, p. 196.

⁵ Cont. in 1 Cor. vi. 12.

⁶ In Rom. xiv., dub. 1.

⁷ Iren., lib. 1, cap. 13, sect. 7, 9, 10.

¹ Ubi supra, cap. 11, sect. 36.

² In Acts xv., n. 18.

faith, because, as the Apostle teacheth, whatsoever is not of faith is sin. Now whilst everything is condemned which is not of faith, two sorts of actions are rejected, as Calvin observeth:¹ 1. Such actions as are not grounded upon, nor approved by the word of God. 2. Such actions, as though they be approved by the word of God, yet the mind, wanting this persuasion, doth not cheerfully address itself to the doing of them. But, I pray, doth the word underprop or approve the use of anything indifferent, if it be not used according to the foresaid rules, and, by consequence, conveniently and profitably?

Sect. 9. The Doctor thinks it enough that, in the use of a thing indifferent, I believe it is lawful for me to do this thing, albeit I believe and certainly know that it is lawful to me to omit it, or do the contrary; so that the doing of a thing in faith inferreth not the necessity of doing it: but for answer hereunto we say,

1. We have sufficiently proven that it is never lawful for us to do anything which is in the nature of it indifferent, except we be persuaded not only of the lawfulness of the thing, but of the expediency of doing it.

2. Of his comparing of things indifferent together, and not considering them positively and by themselves, we have also said enough before.

3. The doing of a thing in faith inferreth the expediency and profit of doing it, and that is enough to take away the indifference of doing it; for since every indifferent thing is either expedient to be done, or else unlawful to be done (as hath been showed), it followeth that either it ought to be done, or else it ought to be left undone; therefore it is never indifferent nor free to us to do it, or leave it undone, at our pleasure.

4. Because the Doctor (I perceive) sticketh upon the term of necessity, and will have everything which is not necessary to be indifferent; therefore, to remove this scruple, beside that Chrysostom and the author of the interlineary gloss upon Matt. xviii. 7, take the meaning of those words, "It must needs be that offences come," to be this, *it is profitable that offences come*. Which gloss, though it be not to be received, yet as Camero noteth,² it is ordinary to call that necessary which is very profita-

¹ Com. in Rom. xiv. 23.

² Prael., tom. 2, p. 345.

ble and expedient. Besides this, I say, we further maintain, that in the use of things indifferent, that which we deliberate upon to do is never lawful to be done except it be also necessary, though not *necessitate absoluta seu consequentis*, yet *necessitate consequentiae seu ex suppositione*. Paul's circumcising of Timothy was lawful only because it was necessary, for he believed by this means to win the good will of the people of Lystra who had once stoned him,¹ otherwise he could not safely have preached the gospel among them. Therefore he had done wrong if he had not circumcised Timothy, since the circumcising of him was according to the rules of the word, and it was expedient to circumcise him, and unexpedient to do otherwise. And (because *de partibus idem est judicium*) whosoever the use of any indifferent thing is according to the rules of the word, that is, when it is profitable for God's glory, and man's edification, and the doer is persuaded of so much, I say, putting this case, then (forsomuch as not only it may, but ought to be done) the use of it is not only lawful but necessary, and (forsomuch as not only it needs not, but ought not to be admitted) the omission of it is not only unnecessary but also unlawful.

Again, put the case, that the use of a thing indifferent be either against or not according to the said rules, then (forsomuch as not only it may, but ought to be admitted) the omission of it is not only lawful but necessary, and (forsomuch as not only it needs not, but may not, neither ought to be done) the doing of it is not only unnecessary but also unlawful. For which it maketh, that the apostles in their decree, allege no other ground for abstinence from blood and things strangled (which were in their nature indifferent), but the necessity of abstaining caused and induced by the foresaid rules, Acts xv. 28.

The Apostle sheweth that that measure of liberality whereunto he exhorted the Corinthians was not by any divine commandment necessary, yet he adviseth it as a thing expedient, 2 Cor. viii. 8, 10. And were not the Corinthians thereunto bound, because of this expediency of the matter, though it was not necessary? *Juxta verbum*, &c.: "According to God's word (saith the Bishop of Salisbury²) we are

¹ G. Sanctius in Acts xvi. 3.

² De Instit. Actual., cap. 42, p. 490.

obliged to glorify God by our good works, not only when necessity requireth, but also when ability furnisheth, and opportunity occurreth," Gal. vi. 10; Tit. ii. 14.

Sect. 10. As touching the scope of all this dispute, which is the indifference of the controverted ceremonies, we shall hear sundry reasons against it afterward. For the present, I say no more but this: As in every case, so most especially when we meddle with the worship of God, or any appurtenance thereof, the rules of the word tie us so straitly, that that which is in its own nature indifferent ought either to be done, or to be left undone, according as it is either agreeable or not agreeable to these rules; and so is never left free to us to be done or omitted at our pleasure: for if at all we be (as certainly we are) abridged of our liberty, chiefly it is in things pertaining to divine worship.

But I marvel why Dr Forbessie discourseth so much for the indifference of the ceremonies; for, lib. 1, cap. 7, he holdeth, that there were just reasons in the things themselves why the pretended Assembly of Perth should enjoin the five articles; some of which he calleth very convenient and profitable, and others of them necessary in themselves. Sure, if he stand to that which he hath there written, he cannot choose but say that it is unlawful, both for us and for all Christians anywhere, to omit the controverted ceremonies; and that all such as have at any time omitted them, have thereby sinned, in leaving that undone which they ought to have done—for the convenience and necessity of them which he pretendeth is perpetual and universal.

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE RULE BY WHICH WE ARE TO MEASURE AND TRY WHAT THINGS ARE INDIFFERENT.

Sect. 1. That the word of God is the only rule whereby we must judge of the indifference of things, none of our opposites, we hope, will deny. "Of things indifferent (saith Paybody¹) I lay down this ground, that they be such, and they only, which God's word hath left free unto us."

¹ Apol., part 1, cap. 9, sect. 1.

Now these things which God's word leaveth free and indifferent (in respect of their nature and kind) are such things as it neither sheweth to be good nor evil. Where we are further to consider, that the word of God sheweth unto us the lawfulness or unlawfulness, goodness or badness of things, not only by precepts and prohibitions, but sometimes also, and more plainly, by examples. So that, not only from the precepts and prohibitions of the word, but likewise from the examples recorded in the same, we may find out that goodness or badness of human actions which taketh away the indifference of them.

And as for those who will have such things called indifferent as are neither commanded nor forbidden in the word of God, I ask of them whether they speak of plain and particular precepts and prohibitions, or of general only? If they speak of particular precepts and prohibitions, then, by their rule, the baptising of young children; the taking of water for the element of baptism; a lecturer's public reading of Scripture in the church upon the Sabbath day; the assembling of synods for putting order to the confusions of the church; the writing and publication of the decrees of the same; and sundry other things which the word hath commended unto us by examples,—should all be things indifferent, because there are not in the word of God either particular precepts for them, or particular prohibitions against them. But if they speak of general precepts and prohibitions, then are those things commanded in the word of God for which we have the allowed and commended examples of such as we ought to follow (for, in the general, we are commanded to be followers of such examples, Phil. iv. 8, 9; 1 Cor. xi. 1; Eph. v. 1), though there be no particular precept for the things themselves thus exemplified.

Sect. 2. To come, therefore, to the ground which shall give us here some footing, and whereupon we mind to rear up certain superstructions, we hold, that not only we ought to obey the particular precepts of the word of God, but that also "we are bound to imitate Christ, and the commendable example of his apostles, in all things wherein it is not evident they had special reasons moving them thereto, which do not concern us:" which ground, as it hath been of a long time holden and confirmed by them of our side, so never could, nor

ever shall, our opposites subvert it. It is long since the *Abridgement* confirmed and strengthened it, out of those places of Scripture: Eph. v. 1, "Be ye therefore followers of God, as dear children;" 1 Cor. xi. 1, "Be ye followers of me, even as I also am of Christ;" 1 Thess. i. 6, "And ye became followers of us and of the Lord;" Phil. iii. 17, "Brethren, be followers together of me."

This ground is also at length pressed by Cyprian, who sheweth¹ that, in the holy supper of the Lord, Christ alone is to be followed by us; that we are to do what he did; and that we ought not to take heed what any man hath done before us, but what Christ did, who is before all.

Sect. 3. But Bishop Lindsey² asketh of us, if we hold this rule, what is the cause why, at the celebration of the sacrament, we bless not the bread severally by itself, and the cup severally by itself, seeing Christ did so, yet having no cause to move him which concerns not us.

Ans. 1. Beside the common blessing of the elements, in the beginning of the action, we give thanks also in the several actions of distribution, saying after this or the like manner: "The Lord Jesus, the same night he was betrayed, took bread, and when he had given thanks (as we also give thanks to God who gave his Son to die for us) he brake it," &c. "In like manner also, after supper, he took the cup, and, when he had given thanks (as we also give thanks to God who gave his Son to shed his blood for us), he gave it," &c. Which form (we conceive) may be construed to be an imitation of the example of Christ.

2. Though we did not observe such a form; yet there were two reasons to move Christ to give thanks severally, both at the giving of the bread, and at the giving of the cup, neither of which concerneth us: 1. The eucharistical supper was one continued action with the other supper which went before it; for it is said, "That whilst they did eat, he took bread," &c. Wherefore, for more distinction of it from that supper which immediately proceeded, it was fit that he should give thanks severally at the giving of each element. 2. He had to do with the twelve apostles, whose hearts being so greatly troubled with sorrow, John xvi. 6,

and whose minds not well comprehending that which they heard concerning the death of Christ, John xvi. 12, much less those mystical symbols of it, especially at the first hearing, seeing, and using of the same, it was needful for their cause distinctly and severally to bless those elements, thereby to help the weakness of their understanding, and to make them the more capable of so heavenly mysteries.

Sect. 4. Now, having heard that which the Bishop had to say against our rule, let us examine his own. He holdeth, "That in the actions of Christ's apostles, or the customs of the church, there is nothing exemplary and left to be imitated of us, but that which either being moral, is generally commanded in the decalogue, or being ceremonial and circumstantial, is particularly commanded by some constant precept in the gospel.

Ans. 1. This rule is most false; for it followeth from it that the example of the apostles' making choice of the element of water in baptism, and requiring a confession of faith from the person who was to be baptised; the example also both of Christ and his apostles using the elements of bread and wine in the holy supper, a table at which they did communicate, and the breaking of the bread, are not left to be imitated of us; because these things are ceremonial, but not particularly commanded in the gospel. So that according to the rule which the Bishop holdeth, we sin in imitating Christ and his apostles in those things, forasmuch as they are not exemplary, nor left to be imitated of us.

2. His weapons fight against his own fellows, who allego (as we have shewed elsewhere) the custom of the church³ is a sufficient warrant for certain ceremonies questioned betwixt them and us, which are not particularly commanded by any precept in the gospel. These the Bishop doth unwittingly strike at it whilst he holdeth that such customs of the church are not exemplary, nor left to be imitated of us.

Sect. 5. Wherefore we hold still our own rule for sure and certain. Christ's actions are either *amanda*, as the works of redemption; or *admiranda*, as his miracles; or *notanda*, as many things done by him for some particular reason proper to that time

¹ Lib. 2, epist. 3.

² Proc. in Perth Assemb., part. 2, p. 38, 40.

³ Ubi supra.

² Supra., part 3, cap. 6, sect. 12.

and case, and not belonging to us, which things, notwithstanding, are well worthy of our observation; or *imitanda*, and such are all his actions which had no such special reason moving him thereto as do not concern us.

Calvin, upon 1 Cor. xi. 1, saith well, that the Apostle there calls back both himself and others to Christ, *Tunquam unicuique recte agendi exemplar*; and Polycarpus Lycerus, upon Matt. xvi. 24, under that command of following Christ, comprehendeth the imitations of Christ's actions.

Most certainly it is inexcusable presumption to leave the example of Christ, and to do that which seemeth right in our own eyes, as if we were wiser than he. And now, having laid down this ground, we are to build certain positions upon it, as follows.

CHAPTER V.

THE FIRST POSITION WHICH WE BUILD UPON THE GROUND CONFIRMED IN THE FORMER CHAPTER.

Sect. 1. From that which hath been said of following Christ, and the commendable example of his apostles, in all things wherein it is not evident that they had some such special reason moving them to do that which they did, as doth not concern us, our first inference is this: That it is not indifferent for a minister to give the sacramental elements of bread and wine out of his own hand to every communicant; forasmuch as our Lord commanded his apostles to divide the cup among them, that is, to reach it one to another, Luke xxii. 17. Some of the interpreters are of opinion, that the cup spoken of by the Evangelist in that place is not the same whereof he speaketh after, ver. 20; but they are greatly mistaken; for if it were as they think, then Christ did again drink before his death of that fruit of the vine whereof we read ver. 18, which is manifestly repugnant to his own words. Wherefore, as Maldonat observeth¹ out of Augustine and Euthimius, there was but one cup; whereof Luke speaketh, first, by anticipation, and, afterward, in its own proper place.

Sect. 2. But Bishop Lindsey¹ falleth here upon a very strange speculation; and tells us, that if all the disciples did drink, howbeit they did not deliver the cup one to another, but received it severally from Christ's own hand, they divided the same among them; because every one takes his part of that which is parted, they divide the whole among them. Alas! that I should blot paper with the confutation of such fooleries. I believe, when his Majesty hath distributed and divided so many lands and revenues among the prelates of Scotland, every one of them takes his part, but dare not say, though, that they have divided these lands and revenues among themselves. Can twenty or forty beggars, when an alms is distributed among them, because every one of them getteth his part, say, therefore, that they themselves have parted it among them? What, then, shall be said of the distributor who giveth to every one his part severally, and by himself? That man who required that his brother should divide the inheritance with him, did not, I trow, desire Christ to cause his brother to take his own part of the inheritance (there was no fear that he would not take his part); but he desired that his brother might give to him his part. So that, to divide anything among men, is not to take it, but to give it. And who did ever confound parting and partaking, dividing a cup and drinking a cup, which differ as much as giving and receiving. Thus we conclude, that when Christ commanded the apostles to divide the cup among them, the meaning of the words can be no other than this, that they should give the cup one to another; which is so plain that a Jesuit² also maketh it to follow upon this command, that Christ did reach the cup *non singulis sed uni, qui proximo, proximus sequenti, et deinceps daret*. Hence it is that Hospinian³ thinks it most likely that Christ brake the bread into two parts, *carumque alteram dedit illi qui proximus ei ad dextram accumbens, alteram vero ei qui ad sinistram, ut isti deinceps proxime accumbentibus porrigerent, donec singuli particulam sibi decerpissent*.

¹ Ubi supra, p. 62.

² Maldon, ubi supra.

³ De re Sacram., lib. 2, p. 31.

¹ Com. in Matt. xxvi. 27.

CHAPTER VI.

ANOTHER POSITION BUILT UPON THE SAME GROUND.

Sect. 1. Our next position which we infer, is this: That it is not indifferent to sit, stand, pass, or kneel, in the act of receiving the sacramental elements of the Lord's supper, because we are bound to follow the example of Christ and his apostles, who used the gesture of sitting in this holy action, as we prove from John xiii. 12; from Matt. xxvi. 20, with 26; Mark xiv. 18, with 22.

Our opposites here bestir themselves, and move every stone against us. Three answers they give us, which we will now consider.

First, They tell us that it is not certain that the apostles were sitting when they received this sacrament from Christ, and that *adhuc sub judice lis est*. Yet let us see what they have to say against the certainty hereof.

Bishop Lindsey objecteth, that, between their eating of the paschal supper and the administration of the sacrament to the disciples, five acts intervened: 1. The taking of the bread; 2. The thanksgiving; 3. The breaking; 4. The precept, "Take ye, eat ye;" 5. The word, whereby the element was made the sacrament. In which time, saith he, the gesture of sitting might have been changed.

Ans. It is first of all to be noted, that the apostles were sitting at the instant when Christ took the bread, for it is said that he took bread whilst they did eat; that is (as Maldonat¹ rightly expoundeth it), *Antequam surgerent, antequam mense et ciborum reliquie removerentur*; and so we use to say that men are dining or supping so long as they sit at table and the meat is not removed from before them. To Christ's ministering of the eucharistical supper together with the preceding supper, Christians had respect when they celebrated the Lord's supper together with the love-feasts. *Probabile est eos ad Christi exemplum respectasse, qui eucharistiam inter comarum instituit*, saith Parens.² But of this we need say no

¹ Com. in Matt. xxvi. 26.

² Cont. in I Cor. xi. 21.

more; for the Bishop himself hath here acknowledged no less than that they were sitting at that time when Christ took the bread. Only he saith, that there were five acts which intervened before the administration of the sacrament to the disciples (whereof the taking of the bread was the first), and that in this while the gesture of sitting might have been changed; which is as much as to say, when he took the bread they were sitting, but they might have changed this gesture, either in the time of taking the bread, or in the time of thanksgiving, or in the time of breaking the bread, or whilst he said, "Take ye, eat ye," or lastly, in the time of pronouncing those words, "This is my body" (for this is the word whereby, in the Bishop's judgment, the element was made the sacrament, as we shall see afterward).

Now but, by his leave, we will reduce his five acts to three; for thus speaketh the text, "And as they did eat, Jesus took bread, and blessed it and break it, and gave it to the disciples, and said, Take, eat, this is my body," Matt. xxvi. 26; Mark xiv. 22. Whence it is manifest, that the giving of the bread to the disciples, which no man, I suppose, will deny to have been the administration of it, went before the two last acts which the Bishop reckoneth out. Nothing, therefore, is left to him but to say, that their gesture of sitting might have been changed, either in the taking or in the blessing, or in the breaking, or else between the taking and the blessing, or between the blessing and the breaking; yet doth the text knit all the three together by such a contiguity and connection as sheweth unto us that they did all make up but one continued action, which could not admit any interruption.

Sect. 2. I saw a prelate sit down to his breakfast, and, as he did eat, he took some cups, and, having called for more, he said, he thanked God that he was never given to his belly; and with that he made a promise to one in the company, which he brake within two days after. Would any man question whether or not the prelate was sitting when he made this promise, forasmuch as between his sitting down to meat and the making of the promise there intervened his taking of some cups, his calling for more, and his pronouncing of those words, I thank God that I was never given to my belly? Yet might one far more easily imagine a change of the

prelate's gesture than any such change of the apostles' gesture in that holy action whereof we speak. Because the text setteth down such a continued, entire, unbroken, and uninterrupted action, therefore Calvin gathereth out of the text that the apostles did both take and eat the sacramental bread whilst they were sitting. *Non legimus, saith he, prostratos adorasse, sed ut erant discumbentes accepisse et manducasse. Christus, saith Martyr, eucharistiam apostolis una secum sedentibus aut discumbentibus distribuit.* G. J. Vossius³ puts it out of doubt that Christ was still sitting at the giving of the bread to the apostles. And that the apostles were still sitting when they received the bread, Hospinian⁴ thinks it no less certain. They made no doubt of the certainty hereof who composed that old verse which we find in Aquinas:⁵—

*Rex sedet in cœna, turba cinctus duodena;
Se tenet in manibus; se cibis ipse cibus.*

Papists also put it out of controversy; for Bellarmine acknowledgeth⁶ that the apostles could not externally adore Christ by prostrating themselves in the last supper, *quando recumbere cum eo illis necesse erat*; where we see he could guess nothing of the change of their gesture. *Intelligentum est, saith Jansenius, dominum in novissima hac cœna, discubuisse et sedisse ante et post comestum agnum.* Dr Stella sticketh not to say,⁷ *distribuit salvator mundi panem discumbentibus.*

Sect. 3. But now having heard Bishop Lindsey, let us hear what Paybody⁹ will say. He taketh him to another subterfuge, and tells us, that though we read that Christ took bread whilst they did eat, yet can it not be concluded hence that he took bread whilst they did sit; because, saith he, "as they did eat," is expounded by Luke (chap. xxii. 20) and Paul (1 Cor. xi. 25) to be *after they had done eating, or after supper.* Thus is their languages divided. Bishop Lindsey did yield to us, that when Christ took bread they were sitting; and his conjecture was, that this gesture of sit-

ting might have been changed after the taking of the bread. Paybody saw that he had done with the argument if he should grant that they were sitting when Christ took bread, therefore he calleth that in question. Vulcan's own gimmers could not make his answer and the Bishop's to stick together.

But let us examine the ground which Paybody takes for his opinion. He would prove from Luke and Paul, that when Matthew and Mark say, "As they were eating, Jesus took bread," the meaning is only this, *After supper, Jesus took bread*; importing, that Christ's taking of bread did not make up one continued action with their eating, and that therefore their gesture of sitting might have been changed between their eating of the preceding supper and his taking of the sacramental bread.

Whereunto we answer, that there are two opinions touching the suppers which Christ did eat with his disciples that night wherein he was betrayed. And whichsoever the reader please to follow, it shall be most easy to break all the strength of the argument which Paybody opposeth unto us.

Sect. 4. First, then, some do think that Christ, having kept the passover according to the law (which is not particularly related, but supposed, by the evangelists), sat down to a common or ordinary supper, at which he told the disciples that one of them should betray him. And of this judgment are Calvin and Beza, upon Matt. xxvi. 21; Pareus, upon Matt. xxvi. 21; Fulk and Cartwright, against the Rhemists, upon 1 Cor. xi. 23; Tolet and Maldonat, upon John xiii. 2; Cornelius Jansenius, *Conc. Evang.*, cap. 131; Balthazar Meisnerus, *Tract. de Fest. Virid.*, p. 256; Johannes Forsterus, *Conc. 4. de Pass.*, p. 538; Christophorus Pelargus, in John xiii., quest. 2, and others. The reasons whereby their judgment is confirmed are these:—

1. Many societies convened to the eating of the paschal supper by twenties.¹ And if twenty was often the number of them who convened to the eating of the same (which also confirmeth their opinion who think that other men and women in the inn did eat both the paschal and evangelical supper together with the apostles in Christ's company), it is not very likely (say some) that all those were sufficiently capped and fed

¹ Instit. lib. 4, cap. 17, sect. 35.

² Apud Didoclar., p. 794.

³ Disp. 3, de Symb., Cœnæ Dom., thes. 4.

⁴ Ubi supra.

⁵ Aquin. 3, quest. 81, art. 1.

⁶ De Sac. Eucharist., lib. 4, cap. 30.

⁷ Concord. Evang., cap. 129.

⁸ In Luke xxii. 19.

⁹ Apol., p. 2, cap. 3, sect. 5.

¹ Joseph., lib. 7; de Bella Jud., cap. 17.

with one lamb, which, after it was eight days old, was allowed to be offered for the passover, as Godwin noteth.¹ *Neque esus unius agni*, saith Pareus, *toti familie sedandæ fumi sufficere poterat*.²

2. The paschal supper was not for banquetting or filling of the belly, as Josephus also writeth.³ *Non tam exsatiandæ nutritiendæque naturæ*, saith Maldonat, *quam servandæ legis ceremonie causa sumebatur*.⁴ *Non ventri*, saith Pareus, *sed religionis causa fiebat*.⁵ But as for that supper which Christ and his apostles did eat immediately before the eucharistical, Cartwright doubts not to call it a carnal supper,⁶ an earthly repast, a feast for the belly, which lets us know, that the sacramental bread and wine was ordained, not for feeding their bodies, which were already satisfied by the ordinary and daily supper, but for the nourishment of the soul.

3. That beside the paschal and evangelical suppers, Christ and his apostles had also that night another ordinary supper, Fulk proveth by the broth wherein the sop was dipped,⁷ John xiii. 26. Whereas there was no such broth ordained by the divine institution to be used in the paschal supper.

4. That there were two suppers before the eucharistical they gather from John xiii. For, first, the paschal supper was ended, ver. 2, after which Christ washed his disciples' feet. And thereafter we read, ver. 12, *resumptis vestibus rursum ad cœnam ordinariam consedisce*.⁸ The dividing of the passover into two services or two suppers had no warrant at all from the first institution of that sacrament; for which cause they think it not likely that Christ would have thus divided it according to the device and custom of the Jews in latter times; for so much as in marriage (and much more in the passover) he did not allow of that which from the beginning was not so. Neither seemeth it to them any way probable, that Christ would have interrupted the eating of the passover with the washing of his disciples' feet before the whole paschal supper was ended, and they had done eating of it.

Sect. 5. But others (and those very ju-

dicious too) are of opinion, that that second course whereunto Christ sat down after the washing of his disciples' feet, and at which he told them that one of them should betray him, was not an ordinary or common supper (because the paschal supper was enough of itself to satisfy them), but a part of the paschal supper. And from the Jewish writers they prove that so the custom was to divide the passover into two courses or services. As for that wherein Christ dipped the sop, they take it to have been the sauce which was used in the paschal supper, called *charoseth*, of which the Hebrews write, that it was made of the palm tree branches, or of dry figs, or of raisins, which they stamped and mixed with vinegar till it was thick as mustard, and made like clay, in memory of the clay wherein they wrought in Egypt, and that they used to dip both the unleavened bread and the bitter herbs into this sauce. And as touching that place, John xiii., they expound it by the custom of the Jews, which was to have two services or two suppers in the passover; and take these words, ver. 2, "Supper being ended," to be meant of the first service, and sitting down again to supper, ver. 12, to be meant of the second service.

Sect. 6. If those two opinions could be reconciled and drawn together into one, by holding that that second course whereunto Christ sat down after the washing of his disciples' feet, was (for the substance of it) a common supper, but yet it hath been and may be rightly called the second service of the paschal supper, for that it was eaten the same night wherein the paschal lamb was eaten, so should all the difference be taken away; but if the maintainers of these opinions will not be thus agreed, let the reader consider to which of them he will adhere.

If the first opinion be followed, then it will be most easily answered to Paybody, that *inter cœnandum instituta fuit eucharistia, cum jam rursum mensæ accubissent*. *Sed post cœnam paschalem, et usum agni legalis*.¹ When Matthew and Mark say, As they did eat, Jesus took bread, they speak of the common or ordinary supper; but when Luke and Paul say, that he took the cup after supper, they speak of the paschal supper, which was eaten before the common supper.

Again, if the reader follow the other

¹ Moses and Aaron, lib. 3, cap. 4.

² Com. in Matt. xxvi. 21.

³ Ubi supra.

⁴ Com. in John xiii. 2.

⁵ Ubi supra.

⁶ Annot. in 1 Cor. xi. 13.

⁷ Ubi supra.

⁸ I'ar., ubi supra.

¹ Jansen. Conc. Evan., cap. 131.

opinion, which holdeth that Christ had no other supper that night before the evangelical except the paschal only, yet still the answer to Paybody shall be easy; for whereas he would prove from those words of Luke and Paul, "Likewise also the cup after supper," that when Matthew and Mark say, "As they did eat, Jesus took bread," their meaning is only this, "After supper Jesus took bread," he reasoneth very inconsiderately, forasmuch as Luke and Paul say not of the bread, but of the cup only, that Jesus took it after supper. And will Paybody say, that he took the cup so soon as he took the bread? If we will speak with Scripture, we must say, that as they did eat the preceding supper (to which we read they sat down) Jesus took bread; for nothing at all intervened betwixt their eating of that other preceding supper, and his taking of the eucharistical cup; there intervened the taking, blessing, breaking, distributing, and eating of the bread.

Now, therefore, from that which hath been said, we may well conclude that our opposites have no reason which they do or can object against the certainty of that received tenet, that the apostles received from Christ the sacramental bread and wine whilst they were sitting. Dr Ferbesse himself¹ setteth down some testimonies of Musculus, Charnier, and the professors of Leyden, all acknowledging that the apostles, when they received the Lord's supper, were still sitting.

Sect. 7. The second answer that our opposites hath given us, followeth: They say, that though the apostles did not change their gesture of sitting which they used in the former supper, when all this is granted to us, yet there is as great difference betwixt our form of sitting and that form of the Jews which the apostles used as there is betwixt *sedere* and *jacere*.

Ans. 1. Put the case it were so, yet it hath been often answered them, that the apostles kept the table-gesture used in that nation, and so are we bound herein to follow their example, by keeping the table-gesture used in this nation. For this keeping of the usual table gesture of the nation wherein we live is not a forsaking but a following of the commendable example of the apostles, even as whereas they drank the wine which was drunk in that place, and we drink the

wine which is drunk in this place, yet do we not hereby differ from that which they did.

2. The words used by the evangelists signify our form of sitting no less than the Jewish, Calepine, Scapula, and Thomasius, in their dictionaries, take *ἀνακλιτω*, *ἀνακλινω*, *ἀνακλινωμα*, *ἀνάκειμαι*, *παράκειμαι*, *κατάκειμαι*, and the Latin words *discumbo*, *recumbo*, *accumbo* (used by Arias Montanus, Beza, Marlorat, Tremellius, &c., in their versions), not only for lying, but also for such sitting as is opposed to lying, even for sitting upright at table after our custom.

3. There is not so great a difference betwixt our form of sitting and that which the Jews used as our opposites allege. For as Didoclausius sheweth out of Casauben;¹ their sitting at banquets was only with a leaning upon the left arm, and so not lying, but sitting with a certain inclination. When, therefore, we read of *lecti discubitorii trilineares*, in quibus *inter cœnandum discumbabant*,² we must understand them to have been seats which compassed three sides of the table (the fourth side being left open and void for them who served), and wherein they did sit with some sort of inclination.

Yot Bishop Lindsey is bold to aver,³ that the usual table gesture of the Jews was lying along, and thus he would prove from Amos vi. 4, "They lie upon beds of ivory, they stretch themselves out upon their couches."

Ans. 1. If we should yield to this prelate his own meaning wherein he taketh these words, yet how thinks he that the gesture of drunkards and gluttons, which they used when they were pampering themselves in all excess of riot, and for which also they are upbraided by the Spirit of God, was either the ordinary table-gesture of the Jews, or the gesture used by Christ and his apostles in their last supper?

2. If any gesture at all be touched in those words which the prelate citeth, it was the gesture they used when they lay down to sleep, and not their table-gesture when they did eat; for *mitta* and *ngheres* (the two words which Amos useth) signify a bed or a couch wherein a man useth to lay himself down to sleep. And in this sense we find both these words, Psal. vi. 7, "All the night make I my bed (*mittathi*) to swim: I

¹ Alt. Dam., p. 739.

² Hadr. Jun. in Nomenclat.

³ Ubi supra, p. 46.

¹ Iren., lib. 2, p. 55, 361, 362.

water my couch (*ugharsi*) with my tears." The Shunnamite prepared for Elisha a chamber, and therein set for him a bed (*mitta*), and a table, and a stool, and a candlestick, 2 Kings iv. 10. The stool or chair was for sitting at table, but *mitta*, the bed, was for lying down to sleep. Now, the prelate, I hope, will not say, that the *lecti tricliniarcs*, wherein the Jews used to sit at table, and which compassed three sides of the same (as hath been said), were their beds wherein they did lie and sleep all night.

But, 3. The place must be yet more exactly opened up. That word which is turned in our English books, *they lie*, cometh from the radix *schachav*, which in Pagnin's lexicon is turned *dormire*. We find, Ruth iii. 7, *lisceav*, which Arias Montanus turned *ad dormiendum*, to sleep. Our own English translation, 2 Sam. xi. 9, saith, "*Uriah slept*," where the original hath *vausehav*; and the very same word is put most frequently in the books of the Kings and the Chronicles, where they speak of the death of the kings of Judah and Israel. Pagnin turneth it *et dormivit*; and our English translators everywhere, "And he slept with his fathers," &c. These things being considered, we must, with Calvin, read the place of Amos thus: *Qui decumbunt vel dormiunt in lectis*. The other word which the prophet useth is *scruchim*. Our English version turneth it, "They stretch themselves out;" but Pagnin, Buxtorff, Tremellius, and Tarnovius, come nearer the sense, who read *redundantes, superfluentes, or luxuriantes*; which sense the English translation also hath in the margin. The Septuagints followed the same sense, for they read, *καταπαλόντες*, i.e., *living in pleasure*. So, 1 Tim. v. 6, *she that lived in pleasure*, *σπαταλῶσαι*; and, James v. 5, *Ye have lived in pleasure*, *ἐσπαταλήσατε*. The radix is *sarach*, *redundavit*, or *luxuriavit*. So, Exod. xxvi. 12, *sarach*, and, verse 13, *saruach*, is put for a surplusage or superfluous remainder, *redundans superfluum*, as Tremellius readeth. Now, then, it is evident that the thing which Amos layeth to the charge of those who were at ease in Zion, in the words which the prelate citeth against us, is, that they slept upon beds of ivory (such was their softness and superfluity), and swimmied in excessive pleasures upon their couches; and, incontinent, their filthy and muddy stream of carnal delicacy and excessive voluptuousness which defiled

their beds, led him back to the unclean fountain out of which it issued, even their riotous pampering of themselves at table; therefore he subjoineth, "And eat the lambs out of the flock," &c. For *ex mensis itur ad cubilia, ex gula in venerem*, saith Cornelius à Lapide, commenting upon the same text. Thus have I cleared the place in such sort, that the Bishop cannot but shoot short of his aims; wherefore I go on to other replies.

4. If the apostles, when they received the Lord's supper, or the Jews, when they did eat at table, were lying all along, how could their mouths receive drink unspilt? or how could they have the use of both their arms? which the Bishop himself would not, I am sure, gainsay, if he would once try the matter in his own person, and essay to eat and drink whilst lying along.

5. The words used by Matthew, chap. xxvi. 10, and by Mark, chap. xiv. 18, where they speak of Christ sitting down with the twelve, is also used by John, chap. vi. 11, where he speaketh of the peoples' sitting down upon the grass to eat the loaves and fishes: and will any man think that the people did eat lying along upon the grass, where they might far better sit upright?

6. If our opposites like to speak with others, then let them look back upon the testimonies which I have alleged before. Jansenius putteth *discubuisse et sedisse*; Martyr, *sedentibus aut discumbentibus*. Pareus useth the word *consedisse*; Meisnerus,¹ *consedendo*; *Evangelista*, saith Dr Stella², *dicit dominum discubuisse, id est sedisse ad mensam*.

7. If they like to speak to themselves: Camero,³ speaking of John's leaning on Christ's bosom at supper, saith, *Christus autem sedebat medius*; Dr Morton saith,⁴ it cannot be denied that the gesture of Christ and his apostles at the last supper was sitting,—only, saith he, the evangelists leave it uncertain whether this sitting was upright, or somewhat leaning.

Sect. 8. Their third answer is, that Christ's sitting at the last supper is no more exemplary and imitable than the upper chamber, or the night season, or the sex and number of communicants, &c.

¹ Tract. de Feste Virid., p. 256.

² In Luke xxii. 14.

³ Prælect., tom. 3, p. 27.

⁴ Partic. Def., cap. 3, sect. 4.

Ans. I. As for the sex and number of communicants, Dr Fulk¹ rightly observeth, that it is not certain from Scripture that twelve men only, and no women, did communicate (as Bishop Lindsey² would have us certainly to believe); but suppose it were certain,³ yet for this, and all the other circumstances, which are not exemplary, there were special reasons either in the urgency of the legal necessity, or in the exigency of present and accidental occasions, which do not concern us: whereas the gesture of sitting was freely and purposely chosen, and so intended to be exemplary, especially since there was no such reason moving Christ to use this gesture of sitting as doth not concern us.

The Bishop saith,⁴ that his sitting at the former supper might have been the reason which moved him to sit at the eucharistical supper; but if Christ had not purposely made choice of the gesture of sitting as the fittest and most convenient for the eucharistical supper, his sitting at the former supper could be no reason to move him, as may appear by this example: There are some gentlemen standing in a nobleman's waiting-room; and after they have stood there a while, the nobleman cometh forth; they begin to speak to him, and, as they speak, still they stand. Now, can any man say that the reason which moveth them to stand when they speak to the nobleman, is, because they were standing before he came to them? So doth the Bishop come short of giving any special reason for Christ's sitting which concerneth not us. He can allege no more but Christ's sitting at the former supper, which could be no reason, else he should have also risen from the eucharistical supper to wash the disciples' feet, even as he rose from the former supper for that effect. Wherefore, we conclude, that Christ did voluntarily, and of set purpose, choose sitting as the fittest and best becoming gesture for that holy banquet.

Finally, Hooker's⁵ verdict of the gesture of Christ and his apostles in this holy supper is, "That our Lord himself did that which custom and long usage had made fit; we, that which fitness and great decency hath made usual." In which words, be-

cause he importeth that they have better warrants for their kneeling than Christ had for his sitting (which is blasphemous), I leave them as not worthy of an answer. Howsoever, let it be noted that he acknowledged, by kneeling they depart from the example of Christ.

CHAPTER VII.

OTHER POSITIONS BUILT UPON THE FORMER GROUND.

Sect. 1. The third consequence which we infer upon our former rule of following the example of Christ is, that it is not a thing indifferent to omit the repetition of those words, "This is my body," enunciatively and demonstratively in the act of distributing the eucharistical bread; and far less is it indifferent so to omit this demonstrative speech in the distribution, as in place of it to surrogate a prayer to preserve the soul and body of the communicant unto everlasting life. Our reason is, because Christ (whose example herein we ought to follow) used no prayer in the distribution, but that demonstrative enunciation, "This is my body." But we go forward.

Sect. 2. The fourth position we draw from the same rule is, that it is not indifferent for a minister to omit the breaking of the bread at the Lord's table after the consecration and in the distribution of it, because he ought to follow the example of Christ, who, after he had blessed the bread, and when he was distributing it to them who were at table, brake it,¹ *manibus comminuendo panem acceptum in partes*, but had it not carved in small pieces before it was brought to the table. Hence G. J. Vossius² doth rightly condemn those who, though they break the bread *in multas minutias*, yet they break it not *in actu sacramentali*. Such a breaking as this (he saith well) is not *mystica*, but *coquinaria*.

Sect. 3. The fifth position, drawn from the very same ground is, that it is not indifferent for a minister, in the act of distribution, to speak in the singular number, *Take thou, eat thou, drink thou*; because he should follow the example of Christ, who, in the distribution, spake in the plural number,

¹ Annot. on 1 Cor. xi. 23.

² Ubi supra., p. 11.

³ See Alt. Dam., p. 742.

⁴ Ubi supra., p. 40.

⁵ Eccl. Pol., lib. 5, sect. 68.

¹ Pareus in 1 Cor. xi. 24.

² De Symb. Cœnæ Dom., disp. 2, thes. 5.

Take ye, eat ye, drink ye; and he who followeth not Christ's example herein, by his speaking in the singular to one, he maketh that to be a private action betwixt himself and the communicant, which Christ made public and common by his speaking to all at one time.

Sect. 4. How idly Bishop Lindsey¹ answereth to these things, it cannot but appear to every one who considereth that we do not challenge them for not breaking the bread at all,—for not pronouncing at all these words, "This is my body," or for never pronouncing at all these speeches in the plural, *Take ye, eat ye, drink ye*,—but for not breaking the bread in the very act of distribution,—for not pronouncing demonstratively those words, "This is my body," in the very act of distribution,—for not speaking in the plural number, "Take ye," &c.—in the very act of distribution, as Christ did, having no other reasons to move him than such as concern us. Why, then, did not the Bishop say something to the point which we press him with? or shall we excuse him because he had nothing to say to it?

Sect. 5. Now, last of all, we find yet another point whereby the Bishop² departeth from the example and mind of Christ. He saith that, by the sacramental word, "This is my body," the bread is made the sacrament, &c.; and that without this word, &c., all our prayers and wishes should serve to no use. Where he will have the bread to be otherwise consecrated by us than it was consecrated by Christ; for that Christ did not consecrate the bread to be the sacrament of his body by those words, "This is my body," it is manifest, because the bread was consecrated before his pronouncing of those words; or else what meaneth the blessing of it before he brake it? It was both blessed and broken, and he was also distributing it to the disciples, before ever he said, "This is my body." Beza saith, *Benedictionem expresse ad panis consecrationem et quidem singularem, refert; et omnes nostri referunt, consecrationem intelligentes*, &c. Parens saith,³ *Qua ex communi cibo, in spiritualis alimentum sacramentum transmutetur*. Wherefore we must not think to sanctify the bread by this prescript word, "This is my body," but by prayer and thanksgiving, as Christ did. Our

divines hold against the Papists,¹ *Verba illa que in sacramento sunt consecrata, non esse paucula quedam præscripta; sed præcipue verba orationis, que non sunt præscripta*; and that, "through use of the prayers of the church, there is a change in the elements."² Dr Fulk objecteth³ against Gregory Martin, "Your popish church doth not either as the Greek liturgies, or as the churches in Ambrose and Augustine's time, for they hold that the elements are consecrated by prayer and thanksgiving." I know none who will speak with Bishop Lindsey in this point except Papists: yet Cornelius à Lapide could also say, *Eucharistia conficitur et conditur sacris precibus*.⁴

Sect. 6. I say not that these words, "This is my body," have no use at all in making the bread to be a sacrament; but that which giveth us dislike is,

1. That the Bishop maketh not the word and prayer together, but the word alone, to sanctify the bread and wine. Now, if both the word and prayer be necessary to sanctify the creatures for the food of our bodies, 1 Tim. iv. 5, much more are they necessary to sanctify them for the food of our souls. *Neque enim solis domini verbis consecratio sit, sed etiam precibus*.⁵ The fathers, saith Trelocatus,⁶ had not only respect to those five words, "For this is my body," *dum eucharistiam fieri dixerunt mystica prece, invocatione nominis divini, solemnibus benedictione, gratiarum actione*. 2. That he makes not the whole word of the institution to sanctify the bread, but only that one sentence, "This is my body;" whereas Christ's will is declared, and, consequently, the elements sanctified by the whole words of the institution,⁷ "Jesus took the bread, and when he had given thanks, he brake it, and said, Take, eat, this is my body which is broken for you, this do in remembrance of me," &c.

That he acknowledgeth not the bread, though sanctified by prayer, to be the sacrament, except that very word be pronounced, "This is my body." Now, when a minister hath, from Christ's will and institution, declared that he hath appointed

¹ Ames. Bell. Ener., tom. 3, lib. 1, cap. 2, quest. 1.

² Cartwr. on Matt. xxvi., sect. 6.

³ Defence of the English Translation, cap. 17, n. 5.

⁴ Com. in Mal. i. 11.

⁵ G. J. Voss. de Synb. Cærenæ Dom., disp. 2, thes. 2.

⁶ Instit. Theol., lib. 2, p. 258.

⁷ Ames., ubi supra.

¹ Part 2, p. 55–57.

² Ibid.

³ Com. in Matt. xxvi. 26.

bread and wine to be the elements of his body and blood, when he hath also declared the essential rites of this sacrament.

And, lastly, when, by the prayer of consecration, he hath sanctified the bread and wine which are present, put the case, that all this while those prescript sentences, "This is my body," "This cup is the New Testament in my blood," have not been pronounced, yet what hindereth the bread and wine from being the sacramental elements of the Lord's body and blood? It is sounder divinity to say, that the consecration of a sacrament doth not depend *ex certa aliqua formula verborum*.¹ For it is evident that, in baptism, there is not a certain form of words prescribed, as Bellarmine also proveth;² because Christ saith not, "Say, I baptise thee in the name," &c.: so that he prescribeth not what should be done. Aquinas likewise holdeth,³ that the consecration of a sacrament is not absolutely tied to a certain form of words. And so saith Conradus Vorstius,⁴ speaking of the eucharist. Wherefore Vossius⁵ doth rightly condemn the Papists, *quod consecrationem non aliis verbis fieri putant, quam istis, hoc est corpus meum, et hic est sanguis meus*.

CHAPTER VIII.

THAT THE CEREMONIES ARE NOT THINGS INDIFFERENT TO THE CHURCH OF SCOTLAND; BECAUSE SHE DID ABJURE AND REPUDIATE THEM BY A MOST SOLEMN AND GENERAL OATH.

Sect. I. Having spoken of the nature of things indifferent, and shewed which things be such; also of the rule whereby to try the indifferency of things: which rule we have applied to certain particular cases;—it remaineth to say somewhat of the main and general purpose, which is principally questioned in this last part of our dispute, viz., whether cross, kneeling, holidays, bishopping, and the other controverted ceremonies wherewith our church is pressed this day, be such things as we may use freely and indifferently? The negative (which we

hold) is strongly confirmed by those arguments which, in the third part of this our dispute, we have put in order against the lawfulness of those ceremonies. Notwithstanding we have thought fit to add somewhat more in this place. And, first, we say, whatsoever be the condition of the ceremonies in their own nature, they cannot be indifferently embraced and used by the church of Scotland, which hath not only once cast them forth, but also given her great oath solemnly to the God of heaven, both witnessing her detestation of the Roman Antichrist's "five bastard sacraments, with all his rites, ceremonies, and false doctrine, added to the ministration of the true sacraments, without the word of God; all his vain allegories, rites, signs, and traditions, brought in the kirk, without or against the word of God;" and likewise "promising, and swearing to continue," as well "in the discipline and use of the holy sacraments," as "in the doctrine," of this reformed church of Scotland, which then first she embraced and used after she was truly reformed from Popery and popish abuses. And this which I say may be seen in the general Confession of Faith, sworn and subscribed by his Majesty's father, of everlasting memory, anno 1580, and by the several parliaments in the land, at his Majesty's strait command; which also was renewed and sworn again, anno 1596, by the General Assembly, by provincial assemblies, by presbyteries and particular parish churches.

Sect. 2. No reformed church in Europe is so strictly tied by the bond of an oath and subscription, to hold fast her first discipline and use of the sacraments, and to hold out popish rites, as is the church of Scotland. And who knoweth not that an oath doth always oblige and bind, *quanto est factum de rebus certis et possibilibus, vere ac sine dolo premeditate, ac cum iudicio, iuste, ad gloriam Dei, et bonum proximi*?¹ What one of all those conditions was here wanting? Can we then say any less than a pope said before us:² *Non est tutum quolibet contra juramentum suum venire, nisi tale sit, quod servatum vergat in interitum salutis æternæ*? O damnable impiety, which maketh so small account of the violation of the aforesaid oath, which hath as great power to bind us as that oath of the

¹ Ames. ubi supra., lib. 4, cap. 6.

² Apud Ames. ibid., lib. 1, cap. 2.

³ Aquin. 3, quest. 60, art. 8.

⁴ In Enchir. Contr. inter Evang. et Pontif.

⁵ Ubi supra.

¹ Aisted Theol. Cas., cap. 15, p. 170.

² Decret. Greg., lib. 2, tit. 24, cap. 8.

princes of Israel made to the Gibeonites, had to bind their posterity, 2 Sam. xxi. 1, 2; for it was made by the whole incorporation of this land, and hath no term at which it may cease to bind. Nay (in some respects) it bindeth more straitly than that oath of the princes of Israel. For, 1. That was made by the princes only; this by prince, pastors, and people: 2. That was made rashly (for the text sheweth that they asked not counsel from the mouth of the Lord); this with most religious and due deliberation: 3. That was made to men; this to the great God: 4. That sworn but once; this once and again.

Sect. 3. Some of our opposites go about to derogate somewhat from the binding power of that oath of the princes of Israel. They are so nettled therewith that they fitch hither and thither. Dr Forbesse¹ speaketh to the purpose thus: *Juramentum Gibeonitis prestitum contra ipsius Dei mandatum, et inconsulta Deo, non potuissent Josue et Israelitæ opere perficere nisi Deus, extraordinarie de suo mandato dispensasset, compassione pœnitentis illius populi Gibeonitæ, et propter honorem sui nominis, ut neque fedifragorum fautor, neque supplicium pœnitentium aspernator esse videretur.*

Ans. 1. If the oath was against the commandment of God, what dishonour had come to the name of God though he had not patronised the swearers of it, but hindered them from fulfilling their oath? If a Christian swear to kill a pagan, and hereafter repent of his oath, and not perform it, can there any dishonour redound thereby to the name of Christ? The Doctor, forsooth, must say so.

2. Where hath he read of the repentance of the Gibeonites, which God would not despise?

3. If an oath made against the commandment of God (the breach of the commandment being dispensed with) bindeth so strictly and inviolably as that oath of the princes of Israel did, how much more ought we to think ourselves strictly and inviolably bound, by the solemn oath of the church of Scotland, which was not repugnant but most consonant to the word of God, even our adversaries themselves being judges? for thus speaketh one of them: *Quod autem juraverunt nostrates,*

¹ Iren., lib. 1, cap. 9, sect. 2.

*non erat illicitum, sed a nobis omnibus jure præstare potest ac debet;*¹ so that the Doctor hath gained nothing, but loosed much, by that which he saith of the Israelites' oath: he hath even fanged himself faster in the snare which he thought to escape.

O but, saith the Doctor, that which they did, either in swearing or in performing their oath, against the express commandment of God, we may not draw into an ordinary example.

Ans. It was against the commandment of God; no man will say that we should follow either their swearing or their performing of their oath. Yet, in the meantime, the Doctor is pressed with this argument, that if their unlawful oath (in the case of God's dispensation) did bind their posterity, much more doth that oath of the church of Scotland (which the Doctor hath acknowledged lawful and commendable) bind us this day.

Sect. 4. But, 4. Albeit the Doctor hath hereby given us scope and advantage enough against himself; nevertheless, for the truth's sake, I add, that it cannot be showed how that oath of the princes of Israel was against the express commandment of God; but it rather appeareth that it was agreeable to the same. For, as Tremellius² hath it noted, that commandment, Deut. xx., whereby the Israelites were commanded to save alive nothing in the cities of the Canaanites, was to be only understood of such cities among them as should make war with them, and be besieged by them. But the Gibeonites were not of this sort; for they sought their lives before the Israelites came to them. And by the same means Rahab and her father's house got their life, because they sought it, Josh. ii. Calvin also serveth:³ *Jussos fuisse Israelitas pacem omnibus offerre.* And Junius, upon Deut. xx., distinguisheth well two laws of war given to Israel.

The first law is concerning offering peace to all; which law is general and common as well to the Canaanites as to foreign nations: "When thou comest nigh unto a city to fight against it, then proclaim peace unto it. And it shall be, if it make thee answer of peace, then it shall be that all the people that is found therein shall be tributaries unto thee, and they shall serve thee." Which commandment was afterward observed by Israel; of whom we read, "That when Israel

¹ Dr Forbesse, *ibid.*, sect. 3.

² In Jos. ix. 19.

³ *Com. in Jos. ix.*

was strong, they put the Canaanites to tribute, and did not utterly drive them out," Josh. xvii. 13; Judges i. 28: by Solomon also, who did not cut off the people that were left of the Hittites and the Amorites, but only made them to pay tribute, 2 Chron. vii. 7, 8. That which I say is further confirmed by another place, Josh. xi. 19, 20, where it is said, "There was not a city that made peace with the children of Israel save the Hivites, the inhabitants of Gibeon; all other they took in battle. For it was of the Lord to harden their hearts, that they should come against Israel in battle, that he might destroy them utterly, and that they might have no favour; but that he might destroy them, as the Lord commanded Moses." From which words it appeareth, that if the Canaanites had made peace with the children of Israel, they were to show them favour; and that they were bound by the commandment of the Lord to destroy them, then only, and in that case, if they would not accept peace, but make war; whence it cometh, that the cause of the destruction of the Canaanites is imputed to their own hardness and contumacy in not accepting of peace, and not to any commandment which God had given to Israel for destroying them. In a word, it was *voluntas signi*, which, in one place, Deut. xx. 10, showed the Israelites what was their duty, namely, to offer peace to all, even to the Canaanites, and not to cut them off if they should accept the peace; but it was *voluntas beneplaciti*, which, as we read in another place, Deut. vii. 2, decreed to deliver the Canaanites before the Israelites, that is, to harden their hearts to come against them in battle, and so to overrule the matter, by a secret and inscrutable providence, that the Israelites might lawfully and should certainly destroy them and show them no mercy. Even as that same God who, by one word, showed unto Abraham what was his duty, bidding him offer up his son Isaac, Gen. xxii. 2, by another word signified unto him what he had decreed to be done, forbidding him to lay his hand upon the lad, or to do anything unto him, ver. 12. But this, I know, will be very unsavoury language to many Arminianised conformitants.

The other law of war which Junius, upon Deut. xx., observeth, prescribed to the Israelites how they should deal with them who refused their peace. And here only was the difference made betwixt the cities which

were very far off and the cities of the Canaanites, Deut. xx. 15, 16; but the first law was common, as hath been proven.

Joseph Hall seemeth to deny that the oath of the princes of Israel had any power to bind, but upon another ground than Dr Forbesse took to himself. "It would seem very questionable (saith Hall) whether Joshua needed to hold himself bound to this oath; for fraudulent conventions oblige not; and Israel had put in a direct caveat of their vicinity."

Ans. I marvel how it could enter in his mind to think this matter questionable, since the violation of that oath was afterwards punished with three years' famine, 2 Sam. xxi. 1, 2. Yet let us hearken to his reasons. One of them is forged; for the princes of Israel who swore unto them put in no caveat at all. The text saith only in the general, that they swear unto them, Josh. ix. 15. As touching his other reason, it is answered by Calvin,¹ *Juris jurandi religio*, saith he, *cumque sancta apud nos esse debet, ne erroris prætextu à pactis discedamus, etiam in quibus fuimus decepti.* Which, that it may be made more plain unto us, let us, with the Casuists, distinguish a twofold error in swearing.² For if the error be about the very substance of the thing (as when a man contracts marriage with one particular person, taking her to be another person) the oath bindeth not; but if the error be only about some extrinsic or accidental circumstance (such as was the error of the Israelites' taking the Gibeonites to dwell afar off when they dwelt at hand), the oath ceaseth not to bind.

Sect. 6. This much being said for the binding power of that oath of the church of Scotland, let us now consider what shifts our opposites use to elude our argument which we draw from the same; where, first, there occurreth to us one ground which the Bishop of Edinburgh doth everywhere beat upon in the trace of this argument, taken out of the 21st article of the Confession of Faith, wherein we find these words: "Not that we think that any policy and an order in ceremonies can be appointed for all ages, times, and places; for as ceremonies, such as men have devised, are but temporal, so may and ought they to be changed when they foster rather superstition than that

¹ Contempl., lib. 8, of the Gibeon.

² *Com. in Jos. ix.*

³ Ames., lib. 4, de Conse., cap. 22, quest. 9.

they edify the kirk using the same:" whereupon the Bishop concludeth,¹ that none who swear the aforesaid article could, without breach of this oath, swear that the ceremony of sitting at the receiving of the sacrament could be appointed for all ages, times, and places.

Ans. None of us denieth that article: we all stand to it. For that which it pronounceth of ceremonies must be understood of alterable circumstances, unto which the name of ceremonies is but generally and improperly applied, as we have showed elsewhere;² neither can we, for professing ourselves bound by an oath ever to retain sitting at the receiving of the sacrament in this national church of Scotland, be therefore thought to transgress the said article.

For, 1. The article speaketh of ceremonies devised by men, whereof sitting at the sacrament is none, being warranted (as hath been showed) by Christ's own example, and not by man's device.

2. The article speaketh of such ceremonies as rather foster superstition than edify the church using the same; whereas it is well known that sitting at the communion did never yet foster superstition in this church; so that the Bishop did very unadvisedly reckon sitting at the communion among those ceremonies whereof the article speaketh.

Sect. 7. But the Bishop hath a further aim, and attempteth no less than both to put the blot of perjury off himself and his fellows, and likewise to rub it upon us, telling us,³ "That no man did by the oath oblige himself to obey and defend that part of discipline which concerneth these alterable things all the days of his life, but only that discipline which is unchangeable and commanded in the word. Yea (saith he), we further affirm, that every man who swears to the discipline of the church in general, by virtue of the oath standeth obliged, not only to obey and defend the constitution of the church that was in force at the time of making his oath, but also to obey and defend whatsoever the church thereafter hath ordained, or shall ordain, &c., whether thereby the former constitution be established or altered," &c. The same answer doth Dr Forbess also return us.⁴

¹ Part 2, p. 5.

² Supra, part 3, cap. 7, sect. 5.

³ Ubi supra, p. 16.

⁴ Iren., lib. 1, cap. 7, sect. 3, 4, 6.

Ans. 1. Here is a manifest contradiction; for the Bishop saith that every man did, by this oath, oblige himself only to obey and defend that discipline which is unchangeable and commanded in the word. And yet again he seemeth to import (that which Dr Forbess plainly avoucheth¹), that every man obliged himself by the same oath to obey and defend all that the church should afterwards ordain, though thereby the former constitutions be altered. The Bishop doth, therefore, apparently contradict himself; or, at the best, he contradicteth his fellow-pleader for the ceremonies.

2. That ancient discipline and policy of this church which is contrary to the articles of Perth, and whereunto we are bound by the oath, was well grounded upon God's word, and therefore should not have been ranked among other alterable things.

3. Whereas the Bishop is of opinion that a man may, by his oath, tie himself to things which a church shall afterwards ordain, he may consider, that such an oath were unlawful, because not sworn in judgment, Jer. iv. 2. Now this judgment which is required as one of the inseparable companions of a lawful oath, is not *executio justitiae*, but *judicium discretionis*, as Thomas teacheth;² whom Bullinger and Zanchius³ do herein follow. But there is no judgment of discretion in his oath who swears to that he knows not what, even to that which may fall out as readily wrong as right.

4. Whereas the Bishop and the Doctor allege that every man who swears to the discipline of this church standeth obliged to obey all that the church ordained afterward, they greatly deceive themselves.

For, 1. The discipline spoken of in the promissory part of the oath must be the same which was spoken of in the assertory part. Now that which is mentioned in the assertory part cannot be imagined to be any other but that which was then presently used in this church at the time of giving the oath; for an assertory oath⁴ is either of that which is past or of that which is present: and the assertory part of the oath whereof we speak was not of any discipline past and away, therefore of that which was present. Moreover, Thomas⁵ doth rightly put this

¹ Ibid., sect. 4, 6.

² Aquin., 2a., 2ae., quest. 49, art. 3.

³ Zanch. in 3 un. Praec., p. 599.

⁴ Pelau. Synt. Theol., lib. 9, cap. 23, p. 802; Zanchius in 3 un. Praec., p. 599.

⁵ Aquin., 2a., 2ae., quest. 89, art. 9.

difference betwixt an assertory and a promissory oath, that the matter of a promissory oath is a thing to come, which is alterable, as concerning the event. *Materia autem juramenti assertorii, quod est de praeterito vel praesenti, in quendam necessitatem jam transit, et immutabilis facta est.* Since, then, the discipline spoken of in the assertory part was no other than that which was used in this church when the oath was sworn; and since the promissory part is illative upon, and relative unto the matter of the assertory part; therefore we conclude the discipline spoken of in the promissory part could be no other than that which was then presently used in this church at the swearing of the oath.

2. Since the doctrine mentioned in that oath is said to have been professed openly by the King's Majesty, and the whole body of this realm, before the swearing of the same, why should we not likewise understand the discipline mentioned in the oath to be that which was practised in this realm before the swearing of the same?

3. This is further proved by the word *continuing*. We are sworn to continue in the obedience of the doctrine and discipline of this church; but how can men be said to continue in the obedience of any other discipline than that which they have already begun to obey? This the Bishop seems to have perceived, for he speaks only of defending and obeying, but not of continuing to obey, which is the word of the oath, and which proveth the discipline there spoken of and sworn to be no other than that which was practised in the church when the oath was sworn. 4. Whilst we hold that he who sweareth to the present discipline of a church, is not by virtue of this oath obliged to obey all which that church shall ordain afterward, both the school and the canon law do speak for us. The school teacheth, that *canonicus qui jurat se servaturum statuta edita in aliquo collegio, non tenetur ex juramento ad servandum futura*; the canon law judgeth, that *qui jurat servare statuta edita, &c., non tenetur ex juramento ad noviter edita*.²

Sect. 8. But we are more folly to consider that ground whereby the Bishop thinketh to purge himself, and those of his sect, of the breach of the oath. He still allegeth,³ that

¹ Aquin., ubi supra, quest. 48, art. 2.

² Dctr. Greg., lib. 2, tit. 24, cap. 35.

³ Ubi supra, p. 9.

the points of discipline for which we contend are not contained in the matter of the oath. Now, as touching the discipline of this church which is spoken of in the oath, he questioneth what is meant by it.¹

Ans. 1. Put the case, it were doubtful and questionable what is meant by the word discipline in the oath; yet *pars tutior* were to be chosen. The Bishop nor no man among us can certainly know, that the discipline meant and spoken of in the oath by those that swear it, comprehendeth not under it those points of discipline which we now contend, and which this church had in use at the swearing of the oath. Shall we, then, put the breach of the oath in a fair hazard? God forbid; for, as Joseph Hall² noteth from the example of Joshua and the princes, men may not trust to shifts for the eluding of an oath. Surely the fear of God's name should make us tremble at an oath, and to be far from adventuring upon any such shifts.

2. The Bishop doth but needlessly question what is meant by the discipline whereof the oath speaketh; for howsoever in ecclesiastical use it signify oftentimes that policy which standeth in the censuring of manners, yet in the oath it must be taken in the largest sense, namely, for the whole policy of the church; for, 1. The whole policy of this church did at that time go under the name of discipline;³ and those two books wherein this policy is contained were called *The Books of Discipline*. And, without all doubt, they who swore the oath meant by discipline that whole policy of the church which is contained in those books. Howbeit (as the preface of them sheweth) discipline doth also comprehend other ecclesiastical ordinances and constitutions which are not inserted in them. 2. Doctrine and discipline, in the oath, do comprehend all that to which the church required, and we promised, to perform obedience; therefore the whole policy of the church was meant by discipline, inasmuch as it was not comprehended under doctrine.

Sect. 9. The Bishop⁴ objecteth three limitations, whereby he thinketh to seclude from the matter of the oath that policy and discipline which we plead for.

¹ Ibid., p. 12.

² Ubi supra.

³ Zanchius giveth the name of ecclesiastical discipline to the rights and policy of the church and laws made thereunto in 4 Praec., col. 763.

⁴ Ubi supra, p. 10.

First, he saith, that the matter of the oath is the doctrine and discipline revealed to the world by the gospel, and that this limitation excludeth all ecclesiastical constitutions which are not expressly or by a necessary consequence contained in the written word.

2. That the matter of the oath is the doctrine and discipline which is received, believed and defended, by many notable churches, &c., and that this limitation excludeth all these things wherein the church of Scotland hath not the consent of many notable churches, &c.

3. That the doctrine and discipline which is the matter of the oath, is particularly expressed in the Confession of Faith, &c., and that in this confession of faith, established by parliament, there is no mention made of the articles controverted, &c.

Ans. I might here show how he confoundeth the preaching of the evangel with the written word; likewise how falsely he affirmeth, that the points of discipline for which we plead, are neither warranted by the Scripture nor by the consent of many notable churches. But to the point: These words of the oath, "We believe, &c., that this is the only true Christian faith and religion, pleasing God, and bringing salvation to man, which now is by the mercy of God revealed to the world by the preaching of the blessed evangel, and received, believed and defended, by many and sundry notable kirks and realms, but chiefly by the kirk of Scotland, the King's Majesty, and three Estates, &c., as more particularly expressed in the Confession of our Faith, &c." are altogether perverted by the Bishop; for there is no discipline spoken of in these words, but afterward. Why, then, talks he of a discipline revealed to the world by the gospel, having the consent of many notable churches, and expressed in the Confession of Faith? And if the Bishop will have any discipline to be meant of in these words, he must comprehend it under the Christian faith and religion, which bringeth salvation unto man. But this he cannot do with so much as the least show of reason. Thus put we an end to the argument taken from the oath of God, wishing every man amongst us, out of the fear of God's glorious and fearful name, duly to regard and ponder the same.

CHAPTER IX.

A RECAPITULATION OF SUNDRY OTHER REASONS AGAINST THE INDIFFERENCY OF THE CEREMONIES.

Sect. 1. That the ceremonies are not indifferent to us, or such things as we may freely practise, we prove yet by other reasons:

For, 1. They who plead for the indifference of the ceremonies must tell us whether they call them indifferent *in actu signato*, or *in actu exercito*; or in both these respects. Now, we have proven,¹ that there is no action deliberated upon, and wherein we proceed with the advice of reason, which can be indifferent *in actu exercito*, and that because it cannot choose, but either have all the circumstances which it should have (and so be good), or else want some of them, one or more (and so be evil). And for the indifference of the ceremonies *in actu signato*, though we should acknowledge it (which we do not), yet it could be no warrant for the practice of them, or else the believing Gentiles might have freely eaten of all meats, notwithstanding of the scandal of the Jews, for the eating of all meats freely was still a thing indifferent, *in actu signato*.

Sect. 2. The ceremonies are not indifferent *eo ipso*, that they are prescribed and commended unto us as indifferent; for, as Aquinas² resolveth out of Isidore, every human or positive law must be both *necessaria ad remotionem malorum* and *utilis ad consecutionem bonorum*. The guides of God's church have not power to prescribe any other thing than that which is good and profitable for edifying; for they are set not as lords over Christ's inheritance, but as ministers for their good: "It seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us, (say the apostles and elders to the churches,) to lay upon you no greater burden than these necessary things," Acts xv. 28. They would not, you see, have enacted a canon about those things, howbeit indifferent in their own nature, had they not found them necessary for the eschewing of scandal. And as for the civil magistrate, he also hath not power to prescribe any thing which he pleaseth,

¹ Supra, cap. 3.

² Aquin., 1a, 2ae, quest. 95, art. 3.

though it be in itself indifferent; "for he is the minister of God unto thee for good," saith the Apostle, Rom. xiii. 4. Mark that word, *for good*,—it lets us see that the magistrate hath not power given him to enjoin any other thing than that which may be for our good. *Non enim sua causa dominantur*, saith Calvin;¹ *sed publico bono; neque effræni potentia præditi sunt, sed quæ subditorum salutis sit obstricta*. Now, the first and chief good which the magistrate is bound to see for unto the subjects, is (as Pareus sheweth²), *bonum spirituale*. Let us, then, either see the good of the ceremonies, or else we must account them to be such things as God never gave princes nor pastors power to enjoin; for howsoever they have power to prescribe many things which are indifferent, that is to say, neither good nor evil in their general nature, yet they may not command us to practise any thing which in the particular use of it is not necessary or expedient for some good end.

3. The ceremonies are not indifferent, because, notwithstanding that they are prescribed and commended unto us as things in themselves indifferent, yet we are by the will and authority of men compelled and necessitated to use them. *Si vero ad res suo natura mediis accedat coactio*, &c., then, say the Magdeburgians.³ Paul teacheth, Col. ii., that it is not lawful to use them freely: "If ye be dead with Christ from the rudiments of the world, why, as though living in the world, are ye subject to ordinances (touch not, taste not, handle not, which are all to perish with the using), after the commandments and doctrines of men." Hence is Tertullian taxed⁴ for inducing a necessity in things indifferent. Now, with how great necessity and co-action the ceremonies are imposed upon us, we have made it evident elsewhere.⁵

Sect. 4. 4. Whatever be the quality of the ceremonies in their own nature, they are not indifferent to us; neither may we freely practice them, because Papists make advantage of them, and take occasion from them to confirm sundry of their errors and superstitions, as we have likewise elsewhere made evident.⁶ Now, *cum adiaphora rapiuntur*

ad confessionem, libera esse desinunt, saith the Harmony of Confessions.¹ Mark *rapiuntur*. Though they get no just occasion, yet, if they take occasion, though unjustly, that is enough to make us abstain from things indifferent. *Etiam ea*, saith Balduine,² *quæ natura sunt sua liberæ observationis, in statu confessionis, cum ab adversariis eorum mutatio postulat, fiunt necessaria*.

Sect. 5. 5. Things which are most indifferent in themselves become evil in the case of scandal, and so may not be used. So hold the Century writers;³ so Pareus;⁴ so Zanchius;⁵ so Chemnitius;⁶ so Augustine;⁷ and so hath the Apostle taught.⁸ But that out of the practice of the ceremonies there groweth active scandal unto the weak, we have most clearly proven.⁹ Wherefore, let them be in their own nature as indifferent as anything can be, yet they are not indifferent to be used and practised by us; and whosoever swalloweth this scandal of Christ's little ones, and repenteth not, the heavy millstone of God's dreadful wrath shall be hanged about his neck, to sink him down in the bottomless lake; and then shall he feel that which before he would not understand.

Sect. 6. 6. It is not enough for warrant of our practice that we do these things which are indifferent or lawful in themselves, except they be also expedient to be done by us according to the Apostle's rule, 1 Cor. vi. 12. But I have proven that many and weighty inconveniences do follow upon the ceremonies,¹⁰ as namely, that they make way and are the ushers for greater evils; that they hinder edification, and in their fleshly show and outward splendour, obscure and prejudice the life and power of godliness; that they are the unhappy occasions of much injury and cruelty against the faithful servants of Christ, that they were belovely to blow up, and are still fuel to increase the church-consuming fire of woeful dissensions amongst us, &c. Where also we show,¹¹ that some of our opposites themselves acknowledgo the inconveniency of the cere-

¹ Apud Park. of the Cross, cap. 3, sect. 6.

² De Cas. Consc., lib. 4, cap. 11, cas. 3.

³ Cent. 1, lib. 2, cap. 4, col. 441.

⁴ Com. in Rom. xiv., dub. 1.

⁵ De Imag., p. 390.

⁶ Exam., part 1, p. 179.

⁷ Epist. 86, ad Casulam.

⁸ 1 Cor. viii. 8, 9.

⁹ Supra, part 2, cap. 9.

¹⁰ Supra, cap. 1.

¹¹ Ibid., cap. 1.

¹ Com. in illam locum.

² Com., ibid.

³ Cent. 3, cap. 4, col. 86.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Supra, part 1, cap. 3, 4.

⁶ Supra, part 1, cap. 6, 9, sect. 4.

monies; wherefore we cannot freely nor indifferently practise them.

Sect. 7. 7. These ceremonies are the accursed monuments of popish superstition, and have been both dedicated unto and employed in the public and solemn worship of idols, and therefore (having no necessary use for which we should still retain them) they ought to be utterly abolished, and are not left free nor indifferent to us, which argument I have also made good elsewhere,¹ and in this place I only add, that both Jerome,² Zanchius, and Amandus Polanus,³ do apply this argument to the surplice, holding, that though it be in itself indifferent, yet *quia in cultu idololatriæ veste lineæ utuntur clerici papæ, et in ea non parum sanctimonice ponunt superstitiosi homines; valedicendum est, non solum cultui idololatriæ, sed etiam omnibus idololatriæ monumentis, instrumentis et administrulis.* Yea, Joseph Hall himself, doth herein give testimony unto us, for upon Hezekiah's pulling down of the brazen serpent, because of the idolatrous abuse of it, thus he noteth:⁴ "God commanded the raising of it, God commanded the abolishing of it. Superstitious use can mar the very institutions of God, how much more the most wise and well-grounded devices of men! And further, in the end of this treatise, entitled, *The Honour of the Married Clergy*, he adjoineth a passage taken out of the epistle of Erasmus Roterodamus to Christopher, Bishop of Basil, which passage beginneth thus: "For those things which are altogether of human constitution must (like to remedies in diseases) be attuned to the present estate of matters and times. Those things which were once religiously instituted, afterwards, according to occasion, and the changed quality of manners and times, may be with more religion and piety abrogated." Finally, If Hezekiah be praised for breaking down the brazen serpent (though instituted by God) when the Israelites began to abuse it against the honour of God, how much more (saith Zanchius⁵) are our reformers to be praised, for that they did thus with rites instituted by men, being found full of superstitious abuse, though in themselves they had not been evil!

Sect. 8. 8. The ceremonies are not indifferent, because they depart too far from the example of Christ and his apostles, and the purer times of the church; for instead of that ancient Christian-like and soul-edifying simplicity, religion is now by their means busked with the vain trumpery of Babylonish trinkets, and her face covered with the whorish and eye-bewitching fairing of fleshly show and splendour; and I have also showed particularly¹ how sundry of the ceremonies are flat contrary to the example of Christ and his apostles and the best times.

Sect. 9. 9. The ceremonies make us also to conform, and like the idolatrous Papists, whereas it is not lawful to symbolise with idolaters, or to be like them in a ceremony of man's devising, or anything which hath no necessary use in religion; such a distance and a dissimilitude there is required to be betwixt the church of Christ and the synagogue of Satan; betwixt the temple of God and the kingdom of the beast; betwixt the company of sound believers and the conventicles of heretics who are without; betwixt the true worshippers of God and the worshippers of idols, that we cannot, without being accessory to their superstitious and false religion, and partaking with the same, appear conform unto them in their unnecessary rites and ceremonies. Durandus tells us,² that they call Easter by the Greek and not by the Hebrew name, and that they keep not that feast upon the same day with the Jews, and all for this cause, lest they should seem to Judaize. How much more reason have we to abstain from the ceremonies of the church of Rome lest we seem to Romanise! But I say no more in this place, because I have hertofore confirmed this argument at length.³

Sect. 10. 10. The ceremonies, as urged upon us, are also full of superstition; holiness and worship are placed in them, as we have proven by unanswerable grounds,⁴ and by testimonies of our opposites themselves. Therefore were they never so indifferent in their own general nature, this placing of them in the state of worship maketh them cease to be indifferent.

Sect. 11. 11. The ceremonies against which we dispute are more than matters of

¹ Supra, part 3, cap. 2.

² Lib. 1, de Cult. Dei Extern., col. 46.

³ Synt. Theol., lib. 9, cap. 38.

⁴ Lib. 7, Contempl. of the Brazen Serpent.

⁵ Com. in Eph. v.; de Bapt., cap. 7.

¹ Supra, cap. 5—7; part 1, cap. 8, 9, sect. 2; part 3, cap. 1, sect. 3, 4, 5, 28; part 2, cap. 9, sect. 14.

² Ration., lib. 6, tit. de Die Sanct. Pasch.

³ Supra, part 3, cap. 3.

⁴ Supra, part 3, cap. 1.

mere order, forasmuch as sacred and mysterious significations are given unto them, and by their significations they are thought to teach men effectually sundry mysteries and duties of piety. Therefore they are not free nor indifferent, but more than men have power to institute; for except circumstances and matters of mere order there is nothing which concerneth the worship of God left to the determination of men, and this argument also hath been in all the parts of it fully explained and strengthened by us,¹ which strongly proveth that the ceremonies are not indifferent, so much as *quo ad speciem.* Quare doctrina à nobis tradita (these be Zanchius' words²) *non licere nobis, aliis externi cultus ceremoniis Deum colere, quam quas ipse in sacris literis per apostolis præscripsit, firma ac certa manet.*

Sect. 12. 12. Whatsoever indifferency

¹ Supra, part 3, cap. 5, 6, sect. 3, 7; sect. 5, 10—14.

² De Cult. Dei Extern., col. 494.

the ceremonies could be thought to have in their own nature, yet if it be considered how the church of Scotland hath once been purged from them, and hath spued them out with detestation, and hath enjoyed the comfortable light and sweet beams of the glorious and bright shining gospel of Christ, without shadows and figures, then shall it appear that there is no indifferency in turning back to weak and beggarly elements, Gal. v. 9. And thus saith Calvin¹ of the ceremonies of the *interim*, that granting they were things in themselves indifferent, yet the restitution of them in those churches which were once purged from them, is no indifferent thing. Wherefore, O Scotland! "strengthen the things which remain, that are ready to die," Rev. iii. 2. Remember also from whence thou art fallen, and repent, and do the first works; or else thy candlestick will be quickly removed out of his place, except thou repent, Rev. ii. 5.

¹ Calv. Epist. et Resp., col. 119.

THE END.

ERRATA.—Page 10, line 3, col. 1, for *for read cor.* Ibid., col. 2, line 19, for *Legem humanam read Legem humanam.* Ibid., line 20, for *refertur read altera.* Page 13, col. 1, line 20, for *paratipet read præscribit.*